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Abstract
Iran has been called the oldest of the "new nations,"
a distinction reflecting not only its lengthy history and
venerable culture, but also its impressive successes in
avoiding the status of a European colony. In recent years,
Iran has augmented this reputation as her remarkable politi-
cal continuity has set the stage for rapid economic growth
and social development. This thesis seeks to analyze the
political bases of these changes and, in turn, the effects
of those changes on the political process in Iran.
The basic assumption on which this thesis is based is
that the attitudes and behaviors of powerful individuals in
societies whose political process is less institutionalized
within the formal structures of government are valid guides
to political change. Operating on such an assumption, this
thesis examines the course of recent political development
in Iran by analyzing its political elite. Using a two stage
reputational analysis, 307 members of the most politically
powerful individuals in Iran were identified. Ultimately,
167 of the elite were interviewed with a lengthy survey
instrument comprising some 450 items.
The data so derived were divided into three categories:
social background information, general character orientations,
and political and social attitudes. Each group of data were
subject to separate factor analyses. Four principal charac-
ter orientations were produced and labelled insecurity, mis-
trust, cynicism, and exploitation. Five political attitu-
dinal factors were labelled xenophobia, social disdain,
populist, reduced government role, and orientation to the
Shah. Finally, five social background factors were produced:
age, activity, foreign exposure, mass media consumption and
status.
The character orientations were assumed to be inter-
vening variables between the social background factors and
the political attitudes. These intervening variables serve
as the linkage between the socializing experiences of youth
and adulthood and the attitudes of the adult towards politics.
Over two hundred separate multiple regression analyses support
this assumption. In virtually every case, the general
character orientations were more efficient predictors of
political attitudes than were the social background factors
singly or in combination.
Thus the character orientations were viewed as central
to an analysis of Iranian politics insofar as those politics
are elaborated by the elite. But these orientations them-
selves fell into two groups. When the loadings for the
character orientation factors were subjected to oblique
rather than orthogonal rotations, higher levels of insecurity,
mistrust, and cynicism were all statistically associated
with each other and with lower levels of exploitation (and
vice versa). Not only did the elite tend to fall into two
separate groups on the basis of these orientations, but
distinct social background factors were associated with each
group. Basically, the greater the immersion in Iranian
politics (as measured by power, position, status, age) and
the greater the foreign exposure (foreign travel and resi-
dence, education), the more likely are the respondents to
demonstrate insecurity, cynincism and mistrust. On the other
hand, those respondents who are the most isolated from the
vagaries of the political process manifest low scores on
these factors but higher scores on interpersonal exploitation.
In turn, these two groupings of factors are statistically
associated with certain political attitudes. The greater the
scores on the cluster of the three factors, the greater the
xenophobia, social discain, elitism, and the lesser the
orientation to the Shah. Of significance for this analysis is
that these orientations of insecurity and cynicism and mistrust
are hallmarks of the political system as are their concomitant
political attitudes.
But the keystone of the entire political system remains
to be mentioned. His Imperial Majesty, Mohammad Reza Pahlevi,
Shahanshah, gives life and order to the politics of Iran.
His style of rule. serves to reinforce and shape the general
orientations of the political elite. What the Shah does, how
he interacts with his elite and how their orientations, atti-
tudes, and behavior, in turn, feedback to limit the freedom of
the Shah, constitute the essence of politics in Iran, a
politics characterized by high costs and gross inefficiencies;
all of which serve to limit political development in Iran.
PREFACE
Recent years have witnessed a remarkable convergence in
formerly disparate disciplines and distant geographical areas.
Concern for the fate of that two-thirds of the world's popula-
tion living in dire poverty was occasioned by the emergence of
those nations from colonialism to independence and the growth
of the United States and then the Soviet Union to 'super-powers"
whose interests, always extending beyond their boundaries, now
became truly international. Into these new and little under-
stood waters ventured social scientists whose intellectual
concerns could be useful for both facilitating the moderniza-
tion of these "new nations" and formulating the foreign
diplomatic and aid policies of their own nations.
Where the anthropologist had long studied went the
economists, followed by political scientists, sociologists,
and psychologists, The early works on development were quick
to indicate that no one of these disciplines could offer a
satisfactory answer to what proved the devilishly complicated
problems of "underdevelopment," or "development," as it is
now more fashionably conceived. Interdisciplinary studies
were called for and then undertaken, not only intraculturally,
but, in increasing number, inter-culturally as well.
It is in this latter stream that this work most neatly
fits,, Concerned with the course of political development in
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4one of the oldest of the "new"t nations, it is predicated on
the assumption that the "political" concerns the inter-
relationships of people. And to understand and analyze those
interrelationships, we must consider not only the form of
government, the political institutions, and the ideologies,
but also the attitudes and values of the political actors,
the norms of the culture, and the structure of the social
system. For all affect, in varying degree, the very inter-
relations which constitute politics, the political process,
and political development.
In this work, no attempt will be made to attribute
responsibility for either the political successes or the
failures of the system under investigation. Nor are sides
taken in a political system whose partisan battle lines have
long since been drawn. Rather, we seek to understand and
generalize, to analyze and explicate the lessons for students
of political development which can be drawn from an inter-
disciplinary approach to but one political system. At the
same time, however, it is also hoped that the lessons of this
political system will be noted, For the contribution which
this study was designed to offer was for those social scien-
tists who seek to formulate and refine theories which will
enhance, initially, our understanding of the processes of
development and assist, ultimately, in facilitating such
development. But to use this work to leap from the first of
these purposes to the second, to seek its relevance in the
virulent politics which occasionally characterize its subject,
5is both premature and unwise. If this study but fulfills the
former of these dual aims, it will be counted as a success by
its author.
But no work of this kind ever has but a single author.
The contributions of others, both material, intellectual, and
emotional, are never slight and collectively may exceed those
of the writer himself. For the material assistance without
which neither the research nor the analysis on which this study
is based could have been accomplished, I acknowledge with
gratitude a Research Training Fellowship of the Social Science
Research Council, held from 1963 to 1965, and supplemental
grants from the Carnegie Corporation, the College Faculty
Research Fund and the Social Sciences Faculty Research Fund,
both of the University of Chicago.
The intellectual contributors to this work are varied
and numerous. Professors Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool,
Lucian W. Pye, and especially Frederick W. Frey of the Depart-
ment of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology all served as my mentors. But more importantly,
they transmitted a sense of the excitement of intellectual
inquiry at the frontiers of the social sciences and provided
me with tools which I would require to conduct my own explora-
tions. Professor Robert A. LeVine of the Department of
Anthropology of the University of Chicago was particularly
helpful in the later stages of the work, when the data were
voluminous and order had to be established in that informa-
tional chaos which only the computer can generate. For that
6chaos and the hours of tedious and laborious work which gene-
rated the data processing on which this study is based, Howard
Rotblat, Department of Sociology, The University of Chicago,
is responsible. The counsel of Frank Bamberger and Allan
Herzog of that University's Computation Center is also grate-
fully acknowledged.
For all these, there would have been no project without
the research opportunities so graciously offered me in Iran
and the cooperation of the many hundreds of Iranians who par-
ticipated in the project. The most important of these were
the 170 respondents who subjected themselves to an aggressive
and often brash foreign researcher, To spare them the embar-
rassment which might result from their being singled out,
suffice it to acknowledge here my appreciation. But none of
these interviews would have been carried out in the absence of
official cooperation and Royal assent. His Imperial Majesty,
Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, Shahanshah, made that available with
speed and kingly grace. His willingness to welcome foreign
scholars is both courageous and laudable. To identify but one
other Iranian whose intellectual integrity and training were
perpetually at my service, I wish to thank Dr. Iraj Ayman,
Director, Institute for Educational Research and Studies of
the National Teachers' College in Tehran. If Iran is to take
its place with the nations of the West, it will be through the
national devotion and toil of men like him.
Finally, I come to the only source of support whose
contributions were never limited, never uni-dimensional, and
7never unnecessary: my wife, Ella Zonis. Without her aid,
this project would still be just that, a project.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Iran has been called the oldest of the "new Nations,"
a distinction accurately reflecting not only its lengthy
history and venerable culture, but also its impressive suc-
cessesin avoiding the status of a European colony. In recent
years, Iran has augmented this reputation as her remarkable
political continuity has set the stage for rapid economic
growth and social development.
Iran's ruling monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi,
acceded to the throne in 1941 amidst foreign occupation,
economic disintegration, and savage attacks on the twenty-
year rule of his father, Reza Shah. Since those chaotic days,
the present Shah has made a series of attempts to establish
solid bases of political support. During the years following
his accession, his relatively insecure throne primarily de-
pended on the graces of the British and Russians who had
deposed his father. Supported by these foreign powers and
many of the elite who had served the ex-monarch, the Shah
reconstructed his defeated army. With his civil and military
elites, the Shah continued to maintain a tenuous grip on the
throne after the withdrawal of the British and American troops,
who had joined the occupiers in 1942, and the ultimate with-
drawal of the Soviets after the collapse of their ill-fated
"autonomous" People's Republics of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan,
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An abortive assassination attempt in 1949 and the near
overthrow of the Shah by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh
(1951-1953) gave testimony to the ethereal nature of this
coalition of civil and military elites, But following Mossa-
degh's overthrow and the Shah's return to the throne after a
hasty exile to Italy in 1953, kingly power was regained by an
almost solitary reliance on the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.
For despite the efforts of Mossadegh and the Iranian Communist
Party, the Tudeh, the Shah had never totally lost control over
the military, a control which was then augmented by a bur-
geoning program of U.S. technical and military assistance,
Using the power of the military, the king extirpated
Tudeh supporters within the ranks of the officer corps of his
army, He then turned to eliminating the Tudeh throughout Iran
and subduing the most ardent partisans of Mossadegh. The most
threatening of his opponents being neutralized, the Shah
began to experiment with new forms of control, From 1957 to
1960, a Royally chartered and directed two-party system was
created. But its "tweedle-dum, tweedle-dee" character failed
to provide a meaningful channel of political expression, The
debacle of the two elections for the twentieth session of the
parliament in 1960-1961--a debacle which resulted in the
dissolution the Majles until new elections were held in the
fall of 1963--testified to the bankruptcy of the two politi-
cal parties,.
The monarch's response to the political turmoil fol-
lowing the closing of the parliament, while unexpected, was
17
not atypical. He answered his increasingly vocal opposition
by liberalizing political life. A P Minister known
to be suspicious of the Royal prerogatives, independent minis-
ters, and an easing of censorship all followed. By 1963, the
Shah launched a new experiment. He appealed for support
directly to the masses through his Six-Point Reform Program
and a National Referendum. With the almost universal popular
support which these moves generated, the Shah once again
turned to narrowing the limits of acceptable political behavior.
In 1964, he gave official support to a single political party
encompassing all of the elite he classed as "progressive."
Building on his increased control over the political
life of his nation, the Shah then began to lessen and, finally,
virtually to eliminate his reliance on the United States. What
had initially been an absolutely necessary basis for main-
taining control, had by mid-1960 become a burden with its
implications of neo-imperialism and foreign subservience.
A new set of commercial and aid treaties with communist states
were contracted and these new diplomatic and economic rela-
tions were capped by a military aid pact with the Soviet
Union in 1967.
Now, at last, the throne appears secure. Organized
internal opposition has been decimated, while even the ex-
pression of anti-regime sentiment is absent. International
support for the Shah's rule has been broadened to include not
only the United States and its Western allies, but also the
18
U.S.S.R. and other communist nations as well. With a firm
grasp over the political process, the Shah has devoted himself
and Iran's continually increasing oil income to internal
development. A mounting gross national product, social re-
forms, educational development, land distribution, and even a
massive program of heavy industries have been the rewards.
But in the face of these widely admired triumphs, it
is generally agreed that Mohammad Reza Shah has not located
the majoritarian political base he has so ardently sought.
The general support of the masses exists, but such support
is an intangible base for Royal strength. The single party
remains an artificially nourished collectivity of office
seekers. Thus, the Shah maintains and continues to operate
the Iranian political system only by incurring substantial
political costs--costs which are largely determined by the
relationship of the Shahanshah to his political elite.
The basic assumption on which this study is based is
that the attitudes and behavior of powerful individuals in
societies whose political process is less institutionalized
within the formal structures of government are valid guides
to political change. Operating on such an assumption, this
thesis examines the course of recent political development
in Iran by analyzing its political elite.
The concept of the "political elite," as used in this
study, is an empirical, behavioral one. No attempt was made
on a priori grounds to equate the "political elite" with
holders of official positions in Iran's Government or social
19
structure. Rather, the political elite were defined as those
members of Iranian society, i.e., Iranian nationals,2 who
exercised and possessed political power to a greater degree
than other members of Iranian society.3 By power we mean "an
interpersonal relationship such that the behavior of one (or
more) actor(s) alters the behavior of another (other) actor(s).
By 'behavior' is meant any change in the state of an individual
from a given time to a later time."14 As Frey indicates,
several subordinate concepts relating to "power" must be
introduced. Two such concepts which are vital in this study
may be mentioned. The scope of a power relationship may be
considered " . . the set of behaviors of the influencee
altered by the influencer.0 5 The domain refers to "the set
of persons whose behavior . . . [the influencer] alters within
a given scope." 6 The "powerful," then, are those individuals
whose behavior alters the widest scope of the largest domain,
i.e.,, the widest range of behavior of the largest set of per-
sons within that society.
This definition does not yet sufficiently narrow our
interests, for with it the investigator would find himself
studying thespians, athletes, and others, who by being thes-
pians and athletes do manage to alter the behavior of sig-
nificant numbers of people. Rather we are interested in
political power, i.e., power exercised within the political
system.
The meaning and nature of "the political system" con-
tinues to be a matter of debate even for political scientists
20
whose legitimate concern it is considered to be. 7 For pur-
poses of research in Iran, the political system was considered
to be that pattern of interactions between actors seeking to
exercise power over the allocation of values at the most com-
prehensive level--the national, social system level.
Another problem which confronts the wary investigator
seeking to identify the "politically powerful" in Iran re-
lates to the persistence or longevity of patterns of power
interactions.8 An individual may be considered to exercise
substantial power in the society-wide political system. But
the power which that individual exercises may be a highly
transitory phenomenon. A second individual may exercise
power to a lesser extent, i.e., his power may be of a nar-
rower scope or smaller domain or he may exercise that power
over less'valued resources. But the lesser power of the
latter individual may have existed over a longer time period
than the greater power of the former actor. Or the lesser
power of the latter may be widely perceived as likely to be
efficacious for a longer period in the future than that of
the former. In such a case, the less immediately powerful
but politically longer-lived individual may be considered
more powerful for our purposes.9 The phenomenon of lasting
political power tends to be especially relevant for the
"behind-the-scenes" political manipulator or the archetypal
civil servant. Never attaining to high or visible position,
they nonetheless manage to exercise power continually.10
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The political elite of Iran, then, consists of those
Iranians who more or less persistently exercise power over
significant behaviors of large numbers of people with regard
to the allocation of highly prized values in the national
political system. Once defined, it became necessary to locate
these politically powerful individuals. Using a two-stage
attributional method (see Appendix I for a detailed account
of this procedure), 307 individuals were identified and
labelled the "political elite." In the process, however, it
became clear that to speak of a single political elite is,
in fact, a misreading of the realities of Iranian politics.
For the power attributed to one member of the general elite
was sufficient to merit assigning that individual to a cate-
gory distinct from and above his fellow members of the
political elite. We refer, of course, to His Imperial
Majesty, Mohammad Reza Pahlevi. The extraordinary power
which the Shah is able to wield vis a vis any other member
of the elite suggests that Iranian politics can most fruit-
fully be analyzed through separate but complementary inves-
tigations of the Shah on the one hand and the remainder of
the elite on the other,
The Iranian political process, then, constitutes a
system in which the two principal actors may be considered
as the Shah and his political elite. As the dominant poli-
tical actor, the decisions of the King directly affect the
political elite. But although unanticipated and frequently
undesired by the Shah, the behavior of the political elite
22
operates as an important influence on him. There is a feed-
back system at work in which the Shah and the elite, whose
makeup he has largely determined, interact and together
elaborate Iranian politics.
These very interactions between the Shah and his elite
and those among the elite themselves constitute the essence
of the political process in Iran. It is a major contention
of this study that a remarkably small set of significant
variables characterize these interpersonal relations. By
means of a factor analysis applied to data derived from elite
interviews, four principal attitudinal dimensions were un-
covered. They have been labelled political cynicism, per-
sonal mistrust, manifest insecurity, and interpersonal
exploitation. They are assumed to represent the general
characterological orientations which underlie elite politi-
cal behavior.
These general attitudes are not unknown to other
students of Iranian politics. Similar attitudes have been
ascribed to the Persians by Iranian and foreign observers
alike. Leonard Binder has described the means available to
those "who engaged in negative system challenging."11 "Silent
resistance" and "the refusal to believe" are two such tech-
niques. Professor Binder adds that the national complement
of such disbelief is "cynicism."12 It is our contention that
a cynicat response to one's environment is by no means re-
stricted to the opponents of the regime. Rather, the attitude
permeates the elite itself. An Iranian satirist captured
9
anyone really get more votes than you did?
A - There were many. All of them got more votes.
Q - Then how did you manage to get elected?
A - That was a miracle of the ballot box.
Q - Have you been a member of Parliament before?
A - No.
Q - Why?
A - Because they did not choose me.
Q - What parties have belonged to in the past,
and now?
A - As far as I recall I have been a member of all
sorts of parties. At the moment I am a member
of the Old Iran party, but I shall soon join the
Future Iran party.
Q - Why?
A - Because my experience has shown me that it would
be the right thing to do.
Q - What's wrong with the present party?
some of the essentials of this cynicism in an "interview"
with a mythical deputy to the lower house of the Parliament,
The interviewer is questioning Deputy Qurbanali (Ali, the
Sacrifice):
Q - What is the population of your constituency?
A - Ten thousand.
Q - How many votes did you get?
A - One hundred and fifty thousand.
Q - Don't you think there is some discrepancy here?
A - I do, but I was told to shut up.
Q - How many rival candidates were there? Did
A - Because the bills were presented by the Government.
Q - Are you saying that one should vote for any bill
presented by the Government?
A - Would you give a vote against them?
Q - What are the three most important events during
your term?
A - The first important event occurred when I was
sitting one day in my home, minding my own business
and wondering what kind of a job I should try for.
The radio suddenly announced in the news bulletin
that I had been elected a member of Parliament!
The second event was the day when the Parliament
voted an increase in our salaries to 70,000 rials
[$1,000] a month. 1 he third, when they gave us a
big housing grant.
As cynicism is a typical response of the Iranian elite
to the political process, so is its counterpart, mistrust,
typical of interpersonal relations. In discussing the place
of mistrust in Persian society, one foreigner noted:
Iranians claim that it is not that they basically are
distrustful or that they prefer the interpersonal
relations to be the way they are, but that since no
basis for altruistic trust exists in Iranian society,
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A - There is nothing wrong with it, but the Future
party has better prospects.
Q - How many times did you speak in the present term;
and what is the total length of your speeches?
A - I spoke as many times, and for as long, as the
speeches they gave me lasted.
Q - Who is "they"?
A - Don't you know?
Q - How many bills did you vote against and which
ones are they?
A - Well, . . . about none!
Q - Why?
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they can but respond accordingly to protect themselves;
or, as more than one Iranian has expressed himself on
the matter, "If I am trustful, I will only be taken
advantage of by others."14
But Iranians themselves put it more strongly. Two Tehran maga-
zines, Khandaniha and Khushe, printed a series of vitriolic
articles castigating Tehranis for their seeming indifference to
the reforms of the Shah and the implementation of those reforms
by the Civil Service. A third journal responded:
The people are not indifferent, they are distrustful.
If you want the truth, the people have lost confidence
in everybody and everything . . . .
This distrust beings with the people themselves.
People are no longer sure of their own ideas, beliefs,
attitudes, or even their decisions.
This distrust in oneself, gained through actual
experience, extends, naturally, to others too. They no
longer trust anyone. They have heard so many lies, have
seen so much creeping and crawling. . . . Whom can theY5
trust? The people do not even trust "the people" . . .
Exploitation or manipulation of others is a third orien-
tation of the elite. A perception of others as self-interested
and hostile coupled with a predilection for opportunism in
dealing with other persons is a stance which has been noted
in Iran for centuries. Adroitness and cleverness have been
particularly valued as weapons in what is perceived as an un-
ending interpersonal struggle. Anne Mehdevi, an American woman
who lived in Iran with her Persian husband, relates not only
the extent to which interpersonal relations are governed by
"Machiavellianism" but also how its successful application is
lauded.
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I was constantly regaled with stories of rascality and
guile, stories told with pretenses of censure but which
really gave all kudos to the trespasser . . . almost
every day some member of our family came home with a
tale of gw he had been shamelessly but cleverly
fleeced.
An Iranian writer has put it differently:
All this modernity in Iran is a facade, a pretense. The
man's appearance has changed but his mentality is the
same. The clean appearance has not stamped out the dirt
of dishonesty; the calculating machines have not made us
any less calculating . . .
Finally, the Persian elite are beset with feelings of
manifest insecurity. Joseph Upton, one of the most perceptive
interpreters of Iranian history, states on the first page of
his study, "This lively and persistent feeling of both national
and individual insecurity is perhaps the dominant character-
istic of modern Persian history."1 8 An Iranian, trained in
the ways of social science, has written a monograph to examine
what he senses as "the manic drive of the socially active
Iranian for money."19 He concludes that most of his countrymen
view money or wealth as the only meaningful source of security
in the face of sweeping social changes.
Clearly, then, others have sensed the presence of these
attitudes among certain sectors of the population. Our data,
which do not permit generalizations about any sector of the
society save the political elite, support the existence of
these variables. But these data not only establish and verify
the presence of such attitudes among the politically most
powerful individuals in the society, they also allow for an
analysis that deepens our understanding of the Iranian political
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process. Who, for example, manifests higher levels of cyn-
icism, of insecurity, of mistrust? What types of social
background characteristics are likely to be associated with
such personal attitudes? Indeed, from among the millions of
eligible and would-be elite, who is recruited into elite
membership? Finally, of what relevance to the political
process are these variables? Is there any policy significance
to the presence of these characteristics among the elite? Does
it make any difference to the political system that its most
powerful members have a particular set of attitudes? Or is it
more important to consider the extra-personal factors--the
Iranian Constitution, the influence of foreign powers, the
economic and social conditions of the country, etc.?
In the course of this thesis, we shall examine a number
of similar issues. Suffice it to say here that the data
suggest unexpected results. Where we had expected that the
older Iranians would have become cynical from their partici-
pation in the political system, we find the opposite. The
younger elites manifest higher levels of cynicism than their
older counterparts. Where we looked for higher levels of
manifest insecurity among those of the elite who had fewer
institutional ties and thus bases of support, we found the
opposite. The more active the elite--the more occupations
they have and the more organizations they have joined--the
higher their levels of insecurity. Where we had expected the
more politically powerful to be more involved and thus more
committed to the political system and its objectives, we were
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again surprised. The more powerful manifested the highest
levels of cynicism. In short, the younger elite are more
cynical; the active are more insecure; and the powerful,
the least committed.
But an additional unexpected finding of our research
is that these variables do not increase concurrently. For the
type of career patterns which the elite have experienced alter
their general character orientations. Those members of the
elite who have enjoyed lengthy tenure in formal positions
within the hierarchies manifest a greater tendency towards
interpersonal exploitation, but less cynicism, mistrust, and
insecurity. That set of variables which has been labelled
exploitation appears to be the attitudinal counterpart to
interpersonal manipulation and political conflict. The elite
whose attitudes are the most "exploitative," and, thus, appear
able to manipulate others, also demonstrate higher levels of
trust, security, and commitment than do their non-exploitative
counterparts. But the latter are by far the more numerous.
The majority of the elite, buffeted by frequent alterations of
position, seem unable to establish the attitudinal bases for
such behavior. Consequently, manipulation is not their forte.
In short, the data indicate that the longer and more
thoroughly a member of the elite participates in the Iranian
political system, the more he manifests personal attributes
of insecurity, cynicism, and mistrust. The incidence of these
orientations among the more powerful, more active, and older
members of the political elite is above the mode for the entire
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panel of elite respondents. Moreover, the data suggest that
individuals more recently coopted into elite status are
socialized into these patterns and manifest higher levels of
these attributes as they mount the elite hierarchy.
The significance of such variables is not principally in
their presence nor solely in the assumption taht the mode for
their distribution is higher among the elite of Iran than it
would be for the elites of other political systems. Their im-
portance also lies in two other areas. Firstly, the variables
to which single-word labels have been attached are, in fact,
composites of a number of sub-conceptualizations whose nature
and meaning reveal the theoretical bases of the general charac-
ter orientations. Secondly, the orientations of insecurity,
cynicism, mistrust, and tendency towards exploitation are
highly correlated with attitudes of the elite which are more
specifically political. A number of political attitudes were
similarly derived from another factor analysis of interview
data and labelled Xenophobia, Social Disdain, Populist, Non-
Elite, Reduced Government Role, and Orientation to the Shah.
Higher levels of cynicism, mistrust, and insecurity go together
with higher levels of xenophobia, social disdain, elitism, and
a lesser orientation to the Shah.
What is being suggested is that there exist modal dis-
tributions of these attitudes which resemble, in actuality, the
descriptions of Iranian society made by so many observers; that
these qualities of cynicism, mistrust, insecurity, and inter-
personal exploitation are then the central character variables
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which explicate that which is peculiar to Iranian politics;
and, moreover, that these very variables are related in essen-
tial ways to the outputs of the political process in Iran.
To put it another way, the more thoroughly acculturated
members of the political elite, on the one hand, display poli-
tical attitudes which reflect their own general character
orientations. And on the other hand, the political attitudes
of the elite tend to form the foundation of the political
policies of the Iranian Government as those policies are
influenced by the political elite. Basically, the following
relationships of influence appear to be present:
His Imperial
Majesty
Elite Elite Ge eral Political
Social Political > Character AAt t ' tudes
Backgrounds Experiences Orientations
Elite
Political
Behavior
The decisions of the monarch affect the social back-
grounds from which the elite are recruited as well as the
political experiences which the members of the political elite
undergo. These in turn affect the general character orienta-
tions which these individuals develop. The more specifically
political attitudes which the elite hold are shaped by their
I
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backgrounds, the lives they have led and the diffuse orienta-
tions they have adopted. All in turn influence the political
behavior of the elite and the direction of the political system.
But these patterns of influence are not uni-dimensional. All
feedback to limit the freedom with which the Shah can direct
his country's domestic and foreign policies.
Nonetheless, there is no allusion here to either of the
exaggerated notions advanced to explain the relationship be-
tween the King and his elite. Apologists for the monarch have
rationalized the failures of the Shah in terms of an allegedly
refractory and powerfully entrenched clique of elite courtiers.
While these courtiers allegedly filter from the Royal ears all
that would cause the Shah discomfort, they simultaneously
impede the implementation of his democratic reforms. At the
opposite pole sit bitter and outcast anti-Royalists who charge
the Shah and his elite with fraud. They allege that the Shah
has purposefully surrounded himself with venal, sycophantic,
and obsequious rogues enlisted to satisfy every royal impulse.
Together this coterie is said to milk the nation of its re-
sources while driving its most talented and upright citizens
to exile.
Neither extremity reprents the entire truth, but both
contain some measure of realism. An accurate assessment of the
relationship between the Shah and his elite must take account
of the time period and the momentum of the political system.
For while this relationship has been grounded in the Shah's
demand for unfailing loyalty, its precise nature is a product
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of the political situation of the moment and the political
vision then motivating His Majesty. To detail this relation-
ship between the Shah and his elite, and in the process the
nature of politics in the Iranian system, we shall examine the
principal actors in that system. It is to the most elite of
elites to whom we first turn.
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CHAPTER II
THE SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN: CONTROLLING THE
COMPOSITION OF THE POLITICAL ELITE
The Sh
weren't w
ah wouldn't know he were Shah if it
ritten down . . .
Brecht
His Imperial Majesty, Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, Shah of
Shahs, Light of the Aryans, is, as his titles might indicate,
the central figure in Iranian politics. Coming to the throne
in 1941, the Shah has demonstrated a capacity for preserving
his position all but unheard of among the nations of the
developing world. Through foreign occupations. and foreign-
sponsored separatist states, internal uprisings, tribal
challenges, assassination efforts, and thwarted military coup
d'etats, the Shah has managed to husband his support, experiment
with new forms of control, and, ultimately, expand his political
power.
Indeed, the entire reign of the Shah, with temporary
setbacks, can be characterized as one quarter century where the
civil and military bureaucracies have continually expanded
their control over the activities of the population at large
while the Shah has even more relentlessly expanded his power
over the bureaucracies. In both relative and absolute terms,
this monarch is more powerful than his father and than any
previous Iranian ruler. This king of kings can, in no political
sense, be considered merely the "first among equals." He,
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personally, without the aid of advisory councils, alter egos,
or close confidants, makes the thousands of decisions which
allow the government to function. From the appointment or
promotion of officers in the army to the decisions as to
whether or not to pave the main street of Tabas, His Imperial
Majesty is the arbiter.
BACKGROUND
Mohammad Reza was the first son and third-born child of
Reza Khan, an illiterate or semi-literate officer in the Russian
commanded Persian Cossack Brigade. Two years after the birth
of his son, Reza Khan was to command the Cossack Brigade, and
with it provide military support for a coup led by a journalist,
Seyyed Zia ed din Tabatabai, against the ailing Qajar regime.
Six years after the boy's birth, Reza Khan, having long since
replaced the Seyyed as Prime Minister, exiled him along with a
number of his more vocal opponents, silenced most of his re-
maining internal critics, ousted the last Qajar, and established
himself as Reza Shah, the first ruler of the new Pahlevi
dynasty. With his coronation in 1925 came the designation of
Mohammad Reza as Crown Prince.
The Crown Prince's childhood appears to be a near parody
of a future monarch's upbringing. Surrounded by servants and
sycophants, protected by older military officers, and supplied
with playmates from the children of the elite, he always managed
to be the first in his class at school. Numerous photographs
show the youth dressed in military uniform taking the salute of
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honor: from the graduates of the Officer Academy to the Boy
Scouts of Iran, he early was the subject of immense deference.
Besides the servility of the Court, the Crown Prince had other
significant childhood experiences. As a young child, he was
considered rather weak and sickly. Shortly after he became
Crown Prince, he was struck by typhoid fever and wavered near
death for weeks. His frail nature and childhood illnesses
heightened the protective and almost isolated atmosphere in
which he was raised.
One final experience contributed to heightening the
effects of these others. Until the age of six, the boy lived
with his mother and brothers and sisters. When he was invested
as Crown Prince, however, his father decided that the future
monarch needed a more "manly education". Thereafter, he was
separated from his mother and sisters, raised by a French
governess, and educated in a specially organized school with
a group of "carefully selected" elite boys. 2
Perhaps to isolate his son from this debilitating atmos-
phere surrounding the Court, Reza Shah sent the boy to study at
Le Rosey secondary school in Switzerland. The king was later
to look back at this period and recall:
I was to stay in Switzerland about four years, a tremen-
dously important period in my life. The democratic Wes-
tern environment moulded my character to In extent that
was second only to my father's influence.
Other evidence suggests that the Crown Prince was not, in fact,
subject to quite the "democratic Western environment" reported.
Reza Shah, concerned with his son's "original frailty",
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despatched a personal physician to supervise the Crown Prince's
health.4 A Persian tutor, his brother, and two boyhood friends
comprised the remainder of the retinue.5 It would seem likely
that this Iranian clique and ready-made peer group isolated the
aspiring monarch from some of the ruder consequences of the
democratic environment of Le Rosey.
Whatever the influence on the Crown Prince of his experi-
ence abroad, his return to Iran in 1936 found him once again
immersed in the atmosphere of the Court'. He entered the Mili-
tary Academy, graduating two years later as a second lieutenant
at the head of his class. Shortly afterwards, he was appointed
by his father to be "Inspector of the Imperial Iranian Armed
Forces".
In 1939, in what was apparently his first great service
to the monarchy, his country, and the legitimacy of his father's
rule, he was married to Princess Fawzia, the sister of King
Farouk of Egypt. Although a daughter was born a year later,
the marriage was apparently a personal failure--the Egyptian
ruling family proving no more compatible to an Iranian than it
did to the Egyptians.
And so the boy lived until the age of twenty-one, when in
1941 Great Britain and Russia invaded his country. Wary of
growing German influence on Reza Shah and fearing an Iraqi-type
pro-Axis coup, the two powers demanded Reza Shah's abdication,
sent him into exile, and established his son on the throne. It
seems clear that the young king was ill-prepared for his new
role. A deadening court atmosphere of servility and sycophancy
41
had isolated the king from many of the pervasive problems of
Iran, their possible solutions, and his own capability for
dealing with them. His own father had been a strict discip-
linarian at home and an authoritarian at Court. His Imperial
Majesty remembered that as Crown Prince he used to "discuss"
details of Iran's domestic and foreign policy with his father.
But he hastily added,
I, and all the officials of my father's Government, had
such respect for him and were so much in awe of him that
"discussion" with him had none of the give-and-take the
word implies. I advanced my views and made hints and
suggestions, but 6discussion in any usual sense was out
of the question.
The king also had countless examples of his father's
forceful methods for dealing with his officials. To this day,
Iranians look back with wonder at Reza Shah's lightning and
unannounced inspection tours of public projects. In the earlier
years of his rule, he would almost invariably find the project
in near collapse and decay, despite the glowing reports of
progress sent to Tehran. Charging the responsible official with
completion by a given date, Reza Shah would return on that very
day, weeks or months later, and find the project completed, or
else. That it was frequently the "or else" alternative was
clear to the Crown Prince:
Proverbially, to get things done in Persia, one must
both reward and punish. My father relied more on
punishment than he did on reward or even encourage-
ment. In his view there was no reason to wax senti-
mental about a man doing something well, because that
was his duty. On the other hand if my father learned
of a man who was doing something poorly or dishonestly,
he would live to regret it. 7
F
enforced separation from his mother and sisters; a stern,
powerful, and dominating father; and a milieu replete with
sycophants--seem to have resulted in the young king's being
filled with self-doubt and fears of his own weakness.8 In his
autobiography, the Shah relates a conversation revealing these
perceived inadequacies:
My father said that he wanted to improve the govern-
ment machinery to such a degree that, if he should die,
the day-to-day process of administration would operate
almost automatically without the need of continuous
supervision from the top.
I was still rather young and perhaps not very mature;
and I took his remark as an insult. "What does he mean?"
I thought. "Does he think that if he were gone I couldn't
take over and continue his work?" 9
With the Allied invasion and the abdication of his father,
then, this young and self-doubting man took the throne. His
country was occupied and effectively controlled by powerful
foreign nations which had recently destroyed, in a matter of
hours, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. These were the same
armed forces which his father had devoted his life to modernizing
and to which he had directed the major share of his country's
resources during his rule. Among his own people, he was sur-
rounded by courtiers, politicians, and generals, more experienced
and older, who had served his father for years. They quickly
moved to consolidate their own power bases, independent of the
throne. Finally, a torrent of domestic opposition, silenced,
exiled, or incarcerated by Reza Shah, was released. From flowing
praise and panegyric a few months before, Reza Shah was suddenly
V
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All these elements recounted above--personal sickliness;
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villified and damned by his enemies, not surprisingly, but also
by many of his apparently warmest supporters.
None of this was lost on the young king. His self-doubts
and fears of weakness were reinforced by an actual inability to
do as his father had done or as Iranian kings before Reza Shah
had always done, i.e., rule. All that which the Crown Prince
had been taught to revere had crumbled. His father was debased
and maligned for his alleged corruption, ignorance, and tyranny.
The much-heralded Iranian army--in whose uniform he had been
invested as Crown Prince--now resembled the rabble of Qajar
times. The modern bureaucracy which Reza Shah had hoped to build
more nearly resembled an inefficient and virtually autonomous
collection of corrupt and nepotistic cliques. And the ultimate
trust of the monarchy--the very independence of Iran--had been
lost.
To the amazement of many foreign observers and at least
grudging admiration from domestic opponents, the Shah faced and
overcame these early obstacles. Working within the weaknesses
of self and system, the Shah strengthened his hold on the throne
and the hold of the throne over the political elite. With
interruptions and setbacks, he has continued the process to the
present day. As Farouk, Feisal, Ben Bella, Sukarno, Menderes,
Nkrumah, Batista, and Trujillo have fallen by the wayside of
political leadership, the Shah has preserved his throne, en-
hanced his power, and maintained the integrity of Iran.
Many answers have been advanced to account for the Shah's
political longevity, but they all share the common failings of
a
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over-simplicity and a lack of exclusivity. That the Shah
has the support of foreign governments, well-equipped and effi-
cient armed forces for internal control, a pervasive secret
police, a subservient and cowed political elite, and rigid con-
trol over the civil liberties and personal freedom of the popu-
lation may or may not be true. If these are true of Iran or,
at least, partly true of Iran, they were also true or partly
true of other nations whose rulers did not enhance and ultimately
preserve their positions. And more importantly, if these pheno-
mena are true of the Iranian political system, they constitute
second-order explanations. That is, they do not account for the
successes of His Imperial Majesty in strengthening his position.
Rather, these phenomena are characteristics of that success. A
more adequate explanation must be sought in the interplay of his
style of rule with the attitudes and expectations of the political
elite, those whose relations to the political process allow them
to execute, thwart, or alter his wishes.
The style of rule which His Imperial Majesty has unfolded
and elaborated since coming to power centers about
(a) controlling the size and compositions of the politi-
cally influential segments of the Iranian population;
(b) manipulating the behavior of the politically active
and influential segments of the Iranian population,
including the political elite10 ;
(c) limiting the nature of the demands made by the politi-
cal process as articulated by the general population;
and
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(d) satisfying, to the maximum extent, those demands
which are articulated.
CONTROLLING ACCESS TO ELITE STATUS
The basis of the Shah's policy of controlling the size
and composition of the politically influential is one of re-
cruitment by cooptation. That is, all elites and those who be-
cause of unusual popularity, charisma, wealth, skills, or
knowledge are considered potential elites or counter-elites
are coopted into elite membership by being offered prestigious
office or other rewards. High status positions in the civil
bureaucracy, Imperial Court, Parliament, universities, or any
number of Royal Commissions are used as counters in the Shah's
attempts to incorporate all potentially relevant individuals.
Specific representatives of the Ministry of Imperial
Court have been commissioned by the ruler to fulfill this func-
tion. Working through personal contacts, reports of the intel-
ligence services, and the ambassadors of Iran (for students
abroad), these representatives designate and seek out politically
relevant individuals. They are then charged with offering the
kinds of rewards or positions which would recruit the designee
into the system.
This cooptative method of recruitment to the ranks of the
elite fills two principal functions: to uncover talent; and to
hinder the formation of counter-elites. In the former sense,
personal representatives of the Shah are able to identify
individuals with valuable skills or training, but individuals who
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are currently outside the monarch's immediate scrutiny. There
may be an individual of unusual capability filling a relatively
menial post. A young student in Iran, Europe, or America may
demonstrate unusual capacity in his university work. An Iranian
with valuable skills may have finished his foreign studies and,
attracted by the higher salaries, remained abroad. All these
individuals can be located and induced, with suitable material
or other blandishments, to use their skills and training for the
regime and Iran.
The second function which this recruitment-by-cooptation
serves is to restrain the formation of counter-elites. In the
words of Fred Riggs, the rise of counter-elites [is]
part of a much broader phenomenon . . namely the 'differen-
tiation' of a population as it becomes mobilized but not assimi-
lated."11 In Iran, individuals with the qualities to lead or,
indeed, form, a mobilized counter-elite rarely do so. They lack
the incentive, for they are rapidly assimilated. And precisely
that which they value, they receive as elites: be it status,
power, money, foreign travel, the rewards of recruitment by
seduction are usually satisfying.
Like so many other political practices in Iran, this one--
buying off the potential opposition--has a long history. In the
early twentieth century, Morgan Shushter, an American brought to
reorganize Persia's finances, commented on one aspect of this:
One of the most remarkable examples of Persia's peculiar
financial chaos was a system of "pensions." According to
the loosely kept records of the different Ministries, the
Government was expected to pay out each year to nearly
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100,000 different people throughout the Empire the sum
of about 3,000,000 tumans, in money and grain.
The greater part of this strange burden had been
inherited by the Constitutional Government from the
regime of the former Shahs. . .
Fully nine-tenths of the pensions allotted
were p e graft. All the grandees enjoyed large pen-
Presently, the cooptative system takes several forms.
Outright "pensions" are still granted to elites or counter-
elites, the monarch's Pahlevi Foundation frequently serving as
13
a conduit. In addition, facilities and conveniences are pro-
vided the elites and potential elites. Thus a building originally
designed to serve as a headquarters for the secret police was
completed at a cost of some $1,500,000 and designed a "Palace
of Youth." But entrance to the building is restricted to
"those, from 19 to 30, who have higher than secondary school
educations." 14 But the most frequent reward for cooptation re-
mains a high status position within the bureaucracy.
One major effect of this method of recruiting of new
elements into the elite may be found in the nature of the
political process which ensues. Politics becomes intra-elite,
rather than inter-elite. Political issues are not formulated
to serve as rallying points for elite cliques. The role of
ideology is minimized and politics, as enacted at the elite
level in Iran, consists of the adjustment of personal differi-
ences within an elite perspective0 While individuals may gain
or lose status within the elite hierarchy, whole groups do not.
Moreover, neither groups not individuals are likely to pass out
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of the limits of the elite. Thus, the incentives for adopting
radical methods of holding or taking political elite status are
lessened,
Another effect to which the cooptation policy contributes
is to foster a surprisingly democratic character in elite
politics, The goal of the regime vis a vis the elite is in-
clusivity rather than exclusivity. When combined with a cynical
perspective on political activities, there are relatively few
political acts which may not be forgiven or which the Shah per-
ceives as sufficiently ominous to result in the exclusion of an
elite from his elite status or, once excluded, which prohibit
eventual return,
One example is found in a well-educated Iranian who becam
active in the Tudeh Party, Iran's organized Communists, in the
1940's. At one stage, he was a member of the Central Committee
and actively working towards Soviet suzerainty. After quitting
the party and retiring from active political life, however, the
man returned in the early 1960's as Minister of Justice' Being
a member of the Tudeh in the 1940's is now perceived as a
tolerable and, for that time, a personally useful form of
political expression, In addition, this was a man of demon-
strated qualities of leadership and administration: better
within the elite than without,
Another example may be found in a youthful activist in
the National Front, the pro-Mossadegh political grouping now,
in effect, illegal, One of His Imperial Majesty's representa-
tives stressed the valuable services which he could perform for
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Iran were he in the government's service rather than out of it.
And he was offered a position as Deputy Minister. This parti-
cular aspiring counter-elite agreed that he could serve best
within the Government, but only in a National Front government.
He refused the offer (and is now living abroad).
The Shah attends to matters other than the immediate
cooptation of potential elites or counter-elites. He also
influences the distribution of resources which serve as bases
for the acquisition of political power. By regulating the
apportionment of these resources, His Majesty attempts to
circumscribe entry into the political elite to those who will
probably sustain his rule. Presently, membership into the
political elite of Iran is most facilitated by control over
two resources--wealth and education. The monarch has labored
long to control these power bases.
WEALTH
The principal criterion for membership in the Iranian
political elite of Qajar times was wealth--wealth to buy offices
and political power. The most feasible method of accumulating
wealth was the ownership of land. What national wealth there
was in Iran stemmed almost entirely from agricultural production
and herding. Land gave one a share in that wealth: a portion
of the crop or the wool, rents from tenants. But while land
ownership was the most prevalent base for the accumulation of
wealth, it was by no means the sole source of wealth. Profits
from internal commerce or production and exporting and importing
financed the elite status of some.
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In contemporary Iran, wealth remains an important but
no longer, in a direct sense, the most important criterion for
membership in the elite or the generally influential. Wealth
as a power base in Iran has been supplemented and occasionally
supplanted by what Frey has called the "hallmark" of the Turkish
elite--education.15 The progressive expansion in the power of
the political center means that the center now has more control
than ever before over these bases for elite membership. Not
only do the Government, and in turn, the Shah, control the
sources of wealth in Iran, but they also control access to
institutions of formal education. The Government's hold over
the first of these sources, the economy, and thus over the pos-
sibilities for accumulating and retaining wealth,is most
strikingly seen in the recent land reform program. As of 1967,
land reform had progressed through two phases and had entered
the third. The first phase, from January 1962 until September
1963, resulted in the distribution of 8,042 villages to their
peasant cultivators. (Originally, it had been estimated that
13,904 villages were eligible for distribution under the first
phase, but "ownership disputes" resulted in the exclusion from
16the land reform of some 5,862 villages. ) The second phase of
land reform, which limited the number of hectares--from 30 to
150, depending on the quality of the land--which one owner could
hold, lasted to January 1965, but seems to have seriously lagged
from mid-1964. Nonetheless, at the end of 1965, the Government
had announced that a total of 38,792 villages had been affected
by the two stages of land reform. 1 7 In 1966, the Minister of
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Agriculture announced twenty aims for increasing agricultural
production and rural welfare, aims which were to serve as the
third phase of the program.
Meanwhile, the former owners of entire villages had been
reimbursed with interest-bearing, twenty-year bonds. 18 The
owners of land subject to the second phase could choose one of
three options for reaching a settlement with their peasants.
They could rent their land to the peasant cultivators for thirty
years with leases renewable every fifth year (and thus continue
to retain ownership). The owners could sell the lands directly
to the farmers on the basis of mutually-agreed-on and Government-
approved terms. Or the landlords and the peasants could estab-
lish a farm company, the ownership of which would be divided
between the cultivators and the present owner on the basis of
the crop-sharing ratios in the area.19 (Both the first and the
third of these alternatives would not alter the distribution of
agricultural profits accuring to the peasants, but would offer
them stability of tenure on their lands, Nonetheless, as one
Kurdestani peasant suggested to an Iranian studying the land
reform, "it makes no difference to the peasant whether his land-
lord owns one village or 600 villages; he will still have to pay
rent and be at the landlord's mercy as before." 20
Whatever its economic shortcomings, the land reform has
been a source of profound political change. Firstly, "land
reform has weakened and alienated a considerable part of the
Shah's traditional allies: the landlords." 2 1 The loss or
weakening of this base of support, however, has become relatively
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unimportant to the monarch. He no longer need rely on this
social group for either the support or guidance which he re-
quired in the past, particularly on his accession to the throne
in 1941 and his return to it in 1953. Moreover, the pace of
social and economic change in Iran has bypassed many of these
older aristocrats. Their relative lack of education and tradi-
tionally conservative weltanschauung make them less relevant to
the kind of Iran which is emerging in the last quarter of the
twentieth century.
Secondly, the land reform has disassociated many of the
present elite from what had been a major source of their wealth.
After a period of some adjustment, however, this is likely to
be a meaningful consequence of land reform only in indirect
ways. Unlike feudal aristocracies, Iran's political elite have
not been attached to their estates from generation to genera-
tion. Moreover, their power, with the exception of tribal
leaders and the owners of exceptionally large holdings, was
based on bureaucratic position bought through the practice of
modakhel with money derived from agricultural income.22 Once
the positions were obtained, they were self-generating--the
positions themselves producing the funds for retaining the post
or acquiring higher office. More importantly, with the reforms
of Reza Shah, new opportunities for amassing wealth appeared.
Importing, commerce, manufacturing, and new public projects such
as the Trans-Iranian Railroad vastly expanded the size of the
money sector. The relative decline in the value produced by
agriculture was vastly accelerated by the wartime occupation
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and the post-war oil production which has continued to the
present. Being dedicated not to their lands or peasants, but
to the wealth produced by them, the elite were quick to seize
the opportunities to amass wealth which the new economic boom
presented. Their holdings have by now been diversified to in-
clude urban land and real estate, commerce and light industries,
or even foreign securities. Thus, many are exposed to relatively
slight financial danger by the land reform.
While disassociated from land-based wealth, however, the
landlords do become more dependent on these other sources of
riches. And those sources of wealth in turn tend to be directly
controlled by the government. That is, the land reform has not
destroyed the financial power of this one segment of society--
no social revolution has been effected. Rather, it has altered
the importance of the elite's sources of wealth (and ultimately
their bases of political power) to those which are under the
control of the Government.
An example from one well-known member of the political
elite may illustrate this point. Shortly after World War II,
his family took advantage of the burgeoning development of
Tehran to begin to manufacture consumer products. His success
was beyond his imagination and growing profits were reinvested
in expanded capacity and eventually urban real estate and foreign
stocks and bonds. All the while, the family retained the owner-
ship of a number of agricultural villages which had originally
produced the funds for the manufacturing facilities. They re-
mained profitable, although less so than the new investments,
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and no additional funds were put into them. With the land refonn,
the family lost its villages, without great fuss. Their response
was to construct a new manufacturing plant with the most modern
machinery available. The plant is operating today, resembling
more an American or West German experimental unit than a facility
in a developing country supposedly making use of labor-intensive
production processes. A handful of well-trained and white-
cloaked workers watch the dials and supervise the plant where
hundreds would have worked before automation. The owner explained
that his family realized that their factories were now their
principal source of wealth. The highpriced equipment, he con-
tinued, was necessary because it eliminated the need for work-
men. Eliminating the workers also eliminated the chief entree
which the Government could claim in order to control his factory.
And keeping out the Government was necessary if he were to remain
an independent producer and retain a substantial proportion of
the profits.
He explained how the Ministries of Labor (concerned with
worker guilds and wages), Interior (worker political organiza-
tion), Information (worker propaganda), and Health (worker wel-
fare), were now far less likely to intervene in the affairs of
his company. In their absence, some hope existed that the owners
could devote themselves to production rather than to politics. 23
But ultimately, of course, entrepreneurs such as this one
will be proven wrong. It is impossible to escape the control of
the Government irrespective of the ruses employed. The in-
creased reliance of this class on industry or trade rather than
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agricultural land to produce wealth will put them under the con-
trol of the Government: if not through the Ministries mentioned,
then through the Ministry of Water and Power for electricity,
the Ministry of Economy for import licenses and permits to en-
gage in manufacturing, the Ministry of Finance for income and
profits tax, the Ministry of Development for permits to expand
production, etc., etc. Through the enforcement of a multitude
of regulations pertaining to all phases of commercial and indus-
trial processes, the Government and the Shah are able to exert
control over these more modern sources of wealth. This degree
of control was never possible when wealth was based on rural
holdings, separated by vast distances and poor communications
from the capital.
But in addition, the Shah possesses even more direct
levers for control. Few industrial or commercial undertakings
are launched in Iran without the "blessing" of the Shah. To
secure those blessings, the Shah is often made the gift of a
share in the ownership of the venture, just as Reza Shah was
the recipient of estates from favor-seeking elites. In other
instances, the Shah or other members of the Royal Family will
invest their personal funds in indigenous commercial ventures,
The result is that at least some member of the Pahlevi family
has a direct and legitimate voice, by dint of ownership, in the
operation of nearly all commerce and industry in Iran. The
Government of Iran and the Shah and Royal Family, then, have
become privy, either directly or indirectly, to the non-
agricultural economy of Iran. As the land reform eliminated
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that area of the Iranian economy which stood outside the sur-
veillance of the Government, the elites who now must rely on new
sources of wealth to maintain their power bases do so under the
control of the Government.
If land reform has antagonized a segment of the tradi-
tional elite and removed a source of wealth from the hands of
the former owners, it has also eliminated a base of votes or
electoral support with which the former landowners could control
the Parliament. By marshalling the peasants in his villages, an
owner could assure his receiving enough votes to be elected,
with the result that His Imperial Majesty had to resort to
countless stratagems to assert his own control over the elections.
From the Mossadegh period, he urged the Majles to pass legisla-
tion limiting the franchise to the literate. Realizing that the
mass illiteracy of the countryside would result in the elimina-
tion of their electoral support, the legislators withstood the
Imperial pressures year in and year out.
Subsequently, in 1957, His Majesty responded by convening
the upper house of the Parliament. The Iranian Constitution of
1907 specified provisions for a Senate but it had never been
organized. The Constitution empowered the king to appoint half
of its sixty members. With that power he was able to set up a
second parliamentary body which could at least serve as a check
on what he considered the excesses of the first. But even with
control of the Senate, the Shah had insufficient influence in
the lower house to assure his control over the Government as a
whole. Control over the Majles, therefore, was also necessary.
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One measure facilitating this process was to cut the links
between the elites and the peasant voters, some sixty-five per
cent of the population. The land reform did this.
This control is even more pervasive: The cooperative
movement is replacing the landlord-peasant links by Shah-
Government-peasant links. The Government cooperatives, where
organized and functioning, are meant to fulfill the services
provided, at least theoretically, by the landlord: finance,
seed, fertilizer, technical assistance, and marketing.24 The
peasants, then, have also been brought under the control of the
political center and the Shahanshah as a result of the land re-
form. Not only have the landlords been denied a source of
"independent" wealth and electoral support, but the peasants are
being denied an existence independent of the Government.
A specter which will undoubtedly yet harass the Government
as a result of land reform will be the frustration of peasant
expectations in years of poor agricultural production. Whereas
these expectations were formerly non-existent or were directed
at the landlord, they now definitely exist and are directed
towards the bureaucracy. As one member of the elite put it,
"The Shah has eliminated the owners of thousands of villages and,
in the eyes of the farmers, replaced those rejal va jenabs
[elites and lords] with his own person." In the event of poor
governmental performance or poor harvests, the ire of the
peasants will be aroused. Each passing year of reform in Iran
has tended to raise the standards of acceptable bureaucratic
performance. With the greater capacity of the political system
will come greater demands for its satisfactory employment.25
EDUCATION
The principal power base for access to elite membership
other than wealth is education. A high level of formal educa-
tion has become not only the "hallmark" of the younger aspirants
to the political elite, but a sine qua non. There are a number
of indications that this is widely recognized in the society.
A recent survey, for example, asked a sample of 400 Tehrani
literates, "Which one particular field of development is of
greatest importance to Iran?''2 6 Responses were as follows:
TABLE 2.1
FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT IMPORTANT TO IRAN
FROM TEHRANI LITERATES
of Development Per Cent Responding
Education 40%
Agriculture 32
Industry 17
Finance 3
Administration 0
Other 1
No Answer 7
Total 100%
As education is viewed as a prerequisite for national
development, so is it viewed as a necessary and even suffi-
cient condition for personal mobility. Such is the concomi-
tant of the publicly iterated rationale of educational policy
in Iran: "to train an intellectual elite who will then occupy
the directing positions in society.r27 This yearning is held
with such fervor that the "education suicide"--a personb taking
his own life after finding that additional education is denied
him or his children--is not an infrequent occurrence. One
poignant case made headlines in Tehran recently when a mother
Field
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of four realized that she could not afford the tuition fees and
books to send her children to primary school. She threw herself
from the roof of an apartment building.28 As education has
become a prerequisite for mobility and as the realization of
this has spread, the Government and the Shah have asserted their
control over the educational system. This control is manifest
in a number of ways.
Firstly, there has occurred the virtual elimination of
the maktab and madresseh. Representing primary and secondary
levels in the traditional religious educational system, these
institutions were formerly the sole means of formal education
available to Iranians. Maktab schools were the product of the
individual mullah who sought commissions from parents eager to
have their children cognizant with the skills of literacy, cal-
ligraphy, poetry, and theology. The madresseh was a more for-
malized school, usually attached to a mosque or religious shrine,
and training maktab graduates in hekmat and 'e theology,
logic, geography, Arabic grammar, and Islamic jurisprudence.
The first modern primary school was not established until
the late nineteenth century. But following its introduction, a
network of privately sponsored,and later public, primary schools
sprang up. As recently as 1936, there were 55,650 boys and girls
studying at maktabs versus 177,000 in modern primary schools. 2 9
The madressehs were rather less widespread, being valued primarily
for the training of future members of the ulema, or clergy. None-
theless, in 1924, before the inception of the Pahlevi dynasty,
4,980 males were studying at the madressehs in comparison with
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only 3,320 boys and girls at modern secondary schools. 30
But Reza Shah's policies of educational development
sounded the knell of these traditional schools. By 1935, the
number of madresseh students had dropped to 2,900, while the
number of pupils in modern secondary schools rose to 16,200.
The "secularization" of the school system was established and
proceeded steadily through the remaining years of Reza Shah's
rule to the present. The chart reveals the decline and elimina-
tion of the traditional educational institutions, beginning in a
TABLE 2.2
ENROLLMENT IN TRADITIONAL AND MODERN
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN IRAN
1922-1962 (in 100's)31
Primary School Secondary School
Year Traditional Modern Traditional Modern
1922 2.1 - .6 -
1923 22.9 64.9 5.0 3.3
1928 35.9 100.6 5.5 7.0
1931 51,0 130.6 3.7 12.5
1935 55.6 177.1 2.9 16.2
1940 37,3 287.2 .8 28.2
1945 22.1 293.7 3.1 29.4
1950 - 481.2 - -
1955 - 824.0 - 142.1
1960 - 1,431.6 - 279.7
1962 - 1,719.4 - 326.9
a1922 refers to the 1922-23 school year, etc.
relative sense with the anti-Qajar coup of 1921 and in an abso-
lute sense with the last five years of the rule of Reza Shah.
Following his abdication, there was a let-up in anti-religious
sentiment as the new Shah sought support where he could find it
and the British and Americans urged him to strengthen the reli-
gious elements as a counter to Communist penetration from the
Soviet occupation. One result was a rise in the number of
madresseh students. But the rise was short-lived, their numbers
having declined to below one thousand and no longer reported by
the Government as of 1950.
The elimination of the traditional educational system went
hand in hand with the growth of the Ministry of Education and a
Government bureaucracy capable and eager to supervise the educa-
tional process. As the maktabs and madressehs declined, a modern,
private, educational sector grew. But unlike the former schools,
the modern private institutions were always under the supervision
of the Ministry. Their textbooks are supplied by the Ministry,
their courses of instruction and teacher qualifications subject
to Ministry rules0 But whatever their independence from the
Government, they too have been relatively overwhelmed by the
burgeoning public sector (although there has been an absolute
increase in their numbers).
TABLE 2.3
PROPORTION OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN MQRERN SCHOOLS
BY SPONSOR, 1935 AND 1960
Year Primary Enrollment Secondary Enrollment
Private Government Private Government
1935-1936 36% 64% 51% 49%
1960-1961 8 92 16 84
62
With this dual expansion--in the number of modern primary
and secondary school pupils and in the influence of the Govern-
ment in the modern educational process--the Government is able to
exercise control over access to educational facilities. One
basic feature of the educational system, more a pattern of social
forces than conscious policy but nonetheless the responsibility
of the Government, is the exclusion of rural students from secon-
dary schools. At the present time, there are no secondary schools
in towns and villages of less than 5,000 persons, in which some
68.6 per cent of the total population resided in 1956.33 The
poorer, rural students are restricted to an education ending at
the primary level.
Another factor which serves to "weed out" pupils in the
advance up the educational ladder is a series of nationally
administered examinations. For the urban and wealthier rural
pupils who aspire to a secondary school education, an "ll-plus"
type exam must be surmounted at the end of the sixth grade. A
similar exam separates the first from the second cycle of secon-
dary school; another must be passed for graduation from secondary
school; and yet another for admission to the university.
In addition, education is not inexpensive. Indirect costs
for the family of the pupil consist of the lost income which
even the young child can earn from an apprenticeship in the
bazaar, rug-weaving, or odd jobs. The direct costs are even
more formidable, however, Even in Government schools, education
is not free and the tuition must be paid, While tuition fees do
not appear high, the eight to twenty dollars per term are beyond
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the means of most urban families in Iran. In addition, text
books are not given away, they are sold; and regulations specify
the wearing of school uniforms costly to lower class pupils. 34
The result of these direct and indirect costs, the location
of the secondary schools, and the system of examinations is an
educational pyramid with sharply angled slopes, i.e., with a high
dropout rate restricting enrollment at each level to a pro-
gressively smaller number of students.
TABLE 2.4
NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED BY
GRADE IN IRAN, 1962-196335
Primary School Grade
1 2 3 4 5 6
410,066 361,752 295,557 248,446 213,028 190,504
------- -------------------------------- -------------
Secondary School Grade
7 8 9 10 11 12
81,578 57,789 51,828 35,104 25,721 23,954
But these primarily implicit factors, whose effects are to
reduce the number of children receiving educations, are augmented
by more explicit means for restricting access to education,
especially at higher levels. Statistics on applications and
acceptances issued by all Iranian universities illustrate this
contention. In 1964, 29,335 individuals received permission to
take university entrance exams. This group was made up of
11,825 individuals graduating from secondary school in June of
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that year and 17,150 who had previously graduated and been denied
access to universities in former years. Of the thousands of
aspirants, less than 4,000 were accepted. 36 But this did repre-
sent a slightly greater percentage of acceptances than in the
previous year when 18,000 took the exams and 2,050 were accepted,7
(All ten Iranian universities counted only 24,459 students at
undergraduate and graduate levels in the 1963-1964 academic
year. 38)
An Iranian who has been influential in the formulation and
administration of higher education policy indicated that the
failure of Iranian universities to expand and accept more students
was not a haphazard consequence of an inefficient educational
bureaucracy. He related that "orders had come from above" to
restrict entrance to Iranian universities. He was to make higher
education more expensive while raising the minimum entrance
examination grade considered necessary for admission. Thus
access to higher education would be limited to those students
"who had the most at stake" in maintaining the present system.3 9
It was clear that children of the elite were those considered
committed and, thus, acceptable.
As an alternative to their inability to gain entrance to
universities within Iran, many Iranians contemplate study
abroad. In 1964, there were 19,500 Iranian students studying
in 23 foreign countries. More Iranians were studying at uni-
versities outside their country than were enrolled at the
Universities of Tehran, Tabriz, Meshed, and Ahwaz and the
National Teachers' College and the National University.4 0 But
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while this option is available and is obviously used, it remains
available primarily to the scions of the upper and upper middle
classes who can afford the high costs involved.
The result is that those students who do receive modern
educations through university levels or post-graduate studies
tend to represent only a narrow segment of the total society.
That is, those who receive the higher degrees and can thus lay
claim to a key power base, tend to be the children of present-
day elites. In other words, the political elites of today are
enhancing the likelihood of the succession to power of their
children by providing these children with higher educations
while excluding the children of non-elites. This would conform
to the observation that among "modernizing traditional elites,"
the well-educated do not rule because they are intelligentsia.
On the contrary, they rule because "they are educated members
of other ruling groups in the society."4 1
Increasingly, the Shah has come to exercise greater control
over the distribution of these most important bases for elite
status in Iran. At least part of His Majesty's success in main-
taining his own power must be attributed to this very control.
By judiciously administer~ng the allocation of key values the
Shah has been able to fashion an elite whose members remain
fundamentally loyal to his throne. Simultaneously, the king
strives to coopt all individuals who have captured or been allowed
to capture the power bases. For the recalcitrant, the potential
counter-elites, the techniques of seduction are employed; the
basic relationship between the king and his elites being one of
inclusivity. But there are those who refuse to succumb to the
blandishments of the Court. An elaborate system for coping
with such persistent independence has been established, a system
which is the subject of the next chapter.
F
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1. Interestingly, perhaps the most articulate critic of
Reza Khan's decision to assume the throne was Dr. Mohammad Mos-
sadegh, then a member of Parliament. As the Prime Minister in
1953, Mossadegh nearly brought about the downfall of the Pahlevi
dynasty.
2. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, Mission for My Country
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 52.
3. Ibid., p. 60.
4. Ibid.
5. One of the four boys was the son of the ill-fated
Minister of Court, Teimourtash, who, falling afoul of Reza Shah's
temper, was relieved of his post. At that point, his son was
forced to leave Mohammad Reza and return home.
6. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, op. cit., p. 64.
7. Ibid., p. 49. Widely-held charges against Reza Shah
suggest that tEis recollection is faulty, i.e., not all dis-
graced officials "lived to regret it". The above-mentioned
Teimourtash, some claim, lost his post and his life as a result
of Reza Shah's ill will.
8. It is not unlikely that His Majesty's avid commitment
to vigorous, physical activities, such as skiing, is in the form
of compensation for perceived self-weaknesses.
9. Ibid., p. 65. Note that His Imperial Majesty refers
to his thoughts rather than to an expression of those thoughts
to his obviously stern and overbearing father.
10. By "politically influential", we refer to a far larger
number of Iranians than the political elite whom we have am-
bitiously specified as the most politically powerful ten per cent
of a general elite. The politically influential would include
the remaining general elite and a substantial number of others,
11. Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration
(New Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1961),
p. 125.
12. W. Morgan Shushter, The Strangling of Persia: A
Record of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue (London:
T. Fisher Unwin, 1912), pp. 267-68.
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13. See, for example, the reports that Majles Deputy
Habibi (an ex-Olympic wrestling champion) had his Pahlevi Foun-
dation "allowances" cut for refusing to follow directions in the
Parliament. (See Farman Magazine, July 14, 1966.)
14. Kayhan International, November 17, 1966, p. 2.
15. Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), Chapter Three, pp. 29-72.
16. The total number of villages in Iran is a matter of
some uncertainty. The 1956 census gives the number of inhabited
places defined as rural as 49,054 and the number of inhabited
places of less than 1,000 persons as 47,116 (Ministry of Interior,
Number and Distribution of the Inhabitants for Iran and the Cen-
sus Provinces, Volume I, p. 12). The New York Times claims that
the Iranian Government has referred to a total of 54,000 (May 11,
1963). Minister of Agriculture Arsanjani referred to 58,000
villages (Echo of Iran, Daily Bulletin, Vol. X, #206, p. 3), while
the Director of the Land Reform programs, Colonel Dr. A. A.
Valian gave the total as 65,000 (television address quoted in
Kayhan, November 9, 1965).
17. Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts--1966
(Tehran: Echo of Iran Press, 1966), p. 571.
18. The bonds can be discounted in the financial markets
of Tehran at thirty to thirty-five cents on the dollar--an indi-
cation of the value which those shrewd traders attach to the
bonds. A great deal of excitement greeted the Government's an-
nouncement that land reform bonds could be exchanged at par value
for shares in Government-owned factories. The interest withered
when the shares were issued, however. It appeared that the
shares were being issued only for those industrial enterprises
which were losing money for their former owners--the Government!
19. For information on crop-sharing practices in Iran,
see Ann K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Iran (London:
Oxford University Press, 1953), passim.
20. Hossein Mahdavy, "The Coming Crises in Iran," Foreign
Affairs (October, 1965), 139-140. Dr. Mahdavy's article is an
excellent critique of the social and economic effects of the land
reforms and possible political consequences.
21. Ibid., p. 142.
22. Tribal leaders are an exception to this generaliza-
tion, for they constituted, in Qajar Iran, a cohesive political
entity with a military force more mobile, disciplined, and
powerful than those commanded by the central government. Reza
Shah's political savoir-faire and armed forces reduced the
tribes from a meaningful threat to the occasional nuisance. An
example of owners of exceptionally large holdings would be the
Alams of the Qaenat in Eastern Iran, Formerly virtual rulers of
the Qaenat, Sistan, and Baluchistan, the Alams' private army
guarded the Iranian heartland from the marches of Afghanistan
and British India, The present Minister of the Imperial Court,
Assadollah Alam, is a direct descendant.
23. The prevalence of automated production facilities in
Iran is not limited to this one factory but is increasingly wide-
spread. While it may lessen the likelihood of Government inter-
vention in the production processes and supply status among
industrialists to its owners, the practice seriously exacerbates
the problems of under- and unemployment which the country faces,
24. In the first phase of land reform, membership in a
cooperative was a theoretical requirement for receiving land.
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CHAPTER III
THE SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN: DEALING
WITH THE COUNTER-ELITE
Where the word of a King is, there is power,
and who may say unto him, What doest thou?
Ecclesiastes VIII:4
What of these potential counter-elites who persist in
their opposition formulations and refuse to repent, be seduced,
or be coopted? Counter-elites who continue their political
activities are ipso facto considered opposed to the present
elite. Inasmuch as the structure of the elite is predicated on
the notion of inclusivity, opposition to the elite is equated,
by the regime, with opposition to the regime itself. And the
regime, to the present, has refused to tolerate persons who, by
its own definition, are in opposition to it. The result is that
the active unassimilated or unassimilatable are subjected to con-
tinued pressure from the regime.
A variety of instrumentalities exist to supervise, control,
and, if necessary, repress such real or potential opposition.
The State Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK) is
surprisingly efficient and pervasive. Not only do its agents
infiltrate counter-elite organizations, but more modern means of
electronic surveillance are not unknown.1 Furthermore, the
discipline, power, and mobility of the armed forces and national
police have been increased. Control over the mass media has
been enhanced so that opportunities for the public expression
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of counter-elite positions are negligible. Finally, the regime
has successfully demoralized many of these groups by broadening
its own support among foreign nations. In the past, opposition
elements have perceived United States policy as the principal
obstacle to their achieving power. Continuing American support
for the monarch has affirmed this belief. But, in addition,
that country which has supported opposition to the Shah in the
past now seems to have made a volte face. The Soviet Union
(and East European nations) have made their peace with the
monarch and ply him with steel mills, grants-in-aid, and even
weapons. The reaction of many in the opposition seems to have
been spelled out by an Iranian proverb: "Enemies," the saying
goes, "are of three kinds--enemies, friends of enemies, and
enemies of friends." The results have been confusion and de-
moralization among many--seeming to approximate the response of
many Europeans and Americans to.the Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939.
By relying on its greater political capacity at home and
this more widespread support abroad, the regime has continually
restricted the limits of acceptable counter-elite behavior.
Where street demonstrations were common occurrences in the past,
a clandestinely printed and distributed pamphlet is now a rarity.
What can be legitimately done or said is narrowly circumscribed.
As a result, the unassimilated or unassimilatable counter-elites
have few options; the most likely are demoralization or depoliti-
cization. For the individuals beset by the former of these two
options, political activities continue to be pursued, but with
a deep sense of pessimism, inefficacy, disarray, and hence, a
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lack of effectiveness. The depoliticized, on the other hand,
have entirely withdrawn from politics to pursue personal inter-
ests at the expensive of any broader concerns. Counter-elites
who fail to succumb to these common resolutions of their dilemma,
i.e., who indicate that they can act and act with dispatch in a
political fashion, are subject to stringent regime measures.
Exile, retirement, or transfer out of official positions, or
ultimately, imprisonment, may well be their fate.
DEMORALIZATION OR DEPOLITICIZATION
The most frequent resolution of these dilemmas in Iran is
an extreme demoralization resulting in nearly total ineffective-
ness as a political actor. As a result of the Shah's present
policy, individuals who have insisted on pursuing counter-elite
strategies appear to have lost their confidence and their discip-
line, and,as a result, a sense of direction. Small groups of the
co-depressed will gather in weekly dowrehs (circles) to complot
once again the gaining of political power. And once again there
are the realizations:
The Shah is too strong. The Shah cannot be pressured
or cajoled into following our plans. Perhaps we should
meet again next week after more thought. Be so kind as
to have more tea. May your shadow never grow less. God
be with you.2
Perhaps the most effective political activity in which the de-
moralized but still active counter-elite engage is subscribing
to newspaper clipping services in Europe0 3 These services scan
American and European publications for reports of oppositional
activities and forward them to subscribers in Iran while the
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subscribers survive by the vicarious satisfaction and stoked
hopes from reports of anti-regime activities (usually "pseudo
events") which exist in the mass media of the West.4 They pur-
sue little tangible activity of their own and bide time.
Exclusion from the political process may result in
depoliticization. This phenomenon resembles demoralization but
shows added symptoms of political withdrawal. The demoralized
counter-elite lack the psychological or organizational means to
be effective but continue to participate in politics. The
depoliticized segments of the counter-elite also lack the means
to be effective but recognize their deficiencies and respond by
turning their backs on the political process. Many intellec-
tuals, for example, " . . . have returned to the sullen quies-
cence which is their tradition whenever a hostile regime is in
power. They participate in the economic life of the state, but
without enthusiasm."'5 Others have withdrawn from fear of the con-
sequences of sedulous counter-elite activities.
With the small private sector and the pervasive presence
of the Government, locating a sanctuary for withdrawal from the
political process can be a difficult task. Here again, the
regime's preference for inclusivity is salutary, for as a counter-
elite becomes depoliticized to the point where he can function
in a political setting without expressing his intense aliena-
tion from the elite, he will be allowed a position within the
bureaucracy. At present, the University of Tehran serves as such
a haven for depoliticized Iranians. A number of professors and
directors of research institutes at the University were ardent
77
supporters of Mossadegh and, in fact, served as ministers under
his Premiership. One well-known professor served not only as
Mossadegh's Home Minister but also as his supporter to the very
end. Together with six others of the faithful, he spirited the
beleaguered Mossadegh over the back wall of the Prime Minister's
home, then under seige by pro-monarchy army troops. Despite
these acts, once viewed as high treason, he and others of simi-
lar stamp retain their posts: partly because some are out-
standing scholars; partly, no doubt, because of the need for
trained faculty members; but basically from a desire to undercut
the formation of counter-elites by holding out the possibilities
or realities of cooptation.
One result of this policy for the regime, however, is that
the fidelity of the university's faculty must be suspect. This
appears as one principal explanation for the refusal of the
regime to expand the University of Tehran. Despite the regime's
control over the social backgrounds of the entering students, it
is harder for the regime to control the instruction which those
elite children receive. Thus, the response of the Shah has been
to expand the university system, where necessary, by building
completely new institutions outside the capital city with a
younger and previously uninvolved faculty.6 (Presumably, the
recent Ph.D.'s from America and Doctorates from France have
matured in the more pacific, post-Mossadegh period.)
Others of the depoliticized withdraw from politics to
journalism. But here they also threaten the regime's efforts
to control the mass media. A particularly talented and prolific
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journalist withdrew from the making of political news to the
reporting of foreign events. Even this proved too upsetting to
the regime, hich forbade his further writing; he now publishes
books!
The regime's concept of an ideal sanctuary for the depoli-
ticized, then, is a position where some contribution to Iranian
development can be made, which provides no opportunity for com-
munication with sizable numbers of politically active or influ-
ential persons or to the urban masses, but which is not totally
isolated from the scrutiny of the elite. Various ministerial
departments and university research posts have been found to fill
these desiderata. Whatever the occupations of the demoralized
or depoliticized, it appears that these potential counter-elites
are rarely successful in completely eliminating their political
alienation. With the loosening of political control in Tehran,
counter-elite activity could reassert itself. But the years
following the overthrow of Mossadegh witnessed a steady growth
in the power of the regime and the control it exercised over
the national political expression. Political parties were
banned and replaced by the Melliyun (Nationalists) and Mardom
(People's) Parties, created by the Shah and led by two of his
most trusted elite. Press laws were decreed and censorship
instituted. The Senate was convened (which gave His Majesty
more control over the legislature). The State Security and
Intelligence Organization (SAVAK) was established with American
aid. And the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were vastly
strengthened.
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With this newly created capability, the Government moved
to eliminate the support and popularity once enjoyed by its
most serious opponent--Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. Yet, 1960 and
1961 were years of growing political turmoil, culminating in
the overthrow of a Cabinet, the appointment as Premier of
Dr. Ali Amini (although personally mistrusted by the Shah) and
the holding on 16 May 1961 of a public congress of the formerly
outlawed National Front. This entire period was not the result
of an anomic outburst reflecting the desperation and fervor
of the urban poor and Moselm clergy, as was the making of the
June 1963 riots. (The response to the latter was uncompli-
cated--mobilize the army and put down the rioters by force.)
But the 1960-1961 turmoil was far more perturbing to His Im-
perial Majesty, for it represented the resurgence of the
supposedly demoralized and depoliticized. At present these
demoralized and depoliticized groups are again dormant in
Iran. How long this stagnation of political activity will
remain is uncertain. What is certain, in the context of
Iranian politics, is its artificiality.
Some say that the emotions blocked from expression by the
quiescence and widespread depoliticization have been displaced
elsewhere in Iranian life. The nearly perpetual grumblings and
other verbalizations of discontent are one outlet for these
tensions. And as long as they remain at the verbal level and
out of the mass media, they are tolerated by the regime. The
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Shah has publicly acknowledged this toleration: "I believe in
balancing toughness towards subversive organizations with
leniency as to expressions of individual viewpoints." 7
One Iranian social scientist has accounted for even the
appallingly dangerous Tehran traffic in this manner, Aggressive
driving, he argued, provides a release to emotions thwarted from
political expression. Automobile and traffic infractions provide
a politically discreet means of acting out counter-elite senti-
ments.8 And, finally, the automobile represents a tremendous
democraticizing force, removing the power and status considera-
tions otherwise operative in the social structure. Once behind
the wheel, more Iranians are more nearly equal,9
EXILE
Elites who refuse cooptation and fail to succumb to
demoralization or depoliticization are subjected to yet another
regime response, exile, a response which results in their exclu-
sion from the political process. While this method of isolating
one's opponents has a long history, its full development is a
product of only the twentieth century.10 At present, it has a
number of variants, the most notorious form being the banishment
of individuals whom the regime deems politically undesirable,
In 1964, for example, Ayatollah Khomeini was swooped upon by the
Iranian police, put aboard a plane at a military airport and
taken to Turkey, where, with the cooperation of Turkish authori-
ties, he is being kept under house arrest.
Khomeini's fame and popularity is such that SAVAK took the
unusual step of issuing the following public statement:
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Since according to reliable information and sufficient
evidence, Mr. Khomeini's attitude and provocations have
been considered contrary to the interests of the people
and to the security, independence, and territorial
integrity of the State, he has been exiled from Iran
effective November 4, 1964.11
Ayatollah Rouhallah al-Mousavi al-Khomeini
Khomeini, an influential Shi'a mullah of the theological
center of Qum, first came to public attention in 1961 following
the death of Ayatollah Borujerdi. Khomeini was one of several
principal contenders to succeed the venerated leader of the
Shilites and began to issue public statements in opposition to
governmental decisions, He branded the plan to enfranchise women
as violating their station in Islam and was arrested in 1962 for
fiery speeches against the Local Council Election Bill. In
January 1963 (before the national referendum which was to pass
on the Shah's six-point White Revolution) he was arrested for
issuing pamphlets asserting that land reform was contrary to
Islam, which guaranteed the sanctity of private property. In
March of the same year, theological students at Qum held public
demonstrations which resulted in the arrest of their leaders and
the occupation of mosques, shrines, and theological schools by
members of the security police.12
The religious holidays of Moharram were a time of
increased passions as the devout anguished over the martyrdom
of Hossein and Hassan, the sons and, according to the Shi'ites,
the rightful successors of Ali to the Caliphate. Khomeini's
picture covered the bazaars of Iran as a symbol of the type of
opposition to illegitimate authority offered by Hossein and
82
Hassan. The authorities waited until the early morning hours of
June 4, after the end of the holy days, and arrested Khomeini at
Qum, Within two hours, crowds of protesters began to form before
the bazaars of Tehran and by 10:00 a.m. the troops had opened
fire. The rioting spread to Meshed, Qum, Isfahan, and Shiraz
but was finally put down with heavy loss of life over the course
of three days.
Khomeini was detained until August 3, when he was re-
leased to house arrest. SAVAK again issued a public statement:
. . understanding has been reached between security
authorities on the one side and Their EminencesKhomeini,
Qumi and Mahallati on the other according to wnich the
gentlemen will cease to interfere in political matters;
and since this understanding has given full assurance
that the gentlemen will not act contrary to the interests
and law and order of the State, they have now been trans-
ferred to private houses.13
Whatever the nature of the "understanding" reached, few of the
faithful were convinced that the three Ayatollahs would refrain
from involvement in politics. SAVAK's attempt to eliminate their
popularity by associating the three ulema with the Government
was a failure. And so was SAVAK's attempts to isolate Khomeini
from future political participation.
On the eve of the elections for a new parliament in Octo-
ber of 1963 (to replace the session which was dissolved by His
Imperial Majesty in May of 1961), Khomeini was again taken from
his home. Having charged government interference in the elec-
tions, he ordered his followers to boycott the vote. This time,
Khomeini was held until May of 1964, when SAVAK announced that
yet another "understanding" had been reached0 Upon his release,
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Khomeini denounced the understanding, claiming that as a good
Shi'ite, he was entitled to the use of tagiyah, or dissimula-
tion, to conceal his true feelings, inasmuch as the agreement
was extracted under "duress." Nonetheless, His Eminence re-
mained silent for some five months.14
In October of 1964, the Majles passed, in a matter of
hours after its first submission, a bill to grant diplomatic
immunity to American military personnel. In the ensuing days,
that august body voted to accept a loan of $200,000,000 from
the United States for the purchase of military equipment. The
connection was too blatant and too reminiscent of the capitula-
tions which had limited Iran's national sovereignty until their
abolition in 1928. The Ayatollah responded with vitriolic
censure.
. . the Majles approved . . . this most disgraceful
decree . . . thus placing the Iranian people under
American bondage.
. . . Why? Because America is the land of the Dollar
and because the Iranian Government needs dollars . . . .
. . . Today, when colonial territories are bravely
freeing the bonds that have chained them, the so-called
progressive Majles . . . votes for the most shameful1gnd
offending decrees of ill-reputed governments . .
The circulation of this speech in pamphlet form was a
threatening indignity to the Government. Their response was
Khomeini's exile. Of interest to us is
(a) the total unwillingness of the regime to allow
Khomeini to serve as a critic of the Government's
policies and thus a focus for counter-elite
sentiment;
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(b) the dogged persistence of Khomeini in pursuing a
course which he must have realized was intolerable
to the regime and likely to lead to retribution;
(c) the enduring forbearance of the Government over a
period of some three and a half years, in hopes,
undoubtedly, of coopting the Ayatollah;
(d) the relatively non-violent and mild punishment--
exile--which was administered when regime efforts to
seduce and coopt had failed; and
(e) that through the entire period of detention, imprison-
ment, and, ultimately, exile, Ayatollah Khomeini was
never officially charged with any wrongdoing and
never brought to trial.
SELF-IMPOSED EXILE
In addition to this type of exile, which might be
described as manifest, punitive banishment, there are other forms
which the practice assumes in Iran. A common means of excluding
counter-elites from the political process is what might be con-
sidered a self-imposed exile. The process consists,
basically, of the individual's leaving the country before the
eruption of an open conflict with the regime.
General Teimour Bakhtiar
A well-known example may be found in General Teimour
Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar is the son of a leading khan of the Bakhtiari
tribes who served as Governor of the Bakhtiari regions as well
as serving several terms in the Majles. Educated at French
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schools and St. Cyr, Bakhtiar entered the Iranian army and rose
through the ranks. With the marriage in 1951 of Soraya, also a
Bakhtiari, to His Imperial Majesty, the outlook for the young
officer improved. After the overthrow of Mossadegh (in which
he played no role), he was promoted to General and,in short
order, to Military Governor of Tehran and Director of Army
Intelligence.
In 1957, when the State Security and Intelligence Organi-
zation was established with American aid, Bakhtiar was the
logical choice as its director. From 1957 to 1961, he streng-
thened the organization and his own position within the Iranian
elite. But he was unable to prevent the political disquiet which
began in the summer of 1960, resulting in the cancellation of the
Majles election in September. That autumn was a period of in-
creasing turmoil with demands for new elections, free of the
control of the secret police.
The second round of elections for the Twentieth Session
of the Majles began in January of 1961, but were as poorly
managed as the previous ones. By the time of the Shahanshah's
inauguration of the Majles on February 20th, the National Front,
Dr. Ali Amini (Iranian Ambassador to Washington and former
Minister of Finance for Mossadegh), Dr. Mozaffar Bagha'i (an
ex-Tudeh and head of the Zahmat-keshan or Toiler's Party) and
other groups had boycotted the elections. Students closed the
University of Tehran with widespread demonstrations, and the
National Front sponsored an ominously successful general strike
in Tehran.
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His Majesty responded to the mounting political chaos and
the growing power of the counter-elites (and many Iranians claim
to the inauguration of President Kennedy in January) in charac-
teristic fashion. He made overtures to the dissident counter-
elites by taking a number of apparently liberalizing steps,
without, however, allowing any fundamental diminution in his own
power.
As in the turmoil following his accession in 1941 and the
threat from Mossadegh in 1951, the Shah responded to counter-
elite pressures in 1961 by manipulating his opulence. In 1941,
the Shah had offered the Crown lands to the State. In 1951, he
had offered to distribute the Crown lands to the peasants. In
1961, he renewed the distribution of these lands and placed the
Pahlevi Foundation on a solid financial footing. He gave up to
the Foundation assets which he personally owned and which were
valued at 135 million dollars. 16 Oil tankers, hotels, a toll
bridge, banks, factories, and even orphanages were included in
the capital of the Foundation.17
In the Royal Decree which transferred the assets to a
perpetual endowment, His Majesty specified the purposes it would
serve:
In view of our constant endeavour and firm belief in
seeking Almighty God's blessing, the welfare of our
nation, for the peace of the soul of our great father,
His Late Majesty Reza Shah the Great, for the glory and
happiness of the noble Iranian people and country, it
has been our constant effort since our accession to the
throne to raise the level of knowledge, to improve
health and sanitation, to develop agriculture, and to
give help to the needy and contribute to other chari-
table works. 1 8
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The Shah-parastis (pro-monarchists) and the foreign press viewed
the gesture as one of magnanimous devotion to the welfare of his
people.19 The more cynical and the dissident counter-elites
wondered how His Majesty had accumulated such sums to begin with;
charged that, in any case, the assets turned over to the Founda-
tion were only a tiny fraction--in the neighborhood of 10 per
cent--of the Shah's personal fortune; and that by making himself
"guardian" of the endowment, there was little likelihood that the
funds would be used for their stated purposes. 20
In addition to subjecting the entire nation to the same
type of material seduction with which individual elites or poten-
tial counter-elites were coopted, His Majesty responded to the
political pressures in other ways. General Abdollah Hedayat,
Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff and number two man in the
armed forces after the Shah; General Alavi Kia, Chief of Army
Intelligence; a number of lesser military personnel; and General
Bakhtiar were simultaneously removed from their posts.
The dismissal of the last was particularly satisfying to
all parties in the turmoil, save the General. Apparently, the
Shahanshah was furious with the performance of SAVAK's chief for
his inability to hold pacific elections and, basically, to ful-
fill his principal responsibility, the maintenance of "State
Security." The counter-elites held Bakhtiar chiefly responsible
for the increasing terrorism and violence in Iranian political
life. And, finally, His Imperial Majesty is likely to have
assumed that Bakhtiar's dismissal would please the incoming,
liberal, American President. Whatever the ultimate reasons,
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the dismissal of the Generals quieted public unrest, at least
temporarily.
Nearly two months later, however, on May 2, 1961, Tehran
teachers struck for higher salaries and demonstrated in front of
the Majles. On the next day, demonstrations continued and
clashes broke out between the teachers and security forces.
Almost immediately, one of the striking teachers was killed.
His death galvanized the waverers and schools throughout Tehran
were shut down as the body of the newly created martyr was
paraded through the streets. His Majesty again responded.
Prime Minister Sharif-Emami, an engineer with service in the
Iranian railways and Plan Organization, was dismissed and Dr.
Amini, popular with the demonstrators (and with American offi-
cials), was asked to form a government.
General agreement exists that the appointment of Amini
could have come about only as a result of the Shah's perception
of intense disquietude. Amini was, and remains, deeply mis-
trusted by the monarch. He is known to favor limitations on
the power of the throne. He had served under Mossadegh, and
although no member of the National Front, was not viewed as hos-
tile to it. 2 1 He was reputed to be devoted to general civil
liberties; was a man known for profound personal integrity as
well as great forcefulness. (A story widely circulated at the
time of Amini's cabinet concerned Reza Shah, Looking back over
the entire one hundred and thirty years of Qajar rule, Reza
Shah is reputed to have claimed that the only tlantin the entire
Qajar family--the only Qajar with the manly virtues of integrity,
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energy, and vigor--was Fakhr ul Dowleh, the daughter of Mozaffar
ed din Shah and Amini's mother')
If the Shah had misgivings and the National Front expec-
tations, both were proven wrong by subsequent events. Amini was
unable to shake the power of the Shah or alter the priorities
which the Shah had for national political and economic life. The
National Front, initially buoyed by the printing of Mossadegh's
picture in Tehran's newspapers, for the first time in seven
years, was soon disenchanted.22 A mass meeting scheduled for the
21st of July was closed down by army troops and their leaders
arrested.
By the end of 1961, Amini had antagonized all major sec-
tors of the elite. The landed aristocracy and members of the
Majles and Senate, led by Sardar Fakher Hekmat, six times Speaker
of the lower house, and Mohsen Sadr (Sadr ol Ashraf), President
of the Senate, expressed intense hostility to the closing of the
Parliament, the failure to hold new elections, and the land
reform program being vigorously pursued by Amini's Minister of
Agriculture. The clergy and religiously-oriented politicians
and bazaaris had as their spokesman Seyyed Jaafar Behbehani, the
son of an Ayatollah and grandson of the widely revered Seyyed
Abdollah Behbehani, the leading liberal cleric in the struggle
to wrest a Constitution from the Qajars. They also protested the
land reform and lack of elections. In addition, they were con-
cerned with an alleged burgeoning of Baha'i influence within the
upper reaches of the Government and deviation from the principles
of Islam. The National Front and other opposition groupings
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expressed their animosity through Allahyar Saleh. Minister in
numerous cabinets, Ambassador to Washington, and an ardent sup-
porter of Mossadegh, Salehts ardent nationalism bridled at the
alleged penetration of American influence in Iran and the severe
curtailment of civil liberties which prevented opposition poli-
ticians from functioning. Finally, a strong military clique
made up of the deposed generals was led by Teimour Bakhtiar.
They were incensed by their dismissals and the allegations of
corruption and incompetence with which their dismissals were
explained.
Not surprisingly, although the Shah continued to offer
support publicly, time was running out for Amini. In the summer
of 1962, he was faced with a budget crisis. The Shah's refusal
to reduce military expenditures and the unwillingness of the
United States to bridge the deficit proved insoluble. Amini
tendered his resignation. In a move totally unexpected by
Iranian politicians and, apparently, the Prime Minister himself,
the Shah accepted the resignation. Assadollah Alam was asked to
form a new Government.
Meanwhile, however, General Bakhtiar was reputed to have
been politically active in the capital. Rumors circulated that
the teachers' demonstrations had emanated from the intrigues of
Bakhtiar, hoping to seize power. When he failed in this, he
carried on increasingly intensive clandestine activities against
the Prime Minister. Manifestations of the underlying tensions
soon became obvious. At a press conferenceh Prime Minister Amini
presented his and the regime's official disapproval of the recent
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Indian occupation of Goa. Some days later, Bakhtiar convened
his own press conference to congratulate Prime Minister Nehru
on India's assertion of her national sovereignty,23
Amini responded by pressing the Shah for cuts in the
military budget and drastic reductions in the size of the armed
forces and officer corps. Rumor had it that 300 senior officers
were placed on permanent retirement. Bakhtiar's response was to
step up his anti-Government activity. It is even reported that
Bakhtiar planned to engineer a coup d'etat against the Shah him-
self. In early January 1962, Bakhtiar was reported in contact
with the National Front. He was subsequently implicated in
clashes between university students and the army which led to
the closing of the University of Tehran.
Whatever the bases for these outpourings from Tehran's
rumor networks, His Imperial Majesty took them to heart. On
January 26, 1962, the Shah confronted Bakhtiar in a face-to-face
showdown, whereupon the General left immediately for Europe.24
Bakhtiar has been living in Europe since then, presumably
enjoying the resources placed there for this very eventuality
when he was Director of SAVAK. He maintains indirect contact
with segments of the Iranian polity but has never returned to
Iran, at least openly. During the 1963 riots, he was observed
flying from Switzerland to Baghdad--undoubtedly to be closer to
the seat of power should his opportunity arise.
On August 15, 1967, the Office of Military Prosecution
announced that General Bakhtiar had been under investigation
for " . . . amassing a vast fortune illegally" while head of
L
92
SAVAK. In addition, he is charged with "engaging in illegal
activities . . . to further his own personal ends . . ." In
the nature of Iranian justice, " . . . orders have been issued
to confiscate all his properties while the relative case is
passing through judicial channels and charges are being inves-
tigated against him in court." 25 With the passage of years
Bakhtiar's power in the military has crumbled. He can now be
tried--in absentia--and found guilty.
While General Bakhtiar is a particular instance of
self-imposed exilethere are entire classes of persons who re-
ceive the encouragement of the regime for the self-same resolu-
tion of their counter-elite postures. Tribal khans and
politicians espousing what the regime considers to be radical
ideologies, who decide to live abroad, are not discouraged in
their resolve. This same phenomenon is responsible for a large
proportion of the Iranian students' remaining abroad. It has
been estimated by an Iranian Government official that approxi-
mately 50 per cent of the privately supported students from
middle class families, 60 per cent of Government and foundation
supported students and an equal percentage of privately supported
upper class students, and 90 per cent of students who have
failed academically "do not return to Iran" from Europe and the
United States. 2 6 It is unquestionably true that higher wages,
better living conditions, and the pleadings of foreign spouses
all coalesce to keep the student away from his country. But the
widespread political disaffection of the students in Europe and
America, heightened by National Front agitation, is an important
93
factor. It becomes highly relevant when the Government openly
discourages the more active and vocal of Iran's critics from
returning. Inability to find any but the most menial of jobs in
Tehran discourages many of those activists who fail to heed the
Government's advice.
FOREIGN POSTS
If Government-imposed exile or self-imposed residence
abroad exclude many of the unassimilated or unassimilatable
potential counter-elites, a third variant for excluding these
elites most resembles the American corporate practice of "demo-
tion to Chairman of the Board." In Iran the variant takes the
form of assigning the persona non grata to a diplomatic post
abroad. In this fashion, the banished person is not only re-
moved from the local political scene, but he is also offered a
glamorous substitute, continuing to receive material and status
rewards from the political system which has effectively elimi-
nated him. He continues to be in the service of the Shah and his
behavior may legitimately be scrutinized. Finally, while he is
segregated from his power base or political following, those
followers will likely be mollified by dint of his new and pres-
tigious post.
The practice has a lengthy history in Iran but recently
has been developed as a more frequently employed device. This
is partly a reflection of the growing power of His Imperial
Majesty but is equally dependent on the greater availability of
foreign posts. The post-World War II expansion of international
relations and of Iran's role in the international political
system has opened myriad positions for such exiles. More than
fifty Iranian embassies, the United Nations and its multitude
of regional offices and special programs, the Central Treaty
Organization, and a number of Iran's other international obliga-
tions all boast sizeable delegations of Iranians. And His
Imperial Majesty has been quick to use the new opportunities.
Dr. Hassan Arsanjani
One of the most notorious and informative of recent cases
concerns Dr. Hassan Arsanjani. Dr. Arsanjani was appointed by
the Shahanshah as Ambassador to the Government of Italy in early
June of 1963 and served in Rome until late 1964 when he was re-
placed. Returning to Tehran, Dr. Arsanjani has busied himself
with the private practice of law. But it is not for his ambas-
sadorship or law practice that he is remembered. Dr. Arsanjani
was the "ambitious and ebullient"2 7 Minister of Agriculture who
launched Iran's land reform during the premiership of Dr. Amini,
continued it through the early term of Amini's successor, or-
ganized a Farmer's Congress in Tehran, and then found his
unwillingly submitted resignation accepted. Herein lies a
lesson in Iranian politics . . . .
Hassan Arsanjani burst rather suddenly on the Iranian
political scene. In 1945, at the age of 23, he founded the
Azadi (Liberty) Group and began the publication of the Daily
Darya (Sea) in which he propounded notions resembling his later
land reforms. In the same year, his political group merged with
I
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the Tudeh, but Arsanjani, personally, refused their overtures.
He was then elected to the next Majles (in 1946) but the cre-
dentials committee denied him membership. He was later to recall:
Before I could take my seat . . . the landlords and their
stooges who were then all in the Majles sent me threats
that I should either withdraw my words and theories and
take my seat in the Parliament or be thrown out so that
I couldn't carry on in the manner which they considered
most outrageous and lacking in decorum and precedent.2 8 .
Characteristically, Arsanjani refused to recant and went into
relative obscurity. While he worked for the Agricultural Bank
and eventually rose to head its Rural Cooperatives branch, he
pursued political activities by supporting the careers of Qavam
and Razmara. The latter was made Prime Minister in 1951, but
was assassinated before Arsanjani could secure a place of power.
Qavam was appointed Prime Minister after the first dismissal of
Mossadegh in 1952 and Arsanjani accepted the post of Deputy Prime
Minister. But Qavam fell in three days and Arsanjani was once
more forcibly retired from politics.
In 1958, Arsanjani attached himself to Ali Amini. He
formed an organization whose express purpose was to advance Amini
to the premiership. This plan too collapsed, for Amini was im-
plicated, by the regime, with a plot to overthrow the Government,
General Gharani, then head of Army intelligence and the alleged
ring leader, was imprisoned. Amini was dismissed from his post
as Ambassador to Washington. And Arsanjani was also detained.
Finally, in May, 1961, when Amini reached his goal as
Prime Minister, he invited Arsanjani to take the Agriculture
portfolio. Although it is reported that the Shah was reluctant
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to accept Arsanjani, who by then had a reputation for extremism
and decidedly unpopular causes, Amini's urgings apparently
carried His Majesty's misgivings and Arsanjani joined the Cabi-
net. Within two weeks, he had organized and convoked a Land
Reform Seminar to formulate plans for the implementation of steps
which he had contemplated since 1945. At the Seminar, he made
his position perfectly clear:
One can no longer continue with this system from the
Middle Ages . . . . In these land reforms we are
facing the reactionary front which has wasted fifty
years of the Parliamentary regime and have now con-
fronted us with the choice of a "red" or "white" revo-
lution. If the 29untry remains in its present state,
it will explode.
The remainder of 1961 was spent in drafting legislation
and experimenting with land reform and peasant cooperatives.
In order to maintain the momentum which his appointment had
engendered, however, Arsanjani prevailed upon the Shah to renew
the distribution of Crown lands. The Crown lands or Royal Domain
were primarily acquired by Reza Shah and encompassed some of the
most fertile land in Iran. These villages were located in a
number of provinces but were primarily concentrated in the
luxuriant jangal (jungle) bordering the Caspian Sea. By the
time of Reza Shah's abdication, more than 2,000 villages passed
to the control of the new monarch. Using a measure of 4.8 per-
sons per household,31 some 235,800 persons were in the direct
service of His Imperial Majesty qua landlord'
After the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, a general out-
cry was heard in the capital over the devious and often ruthless
means which the deposed tyrant had used to acquire the property
Province Villages Families
Fars 19 1,200
Kerman 191 4,250
West Azarbaijan 315 6,365
Tehran 428 4,424
Gilan and Mazandaran 1,214 32,878
Total 2,167 49,117
which caught his eye. The peasants of Mazandaran even rose in
revolt against the Royal Estates, beating officials and burning
houses built on orders of Reza Shah. In response, the new king
announced that the Crown lands would be turned over to the Gov-
ernment for return to their original owners. Apparently, a few
of the estates which had been most blatantly confiscated were
restored to the injured parties. But gradually, the center of
power shifted back to the Monarch. In 1949, after an attempt
was made on his life, the Shah outlawed the Tudeh Party and
withal silenced his principal critics. And, less than one month
later, the Majles passed a law returning the Royal Estates to the
Shahanshah. When confronted with a threat to his throne in the
form of Prime Minister Mossadegh, however, the Shah remembered
those lands.
TABLE 3.1
NUMBER OF VILLAGES AND FAMILIES CONSTITUTING
THE CROWN LANDS, BY PROVINCE30
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In 1951, His Majesty announced a scheme to distribute the
Royal Estates. Farmers working land in his villages were to re-
ceive deeds for the fields they were already tilling. Consider-
ably reduced annual remittances would still be made, but in lieu
of rents, they would be considered as mortgage payments. After
twenty-five years, the new landlords would receive a fee simple
title deed and be outright owners of the land. In order to super-
vise the collection of the annual payments, the Shah established
a Development and Rural Cooperatives Bank, and directed that its
assets be invested in development projects, especially those re-
lating to agriculture.
In February of 1951, the Shah distributed the first of his
villages at Davood Abad, Varamin, not far from Tehran. Almost
immediately the plan was attacked by Prime Minister Mossadegh and
his supporters. They charged that the Shah was attempting to
make political capital at their expense. Moreover, by selling
lands originally acquired without payment, His Majesty would
obtain prodigious funds to be used for his personal welfare
rather than for development spending, as the king claimed.32
The Shah eventually acceded to pressure from Mossadegh and placed
the Royal Domains under the supervision of the Government.
With the overthrow of Mossadegh, the lands once again
reverted to monarchic control. And once again, the Shah announced
his intention of distributing them. By the end of 1957, however,
a total of only 107 villages had been transferred to the peasant
cultivators. The next year, His Majesty announced still another
plan for dealing with his villages. "His Majesty decided to
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establish a Pahlevi Foundation to employ for charitable pur-
poses the profits of such Pahlevi Estates as could not be
distributed or divided.,"33 And so the Crown Lands Distribu-
tion program rested until the political turmoil of 1961, when
Arsanjani enlisted the firm support of His Majesty. The
removal of the lands from the Foundation, and their distribu-
tion (as well as the deeding of major new assets to the Pahlevi
Foundation) followed. Anew, the Royal Personage began leaving
Tehran to distribute title deeds to his own peasants.
This scheme was actually the second attempt to effect
land reform in the country. Originally, Reza Shah had begun
a land distribution scheme in the early 1930's, with a view
to enforced habitation of the migrant tribes on public domain
lands. They were to be deeded parcels of such land on condition
that they agree to reside permanently on their land and to en-
gage in full-time farming. For want of cadastral surveys and
tribal acquiescence, the plan was a total failure. Faced with
the task of drafting new legislation, Arsanjani considered
the experiences of these previous programs. He also had
before him the text of a land reform measure already law,
having been approved by Parliament in 1955, but that law he
could rejecte out of hand as it had been passed by a landlord-
packed Majles. But the situation in 1961 would be different.
After Amini assumed the Premiership, the new Majles was subject
to almost universal charges of a rigged election. The clamor
rose until His Majesty dissolved the Majles, but he did not pro-
vide for new elections.3 4 The Shah later provided Amini with a
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decree allowing him to govern by fiat. It was under this blanket
authorization that on January 15, 1962, Arsanjani announced that
the Land Reform Bill had become law, by Royal proclamation.
The new law tried to cut through the problems of the
Iranian countryside. It specified that each family could retain
one village irrespective of size; that the peasants in the excess
villages would receive title to the land they were then tilling;
that peasants would make annual payments to the Government for
fifteen years, after which they would own their land; that the
ex-landlords would be reimbursed for their lands with fifteen-
year Government interest-bearing bonds; and that the Government
would establish rural cooperatives to assist the peasants in ful-
filling this new agricultural responsibility.
Neither Arsanjani nor His Majesty lost additional time in
carrying out this decree. In March, the Shah traveled to
Maragheh in the northwest of Iran and personally handed land
deeds to peasants representing 520 new owners. 35 Arsanjani
warned the landlords against obstructionism and censured them
for converting the peasants into "fifteen million helpless and
semi-starved people." 36 As the spring of 1962 waned, the pace
of land distribution accelerated. Both the Shah and Arsanjani
flew from one end of Iran to the other distributing deeds
to Turcomens, Qashqais, Baluchis, Mazandaranis, Shirazis. But
then, in July, Prime Minister resigned. To the surprise of
political observers, Arsanjani was named as Agricultural Minister
in the next cabinet, under Alam.
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His reappointment confirmed the belief that his power no
longer depended on Amini, but rather was rooted in the Shah him-
self. With this new vote of confidence, the Agriculture Minister
intensified his efforts, the program of land distribution, and
the turmoil in the countryside. By the end of the year, Arsan-
jani could report that 500,000 hectares of land had been dis-
tributed to 35,000 peasant families and 1,080 cooperatives had
been established, 3 7
But Arsanjani's paramount triumph, which ironically also
marked the denouement of his power, was the Congress of Rural
Cooperatives which the Minister ran in early January 1963. Some
4,700 delegates gathered in Tehran to thank His Majesty and
praise his Minister, Most of the delegates were chairmen or
officers of the rural cooperatives; as such, they represented
the elite of the new owner-cultivators. After days of speech-
making and meetings, the delegates unanimously passed eight
resolutions,
The major points of the resolutions were:
(1) " The farmers take an oath to give their last
breath to the protection of the Constitutional
Monarchy in Iran;
(2) "We . 0 . resolve that the prime duty of the Govern-
ment is the observance of the U.N. Charter on Human
Rights . 0 0 ;
(3) " . 0 . the reconstruction of the Iranian economic
and social structure in favor of the Toilers of Iran
is the prime task . . .;
I
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(4) " . . . unity of all the farmers is a necessity . . .;
(5) ". . . all should join the nighty class of rural
cooperatives . . . "
(6) " . . . rural organizations should be based on the
economic interests of the rural people . . .
(7) " . 0 . We unanimously confirm and approve the six
laws offered in the referendum by His Imperial
Majesty; and
(8) " thanks and appreciation for the selfless efforts
and sacrifice of Dr. Hassan Arsanjani0 n 38
Shortly after the Congress, Arsanjani sought and received
permission for a three weeks' rest trip to Europe. As soon as he
had departed, a number of ominous signs materialized. Security
forces disrupted the work of land reform officials. Orders
contradicting previous instructions of the Minister permeated
through the Ministry. The Cabinet was reshuffled and new Minis-
ters, inimical to Arsanjani, appointed. Finally, a high level
conference was arranged which advocated economic programs opposed
by the Minister.
Arsanjani extended his stay but the Shah cabled him to
return, and on March 1, Arsanjani was received in audience.
At the meeting Arsanjani reputedly demanded $100,000,000 for
the formation of cooperatives; centralization of finance,
planning, and administration of all land reform programs under
his jurisdiction; and various cabinet changes to enhance Minis-
terial harmony.3 9 The Shah promptly refused and immediately
"accepted" Arsanjani's resignation.
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Fundamentally, Arsanjani's growing power with the peasants
was clearly intolerable. But for the same reason a crude effort
to destroy the man was hazardous. A too blatant showdown, with
the aggrieved ex-Minister left in the capital to rally his
peasants, might be embarrassing. But his appointment as Ambas-
sador was ideal. This would enforce separation from his rural-
supporters and erode his power base. Simultaneously, his being
coopted by the regime, evinced by his service in the lucrative
and sinecure-like post of Ambassador in Rome, would defile his
reputation among the alienated peasantry and urban liberals.
Arsanjani was dismissed from the Agricultural Ministry. He was
appointed Ambassador. He left with tumult and returned slightly
over a year later, unobtrusively.4 0
There were several collateral reasons for Arsanjani's
dismissal, but, principally, it appears that His Imperial Majesty
resented and feared the power which Arsanjani was collecting
independently of the throne, based on peasants and urban liberals.
The earnest support which Arsanjani had received at the Congress
was most telling. Also, the resolutions of the Congress too
strongly reflected the personal ideology of Arsanjani, under-
played the importance of the monarch, stressed the kinds of
radical and divisive reforms which His Majesty had always sought
to avoid, and suggested in their pleas for civil liberties that
those virtues were somehow missing in Iran. The emphasis on
"Constitutional" and "Human Rights" also hinted at a major bid
for the support of urban political groups. Finally, before his
departure for Europe, Arsanjani had played a major role in the
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successful National Referendum which was held on January 26,
1963. He demonstrated a capability to provide thousands of
peasants at short notice for pro-Referendum rallies. His ability
to deliver these peasants to Tehran for political purposes was
especially foreboding.
Combined with his reputation for demagogy and his public
performances which fed that reputation, Arsanjani left His
Majesty with little choice. As the Shah made every effort to
coopt him into the elite, Arsanjani seems to have fashioned a
power position calculated to place himself in the elite irres-
pective of the wishes of the king and immune from the latter's
control. But a lesson which must haunt the mind of the Shah is
the peril to his life and his throne posed by elites with inde-
pendent power bases. For example, fears of the senior Qashqai
tribal chiefs, Nasser Khan and Khosrow Khan, have plagued the
Shah for three decades. Their ability to influence national
politics with tribal power has resulted in European exile for
both. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1962, their tribal devotees
were accused of following the instructions of the Khans by
killing Engineer Malek Abadi, a land reform official. They were
also denounced for leading a tribal revolt which harassed the
Government for eight months in 1963.
Another example of a politician using an independent power
base for opposition to the Shah is a man whose very name the Shah
refuses to mention because 0 0 it had become plain . . . soon
after his appointment as Prime Minister that he wanted to destroy
my dynasty."41 His Majesty clearly recognizes that Mossadegh
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nearly succeeded in this goal because he had mammoth mass sup-
port . . 0 Q
How could anyone be against Mossadegh?
He would enrich everybody, he would fight against
the foreigner, he would secure our rights. No wonder
students, intellectuals, people from all walks of life
flocked to his banner.
With such promises Mossadegh carried everything be-
fore him . . . no one could stand against him.4 2
In the final showdown, Mossadegh failed because he was unable to
secure control of the Army. Again, the lesson was not lost on
the king.
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal
Arsanjani is not alone in enjoying this form of exile
which results in being posted to a lucrative foreign post. Nor
are the roots for such exile necessarily located in His Majes-
ty's fear of independent bases of power. Neither are its sub-
jects necessarily under quarantine from their indigenous
supporters.
Dr, Manouchehr Eghbal, for example, was sent to Europe
after mishandling the first elections to the Twentieth Majles.
He had been the target of severe criticism from all sections of
the political spectrum for his gross and illegal interference
in the balloting. Under mounting general discontent, he re-
signed in August of 1960, after completing forty-one months in
office, the longest tenure of any Prime Minister to serve under
Mohammed Reza Shah. In part as punishment for the poorly run
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elections, but primarily as a reward for his long service and,
no doubt, in part to help Eghbal weather political opposition
by removing him, the Shah determined to post him abroad.4 3
The pressure on the Shah, both from Amini and the politi-
cal chaos following his appointment, is manifest, however, in the
various posts to which Eghbal was assigned and then withdrawn.
Initially, it was announced that Eghbal would go as Ambassador
to the Court of St. James. Shortly therafter, Amini took office
and widespread arrests took place. His appointment annulled,
Eghbal secretly fled the country to avoid a similar fate.44
From this self-imposed exile, Dr. Eghbal wrote the newspapers
to announce that he had been reappointed, but as Ambassador to
Spain. Only a matter of days passed before His Imperial Majesty
cancelled this appointment. (Pressure against his entire family
was mounting, and Eghbalds brother, Ahmad Eghbal, was cashiered
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) Then, after several
months out of the news and a corresponding decline in his
saliency, and the fall of Amini, the Shah appointed Eghbal as
Iranian Representative to the European office of UNESCO, per-
haps the greatest sinecure available to Iranian exiles.
That exile can have value as well as cost is attested by
Eghbal's subsequent fate. The Amini government had already
begun its anti-corruption purge. After his flight, Eghbal was
formally charged with illegal interference in the elections and
with providing illegal tax concessions to a number of soft drink
manufacturers, which resulting in their short-changing the public
Treasury of some 500 million rals ($7,300,000). But under
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Iranian law, an ex-Cabinet Minister could not be punished
without a special act of Parliament. As the Shah had dis-
solved that body, Eghbal's prosecution was hampered. Ul-
timately, some twenty-five minor officials were sentenced to
fines and imprisonment for ballot tampering but by the time
Amini could have the law amended to allow for the trial of
Eghbal, the ex-Prime Minister was in his new post and no
action was taken.
Exile, then, is one of the means which the Shah employs
to control elite who refuse to be coopted or who violate the
rules of the political game even after they have been coopted.
Its practice assumes a variety of forms, but it remains,
relatively, a last resort when other methods for political
control have failed. Nonetheless, a recent resport has
suggested there are as many as five thousand Iranians who are
banned from entering their own country. This figure seems in-
credibly high, however, even to many of the exiles themselves4 5
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE
His Imperial Majesty has other means of limiting the
power of the counter-elite than these variations in what is
basically the rather uncommon practice of forced or volun-
tary exile. One such means which is repeatedly employed is
the removal of dissidents from office. There exist numerous
examples whereby a member of the counter-elite, persisting in
attacking the Government or regime, exhausts the patience and
tolerance of His Majesty. More unusual is the case of a group
of the most trusted of the elite, perceived by others in fact as
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nokare dowlat (lackies of the government), being so removed.
By the second day of the extensive rioting following the
mourning of Moharram and the arrest of Khomeini in June of 1963,
the blood of thousands of Iranians had been spilt.46 His Excel-
lency Hussein Ala, then serving as Minister of the Imperial
Court, expressed mounting concern over the force of the military
reaction to the riots. He called together a handful of Iran's
most elite officials, among whom were Abdullah Entezam, General
Morteza Yazdanpanah, and Sardar Fakher Hekmat. Together they
agreed that the savage military response to what had begun as a
simple protest against the arrest of Khomeini could only redound
to the ill of His Majesty. Already the strength and determina-
tion of the rioters had grown in the face of the shooting. Dis-
orders had spread through Iran and rumor had it that University
of Tehran students were about to enter on the side of the rioters.
And, increasingly, the demonstrators were not expressing their
violence in random fashion. They were seeking out, looting, and
burning undefended Government offices.
The results, this group assumed, could be a Government
victory, but by bloodbath. Or the army could waiver and the
Government fall, perhaps, with unimagined consequences for the
Shahanshah. In either case too many lives would be lost and too
much bitterness engendered for the intrinsic importance of the
riot's origins. They decided to approach His Imperial Majesty
and urge him to temper the violence of the Government's response.
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Hussein Ala
Who were these four elites who had resolved on this un-
usual step? Hussein Ala was then seventy-eight years of age.
His father had served the Qajars as Prime Minister, Minister, and
Ambassador and was a leading Constitutionalist in the 1905-1907
Revolution. Ala himself had served with distinction under Reza
Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah. He filled Cabinet posts in the
Ministries of Finance, Public Welfare, Science, Agriculture,
Trade, and Foreign Affairs. He was a delegate to the Paris
Peace Conference following World War I (where the Iranian delega-
tion was excluded by British pressures) and Iran's chief delegate
to the United Nations after World War II. It was Ala who elo-
quently pleaded Iran's case against the U.S.S.R. in the Security
Council, protesting the Soviet's refusal to withdraw their
troops from Iranian territory. He had also served the two
Monarchs as Ambassador (Spain, London, and the U.S.A.), and the
present king as Prime Minister and twice previously as Minister
of Court, He was considered so devoted to the Monarch that
Mossadegh had demanded and received his dismissal by the Shah.
At the time of this extraordinary meeting, Ala was once again
serving as Minister of Court, a position to which he had been
reappointed immediately following the overthrow of Mossadegh.
Abdollah Entezam
Abdollah Entezam, born in 1907, was the son of Entezam
os-Saltaneh (Order of the Kingdom), who several times served the
Qajars as Minister, Abdollah Entezam had entered Government
service in the Foreign Ministry and filled a variety of foreign
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posts until Ala was called to form a Cabinet. Entezam served as
his Minister of Foreign Affairs. After Mossadegh's overthrow,
Entezam again served as Minister of Foreign Affairs through the
Cabinets of General Zahedi and Ala. In 1957, he was appointed
Director of the National Iranian Oil Company, a position he was
holding when the riots broke out.
Sardar Fakher Hekmat
In 1895, Sardar Fakher Hekmat was born into a renowned
family of Shiraz, His grandfather was the most famous physician
of his day while his father was a wealthy landowner. Hekmat was
early a patriot, taking part in the Constitutional Revolution.
Later, during World War II, he organized military resistance to
the British in Southern Persia. Thereafter he served as Gover-
nor of numerous provinces but entered the Majles in its Fourth
session, inaugurated shortly after the coup staged by Zia ed din
and Reza Khan. Hekmat continued to serve in numerous sessions
of the Parliament, even rejecting a request from the Shah to
form a cabinet, Beginning in 1941, he was elected Speaker of
the Majles, a position which he held through the dissolved
Twentieth session. He headed the Lower House from 1947 through
1961, save for the Mossadegh period, when he "retired" from
politics as a result of his differences with the Prime Minister.
At the time of the riots, Hekmat was preparing to resume his
political activities in the elections for Parliament which had
been promised for that summer.
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General Morteza Yazdanpanah
General Morteza Yazdanpanah was the oldest and most
venerated general of his time. Born in 1888, he was a graduate
of the Ghazaq Khaneh (Cossacks' House) where officers were
trained for the Russian-sponsored Cossack Brigade. At the time
of the 1921 coup, Yazdanpanah was a general commanding the
Northern Army. He was invaluable to Reza Shah from 1921 to
1941 as he drove his troops victoriously against the tribes in
all sections of the country. With the abdication of Reza Shah,
the new king leaned heavily on the experienced and devoted Yaz-
danpanah. The general served him four times as Minister of War,
as His Majesty's General Adjutant, and finally as Senator. With
the dissolution of the Parliament in 1961, His Majesty appointed
General Yazdanpanah as Director of the Imperial Inspectorate
(an Iranian variant of the Ombudsman reporting directly to the
Shah), a position he was filling in June of 1963.
These four devoted elites carried their forebodings to His
Imperial Majesty at a hastily arranged audience. What actually
transpired at that audience is unknown. It is reported that the
Shah was infuriated. That any of his servants, even these four
trusted officials, should presume to instruct him in the conduct
of kingship, which he had practiced since 1941, was insufferable.
What is known is the aftermath. Ala was relieved of his duties
as Minister of Court. Later, he was "promoted" to the Senate.
Yazdanpanah was dropped from the Inspectorate. He was also "pro-
moted" to the Senate0  Hekmat was forbidden to campaign for the
Parliament, was not appointed to the Senate, and remained in the
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silent isolation of an inactive politician. Entezam was retired
from the National Iranian Oil Company and was "at home". (He was
succeeded by Dr. Eghbal, returned from Europe.)
These four had attempted what is never done in Iran--to
volunteer suggestions of policy to His Imperial Majesty. That
a member of the elite should assume that he could alter the be-
havior of the Shah might establish a precedent dangerous to the
continued autonomy of His Majesty's sovereignty. From the Shah's
perspective, such an assumption must be rejected out of hand,
while publicly negated and invalidated. A most effective means
of accomplishing these ends and destroying the assumption is
to render powerless their perpetrators. In this, the Shah did
not hesitate, irrespective of the individuals involved.
Interestingly, these same riots witnessed a similar inci-
dent which Persians, au courant with Court matters, consider
unprecedented. Another Government official offered the Shah an
ultimatum, and, strangely enough, succeeded! During the night
between the first and second days of rioting, Prime Minister
Alam roused the Shah by telephone. He respectfully suggested
that troops who had spent the day and evening firing on their
own countrymen might refuse to continue a second day, With riots
having broken out in cities around the country, no risks could
be run in Tehran. If the troops of the capital refused to "shoot
to kill" as the Shah had ordered, forces throughout Iran might
waiver. The Shah is reported to have raged that as Commander-
in-Chief of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, he knew his men.
They were too well disciplined and too obedient to refuse to
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execute even his most inconsequential orders. Alam then
responded that such might be the case. But if the Shah did
not remove the troops who had seen action and replace them
with fresh troops from outside the city by morning, he was
resigning the Premiership. His Majesty knew Alam as a
trusted boyhood playmate who had been totally loyal his entire
life. If he concurred, it would be one of the few such in-
cidents of his rule. The Shah hesitated, but agreed. On the
second day, fresh troops "shot to kill".
IMPRISONMENT
Another technique used by His Majesty to exclude potential
counter-elite is imprisonment. This is usually a means of final
recourse in the cooptation process, to be adopted when more
conventional techniques for eliminating the counter-elite have
failed. On the other hand, temporary imprisonment for corrup-
tion is an oft-used device for expressing the Royal Displeasure.
In fact it is frequently difficult to discriminate between
prisoners being held for alleged political offenses and those
incarcerated for more ordinary civil and criminal offenses.
Where boundaries between these types of offense are so poorly
defined because of the centrality of politics and because the
Shahanshah is the unmistaken keystone of the political system,
distinctions between civil, criminal, and political can become
meaningless. Intense observation of Iranian politics will con-
vince one that these distinctions are, in fact, spurious. Any
offense is a priori a political offense.
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A practice of the regime compounds this. Frequently,
elites will be charged with corruption and removed from office,
exiled, or imprisoned when their offense was, in fact, entirely
political. Such charges are advanced in order to mask the exis-
tence of the political turmoil which endures beneath the placid
facade of Iranian unity and stability. In addition, instances
of corruption are easily found, expeditiously adjudicated, and
immediately credible, to the politically aware.
Those intimate with the workings of Iranian politics
suggest that corruption among the elite is used in exactly the
same way as are the resignations submitted to the President of
the United States by his Cabinet Secretaries as they assume the
responsibilities of their offices. When the Chief Executive
determines that a Secretary is no longer satisfactorily fulfilling
those responsibilities, he may accept, with deep regrets, the
resignation. It is alleged by some that His Majesty not only
maintains a dossier pertaining to the improbity of each member
of the elite, but actually countenances or even encourages their
dishonesty in order to fatten their dossiers. When the proper
moment arises, the elite can be confronted with the dossier and
his resignation or exile demanded. Of if need be, the materials
therein can be used as the basis for successful judicial pro-
ceedings. Either way, the suspect or unwanted elite can be
politically neutralized.
Abol Hassan Ebtehaj
It is impossible to ascertain with surety those corrup-
tion cases which have their roots in treasonable issues0
m
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Nonetheless, Tehran rumor networks agree on a number of recent
instances. Perhaps the most notorious was the imprisonment of
Abol Hassan Ebtehaj. As the former Governor of the National
Bank (1942-1950), Managing Director of the Plan Organization
(1954-1959), and Founder of the private Iranians' Bank, Ebtehaj
is known as Iran's leading economist. More importantly, outside
the country his reputation for integrity and professional com-
petence is second to none, and in Iran, he is known as "first of
the 'technocrats"'"4 7 On November 10, 1961, Ebtehaj was taken
into custody by the police.
The public reaction was sharp and critical. Prime Minis-
ter Amini felt obliged to deny any responsibility in the arrest.
Ministry of Justice inspectors acknowledge that they were inves-
tigating complains made by Ahmad Aramesh, Ebtehaj's successor as
Plan Organization chief. In a speech to the Majles, Aramesh
charged that under Ebtehaj, the Plan Organization had paid
David E. Lilienthal and Gordon R. Clapp 7,000,000,000 rials
($100,000,000) since 1956 without their having accounted "for
even a single rial,"4 8  (At the time, the two former chairmen of
the Tennessee Valley Authority were directors of the Development
Resources Corporation. The latter company was responsible for
the planning and construction of a TVA-like scheme in the oil
and water-rich southwestern province of Khuzistan.)
Subsequently, Minister of Justice Nour ed din (Light of
the Faith) Alamouti claimed that Ebtehaj had wasted vast state
funds and signed contracts without the necessary approval. Never-
theless, Ebtehaj was never formally charged with these or other
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offenses. Seven months after his arrest, Ebtehaj was released
from prison on bond, agreeing that if he left Iran, he would
pay the Government $171,000,000 in forfeited bail.4 9
Ebtehaj demanded speedy resolution of his case. But Amini
was displaced by Alam and with him went Alamouti.; the case hung
fire. Ultimately, the whole affair was dropped and Ebtehaj
acquitted. On February 13, 1964, " . the Examining Magis-
trate ruled that the charges were unfounded, The ruling was
confirmed by the Prosecutor of the Civil Service Tribunal."50
In assessing this bizarre series of episodes, it seems
clear that Ebtehaj was not imprisoned on the basis of the pub-
lished accusations. His renowned and proven integrity and the
abandonment of the case argue against such an eventuality.
Rather, the causes for his arrest must be sought in political
affairs0 Only slightly more than one month previous to his
arrest, Ebtehaj had delivered an address at the International
Industrial Conference in San Francisco. In his talk, Ebtehaj
spoke of the need for Government planning and a strong private
sector in developing societies. He also urged greater multi-
lateral assistance, criticizing bilateral aid programs of the
past. He charged that country-to-country aid led to the diver-
sion of funds from development efforts "by military and political
considerations." Moreover,
Even if a recipient government became convinced in all
good faith of the fairness of certain bilateral pro-
grams offered by another country, it would soon be
condemned in the public mind. Opposition leaders will
charge the government with selling out to the imperialists,
and the public will believe those charges0
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No matter how false the accusation that other nations
will use "development schemesr to exploit poverty and
restrict freedom, it is a popular belief that must be
recognized. Bilateral aid poisons the relationship be-
tween nations, frustrates the donor, and causes revul-
sion in the recipient.
s . . Where the recipient government is corrupt, the
donor government very understandably appears, in the
judgement of the public, to support corruption . . . .
The bilateral approach cannot bring about reform
. . . [but] delays internal pressures toward reform by
providing considerable material resources to corrupt
regimes and by unwittingly fostering the fear that
development aid will be stopped if the old regime is
overthrown . . . .
Lest there be any uncertainties in his listeners' minds
about the countries he was using in this model, Ebtehaj con-
tinued,
I can think of no better summary of all the disadvantages
and weaknesses of the bilateral system than the modern
history of my own country. Not so very many years ago in
Iran, the United States was loved and respected as no
other country, and without having given a penny of aid.
Now, after more than $1 billion of loans and grants,
America is neither loved nor respected; she is distrusted
by most people, and hated by many.
Ebtehaj concluded his talk with a plea for ending bi-
lateral aid with the thought that,
Social and political unrest is a manifestation of the
despair and lack of faith of the people, of their dis-
trust of incompetent and sometimes corrupt governments,
and of the whole pattern of bilatera 1agreements that
seem to support the bankrupt system.
It would seem uncontestable that His Majesty had resorted
to imprisoning Ebtehaj not for mismanagement or corruption, but
as chastisement for these aspersions against his regime, Iran,
and the United States. Allegations were made to the wasted
funds and misbehavior in his dealings with Lilienthal and Clapp
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partially because of the fortuitous raising of those charges by
Aramesh some time previously. Partially, no doubt, they were
made because of their very incredulity to all who knew Ebtehaj
personally. And finally, they were undoubtedly a rebuttal of
Ebtehaj's defense of Lilienthal and Clapp in his damaging speech.
But few did take those charges seriously. The general belief was
that the issue of corruption was being raised as the basis for a
punitive response to a political offender. Some time later, the
United Nations requested that Ebtehaj serve as Chief Economic
Adviser to the Government of Algeria, then struggling to correct
the excesses of the Ben Bella era. Ebtehaj accepted, but His
Majesty refused permission.53 The Royal Displeasure was still
aroused.
THE NATIONAL FRONT
Finally, there are instances of imprisonment which grow
out of activities perceived by the regime as direct threats to
its welfare. These are frequently seen as manifestly treason-
able and no attempts are made to rationalize,in terms of cor-
ruption, the deserts meted out to the offenders. In recent
years, most of these imprisonments involved the most articulate
and well-organized opposition group in Iran, the National Front.
From 1963 to 1966, the regime conducted an extensive campaign
to eliminate the Jebheye Melli (National Front) as a meaningful
political force. The Front, which came into existence as a
coalition of political groupings revolving around Dr. Mohammad
Mossadegh, began to fragment and collapse with the approach of
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the showdown between the Prime Minister and the Shah in 1953.
Many of its original and most prestigious leaders split away to
form their own parties or join the Shah. Hossein Makki, Dr.
Mozaffar Bagha'ee, Seyyed Hassan Ha'eri Zadeh, and Ayattolah
Kashani all withdrew their loyalty. With Mossadegh's overthrow,
the Front collapsed. A number of the ex-Prime Minister's
staunchest lieutenants escaped to Europe and the United States;
there they formed a new coalition, more radical than the Front,
the Moghavamate Melli (the National Resistance Movement) and
began publishing Bakhtare Emruz. Within Iran, the N.R.M. was
able to organize an occasional demonstration (at the trial of
Mossadegh, against the negotiations with the international oil
companies, etc,). Others of Mossadegh's supporters, primarily
the intellectuals, remained in Iran and withdrew to faculty
positions at the University of Tehran.
Mossadegh, meanwhile, had been tried and found guilty of
high treason. His Foreign Minister, Hossein Fatemi, who went
into hiding withi the Premier's arrest, was convicted of the same
offense and executed, The Prime Minister, however, was too
likely to be martyred by such a death--and Iran's history is
fraught with martyrs who invariably serve as foci for anti-
regime opposition.54 Instead, he was sentenced to three years'
solitary confinement after which he was released and " . .
retired to his country estate near Tehran, for he is a wealthy
man."55 Thereafter, with Mossadegh a prisoner and the army and
the newly formed SAVAK apparently omniscient and omnipresent,
both the National Resistance Movement and the intellectuals
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were in a slough of despondency and inactivity.
With the first elections to the Twentieth Majiles, however,
this was to change. The Shah's attempt to experiment in con-
trolled democracy, i.e., the creation and direction of a two-
party political system by the throne, in 1957, was a demonstrable
failure. For as the election campaigns wore on, the party can-
didates took their roles seriously and began unbridled attacks on
their opposite numbers. When the election results were announced,
then, they were greeted with an uproar of dismay. As if the
heated campaign had not been held, the Shah-sponsored Prime
Minister Eghbal's Melliyun Party won 104 seats in the Majles.
The Mardom Party led by Asadollah Alam captured 50 and the inde-
pendents but 3 seats.
When the Shah cancelled the first elections and brought
Sharif-Emami, once a partisan of Mossadegh's, to the Premiership,
hopes for a massive liberalizing of political life were inflamed.
The second elections witnessed even more unrestrained cam-
paigning. A number of politicians, many of whom had been re-
jected by the Melliyun and Mardom, declared as independents.
(Abdul Rahman Borumand went so far as to run a second time under
the banner of the National Front. But for a second time this
transcended even the new liberalism and Borumand was arrested.5 6)
The results of these elections were more assuring. The
Melliyun led with 69 seats, the Mardom had 64. But with neither
party holding a majority, the votes of the 32 independents also
elected would be decisive. And among the 32 was the name of
Allahyar Saleh, the leader of the Iran Party, the intellectual
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wing of the National Front. With Saleh's election, a resurgent
Front began to operate. Rumors were rife in Tehran that the
Front was being encouraged because of President Kennedy's
liberal philosophy. A visit by Averell Harriman was perceived
as "paving the ground for the National Front."5 7
Whatever the truth to these rumors, a convention was held,
a platform issued, and a new Central Committee elected. The
Front organized public meetings, demonstrated at the University,
protested the second elections as fraudulent, and went so far as
to call for a general strike. With its success, the Front grew
bolder. It opened a headquarters and began to register members.
Symbolizing their resurgence, the Front called a mass meeting
for the 21st of July to commemorate the return to power of Dr.
Mossadegh on that date in 1952 (after he had been dismissed by
the Shah for a total of three days). It was this meeting which
the Government forbade. Their wishes were enforced with tanks,
and a number of the National Front leaders were temporarily
arrested.
Faced with this rebuff and the growing restrictions of
the Amini regime, the Front turned inward to consider problems
of internal organization. Engineer Mehdi Bazargan had resigned
from its Central Committee, announced the formation of a new
political grouping, the Nehzate Azadi (Freedom Movement of Iran),
and promptly sought its recognition by the Central Committee as
part of the National Front. With legitimacy provided by a let-
ter from Dr. Mossadegh welcoming the Movement, Bazargan's new
group was accepted. From its platform and founding members, it
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was clear that the Freedom Movement represented a materialization
within Iran of the radical N.R.M. still abroad. The Freedom
Movement, like the N.R.M., was primarily a coalition of acti-
vists--baazaris, religious leaders, and students--as opposed to
the Iran Party's intellectuals led by Saleh.5 8 The presence of
this division between the radical activists and relatively more
conservative intellectuals persisted and did not escape the
regime.
The National Front was, perhaps, the unwitting party to
a massive and bloody clash between students at the University of
Tehran and army troops in January of 1962. University students
were agitated over the closing of the National Teachers' Training
College following student protest there at an announced cut in
scholarships. Then it was learned that three students had been
expelled from the Dar ol Fonun for outspoken criticism of the
Government. In protest, University of Tehran students demon-
strated in sympathy with their colleagues--even offering two
minutes of silence in honor of the recently martyred Lumumba.
The very next day, January 22, the University was stormed
by Government troops. Perhaps the best description of what hap-
pened was supplied by Dr. Ahmad Farhad in his letter of resigna-
tion to Prime Minister Amini protesting the assault:
Pursuant to our conversation, at 11:00 a.m., soldiers
and paratroopers had occupied Tehran University. There
was no reason or excuse for the violation of the rights
or regulations of the University.
Soldiers and paratroopers after entry attacked boys
and girls indiscriminately. . . , Many of the students
were beaten to the point of death.
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I have never seen or heard so much cruelty, sadism,
atrocity, and vandalism as on the part of the Govern-
ment forces, Some of the girls were criminally attacked
in the classrooms by the soldiers.
When we inspected the University buildings, we were
faced with a situation as if an army of barbarians had
invaded an enemy territory. Books were torn, shelves
were broken, typewriters smashed, laboratory equipment
stolen or destroyed; desks, chairs, doors, windows and
walls were vandalized by the troops fighting unarmed
students without interference from their officers.
Even the University Hospital was not immune from the
soldiers . . .59
When the attack had subsided, the Government closed the University
and ordered massive arrests. Government opponents of all poli-
tical coloration were detained.
The National Front leaders were the first targets, being
accused of inciting the students. But other politicians, usually
considered the Front's enemies, were also arrested. Fatollah
Forud, an ex-Mayor of Tehran, and his political ally, Assadollah
Rashidian, a banker and known friend of the British; Seyyed
Ja'afar Behbehani and S. Behdad, the Editor of Jahan, were also
taken. It was then that General Bakhtiar became implicated. As
the investigation deepened, more of the guilt was reputed to
center on Bakhtiar. It appeared that he had instigated the
military attack in order to embarrass the Shah, bring down Amini,
discredit the National Front and have himself--the choice of
the military--promoted to the Premiership.
Following these revelations, Bakhtiar was exiled and most
of the politicians released--all but the Iran Freedom Movement
leaders. They spent longer in jail. Their student wing had
issued a pamphlet analyzing the attack which infuriated the
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regime. The students explained that
0 . . The intention was to close down the University
because the University had become the last bastion of
the national struggle, it had replaced the Bazaar as a
political centre, In the old days, the Bazaar could
resist the Government because it was economically inde-
pendent and it enjoyed clerical support. But the cen-
tralization of Government and the establishment of banks
, a robbed it of its independence. With the economic
depression [beginning in 1960], the intimidation of the
police finally was able to completely suppress the Bazaar
voice. The clergy were similarly silenced. The civil
service restricted, The press muzzled. The Majles non-
existent. They had left only the University. . 0 0 It
was this last voice that had to be silenced. The Ruling
Class obviously wants a university. Their country, for
propaganda sake, must have everything--even a nuclear
reactor! But this university should not have living
students, let alone talking ones.6 0
With the dismissal of Amini, newly installed Premier Alam
paid a personal visit to Allahyar Saleh0 To the utter astonish-
ment of many within and without the National Front, Alam told
Saleh that the Shahanshah wished to make use of their views in
administering the country. He was even prepared to assign cabi-
net seats to Front nominees and assure the election of their
representatives to the next Majles. To those aware of His
Majesty's style of cooptation and inclusivity, these overtures
were less surprising.
After several further meetings and an invitation from the
Prime Minister to meet directly with the king, the Front issued
a memorandum outlining three conditions for joining the Govern-
ment. It demanded strict observance of the Constitution and
'"sincere" enforcement of the principles guaranteeing a Consti-
tutional Monarchy. Secondly, it called for immediate elections
to be held according to law. Finally, the Front stressed that
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basic legal freedoms were "necessary and essential" for carrying
out any reforms. 6 1
In effect, the Front was demanding an entire restruc-
turing of the political system which the Shah had fashioned
since 1953. His "rule" would revert to his "reign." Political
parties, including the Front, would contest free elections and
dominate a Majles outside the control of the throne. The center
of power would pass to the legislature. The Front clearly re-
fused to be coopted. They must have realized that acceptance
of their conditions would be impossible for the King, and they
were. Negotiations broke off and the Front returned to sub rosa
polemics against the Government.
Then in January 1963, in the face of the Rural Coopera-
tive's Conference and growing publicity for the Referendum, the
Front held another National Congress. After electing a new Cen-
tral Committee, the Front urged the people of Iran to boycott
the January 26th Referendum called to ratify the Shah's Six
Point reform. To fortify public opposition, the Front announced
a mass meeting and demonstration on January 25th to protest the
balloting and issued a manifesto which ended:
We warn the people of Iran that our country is now on
the verge of being officially changed from a demo-
cratic parliamentary regime to that of reaction and
despotism0
We must, therefore, say YES to the abolition of the
feudal system; land and water for the farmers and better
rewards for the worker; sovereignty for the nation and
freedom for all; and destruction of colonialism and
exploitation.
But we must say NO to the ARBITRARY RULE OF THE SHAH,
HIS INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE, THE RULE OF
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TERROR AND SAVAK ATROCITIES, COLONIAL DOMINATION OF THE
COUNTRY, POLICE VIOLATIONS AND GENDARMERIE OPPRESSION AND
THE OVERLQ DSHIP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN TOWNS AND
VILLAGES. 2"
His Majesty responded with fury. From his perspective,
these leaders had demonstrated their total alienation from his
rule and unwillingness to be coopted or demoralized or depoliti-
cized. Their leader, who had nearly succeeded in unseating the
Shah, had not, after all, been executed and was not even im-
prisoned. Their second-in-command had been elected to Parliament,
and the organization had been allowed to surface. A four-star
general (the first in Iran's history) who commanded the army and
the Chief of the Secret Police had both been fired and replaced
by officers reputed for their liberalism.63 Finally, the Shah's
staunchest ally and Prime Minister had made overtures to the
Front seeking their cooperation and offering to bring them into
the Government. Their unwillingness to play the game of politics
in Iran by the rules which he had established must have appeared
to the Shah as gross obstructionism. Their widespread popularity
among the mobilized segments of the urban population--students,
teachers, bazaaris, religious leaders, and workers--made that
obstructionism not merely troublesome but pernicious and, per-
haps, lethal.
National Front leaders were rounded up and their scheduled
meeting banned. The Shah went to Qum, the hub of religiously
inspired opposition to his rule and distributed land reform deeds
in the face of the hostility of the ulema and ruhanis. He
blasted his opponents in a speech there, branding them "100
times more treacherous than the Tudehn"
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. the "Black reactionaries" and "the destructive red
elements" will not sit quietly. They cannot see the im-
plementation of the six bills which insure the prosperity
and glory of Iran and make it an advanced Modern Iran .
Now these very persons whose flesh and blood belongs to
the aliens present themselves as patriots merely to serve
their own ends though the whole record of their lives is
marked with black and dirty acts. They do not wish to see
the country make progress and be prosperous,. These people
hold meetings and issue resolutions and communiques in
order to serve their own ends. They have chosen the Egyp-
tian government as their leader and want Iran patterned on
Egypt.
. 0 We shall pity these people if they do nog mend
their ways and do not make use of our generosity0
With the opposition muzzled, the Government announced
overwhelmingly popular support for the Referendum. According to
official figures, 5,593,826 Iranians had cast their votes for
the land reform, the nationalization of forests, the sale of
state-owned factories, a profit-sharing scheme for factory wor-
kers, the enfranchisement of women, and the establishment of a
Literacy Corps. Only 4,115 voted "no." 65
A quiescence descended on Tehran after the Referendum.
But it dissolved in April as the National Front detainees went
on a hunger strike. Students at the University then demonstrated
in sympathy while families of the prisoners paraded before the
Ministry of Justice and a delegation delivered a letter to the
U. N. Secretary General at the U. N. offices in Tehran. Indi-
cations of a new direction in Iranian politics were immediately
evident. Buoyed by his success in the Referendum and still
smarting from his rebuff at the hands of the Front, the Shah
gave orders for the immediate suppression of these demonstra-
tions.
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While the National Front leaders remained in jail, the
rioting of June 1963 occurred. More arrests followed and the
Government turned its attention to prosecuting prisoners charged
with these crimes. As the investigations progressed, additional
arrests were made and the last four months of 1963 took on the
character of a mass "round-up" of opposition politicians
throughout Iran: controlling the opposition through imprison-
ment became more prevalent. It is estimated that at least 250
persons were arrested, including other National Front supporters,
members of the Tudeh Party Revolutionary Committee and the Pro-
vincial Committee of the Tudeh, religious leaders throughout
Iran, and, once again, General Gharani and his supporters.
Finally, one year after their original arrest, in Janu-
ary, 1964, a number of National Front leaders were brought before
a military court-martial, charged with activities against the
security of the state. But of all the detainees, only the
leaders and founders of the Freedom Movement were put on the
docket. The Government was clearly striking at the activist
and more radical wing of the Front--the reinstituted National
Resistance Movement. Engineer Bazargan and his co-leader, Seyyed
Mahmud Taleghani, were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
Other members of the group were jailed for terms of one to six
years. The intellectual wing of the Front was treated more
liberally--perhaps to hold open the promise of an ultimate
reconciliation with the Front's more conservative members.
Allahyar Saleh was eventually released, but in poor health
retired to his home in Kashan.
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The years 1965 and 1966 witnessed other arrests and other
trials in Iran. Numerous suspects were detained after the assas-
sination of Prime Minister Mansur in January, 1965 and after
the abortive assassination attempt on the life of the Shah in
April of that year. A general round-up of members of the poli-
tical opposition was conducted on the eve of the anniversary of
Mossadegh's overthrow. Fifty-five persons were taken into cus-
tody at the end of the year and charged with plotting the over-
throw of the regime and the establishment of an "Islamic
Government." Fourteen leaders of the Tudeh were tried in
absentia and sentenced to death.
Speculating on the number of political prisoners who
remain in Iranian jails is a highly tenuous affair. One foreigner
commented,"By Middle East standards, the 100 to 200 political
prisoners now in jails is a relatively small total." 6 6 It is
by no means certain that the number is between 100 to 200,
although it does appear that the number is, in fact, substan-
tially below the numbers prevailing in other countries of the
Middle East. (This, of course, is no consolation to a deter-
mined member of the Iranian opposition.)
In spite of these measures for dealing with potentially
threatening elites, the Government of Iran resorts to "the
specific means peculiar to it . . . the use of physical force"
only when other means of implementing the wishes of His Imperial
Majesty have failed. 67 Except in instances which constitute a
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direct physical threat to the regime, every effort is made to
seek a resolution of political controversy through non-violent
means. The attempted seduction of counter-elites is the tech-
nique most universally applied by the regime to coopt and thus
disarm its opponents. If these efforts are successful and the
dissident is brought into the system, then the techniques of
seduction must be continually maintained, both to prevent back-
sliding on the part of the newly coopted and to appease those
partisans of the regime who would resent not sharing in the
largesse and recompense because of their loyalty. Consequently,
the regime confronts (and satisfies) persistent demands for new
bureaucratic positions bearing high prestige, higher salaries,
luxury imports, and the like, all necessary to maintain the
status quo. Greater resources are needed merely to stand still,
If the efforts at seduction are not successful and the
counter-elites persist, then the regime hopes for a resolution
through demoralization or depoliticization. These solutions are
ultimately less acceptable than cooptation because they have
proven to be only temporary adjustments to immediate political
realities. Too often in the past, the university professors,
bureaucrats, and bazaaris have devoted themselves to their pro-
fessions when counter-elite activities were dangerous. But with
the removal of regime pressures, they renewed their political
activities. Thus a slight let-up in regime control frequently
has led to widening and ultimately massive political agitation,
emanating from what had appeared as a stable polity and society.
0
131
Only when the counter-elites fail to adopt one of these
means for coping with their hostilities to the regime or its
programs are more decisive counter-measures employed. Exile
for the more powerful or those with a political base; retire-
ment for the older or less powerful; and imprisonment for the
most threatening are the three most commonly employed techniques
for excluding those who refuse either to change their ways or
to exclude themselves. This pattern is revealed in the con-
tinuing efforts by the Shah--extending over some six years--to
keep the door to National Front cooptation open. If they would
only accept him and renounce their manifestly complete aliena-
tion, he would welcome them. Each arrest of Front leaders was
followed by his retreat and their release. Government posts
were offered the Front, as were ministerial portfolios. But
to the Front, the Shah qua ruler, i.e., tyrant rather than
Constitutional Monarch, is anathema and to accept a Cabinet
post under his rule would be "patriotically suspect."68 Only
when the Shah felt that their alienation was total and that they
would persist in attempts to act out that alienation did he move
against them in a decisive fashion.
The regime, then, is reluctant to suppress counter-elites
before they have been given several opportunities to "reform."
This is partly responsible for the oft-noted phenomenon that
arrests of elites for corruption or political misdeeds are
never petty matters but involve millions of rials or crimes of
high treason. An Iranian folk story puts it succinctly: A
Persian once claimed to know Arabic0 When asked what the Arabs
____4
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called a cow, he offered their word. He was then asked what
the Arabs called a calf. The man did not know but, typically,
did not wish to admit his ignorance. He replied, "Well, the
Arabs are patient people. They wait until the calves grow up
and then they call them cows.,"6 9 So it is with His Majesty's
response to the political opposition.
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FOOTNOTES
1. While SAVAK is "efficient and pervasive," it is fal-
lacious to attribute omniscience to is as do many of the
demoralized elite. The presence of the security agents makes
counter-elite activity much more difficult, but not impossible,
as the successful assassination of Prime Minister Mansur in
January 1965 demonstrates. Nonetheless, it is true that with
their Israeli and American advisors, SAVAK is becoming in-
creasingly more efficient.
2. After having had the privilege of sitting through a
particularly agonized session of this kind, I asked why they
didn't gather arms, destroy the Government, and take power?
After considerable thought, these members of the counter-elite
agreed that such a move would only result in the imposition of
a military dictatorship with a fascist general at its head.
"Better to keep what we have," they agreed.
3. There are adequate precedents for similar practices.
Nasr ed din Shah Qajar (1848-1896) subscribed to two such
clipping agencies following his trips to Europe. He insisted
that each agency compile all articles in any European publica-
tion which related to Iran. Each agency sent their clippings
to a different court official. Thus Nasr ed din attempted to
prevent either official from merely removing clippings unflat-
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CHAPTER IV
THE SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN:
DEALING WITH THE ELITE
Imperious, diligent, and fairly just, the Shah
is in his own person the sole arbiter of Persia's
fortunes .
Lord Curzon
We have discussed above the efforts which the Shah makes
to control demands for elite membership. By attempting to manage
access to the resources which serve as the main power bases, he
is able to regulate the numbers and types of persons who can
present legitimate claims for inclusion into the political elite
and, in turn, the types of demands which the elite will make of
the political system. We have also noted the means he employs
to deal with incorrigible elites who persist in making demands
which he has defined as illegitimate. But how does he manoeuver
those who are members of the political elite? What is his type
of governance vis a vis the khans, sheikhs, emirs, mirzas--those
who are the "governing class"?
DIVIDE ET IMPERA
The Monarch's basic style can be described simply as
divide et impera--a policy with a long and honored history in
Iran. Perhaps the first Iranian to develop the technique to a
sophisticated level was Darius the Achaemenid. He feared the
concentration of power in the hands of his governors and the
rebellion of distant provinces. To prevent this, Darius
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appointed a Satrap, a General, and a Secretary of State in each
Satrapy. All three officials were independent of each other and
reported directly to Darius's court. Sykes suggests that
Under this system of divided powers, the three great
officials would be hostile to one another and conse-
quently most unlikely to organize a rebellion. As a
further precaution, inspectors of the highest ranks
were sent out at irregular intervals, supported by
strong bodies of troops, and armed with full powers
to investigate and punish any abuses and to report on
the Satrap and other officials.1
The extent of Mohammad Reza Shah's debt to Darius will become
manifest in the course of the following discussion.
This policy was developed to still more refined levels by
Shah Abbas, the great Safavid monarch (1587-1629). Shah Abbas
feared the machinations of three sets of his subjects, and for
each he applied a variant of the divide and rule policy. Safavid
kings before him had learned to fear the Shahzadehs--the Royal
princes and princesses--and even their ambitious sons. Shah
Abbas set one against the other and nurtured their jealousies
and rivalries, hoping to dissipate their energies in mutual con-
flict and prevent their combining against him.2 In addition to
the children of the Royal blood (whom he either blinded or
executed), the Shah feared the power of the tribal chiefs. In
the first years of his reign, Shah Abbas had been a puppet in
the hands of two of the Qizil-bash nobles, one of whom actually
placed him on the throne. 3 He devoted considerable energies
thereafter to playing off the chiefs of the Qizil-bash tribes0
Those whom he could not neutralize in this fashion were elimi-
nated by exile or death. He also created a new tribal military
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force, the Shahsevens, whose ranks were filled by recruiting
from each of the seven Qizil-bash tribes. Their subsequent
campaigns against the very tribes from which they were recruited
eliminated the possibility of further tribal threats.
Finally, Shah Abbas devised an ingenious and apparently
original scheme for applying his maxim among the politically un-
reliable city dwellers who had proved a threat to previous Safa-
vid kings, Shah Abbas countenanced factions within each town
who were set against each other and encouraged to maintain high
levels of tension and even conflict. The Jesuit Pere Krusinski
reports their names as Pelenk and Felenk and their conduct,
so opposite, and so much enemies one to the other, that
people in different States, in arms against one another,
do not push their aversion and enmity farther. . . .
Though they fought without arms, because they were not
supposed to make use of anything else but stones and
sticks, it was with so much fury and bloodshed that the
King was obliged to employ his guards to separate them
with drawn swords. . . . At Ispahan in 1714 they were
under a necessity, before they could separate the com-
batan s, to put about three hundred to the sword on the
spot
Sykes comments that while Shah Abbas's policy of divide and rule
t . . . greatly strengthened the power of the Crown, it undoubt-
edly conduced in the end to the weakening of the nation and the
degeneration of its rulers." 5
This was by no means the last instance whereby a Persian
monarch created or stimulated dissensions among the leaders of
groups perceived as menacing. A similar policy was the pillar
of Qajar policy towards the tribes. Fath Ali Shah and subse-
quent Qajars made the creation of "tribal feuds into instruments
of State policy." 6 And the artificial bifurcation of the
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politically aware urban population was fostered by the Qajars
into the nineteenth century.
But if Iranian history is replete with elegant examples
of this means for dealing with internal opposition or
checking potential opposition, the present form of the policy
constitutes a new level of sophistication. Its basic pur-
poses are to prevent the formation of coalitions among the
political elite which might challenge the supremacy of the
king, and to prevent the rise to prominence of any single
individual who could attempt to impose limits on the Shah's
power.
APPOINTMENT POLICIES
This policy, whose overriding purpose is to prevent any
diminution in the power of the monarch, has several components.
One basic aspect is the appointment of personally antagonistic
individuals as directors of major organizations within the
Iranian Government. The central institutions within the civil
bureaucracy are the Cabinet, the Senate, and the National
Iranian Oil Company, powerful because of its control over
Iran's petroleum wealth. Frequently these will be headed by
personal enemies. A most notorious example of this was the
recent period in which Assadollah Alam was the Prime Minister,
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal was head of the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany, and Engineer Sharif Emami was President of the Senate.
(With the premiership of Hoveyda, the relationships do not
appear to have grown more cordial.) All three individuals
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represented widely varying social backgrounds, educations, and
political experiences, and, reputedly, nursed deep and mutual
hostilities.
Previously, these mutual hostilities were introduced
into the Cabinet itself. But in recent years, efforts have been
made to establish "party" governments. Beginning with the Mel-
liyun Party under Prime Minister Eghbal and, since 1964, the
Iran Novin Party (New Iran) under Hassan Ali Mansur and Amir
Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Ministers have been allowed to staff
their Cabinets with party men--a united "team."7 Save for the
Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs, which the Shah continues
to reserve for his sole jurisdiction, the factionalism formerly
produced by appointments to the other posts has been reduced.
Increasingly, the Cabinet has begun to act as a more unified
agency and conflicts now tend to exist between the Cabinet and
other parts of the bureaucracy, rather than within the Cabinet
itself.
A second component of the divide and rule policy is His
Majesty's seeming penchant for shaking up personal relations
within the administration by making surprise appointments. The
king appears to delight in appointing individuals of low status
to positions associated, in the minds of the elite, with high
power. Conversely, high status individuals are frequently
assigned to posts not known for their importance, Several
examples of this practice might be cited, although a most
notorious examp of the latter was the seconding of Assadollah
Alam to Shiraz after his Premiership. From 1962 to 1964, Alam
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had served the king by converting the turbulence of the Amini
period to one of relative tranquility. He conducted the success-
ful Referendum and elections for the Majles and Senate which were
unparalleled for their orderly and predictable outcome. When he
was replaced by Mansur, Alam assumed the Chancellorship of
Pahlevi University. There, Alam was several hundred miles from
the seat of power and in charge of an institution with slight
connection to the bureaucracy and no prestige within it. But
Alam still remained powerful. In fact, at the time the power
attributions for this present study were made by the panel of
ten, Alam had left Tehran for his new post. Yet he was one of
only four individuals from a general elite of 3,000 whom all ten
rankers dubbed "politically very powerful."
The principal effect of this practice is that the indivi-
dual so appointed intervenes in the administration at a level
more commensurate with his personal power than his organiza-
tionally derived influence. 8 As a result, personal relation-
ships within the bureaucracy are disturbed as administrators
find their orders ignored and lower-echelon personnel going over
their heads. Formal communication and authority relationships--
as defined by the organizational charts so assiduously con-
structed by the High Council on Government Administration--
dissolve and organizational effectiveness is diminished. But
from the perspective of His Imperial Majesty, these results are
not necessarily untoward. While the capability of the bureau-
cracy is reduced and with it the efficiency with which the Shah's
reforms are effected, the ability of any bureaucratic agency to
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amass independent power or to combine with other agencies for
the same purpose is reduced. The overlapping and nonsequential
relationships seriously impede the development of unity which
the bureaucracy would need to challenge the wishes of the king.
OVERLAPPING BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITIES
A third major component of the Shah's style of rule is
his penchant for "hedging his bets." Thus, responsibility for
the performance of any task considered vital to the regime is
never assigned to a single agency. No one bureaucrat or adminis-
trator will ever be allowed to amass power by dint of the fact
that he alone can supply some wanted service or effect a desired
end. The task of supplying intelligence to the regime is a
relevant example. Accountability for gathering and interpreting
intelligence on internal and external political matters is not
assigned to a single organization. Rather, a multiplicity of
agencies are charged with gathering intelligence on similar
matters.
The Sazemane Ettela'at va Amniyate Keshvar (State Security
and Intelligence Organization) bears principal responsibility for
general intelligence. (Established in 1957 with American aid
and technical assistance, SAVAK has since developed closer col-
laboration with the Israelis.) The three directors of the
organization all have been known for their unswerving loyalty
to the king. But the first, General Bakhtiar, was dismissed
admist rumors of inciting rebellion. The second, General
Pakravan, was assigned as Ambassador to Pakistan amidst rumors
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of Royal dissatisfaction with his leniency towards suspected
traitors. The third and present chief, General Ne'matt'ollah
Nassiri, might well succeed where each of his predecessors has
failed. Nassiri was a classmate with the Crown Prince at the
Military Academy and received his officer commission with the
future Shah. He demonstrated his loyalty and toughness by
serving as Commander of the Imperial Guards from 1950 and by
carrying on activities against Prime Minister Mossadegh. It
was Nassiri, then a Colonel, who carried the Shah's orders of
dismissal to Mossadegh on August 16, 1953, and who ultimately
found and arrested him after his escape from the armed forces
beseiging his house.
But even with these credentials, Nassiri is not entrusted
with sole responsibility for intelligence. Nominally within the
organizational framework of the Sazeman is a Special Intelligence
Bureau, which is physically separate and financially independent.
It is assigned the task of duplicating the work of Savak with re-
guard to potentially serious threats to the regime. It is
headed by General Hossein Fardust, who was not only a classmate
with the future monarch and Nassiri, but was one of the Persian
boys whom Reza Shah despatched to Switzerland with his son. The
Shah has described him as a "special friend" during his child-
hood. 9
Finally, the J-2 branch of the Imperial Iranian Armed
Forces is charged with duplicating the function of both these
organizations. Its head is General Azzizollah Kamal. Although
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not an early companion of the king, Kamal is generally regarded
as totally loyal to the Shah.
These men and their organizations duplicate each other's
efforts. There is little likelihood that any important internal
or external threats to the regime will escape unnoticed. More-
over, with at least three independent agencies, it is unlikely
that any intelligence of importance will be held back from the
ears of the monarch, In order to lessen this probability even
further, His Majesty has regularly scheduled personal audiences
with each of his intelligence chiefs. Thus, the overlapping of
responsibility means that no one officer can become indispensable.
No one officer can exert influence over the king because the
responsibilities which he fulfills are unique or essential. The
dismissal of any of the three would not submit the regime to any
"intelligence gap."
And this overlapping of function is not restricted to the
gathering of information vital to the survival of the regime.
Similar practices exist elsewhere in the bureaucracy. There is
a Ministry of Economy and another for Development and Housing.
Labor unions are the concern of the Minister of Interior and the
Minister of Labor0 Responsibility for the Literacy Corps is
assigned to the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Education.
THE SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM
Similarly, the vaunted single party system for Iran was
doomed to inevitable failure. Those who recognized the Shah's
desire for redundancy also realized that any single party
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system would be anathema to him. And as it was unwelcome to him,
its future was ominous. Shortly after the Referendum of 1963,
rumors percolated through Tehran political circles that a single
party system would be the logical outcome of the Rural Coopera-
tive's Congress and the overwhelming unity demonstrated in the
balloting. Further, the royal experiment with a controlled two
party system had been disastrous. What more logical, then, than
a single, mass party? These rumors reached new heights when an
article appeared in the press entitled, "A Single Party System
for Iran,"10 an article written by a foreigner conducting
political research in Iran known to have met with the Shahanshah
and other political notables during that time. Given the poli-
tical cynicism and mistrust so widespread in the capital, it was
generally assumed that the plan had been devised in the offices
of the United States State Department and the C.I.A. It was
then transmitted to Iran by this specially delegated foreigner.11
Whatever the substance to these rumors, subsequent developments
did not discredit them.
Hassan Ali Mansur, future leader of this party, like many
of his fellow political aspirants, was then a member of a
dowreh (circle) composed of contemporaries and familiars. The
dowreh met regularly to discuss Iran's social and economic prob-
lems. Unlike other such groups, however, this one had been pub-
licized as a study group and been dubbed the "Progressive
Center." Shortly after the appearance of Dr. Pfaff's article,
this dowreh was further distinguished by being royally chartered
as the "Economic Research Bureau to the Imperial Court."12
15'
Earlier, Mansur had specified that his colleagues would play no
role in Iranian politics. He insisted that his Progressive Cen-
ter develop a "proper foundation and become naturally popular."1 3
Apparently, the "foundation" which Mansur sought was not to be
found in mass support. For mass support or even a firm base
among the political elite would bear no relation to the fundamen-
tal source of political power in Iranian society--the Shahanshah.
Thus Mansur changed his attitude toward political activity with
the granting of the Royal Charter. At a rally of the Progres-
sive Center held shortly thereafter, Mansur announced that members
of the Center could enter the coming elections of the Majles.
He "hoped" that his candidates would "enjoy the support of . .
all those who believe in its aims." 14
Late in the summer of 1963, the "Congress of Free Men and
Free Women of Iran" was called, ostensibly to nominate candidates
for the Majles. The candidates were to be broadly representative
of the newly enfranchised female population, the recently landed
peasantry, and workers scheduled to receive shares in the profits
of factories. What transpired was three days of laudatory
speeches followed by the submission of a list of nominees. This
slate had been prepared by negotiations between Mansur and the
Ministry of Interior.15 Of the 193 candidates, thirty-eight
(including Mansur) were members of the Progressive Center. And
in the subsequent elections, all were elected.16
The Majles held its first session in October, and although
Alam retained the Premiership, the Progressive Center had clearly
captured the momentum. Its leader had already confidently
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declared, "When the Progressive Center forms the Cabinet, all
the key posts in the Government will obviously go to Party mem-
bers." 17 Majles members flocked to join the Progressive Center.
Within two months, the Center boasted that 150 of the deputies
had joined. And by December, 15, Mansur announced the conversion
of his Center into a "New Iran Party." In March of 1964, Mansur
was called by the king to form a new Government. As Mansur had
predicted, Party members did hold all Cabinet portfolios, save
the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs.
Thus, only months after the founding, the Iran Novin Party
was in control of the Cabinet and the Majles. The Shah received
the Party Executive Committee in audience and Mansur reported to
the press that the Shah would assume "overall leadership" of the
Party.18 Tehran was in an uproar. Not only had the vaunted
single party been created; not only had the Government devoted
its resources to advancing the interests of that Party; but the
monarch himself would assume its direction. As in Egypt, Iraq,
and Syria, and a host of other developing societies, Iran was
to have a single, national political party. How, after all,
could any opposition challenge a party whose leader was the king?
But both the uproar and a single party system were
apparently more than His Imperial Majesty intended. On the very
next day, the Ministry of the Royal Court reported that there had
been a "misunderstanding." An official transcript of the Shah's
statement was issued:
I am entrusted with leading the Iranian people, and
without doubt, the large organization of the Iran Novin
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party . . . which has been mobilised to execute these
high aims, has my support and interest.
I feel there is a bright future for the Iranian
people, and will watch the prosperity of the liberated
farmers, workers, women, and intellectuals in the
framework of the new and just political organization.19
Clearly, His Majesty had backed off from unconditional
support of Mansur and from willingness to lead the Iran Novin.
A single party would be incompatible with his perpectual in-
clination to provide himself with a "fallback" position. The
support of a single party, for example, would constrain him in
a choice of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Under such a system, it
would be necessary to select his executive officials from amongst
the Secretary-General and deputy leaders of the Party. But if he
were to do this, His Majesty would no longer be a free agent in
staffing his Government. Also, the party would be unchallenged
in its recruitment and the leaders of the party unencumbered by
competition from other parties. The competition and personal
animosities of the leaders are essential for preventing any
cohesion of opposition sentiment or resistance to the wishes of
the Shah.
The result was the communication to the leaders of a num-
ber of moribund political groupings that their political ac-
tivities would once more be sanctioned. The Melliyun Party
immediately revised its platform to give the party "a more
progressive program."20 The Mardom Party tightened discipline
over its twelve-man Majles faction and announced a committee to
draft a new party platform.2 1 Neither of these parties, however,
was allowed the encouragement or resources accorded to the Iran
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Novin Party. It was not His Majesty's goal to restore Iran to
the political chaos of 1960-1961. These parties would be
allowed to function--but only at a level insufficient to gene-
rate the turmoil of those earlier years when the experiment in
a competitive two party system had collapsed.
By supporting one major political party and encouraging
a number of minor parties, the monarch has accomplished diverse
ends,, The governing party is always confronted with a viable
alternative to its rule. They well appreciate that what is but
an alternative at present would actually become their replace-
ment were the Shah displeased. By offering a number of
legitimate channels for the expression of political interests
(admittedly, a highly circumscribed set of political interests),
the available loci for coopting elites are enhanced. That is,
there are now political parties as well as administrative posi-
tions into which potential counter-elites can be coopted.
Finally, by being allowed legitimate participation in the poli-
tical system--in the Majles and Senate, if not the Cabinet--the
opposition becomes sullied. These opposition parties collabo-
rate with the Government and "bargain with it while constantly
jockeying to obtain more power."22 As a result, while the
National Front, the major opposition force, remains totally
alienated and totally uninvolved, the active opposition has
become discredited for its participation in the system. Cor-
rupted by their very participation, they too are held respon-
sible. And for their responsibility their utility as a focus
for opposition to the regime is lessened. Thus, the Front has
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been forced to a position of quiescence while other opposition
groups have been discredited for their involvement with the
regime. As a result, no meaningful focus for grouping oppo-
sition activities remains.
THE SHADOW CABINET
Yet another means which His Imperial Majesty employs in
order to divide and rule is that of the "shadow cabinet." Just
as institutions are assigned overlapping responsibilities and
the directors of those institutions, ipso facto, have over-
lapping duties, so this is yet another way in which the king
may "hedge," A member of the political elite will be asked to
follow the activities of an organization or Ministry within the
bureaucracy. He will be provided with information on the
finances and policies of that agency, its personnel, and the
intentions of its chief. With this information, he will be
expected to pass on the advisability of the policies and future
plans being pursued by the actual director. Moreover, he is
expected to be thoroughly familiar with the entire operations
of the agency or Ministry.
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal is reputed to have filled this post
of "shadow director" at the N.I.O.C. before he actually assumed
formal office. As such, he would be received in regularly
scheduled audiences with the king, frequently having to return
from Europe to do so. As the "shadow" director, he accomplished
several important functions. He was able to offer His Majesty
another educated, but hopefully less biased, opinion on the
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conduct of N.I.O.C. affairs than could the actual director,
This facilitated the king's supervision of the oil company and
his making key policy decisions regarding the exploration, pro-
duction, and sale of petroleum and Iran's relation to the Inter-
national Oil Consortium. The director's knowledge that another
individual had the ear of the monarch with regard to his own
responsibilities was thought to keep him alert, honest, and more
conscientious. A more important result of this policy is that
the director could be replaced and the "shadow" director
brought from the wings with minimal disruption of the agency's
affairs. Given the frequent personnel changes which the king
imposes on the bureaucracy, any contribution to continuity is
beneficial. It complements the continuity provided by the king
and conduces to the stability of the political systems.
THE RISE OF "EXCEPTIONAL" INDIVIDUALS
Another major component in the Shah's divide and rule
style is based on the uneasiness induced in him by the rise to
prominence of institutions or individuals. He maintains con-
stant supervision over the political process to allay that un-
easiness, Individuals who become too powerful will be reduced
in stature, by being re-assigned, discredited, criticized in
public, or, if need be, excluded from the political elite.
Institutions which manifest the same characteristics will be
subject to the same fate. The directors may be dismissed, the
organization itself relieved of certain responsibilities, and
under extreme conditions, the entire institution dismantled.
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His Imperial Majesty is especially attentive to the rise
to power of exceptional individuals. In this regard, "excep-
tional" can be defined as any member of the political elite
possessing or potentially possessing an unusually high degree
of charisma, personal popularity, or hostility towards the
regime. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the king
followed the recommendation of Thrasybulus, ruler of Miletus, by
discarding those who stand above their peers. 2 3 But His Majesty
certainly deals with leaders of elites in an approximately
similar spirit. Any self-styled censor of the Shah can reel off
the names of individuals dismissed from office and isolated from
political currents. Invariably it is explained that many were
subject to this fate because they were too "smart" or too
"aggressive" or too "popular." What is meant is that they
refused to remain in the penumbra of the Imperial presence and
were accorded, or at least sought, a personal following among
significant numbers of Iranians. A feature of these lists,
which any researcher into Iranian politics will uncover, is
their overlap. On a surprising number appear the names of Dr.
Mossadegh, Dr. Amini, Ebtehaj, Arsanjani, Allahyar Saleh,
Eng. Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Dariush Foruhar,
leader of one wing of the National Front. The names of others
turn up with sufficient frequency to consider them as members of
the same group. Abdollah Entezam, Ahmad Farhad, Dariush
Homayoun, Mohammad Darakhshesh, Khaleel Maleki, and Shoja ed
din Malayeri are also reputed to have been demoted or isolated
for being "exceptional" individuals0
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Mohammad Darakhshesh
Mohammad Darakhshesh, for example, had been Minister of
Education in Amini's Cabinet. With Amini's fall in 1962, he too
was dropped from formal office. Although he retains the title of
Member of the High Council of the Ministry for Education (and
receives remuneration for that office), he has never been in-
vited to a meeting of that august body--if such a meeting has
been held. But he has been arrested since 1962 and his house
kept under surveillance. Why should a Minister of Education be
accorded this unusual treatment?
Darakhshesh was more than an ordinary civil servant.
After graduating from the Tehran Teachers' Training College and
Tehran University, he entered Government service as a secondary
school teacher. He formed the Association of Teachers' Training
College Graduates and used it successfully in a teachers' strike
for higher wages in 1949. Later in the year, the Association and
its magazine, Mehregan, were banned, along with other political
parties, after the abortive assassination attempt on the life
of the Shah. But this was not the end for Darakhshesh. With
the sholugh (turmoil) preceding the oil nationalization, the
group was back, switching its affiliation from the Tudeh Party
to Khaleel Maleki's socialists0
In the early years, Darakhshesh sided with Mossadegh,
but later broke with him and threw in his lot (and that of his
Association) with the Shah. Not surprisingly, Darakhshesh's
name was among the successful candidates to the Eighteenth
Majles, the first elected after Mossadegh's overthrow. To the
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amazement of many, however, he refused a passive role in the Par-
liament. Darakhshesh gave several impassioned speeches from the
floor of that chamber, opposing the prospective agreement with
the International Oil Consortium. He supported the National
Front and castigated the landlords for their reactionary poli-
tical policies. Thus, as might be expected, his failure to be
re-elected to the Majles naturally followed. Darakhshesh went
back to teaching, to publishing his journal, and to organizing
the teachers. In the chaotic spring of 1961, it was the
teachers' organization which demonstrated before the Majles.
And it was the killing of one of the teacher-demonstrators that
resulted in the fall of Sharif-Emami and the investiture of Amini.
To placate this well-organized and aroused group of
teachers, the Shah agreed to Darakhshesh's inclusion in the
Cabinet. It ought to have been obvious, however, that with the
return of political autonomy to the throne, the "exceptional"
individuals would be dismissed. Darakhshesh was one of those
individuals, primarily because he had been able to construct a
base of power distinct from the throne. Moreover, that base--
the teachers' organization--was sufficiently vigorous to permit
his demanding and receiving a Cabinet portfolio. With Amini's
fall, therefore, the regime struck back. The Association of
Teachers' Training College Graduates was disbanded, Its club
house was closed and shuttered. The publication of Mehregan
was suspended. Characteristically, though ruined as a political
figure, Darakhshesh was not ruined as an individual. He
received a new post at the Ministry and was allowed to return
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to his home. Insofar as he shuns political activity, he is
permitted this relative freedom. But allegations of his poli-
tical involvement and the detention of the mass of political
figures following political disturbances have resulted in his
periodic arrest. Nonetheless, there is no reason to assume he
will continue to be harassed if he can but learn, at the age of
52, to live the sedate life of a retired homebody.
Shoja ed din Malayeri
Other individuals have tried to have it both ways. They
have tried to build a power base other than the graces of His
Imperial Majesty while retaining his support by constantly pro-
fessing their loyalty and fidelity to the throne. Shoja ed din
Malayeri is such an individual. Malayeri was born and educated
in Tehran, receiving a degree from its university. After gradu-
ation, he entered the bureaucracy and held a variety of posts,
including Director of the Translation Department of the Ministry
of Agriculture, Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Interior,
Member of the High Council for Electricity, and finally Deputy
Minister of Interior.
With that title, he was appointed Director of the Sherkate
Sahamiye Vahede Autobus (United Bus Company) of Tehran. The
UB.C. was established by the Majles in 1952. Its charter
specified that the owners of existing buses were to place these
vehicles under Government ownership in return for shares in the
new corporation. The fierce resistance of Tehran's independent
operators kept the law a dead letter until 1956. Then a new law
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was passed and General Alavi Moqadam, Chief of the National Po-
lice, assumed the additional duties of organizing the U.B.C.
Under his aegis, the new company commenced operations in June
1965, "amidst appropriate ceremonies."24 After taking shape
under its powerful chief, the job was passed to Malayeri. Mala-
yeri imported new buses and expanded their routes while raising
fares. But the more relevant program which he undertook was the
political organization of the bus drivers. As the reforms from
the throne were publicized and their implementation begun, more
and more rallies were held--to mobilize and inform public opinion
and to demonstrate public solidarity with the Shahanshah. And
when the initial preoccupations of 1963 were transformed to the
zealousness of 1964, Malayeri's bus drivers were ever more in
evidence. They were ideally suited for the role of public
demonstrators. Being dependent on the U.B.C. for their incomes,
they were easily marshalled to attend meetings. Being bus
drivers, they were able to provide their own transportation.
(Caravans of buses loaded with bus drivers going to yet another
welcoming ceremony or parade became commonplace.) Finally, the
income of the U.B.C. allowed Malayeri to employ more than two
thousand bus drivers, a substantial surplus being available to
serve as vociferous Shah-parastis. The result was that the
Director of the U.B.C. had constructed a disciplined force of
highly mobile, able-bodied male demonstrators. They were fre-
quently used in the service of the regime and aided the regime's
efforts to generate public support for its reforms. But profes-
sions of loyalty and demonstrated support of the throne were
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insufficient to overcome the Shah's profound distrust of poli-
tical figures who possess independent bases of power. As with
Arsanjani and Darakhshesh, Malayeri was suspect because of his
leadership of organized followers available for political pur-
poses. While the first led peasants, the second, teachers, and
the third,bus drivers, all presented fundamentally the same
dilemma to the king. All were dealt with accordingly. Malayeri
now serves as Director of the Iran Fisheries Company, charged
with developing the caviar of the Caspian and the seafood of the
Persian Gulf.
The above is not to suggest that no individuals of unusual
talent are allowed to function in the bureaucracies. There are
numerous examples of capable, well trained, and efficient civil
servants. But these so-called "technocrats" must pay a price in
order to serve--the price of becoming depoliticized or apolitical.
Some individuals have demonstrated their ability to withdraw
from political activities to fill technical positions in the
bureaucracy. Others have firm reputations for the apolitical
pursuit of their responsibilities. In this latter category,
Mehdi Sami'i and Dr. Khodadad Farmanfarmaian may be mentioned.
As Director and Deputy Director of the Central Bank of Iran, the
two have been most successful in remaining outside many of the
political currents of the Capital. Whi]ethey are both regarded
as followers and supporters of Ebtehaj, neither has allowed that
relation to interfere with his responsibilities for directing
the fiscal life of Iran. In return both have been rewarded by
their successes in building the Bank to its unchallenged position
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of expertise and competence as well as by the status and other
rewards which are their due.
It needs to be made explicit that "depoliticized" and
"apolitical" are actually misnomers. In the Iranian context,
these two concepts refer to the withdrawal from any activities
which the Shah would consider actually or potentially injurious
to his regime. Failure to pursue those activities while filling
key posts in the bureaucracy is certainly not being "non-
political," therefore. Rather, they are highly political acts
in the sense that the satisfactory management of a Central Bank,
for example, is an important contribution to the longevily and
security of the throne. They are only "non-political" in the
sense of not challenging that throne with regard to the distribu-
tion of values in Iranian society.
DECISION-MAKING
There are a number of additional techniques which the Shah
employs to complement the divide and rule tactics which remain
the basis of his governing style. One such technique is the
effort to force communications within the bureaucracy in vertical
lines rather than horizontal. Both intra-agency and inter-agency
communications are meant to be basically hierarchical--between
levels--rather than horizontal--between divisions. Even the most
petty information, intelligence, and problems are communicated
upwards for decision-making while orders are communicated down-
ward for execution.
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Whenever possible, decisions are made at the apex of each
bureaucratic structure. While the efficiency of the bureaucracy
is thereby diminished, so are the possibilities that decisions
considered perverse by the Shah will be made. Similarly, there
is a greater likelihood that His Majesty may thereby play a per-
sonally decisive role in the decision-making process. To abet
this likelihood, the king is physically present for the making of
major administrative decisions whenever possible. This is accom-
plished in two ways.
As often as is feasible, the Cabinet of Ministers meets
in the Imperial presence.25 The king often takes charge of these
meetings both to remain abreast of developments in each Ministry
and to be able to participate in the making of decisions. The
decision, having been pushed up the bureaucratic hierarchy,
must be settled at the inter-Ministerial level, rather than by
consultations between lower level officials of the different
Ministries. And it is at sessions of the Cabinet that the prin-
cipal inter-Ministerial decisions are taken.
Having already been made aware of many relevant issues
through audiences with the "shadow" ministers and through the
reports of SAVAK, the king is at no disadvantage vis-a-vis the
Cabinet in terms of information. On the contrary, because com-
munication within the bureaucracy tends to remain within verti-
cal lines, a Minister is frequently unaware of important affairs
occurring outside his own bailiwick. When confronting the Sha-
hanshah, then, the Ministers are not only cognizant of the Con-
stitutional power of the Monarch to dismiss them but also of his
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superior information. He possesses knowledge of factors outside
their own agencies which bear on them as well as factors internal
to their agencies and thus central to their concerns,
An example of the Shah's intervening in a session of the
Cabinet to retain his decision-making capability--an atypical
instance of such intervention, for it proved disastrous--occurred
in late 1964. As the year passed, it became obvious that Iran
was entering a financial crisis. A burst of renewed economic
activities spurred by Government spending was meant to pull the
country out of the economic depression by 1960. The result,
however, was that
Pressure on domestic resources and considerable increase
in the demand for consumer goods led to an unprecedented
increase in imports and a sharp rise in prices. Expan-
sion of bank credit to the private sector resulted in a
"liquidity squeeze" for the banking system . . . .
Government's fiscal operations failed to mop up the
extra purchasing power in the hands of the public.26
By the month of November, it was clear that a dangerous monetary
crisis was imminent. In the preceding three months, the price
of flour, bread, and rice--staples of the Iranian diet--had risen
10.1 per cent. 2 7 Meanwhile, the Government found that its re-
ceipts in the first nine months of the year had fallen 4.6 per
cent, while its disbursements had risen 2.5 per cent over a
similar period a year previous.28 Rather than the predicted
budget surplus of $34 million, a $60 million deficit loomed.
The deficit for the next year was predicted at $233 million.29
And finally, there was a decline in Government holdings of
foreign exchange of $38 million, versus an increase of $24million
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in 1963.30 Meanwhile, throughout the year, the Plan Organiza-
tion had heightened the crisis. While the Third Plan had
covered 41 per cent of its life span by the end of November,
1964, the Plan Organization had spent only 23 per cent of its
budgeted outlays. But as 1964 had progressed, "Plan" was
spending greater and greater sums on non-development spending,
aggravating the trends.
His Majesty's response was not untypical. He established
several committees to study the question. Within the Plan Or-
ganization, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Finance, study
groups were at work. An inter-Cabinet group surveyed the same
problem. By November, the reports were in and, as might be sus-
pected, a wide variety of policies were suggested. All centered
about the need to diminish the purchasing power of the private
sector while raising Government revenues and limiting the
spending of the public sector to essentials and developmental
outlays. At a four-hour Cabinet session on November 23, 1964,
the Ministers voted to raise the prices on a number of products
over which the Government had a monopoly.
The Shah is reported to have intervened and demanded a
firmer stand. He specified that the 40 per cent rise in gaso-
line prices urged by the Ministers on the basis of their
studies was too lenient. "Let them pay double," he is reported
to have commented. Gasoline went from 5 to 10 rials per liter.
Whereas the Cabinet had urged a modest hike in the price of
kerosene--the fuel used by the vast majority of Iranians for
heating, lighting, and cooking--the king set the rise at 1 rial
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per liter, from 2.5 to 3.5 rials.31 And so it was with a number
of other commodities. When the concerted conclusions of the ex-
perts had not satisfied the king, he demanded and was accorded
the kinds of more radical action he favored.
It was for the hapless Prime Minister to announce the new
price rises to a silenced Majles. Mansur declared:
I must unfortunately say that the increase in our
national income is very inadequate and has not kept
pace with the population increase . . . .
Our economic course is an inflexible one . . .
When Governments are engaged in the execution of . .
a White Revolution . . . they have to take basic deci-
sions and apply drastic measures. . . . We must have
a great motto for building a new Iran. This motto
should be a "National Crusade for Progress" . . 32
But the price rises for gasoline and oil were not the sole
changes. New taxes were announced for Iranians wishing to
travel abroad, on soft drinks, and on alcohol. The Ministry
of Finance ordered a pay freeze and the rescinding of salary
increases. The Majles imposed new municipal taxes on diesel
motor vehicles and other services. Government Ministries, as
so often in the past, were forbidden to hire new personnel.
The public reaction was immediate and vehement. A general
strike was called, and taxi drivers pulled their taxis off the
streets and refused to work. But 1964 was not 1961, and vigorous
police measures brought all but the most recalcitrant taxi dri-
vers back to the streets. A more devastating public response
occurred, however--a marked drop in public consumption of gaso-
line and kerosene. 33 Not only had sales fallen off, but they
had plummeted to the point where revenues of the N.I.O.C. were
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expected to decline, despite the doubling in the price of gaso-
line and the 40 per cent rise in the kerosene price. Whereas
the Shah had counted on an additional 7 billion rials per year
in new revenues, N.I.O.C. officials began to predict a drop in
their annual income from domestic sales of 500 million rials! 34
Seven weeks after the price rises, on January 13, 1965,
Mansur went before the Majles and reported that a new agreement
with the Oil Consortium would supply Iran with additional reve-
nues. As a result, the Government was rescinding the price rise
on kerosene and dropping the price of gasoline from 10 rials to
8 per liter. While a new agreement had been signed for offshore
oil production, it was the decline in revenues and the profound
public dissatisfaction which motivated the Shah to relent on the
price rises. But his decision was too late. Eight days later,
Hassan Ali Mansur was assassinated on his way into the Majles.
And in April, an abortive attempt was made on the life of the
Shah., While there was no direct link between the two events,
it was unquestionably the milieu of discontent and malaise
permeating all Tehran, but especially the poorer sections sur-
rounding the bazaar, which spawned the assassins. The driver
of a Tehran taxi spoke for many Persians when he responded to
a question from the author about the late Mansur:
What is it to me? Bread! Bread to eat every day is
what matters. This Prime Minister, that Prime Minis-
tet. We must eat! 35
The fuel price hikes were one example of the intervention
of the king in the decision-making process of the bureaucracy.
Lucian Pye has offered an explanation for such behavior of the
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Shah, which appears to the outside observer as nonrational as
this action. Pye explains that an absolute monarch must occa-
sionally behave in an illogical fashion to demonstrate that it
is he, the monarch, who rules and not logic, not rationality,
and certainly not the dictates of "planning and programming and
budgeting."36 Whatever the explanation, it seems certain that
the decision was unwise and ill conceived. The regressive nature
of the price rises and the depth of public passions resulted in
a highly elastic demand for fuels. Consequently, none of the
crises which originally prompted the rises were allayed and new
measures had to be taken in 1965, primarily another approach to
the Oil Consortium.
In addition to the Cabinet meetings over which the Shah
presides, he fosters his dominant role in the decision-making
process by maximizing the number of face-to-face communications
he has with key individuals in the bureaucracy. The Shah main-
tains a calendar which establishes regular weekly audiences with
Ministers and Directors of key institutions within the Govern-
ment, like the N.I.O.C., the Central Bank, or the University of
Tehran. These officials are received in private audience to re-
port their activities over the week and to discuss key decisions
with the king. But his many private audiences are not limited to
these responsible officials, for the king also regularly sees
his "shadow" administrators and a number of personal acquain-
tances. Assadollah Alam, for example, would be seen regularly
on this basis. Seyyed Jalal ed din Tehrani is reported to be a
frequent visitor to the palace. The Seyyed is a Senator, but
I
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more relevantly, an astrologer, and it is claimed by some that he
is occasionally consulted. A select few venerated, aged members
of the political elite are also regularly received by the king.
Seyyed Zia ed din Tabatabai, who staged the 1921 coup with Reza
Khan, is reported to discuss contemporary political affairs with
the king two and three times a week. The Shahanshah also sees a
group from the political elite for recreation. He is fond of
social card games and a clique of elite members are his fellow
players. Dr. Jamshid A'alam is perhaps the most known of His
Majesty's gaming associates. Finally, the king sees a number of
the Princes and Princesses on a regular basis, especially for
social events and movies at the palace.
There are, then, a variety of types among the political
elite who share the honor of frequent meetings with His Imperial
Majesty. His ministers, administrators, advisers, friends, and
relatives all explicitly or implicitly serve to keep His Imperial
Majesty at the very nucleus of the Iranian political system.
Astride the formal and informal channels of communication, he is
party to the information on which that political system operates.
By integrating that information and by maintaining frequent and
periodical personal contact with the Government elite, the Shahan-
shah is able to dominate the decision-making processes of the
Government.
CORRUPTION
There are, however, two additional components to His
Majesty's style of rule which complete the picture of his
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dominance: the tolerance or even encouragement of corruption
and the possession of a monopoly over the means of physical
violence. Corruption is not a latter-day phenomenon in Persian
politics. Herodotus and Plutarch both mention early instances of
corruption, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs.36 Its
presence and durability are even celebrated in Persian poetry:
In Persia will bribes ever go out of fashion,
o Kablay?
Will the mullas for justice develop a passion,
o Kablay?
From magic and murshids pan Islam win free?
Bid the dead come to life, for 'twill easier be,
You limb of the devil and son of a gun,
o Kablay.37
Indeed, there are many members of the elite who argue that cor-
ruption has always been endemic in Persian society, but only
recently have the venality, unscrupulousness, and turpitude that
were once accepted been considered evil. As one person put it:
"What was an accepted administrative practice in the past is now
branded corrupt."
While these practices may be branded corrupt at present,
there is no doubt that they continue to exist. But there has
been a major metamorphosis in the form of their occurrence. As
with so many other features of the society, corruption has been
brought under the control of the center and is now used as a
major counter in the cooptation process, that is, in the seduc-
tion of the elites. 38 The immense enlargement of Government
revenues and resources over which the monarch has control has
facilitated that process. Combined with the growth of central
political power, these resources have made it possible for the
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Government to dominate totally the economic as well as the social
life of the nation. As a result, there are a greater number of
extensive projects with vast cash flows in the control of the
Government. If the opportunities for rewarding friends have been
prodigious, the occasions for silencing enemies are no less
Cyclopean.
But concurrent with the availability of these immense
resources, there has come a reduction in the need for the Shah
to sanction such corruption. The throne is far more powerful
and secure than it has ever been before. While Reza Shah's hold
over the crown, for example, was relatively firm, he was able to
exercise less power than his son as the instruments for the
exercise of such power--the civil and military bureaucracies--
were less developed, while other institutions outside kingly con-
trol--the tribes and the Islamic clergy--were far more powerful.
Thus the need for that ruler to seduce more of his elites and
counter-elites was in all probability far greater than at
present.
Thus the need for the Shah to sanction corruption has
been reduced while his capabilities for doing so have been en-
hanced as the relative and absolute value of his largesse to
the corrupted is greater than in the past. The results of these
conflicting pressures are difficult to assess. What appears to
have happened is a general diminution in the rewards allowed
the counter-elites. As we have seen above, the Shah no longer
needs to accord deference to those opposition elements to pre-
serve his rule. The Persian poet Saadi had counseled otherwise:
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A vicious fellow's mouth must utter words.
If thou desirest not bitter words, sweeten his mouth.3 9
The Shah no longer must "sweeten mouths" to silence opponents.
There appears, on the other hand, to have been no les-
sening in the willingness of the Shah to reward members of the
elite. Although there has been a precipitous decline since
1962-1963 in reported incidents of corruption, this is generally
assumed to reflect a lack of interest in uncovering such occur-
rences rather than a lack of suitable cases' We have mentioned
above that allegations of corruption are frequently used to
dismiss and even prosecute officials suspected of political
disloyalty. With the renewed political calm of the Alam era,
the need for such prosecutions has diminished. It is far more
likely, and generally accepted, that many officials enjoy the
cream from the top of Government expenditures. If they do,
their conduct is tolerated by the regime as one of the prices
of political stability.
THE ARMED FORCES
Perhaps the final and most obvious means available to the
king for manipulating the behavior of his subjects is the use of
physical force. The British officials who complained in 1920 of
the "mensualities" being paid to the Qajar monarchs also noted
that "the present system of Government, in absence of moral and
material force, relies on bribery and repression."4 0 It would be
incorrect to suggest that His Majesty continues to "rely on
repression." The "moral" and "material" foundations of his
176
regime are more secure than ever before and physical repression
is not a manifest part of his style of governance. Rather, a
twofold process has been occurring in Iranian politics since
1960. On the one hand, there has been a mrked reduction in the
physical presence of the armed forces in their role of defender
of the regime, while the intervention of members of the armed
forces in the civilian political process has increased. On the
other hand, the king has developed unchallenged control over the
instruments of physical violence while those instruments have, in
turn, asserted their claims of unassailable physical power over
other institutions in the society.
As recently as fifty years ago the Armed Forces of Iran
consisted primarily of a Cossack Brigade staffed with Russian
officers operating in the northern provinces and a Household
Guard for the Court. There also existed, on paper, a regular
standing army of 40,000 men, but one observer described that
force as
. . beneath contempt. At least a dozen different
patterns of rifles constitute their armament, consisting
of matchlocks, flintlocks, sniders, Martinis, obsolete
Russian guns, and a portion of a cargo of nondescript
description that was seized some years ago in the Persian
Gulf. When it is added that there is not a round of
ammunition to fit any of the above weapons, some idea of
the value of these 40,000 men may be formed.1
In fact these troops were useless to the Qajar regime and to the
Nationalists in the Constitutional Revolution and its aftermath,
The two most powerful military forces in the country at that
time proved to be Bakhtiari tribesmen under the command of
Samsam ul Saltaneh and a troop of volunteers led by the Armenian
-I
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Ephraim Khan, of Tabriz. To the honor of both groups, and
especially the latter, is their responsibility for preserving
the Constitutional regime and preventing the return to power
of the deposed tyrant, Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar.
But other military forces were soon created. A Treasury
Gendarmerie was established by the American Treasurer General
of Iran, Morgan Shushter, in 1911. With Russian pressures and
British acquiescence, however, Shushter was dismissed in 1912
and a new Gendarmerie was formed with Swedish advisers.4 2 Then,
during World War I, the Persian Government succumbed to British
demands. The Cabinet agreed to a British-organized and -officered
force, the South Persia Rifles, to protect British trade routes
in the South as well as as a quid pro quo for the military
presence of other nations. The ever-tenuous internal security
of Iran rested, then, on Swedish-led Gendarmes, British-led
"Persia Rifles," and Russian-led Cossacks.4 3 When the officers
commanding this last force were recalled to Russia during the
1917 Revolution, a Persian Colonel, Reza Khan achieved command.
But under him neither the military nor Iran itself was to be
the same.
For Reza Shah, as he was later known, was the first ruler
of Iran "who instinctively understood the lesson of European
history--the emergence of a unified national state coincides
with the development of a standing national army."44  Putting
aside the preferences of past rulers for armed forces composed of
separate fighting units, Reza Shah's policies of national devel-
opment created a Westernized,unified army.45 "This army was ca-
pable of maintaining the absolute authority of the central govemment
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throughout Iran--a condition that had not existed in the country
for centuries."4 6 The military proved unable to defend Iran
against the foreign aggression of 1941, however. Invading Brit-
ish and Russian troops effectively destroyed Reza Shah's hard-won
military gains in a matter of days.
Nonetheless, the new Shah was quick to appreciate the
importance of the army, both to himself as a ruler and to an
Iran subject to centrifugal pressures. Immediately upon taking
office, he devoted himself and the resources of his country to
rebuilding the shattered army. In 1943, for example, a budgetary
crisis forced the Shah to spell out his priorities. The American
financial advisor Arthur Millspaugh urged a reduction in size of
the 90,000-man standing army. Millspaugh relates:
I told the Shah that if the Army budget were increased
we could do little if anything for agriculture, educa-
tion, or public health. He said: "Ver well, then;
we'll have to postpone those things."4
The priorities for the expenditure of Iran's national
wealth have remained relatively stable since that time. The
Shah has resisted the pressures exerted by Dr. Mossadegh, other
opposition politicians, and the Americans as well as those of
subsequent financial crises. His public position has also been
remarkably consistent. In a major statement of his policies
broadcast throughout Iran immediately after the death of Mansur,
the Shah succinctly stated his views towards the military:
In any case, God willing, our future is so bright that
we should not neglect even for a moment the means of
attaining it. Despite all the confidence we have in
our political alliances, we must not, even for a moment,
neglect to strengthen our defense forces until the day
when there is a reliable general disarmament in the
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world, especially because we occasionally note some
weakening and wearing off of the United Nations
Organization and also because we hear of certain
insolence against our interests. 4 8
As a result, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces have consistently
grown in size, been equipped with modern weapons, and charged
with the performance of vital non-military functions.
When in 1921 Reza Khan led his Cossack troops from Qazven
to the capital, his columns numbered between 1,500 and 3,000
men.4 9 Several hundred troops formed a Royal Guard. Perhaps
an additional few thousand Iranians armed as border guards and
Gendarmes were loosely under central control. With this, Reza
Shah began his reforms. He unified all the disparate forces,
dissolved the Cossacks and South Persia Rifles and increased the
number of men under arms. In the first year following his
accession to the throne, he devoted 43 per cent of his Govern-
ment's expenditures to the Ministry of War,50 a proportion
which was to remain nearly as high during his entire rule. With
these funds, he enlarged the army in successive stages to a
force of 100,000 men by 1941.
Following the invasion, Millspaugh sought to persuade the
new king that the collapse of the army before the foreign inva-
ders demonstrated the utter prodigality of maintaining a large
force. While Millspaugh argued, however, the Shah insisted on
"at least 90,000."51 The numbei has never diminished since. By
the time of Amini's premiership, Iran could boast a standing army
of 200,000 men, larger than those of West Germany or Japan,
although the dictates of the country's economic recession and
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the Government's financial crisis suggested a reduction in mili-
tary expenditure. The new Kennedy administration urged the same
program. Indeed, the Shah announced that he had determined to
reduce the size of the armed forces by 15 per cent.52 But in
spite of his announcement, it was the Shah's refusal to lessen
military expenditures which prevented Amini from balancing the
budget. There is no evidence that the size of the Iranian
Armed Forces was ever altered except for purposes of expansion,
and by 1965 the force was estimated at 220,000 men.
The quality of the equipment of the Armed Forces has im-
proved at a rate greater than its size. Originally the troops
could boast a motley assortment of makeshift weapons. Reza Shah
modernized these and constructed munitions plants and arsenals.
Machine gun and rifle assembly plants were established by Brno
of Czechoslovakia. Heavier artillery was imported from Sweden.
Faced with the budgetary difficulties of World War II, however,
it was obvious to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlevi that Iran could
never afford to equip a modern army by self-generated funds.
The Shah turned to the United States. After a long courtship
beginning with the first American Military Mission to the Iranian
Gendarmerie in 1942, significant levels of aid were finally ob-
tained from President Eisenhower following the overthrow of
Mossadegh. In the two postwar decades, Iran received nearly a
billion dollars in military assistance from the United States--
grants, loans, direct shipment of surplus stocks, and technical
training.
United State 3Aid To
Iran
(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)
U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS NET OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS REPAY- 16 A A
POST-4AR MARSHALL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TOTAL MENI'5 AND LE'.S
PROGRAM RELIEF PLAN MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD ACT PERIOD . 19A6-
PERIOD PERIOD 1946. MENTS AND
1946:19481949.19521953-1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966 1966 INTERCST
.1.0. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.... - 1.9 303.4 51.4 46.0 37.5 62.0 53.0 22.0 h.3 2.5 6.9 6C3.8 85.0 518.5
Loans....- . - 65.0 40.0 37.7 - 37.2 19.7 17.4 1.3 - 4.9 223.1 85.0 138.1
Grants............................. . 1.9 238.4 11.4 8.3 37.5 24.8 33.3 4.6 3.0 2.5 2.0 380.7 - 380.7
OCIAL PROGRESS TRUST FUND................. .- - - - - - - - - -- - - -
000 FOR PEACE - TOTAL................... 0.1 7 0.5 0.9 0.7 23.9 13.9 21.7 n.8 23.0 11.6 122.8 6.6 116.2
Title I. - (Total Sales Agreements) ..... (-) (-) (12.4) (-) (-) (-) (19.5) (6.6) (6.9) (5.4) (11.5) (-) (62.4) (-) (62.)
Less: (Planned for U.S. Uses).....-W() (-) (4.0) (-) (-) (-) (5.8) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (5.8) (-) (20.6) (-) (20.6)
TITLE I - PLANNED FOR LOANS AND GRANTS - - 8.4 - - - 13.7 5.o 5.2 3.8 5.8 - 11.8 3.0 38.8
104c - Grants jor Common Defense..........- - 5.9 - - - - 4.6- - - - 10.5 0.4 10.1
104e - Grants for Economic Development.- - - f - - - - -
104e - Loans to Private Industry......... - - . - - 1.6 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.2 - h.1 0.4 4.o
104s - Loans to Governments............. - - 2.5 - - - 12.1 - 4.2 3.5 4.6 - 26.8 2.2 24.6
TITLE I -ASS'T FROMOTHER COUNTRY AGRMT.S. - - . .
Ts T LE I1 - EMERGENCY RELIEF &ECON. DEV.. - 3.4 - - - 8.6 6.0 13.1 2.2 1.4 - 31.7 - 31.7
TITLE III - VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES......- 0.1 2.9 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.6 2.9 3.4 5.8 0.2 2.2 21.3 - 21.3
TITLE IV - DOLLAR CRED T SALES ............ -- - - - - - - - 15.6 9.4 25.0 3.6 21.4
XPORT-IMPORT 8AiCK LONG-TERM LOANS............ - 48.7 - - - 21.3 - - 8.7 18.5 - 97.2 . 71.6 25.6
ITHER U.S. ECONOMIC PROGRAMS................ 25.8 1.5 - - - - . 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.4 2.6 33.0 2.4 30.6
TOTAL ECONOMIC........................ 25.8 16.5 366.8 51.9 46.9 38.2 107.2 67.3 43.9 25.9 45.4 21.1 856.8 165.6 691.2
Loans................................ 25.8 116.2 10.0 37.7 - 72.2 -24.6 22.6 13.8 39 9 1143 4CYA.9 - 165.6 211.3
Grants.............................. ..- 16.5 250.6 11.9 9.2 38.2 35.0 42.6 21.3 12.1 5.5 6.8 449.8 - 449.8
b/
ILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM - (Chg. to A011.) - 16.6 133.9. 73.0 90.9 89.1 49.2 33.3 66.0 27.3 449.9 1.7 895.2 - 895.2
Credit Assistance................... - - - - - 3.6 132.0 139.0
Grafts................................ - 16.6 133.9 73.0 90.9 89.1 49.2 33.3 66.0 27.3 49.9 41.1 756.2- 756.2
(Addi tional Grants From Excess S tcks) (-) (0.7) (21.1) (1.8) (6.0) (7.0) (10.1) (1.1) (2.7) (4.0) (1.0) (1.0) (57.1) (-) (57.1)
ITNER MILITARY ASSISTANCE (GRANTS).......... . . - - - - - -
TOTAL MILITARY........................- 16.6 133.9 73.0 90.9 89.1 .9.2 33.3 .66.0 27.3 49.9 44.7 895.2 _ 895.2
TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ............. 25.8 33.1 500.7 124.9 137.8 127.3 156.4 100.6 109.9 53.2 95.3 65.8 1,75-.0 165.6 1,5S6. 11
Loans............................... 25.8 - 116.2 40.0 37.7 - 72.2 24.6 22.6 13.8 39.9 17.9 545.9 165.6 380.3
Grants..............................-. 33.1 3P.5 84.9 100.1 127.3 84.2 75.9 87.3 39.4 55.4 47.9 1,206.0 - 1,206.0
af Represents loan under Section 14(c).
b/ Annual data represent delivorieel total through 1966 is the cumulative program.
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The initial American rationale for providing these
supplies stemmed from the dictates of its Containment Policies.
The Pentagon hoped to be able to strengthen the Iranian military
to the point where it could resist a massive Soviet land inva-
sion. With the passage of time, the importance of this goal was
progressively diminished. Secretary of Defense McNamara spelled
out the more recent American rationale for military aid to Iran
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee:
With respect to Iran, our objective has been to help
build up its military forces to the point where they
can ensure internal security and provide at least an
initial defense against an overt Soviet attack. Al-
though the Iranian military forces, with our aid, have
improved significantly during the last decade, they are
still not, and never can be, a match for Soviet forces
presently deployed along the Iranian borders, even
though the terrain favors the defense.
In Iran, as elsewhere in the world, the best defense
against the spread of communism is a steady improvement
in economic and social conditions which is the primary
aim of our economic assistance efforts. In this connec-
tion the assurance of a continued substantial level of
military assistance support has enabled the Shah to con-
centrate on reforms leading to economic and social
progress throughout the country. 5 4
Following this presentation of America's views for such support,
a new military aid agreement was concluded between Iran and the
United States. Using the revolving credit, "Country-X" authori-
zation of the Export-Import Bank, the United States agreed to
guarantee a loan of $200,000,000 to Iran for the purchase of
arms. In addition, an outright grant of $50,000,000 was made
for the purchase of spare parts. 55
But these same premises of economic determinism and the
use of foreign aid to reduce Iranian dependency on the United
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States are apparently also shared by the U.S.S.R.56 It has made
frequent overtures to Iran and made its opposition to the United
States presence unambiguous: "Situated as she is on the border-
line of the two systems, Iran is doomed if she lets herself be
turned into a base of imperialist aggression. No two opinions
are possible about that."57 Iran has not become such a base.
The cooling of His Majesty's relations with the United States--
evident since the election of the Democratic Party in 1960--and
his firm efforts at internal reform must have impressed the
Soviets. Almost in causal fashion, more cordial relations with
the U.S.S.R. accompanied the worsening relations with the U.S.A.
By 1965, the Shah and Soviet leaders "declared their readiness
for still further expansion of friendly and good neighborly
relations . . . as well as for the substantial expansion of
economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation bene-
ficial to both nations." 58 Few foresaw the area in which the
most dramatic expansion in "~good neighborly relations" would
occur. While presenting his annual budget message in early
1967, the Prime Minister declared that Iran had "clinched" a
$110 million arms deal with the Soviet Union. Iran would re-
ceive weapons in return for which she would supply the U.S.S.R.
with local products and natural gas. 5 9
In addition to the foreign aid which Iran has received--
massive for a nation of 25,000,000--a striking level of inter-
nally generated funds has also been devoted to defense. Iran's
Defense Budget constitutes some 25 to 30 per cent of each
year's steadily mounting Government budget. 60 And this
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percentage understates actual defense expenditures. Wherever
possible, major military expenditures, e.g., the construction
of bases and barracks, are assigned to non-military accounts
in the budget. The development expenditures of the Plan Organi-
zation are a favored home for such expenses. Finally, in the
face of growing unrest in the Middle East, Iran has sought to
generate new funds. In late 1965, the Majles authorized the
Government to supplement the defense budget by further borrow-
ings of $200,000,000. In presenting the bill, the Prime Minis-
ter told the Majles that the measure was necessary to secure
Iran's "frontiers and territorial integrity against outside
threats." 61 It was clear that the threats to which he referred
emanated from Egypt and Syria. These threats were not perceived
as less when Iran announced in early 1967 that her defense
spending was still inadequate, although it was running at an
annual rate of at least $485,000,000.62 To further strengthen
defense, the Shah announced that for the first time in their
history, Iranians would be "invited" to "subscribe to defence
expenditures through the floating of 3,000 million rials
[$40,000,000] worth of defense bonds."16 3
With the funds and outright gifts of equipment provided
by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the re-
sources generated by Iran's own economy, the Shah has been able
to insure the adequate supply of his troops. For example, in
fiscal year 1962, the United States supplied the Iranian Gen-
darmerie, which has an authorized strength of 30,000 men, with
the following equipment: 2,000 tear gas grenades, 1,602
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quarter-ton trucks, 1,040 jeeps and miscellaneous motor vehicles,
29,960 weapons, and 15 aircraft. 64 Aside from these rather pro-
saic supplies, however, Iran can boast more sophisticated
weapons. In 1966, Iran was equipped with Hawk anti-aircraft
missile battalions.65 The year before, Iran became the first
foreign nation to receive America's most advanced supersonic
jet tactical fighters, the F-5. General Khatami, the brother-
in-law of His Imperial Majesty and commander of the Air Force,
announced that a total of 100 F-5 fighters would be received by
1970.66 Later the United States agreed to sell Iran "at least
one squadron of F-4 Phantoms, the most advanced jet fighter in
the American inventory."67 In addition, Iran bolstered her naval
forces. In late 1966, the Shah placed orders totalling $63 mil-
lion in Britain for five destroyers, a number of other naval
vessels, and more ground-to-air missiles.6 8
But a military force is more than weapons alone. With
her military resources, Iran has also been able to develop a
network of modern military installations. For example, in 1965,
the Iranians officially opened the Shahrokhi Air Base near
Hamadan. The base boasts one of the longest runways in the world,
as well as advanced radar systems. 69 Naval bases on the Persian
Gulf and defensive forts around Iran's borders have recently
been under construction. Nor have the non-combat needs of the
military been neglected. New housing projects and apartments
have been built by the Ministry of Housing and the Plan Organiza-
tion and reserved for military personnel. The new Officers' Club
of Tehran seems to the uninitiated more a palace for the
Ni
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Commander-in-Chief himself. Finally, the Government has not been
remiss in satisfying the more direct material aspirations of
military leaders. His Majesty has consistently stressed the need
to raise military salaries and he has more consistently done so.
In the midst of the economic crisis of late 1964 and the accom-
panying extraordinary price rises and tax hikes, for example,
the king announced his intention of raising the salaries of Army
and Gendarmerie officers. It was estimated that the raises would
cost the Government an additional $2,500,000 per year. 70 In
addition, the Government allows officers in the military to im-
port such luxuries as automobiles without the payment of customs
duties, as well as occasionally providing outright bonuses for
their purchase. 71
The Shah, then, has increased the size and fighting effi-
ciency of his armed forces. He has also, apparently, succeeded
in satisfying their material aspirations. But he does not risk
this eventuality as he has consistently striven to eliminate the
possibility of losing direct command of the forces. This has
traditionally assumed two dimensions. On the one hand, the Shah
has closely supervised the personnel who comprise his officer
corps. On the other, he encourages the inculcation of loyalty
to his person and the institutions of the monarchy.
In the first regard, no promotions above the rank of major
can be made without the Shah's explicit perusal of the officer's
dossier. The Shah personally examines the records of all these
officers to determine the advisability of their promotion. He
has forbidden any of his generals to visit the capital or meet
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with any other general without his personal, case by case, per-
mission. Finally, His Majesty frequently meets with his comman-
ders and deals with them in the same fashion, described above,
with which he treats his civilian bureaucrats.
But as well as satisfying the commanders, the Shah also
makes stringent efforts to build loyalty among the troops. Cer-
tainly the rewards he accords the army are one such method. But
the Shah does even more. He frequently appears in full military
regalia surrounded by a coterie of important generals--even at
totally civilian functions, e.g., for the distribution of land
reform deeds or supervising a Boy Scout encampment. (At such
times, he is referred to as the Commander-in-Chief of the Im-
perial Iranian Armed Forces.) The first order of duty each
morning at all Iranian military camps is the mass recital of a
prayer for the welfare and longevity of the Shah. The slogan,
"Khoda, Shah, Mihan" (God, Shah, Fatherland), is a byword in the
military. And the Shah does not demur in publicly lauding the
military for its help in carrying out the White Revolution. A
recent Armed Forces Day provided the Shah with a suitable occa-
sion for thanking the Army. "It is our hope," the Shah con-
cluded, "that with the help of Almighty God, the Army will gain
even more success in the path of greatness of the beloved
nation."72
This treatment has not gone unnoticed by the less favored
civilians. An unusual editorial in one of Tehran's daily news-
papers verbalized their growing indignation:
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Perhaps it is time for our military leaders to give a
second look to the unfair and unnecessary privileges
which some of our military personnel have obtained in
past years. Such privileges . . . should be re-
appraised by the military leaders of the country in
view of the growing public disapproval of such privi-
leges.
Indeed, the Imperial Army should be rightly concerned
about the unfavorable public attitude in this regard . . .
at a time when the majority of the country's population is
experiencing many financial and social frustrations and at
a time when everyone is urged to tighten his belts, public
jealousy is too natural to overlook.
The fact that our army officers are receiving "most
favored" treatment constitutes a privileged class and
in fact the "upper class" of those on the government pay-
roll, is a by-product of the past when the government had
little support among the populace and had to build support
for itself by lavishly feeding the armed forces. 7 3
The response of His Imperial Majesty was to order the
military to shed its uniforms in public places and to refurbish
its image by performing more immediately useful tasks. 74
Since 1963, the armed forces have responded to the Shah's
plea with startling rapidity. The army has assumed responsibility
for an ever-widening number of non-military functions, Civil
action programs under the tutelage of American advisers have wit-
nessed army battalions building roads, primary and secondary
schools, and public baths as well as distributing food and
medical supplies to famine, epidemic, and earthquake areas. In
addition, the military has organized its new recruits into a
series of non-combat "Corps"--the Literacy Corps, Health Corps,
Development and Rural Extension Corps. To staff these new
groups, the Army conscripts additional men, above its military
requirements. The recruits are given basic military training
and then special instruction relevant to their future
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assignments. The remaining two years of their duty are spent
entirely as members of a given Corps.
It is generally agreed that these civic Corps have been
immensely successful. By January 1966, some 23,487 recruits had
served or were serving the Literacy Corps in some 19,000 vil-
lages. By contrast, in the entire fifty years' existence of the
Ministry of Education, only 16,000 teachers had been dispatched
to rural areas.75 Moreover, more than 6,000 of these Corpsmen
became regular teachers under the Ministry upon completing their
military service. The more recently formed Health and Develop-
ment Corps (January 1964 and September 1964) have nonetheless
managed to post several thousand trained physicians, medical
assistants, and extension workers to rural areas.
With the intervention of the military in these tradi-
tionally civilian matters, there has been a steady accrual in
the power of the Armed Forces at the expense of the civil
bureaucracy. One contributory factor has been the allocation
to the Military of additional resources for filling its new
roles. The entire costs of the Literacy, Health, and Develop-
ment programs are borne by the Plan Organization and the Minis-
tries of Education, Health, and Housing and Development. The
Armed Forces have not been required to reapportion any of their
regular funds for these purposes. 76 Moreover, the assumption
by the military of these traditionally civilian responsibilities
has at least partially relieved the civilian Ministries from the
need to improve their own efficiency. The civil bureaucracies
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have been relatively weakened as a swelling list of services
comes to be performed by the Armed Forces.
The Armed Forces, moreover, have assumed wider respon-
sibilities for the administration of justice. Enabling legis-
lation for martial law in Iran was originally passed by the
Majles to deal with the threat posed by the deposed Mohammad
Ali Qajar's attempt to regain his throne. It was used fre-
quently thereafter to deal with Government opponents. Martial
law was called upon by the Allies throughout World War II to
eliminate alleged Nazi sympathizers. The Shah used it as a means
of dealing with the Tudeh after the 1949 assassination attempt.
General Razmara relied on it for authority to deal with Mossa-
degh's supporters in 1950. And that nationalist Prime Minister
dealt with many of his opponents under its legitimation. With
Mossadegh's overthrow, martial law remained in effect to the mid-
1950's as General Bakhtiar, then military Governor of Tehran,
eliminated Mossadegh's partisans and Tudeh members from positions
of power. Martial law was again declared following the June 1963
riots and remained in effect until after the elections that fall.
But even when explicit military rule is not in effect, the
Armed Forces continue to play a judicial role. All alleged
treasonable offenses are tried before military courts and the
definition of treason has steadily widened. Since 1965, a num-
ber of key trials have been held before military tribunals.
Fourteen Tudeh leaders were tried in absentia and thirteen
sentenced to death. A second group of alleged Tudeh leaders
were also tried and sentenced. Twelve young men charged with
190
complicity in the 1965 attempt on the life of the Shah received
jail terms and death sentences (later commuted to life imprison-
ment by the Shah). Members of a group accused of Feda'ine Islam
(Sacrificers or Devotees of Islam) tendencies were sentenced to
death and prison for the killing of Prime Minister Mansur. The
clandestine Islamic Nations Party was judged treasonable and
fifty-five of its members were given lengthy jail terms. Leaders
of the Iran Freedom Movement were sentenced by such a court, as
was Khalil Maleki, the leader of the Socialist League. Maleki
and two associates received sentences up to three years. In
1966, Ahmad Aramesh, former chief of the Plan Organization and
leader of the Progressive Group, was also sentenced to three
years, for publishing pamphlets "enciting unrest and rebellion."
Most recently, the jurisdiction of the military has been
broadened to the extent that even currency forgers are brought
to justice by such tribunals.77
But the presence of the Armed Forces in civilian life is
not restricted to these Corps or to the judicial functions of the
military., Recent years have also witnessed a marked increase in
the number of individual military officers assigned to tradi-
tionally civilian posts. SAVAK, the National Police, and the
Passport Service remain in the hands of the military. The re-
cent Minister of iture was General Esma'il Riahi. His
Director of Land Reform is a Colonel. The Governors of sensi-
tive and disturbed areas are Generals. The Director of Civil
Aviation is a General. And the new Mayor of the nearly un-
governable Tehran is a Brigadier General. The Mayor, taken
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aback by the problems he faced, reportedly requested the Shah to
assign him "ten high ranking officers" to head each of Tehran's
ten districts, for "only men with military discipline will be
able to overcome all the difficulties." 78 Numerous other offi-
cers on active military service fill positions throughout the
civil bureaucracy.
The Shah, then, has increased the size and fighting effi-
ciency of his Armed Forces. He has also apparently satisfied
the material aspirations of the officer corps, while making
major and also apparently successful efforts to insure their
loyalty. With these achievements, the military has become by
far the most efficient bureaucratic organization in Iran. Capi-
talizing on their efficiency and loyalty, the Shah has encouraged
the Armed Forces in two endeavors. Their first task--the
establishment of a monopoly over the means of physical violence--
has already been accomplished. Its achievement was heralded by
the ability of the Armed Forces to repress the urban discontent
which exploded into widespread riots throughout Iran in June
1963, while simultaneously extinguishing a tribal uprising in
Fars. 7 9 The second task has perhaps been less explicitly en-
couraged by His Imperial Majesty. Nonetheless, the military's
assumption of civil power seems to have been pursued with vigor.
In a private audience with this researcher, the Shah emphasized
that "We in Iran have one invariable rule--the complete and
unalterable separation of the Armed Forces from politics." In
its implementation, this rule seems to have taken a different
form--the rigid exclusion of Iranian politics from the military
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bureaucracy. Events have demonstrated that the converse, the
intervention of the military into the political sphere, has
occurred with celerity.
But it should not be concluded that Iran is ruled by a
military government. The Shah realizes the ultimate futility
and inevitable debacle which military rule invites. He has told
highly critical students that "A country cannot be ruled by the
force of the bayonet and secret police. For a few days, this
may be possible, but not for all times. Only a majority can
rule a society . . . ."80 With his programs of distributive
justice based on the six-point Referendum, the Shah appears to
be struggling to unite that majority behind his rule. The land
reforms and economic development based on mounting oil revenues
will abet his goal. In the process, however, His Imperial
Majesty recalls the caveat of Sa'adi that a kingdom is based
on people, a king, and an army.
What we have demonstrated in the last three chapters are
the ways in which His Imperial Majesty controls his political
elite. He manipulates the channels of wealth and education
through which aspirants for membership in the general elite
must pass. He controls the patterns of recruitment from this
elite into the elite of elites--the nucleus of the most poli-
tically powerful individuals. The entire recruitment process
has been described as one of cooptation through seduction.
With surprising toleration, His Majesty is willing to give what
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members of the elite want, so long as those demands are not
directly political.
Once the elite is constituted, the Shah seeks to control
political behavior. We have detailed some of the means employed
by the monarch to accomplish this. His style of rule--assessed
as one of divide et impera--has proven efficient as a means for
manipulating the elite and assuring their loyalty, or at least,
their ineffectiveness in challenging the autonomy of this
position.
Finally, we have described the keystone in the Shah's
rule--his control over the Armed Forces. Their loyalty to him
and their unparalleled position of institutional power vis a vis
other organizations within the political system are central
characteristics of Pahlevi power.
It remains to investigate the consequences which these
Royal policies partly nurture--consequences which in turn feed
back to His Imperial Majesty and affect his reign, his rule,
and the success of political development in Iran.
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CHAPTER V
THE ELITE NATURE OF IRANIAN SOCIETY:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Over every authority, God has placed a higher
authority . .
Nizam ul Mulk
We have examined above the central position of the Shah
in contemporary Iran. Although his particular "style of rule"
sets the tone of politics in that country and establishes pat-
terns of behavior which animate the political process, there
are other important actors in that process. Before turning to
their styles of behavior or "code," we wish to describe the
social and political milieu in which they and their monarch
operate.
The quotation which began this chapter was no idle specu-
lation, but accurately reflected both the nature of political
organization in Persian society in the days of its author,
Nizam ul Mulk of the eleventh century, and in most periods of
Iranian history. After arguing for the hierarchical nature of
Iranian society, Nizam ul Mulk went on to issue a warning to
his ruler, Sultan Malik-Shah of the Seljuk dynasty, to know and
respect society's ranks:
God, be he exalted, has created the king to be the
superior of all mankind and the inhabitants of the world
are his inferiors; they derive their subsistence and rank
from him. He must then keep them in such a position that
they always know their places and do not put off the ring
of service from their ears nor loose the belt of obe-
dience from their waists. At all times, he must let them
know how they stand whether in merit or demerit, so that
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they do not forget themselves . . . . He should know
the measure and rank of everyone, and be constantly
enquiring into their circumstances lest they deviate
from the letter of his commands or overstep the limits
which are set for them.1
Persian society, then as now, was viewed as a progression of
ranks, the members of each possessing successively more auth-
ority than the ranks below. While all societies can be viewed
as a hierarchy of ranks, few people have been as consistent as
the Persians in delineating and identifying intra-social ranks
or broad social classes or in having those perceptions of the
social structure remain so constant over time.
The Achaemenids (550-330 B.C.), the first of the Iranian
national dynasties, united the Medes and Persians and spread
Iranian hegemony from the Indus in the East to Egypt in the
West. Achaemenid rulers divided their subjects into four
classes: (1) princes of the royal blood and military comman-
ders; (2) religious officials and keepers of the Zoroastrian
fire temples, the Magi; (3) learned men including scribes,
astrologers, physicians; and (4) cultivators of the soil and
menials. The "first" class (as the elite are known in Iran
today) was further subdivided by the rulers. After himself, the
Shahanshah counted members of the Royal Family on the next level
of rank. Below them were the personal companions of the king
who were entrusted with the execution of special missions. The
commander of the king's bodyguard and other important military
chiefs were next in authority. Local rulers and the satraps of
the major conquered territories constituted yet another level of
the elite. Finally, six noble families who, with the royal
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family, were known as the "Seven Princes . . . generally filled
the great offices and formed a permanent council."2
The second of Iran's great national dynasties, the Sas-
sanians, once again expanded the empire and succeeded in the
previously unimagined feat of capturing a Roman Emperor--
Valerian. And once again, the ideal society of the Sassanians
was conceptualized in four gross categories: the religious
leaders, warriors, bureaucracy (including biographers, poets,
astronomers, and physicians), and peasants, shepherds, mer-
chants, and artisans.3 As in Achaemenid times, the elite were
further divided into sub-ranks which were manifest by the
proximity to the monarch allowed the group at functions of the
Royal Court. Closest to the king sat the Ministers of the Crown,
followed by the Mobeds and Hubeds, the chiefs of the Magi and
the judges. This entire assembly was circled by the Sepahbads,
or commanders-in-chief of the armies of the empire, who in turn
were flanked by singers, musicians, and men of science and
learning.
These divisions of society in terms of relative status
levels were frequently and publicly made in Sassanian times,
with even the Avesta suggesting the propriety of such a quadri-
partite ordering of mankind. Scholars, however, have questioned
the actual meaning of these groupings or classes. Frye asks
whether these were "theory, tendency, or reality."5 But con-
firming these divisions is the report that Artaxerxes, or Arde-
shir, the exalted Sassanian monarch, kept his subjects " . .
rigidly in their separate divisions, for the reasons he explained,
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that nothing more swiftly leads to the destruction of empires
than the transfer of one class to another, whether it be the
elevation of the humble into a higher class or the degrading
of the nobles into a lower one." 6 If the quotation attributed
to Ardeshir is not apocryphal, we can assume that this division
was more than theoretical and represented a caste-like social
structure with horizontal rather than vertical mobility and
recruitment as a general rule, being intra-class rather than
inter-class.
The lengthy interregnum between the Sassanians and the
Safavids witnessed great social and political turmoil in Iran
as Arab, Seljuk, and Mongol invaders pressed their suzerainty
on the Persians for ten centuries. At least for the first of
these conquerors--the Arabs--it appears that the social struc-
ture retained its distinctive identity. Many sources attest to
the alacrity with which Sassanian-Zoroastrian elites went over
to the "enemy" by quickly adopting Islam, in the process
failing to provide leadership for the remainder of society,
who remained Zoroastrian for much longer, or to demonstrate a
sense of social consciousness which might have alleviated the
hardships brought about by the conquest. But " . . . the old
Persian aristocracy and landed proprietors did . . . succeed in
preserving much of their power and wealth by embracing Islam
and throwing in their lot with the conquerors, to whom their
services were needful, and their local influence and knowledge
indispensable." 7 Undoubtedly their success in retaining power
mitigated the early Arab proclivity for a simple division of
209
society between believer and infidel, and preserved not only the
pre-Islamic structure of Iranian society, but even continuity of
personnel (other than the Magi, of course).
The Safavids (1500-1722) resurrected the tradition of
great national Iranian dynasties which had collapsed with the
fall of the Sassanians. With them was also reinstituted the
four-class division of Iranian society. This class structure was
maintained under the Qajar dynasty (1789-1925), but was aug-
mented to reflect the heightened importance of the tribes (on
which Qajar military strength was based) and the commercial
sector.8 At the apex of society sat the Qajar Shah, and then
members of the Qajar family. Next in importance came the
Ilkhans and Ilbeigis of the great Persian tribes, the Bakhtiaris,
Qashgai's, Kurds, Baluch, Afshars, Qara Gozlus, Arabs, and Tur-
komans. (The military officers, recruited almost entirely from
the tribal chieftains, made up another group conceptually dis-
tinct but socially identical with the preceding group.)
The Qajar monarchs expanded and organized the civil
bureaucracy by appointing officials charged with specific ad-
ministrative responsibilities. The sadr-i a 'zam served as a
prime minister to supervise the activities of other officials.
The mustawfi al-mamalik (finance), vazir-i lashkar (war), munshi
al-mamalik (chief secretary), sahib divan (signer of official
documents), mu'ayyir al-mamalik (master of the mint), khatib
al-mamalik (reader of the khutba), and minajjim bashi (chief
astrologer) composed the king's cabinet. By 1850, Nasr ed-Din
Shah eliminated these officials and established six "ministries"
210
on "modern" lines: finance, war, interior, foreign affairs,
justice, and awqaf (religious endowments).
Below the bureaucracy were the religious leaders, the
muitaheds, the shaykh ul-Islam, in the towns, and the imam jum'eh
in the cities. Counted after the spiritual heads were the mer-
chants appearing for the first time in the explicitly articulated
social structure. Their identification as a distinct group with
greater status than the mass of peasants and menials undoubtedly
reflects economic development in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the growing economic interdependence of formerly dis-
junct regions, and an increase of foreign trade. 9
Finally, at the nadir of the social hierarchy were the
masses--the town and country peasants, laborers, menials, domes-
tics, and artisans. Under the Qajars as in a score of previous
centuries, the principal function of these masses was to pay
taxes to government officials, local landlords, or both. No
wonder they remained "illiterate, ignorant, and inarticulate,"
showing "a common feeling, that of distrust and fear, directed,
on the one hand, toward the privileged and powerful above them,
especially the officials of the government, and on the other
hand toward the foes from without and the bandits and rebels
from within. No one ever closed or bridged the chasm . . . ."10
Such, then, was the nature of traditional Iranian society:
the ruling family, leaders of the tribes, civil bureaucracy,
religion, commerce, and the peasants and menials. From the
earliest days of Iranian greatness to the time of Reza Shah
Kabir and his drive for modernization, there has been a highly
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articulated social structure whose divisions were always well-
defined and recognized. Moreover, an explicitly identified
elite group has existed for the same period, an elite group
which was differentially rewarded as, it was assumed, was their
rightful desert. This was also reflected in the counsels of
Nizam ul-Mulk, who reminded the monarch that:
One of the principles which kings have observed in all
ages is to preserve ancient families and honor the sons
of kings, not allowing them to be neglected and debarred
from their rightful position and power. Rather did they
give them a portion for their substance so that their
families continued to flourish; other deserving persons
too were given allotments from the treasury, such as
learned men, descendants of Ali, guardians of the fron-
tiers and expositors of the Quran.ll
Despite the differential rewards and the apparent rigidity
of the classes themselves, however, the personnel who composed
these classes were less rigidly assigned to them than might be
supposed. Social mobility was always a possibility in Iran,
and class divisions could at least occasionally be broken. The
fictitious but now legendary Hajji Baba of Isfahan is a per-
sonification of an almost cyclical progression between "the
heights of prosperity and the depths of penury and ignominy" in
traditional Persian society.12 From illiterate barber to wan-
dering Mullah, to the counselor of kings, he crossed class lines,
for better and worse, with alacrity0
Iranians themselves are fond of citing actual Persians
whose lives exemplify the possibilities for mobility. Perhaps
the most widely noted example is the mid-nineteenth century
vizier of Nasr ed din Shah, Mirza Taghi Khan. The Amir Kabir
(the Great Amir), as he is now known, was "truthful, incorruptible
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. . . and placed the finances of the country on something re-
sembling a business-like footing."1 3 In addition, he estab-
lished the first school with a modern curriculum in Iran, the
Dar al Fonun. Yet in spite of his exalted position, the Amir
Khan's father had been a cook and stewart'
Other examples of great mobility may be cited. Hajjt
Muhammad Hussayn Khan, Amir ud-Dowleh, was a grocer who became
beglerbeg (governor) of Isfahan by dint of a large gift to the
king, and in 1806, the mustawfi al-mamalik (Minister of Finance)
under Fath Ali Shah.14 Mobility through marriage is illus-
trated by the third wife of Nasr ed din Shah, and his favorite,
Anis ed-Dowleh, who was originally a miller's daughter from a
village near Tehran. As he was passing on horseback, she
lifted her veil before the Shadow of Allah, the Pivot of the
Universe. The Shah is reported to have been so fascinated by
this brazen act that he brought her to the palace, where she
gained such influence that " . she has secured lucrative
positions at Court for all her relations." 15
The most startling example of rapid mobility, however, is
provided by the rise of new ruling families. The Pahlevis, to
take only the most recent example, descend from an undistin-
guished line of petty military leaders from the province of
Mazandaran bordering the Caspian Sea. Reza Khan, as the father
of the present Shah was known before his coronation, had but
poorly mastered the skills of literacy even "as a grown man."16
Reza Shah's accession to power not only supplied an entire new
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ruling family but made room at the top for numerous officials
who had abetted his rise.
Coupled with such examples of mobility may be mentioned
the general lack of esteem associated with lineage or pedigree.
Other than certain members of the ex-ruling house, the Qajars,
who relish their descent from kings, and various tribal leaders
who boast family trees which lead back, rather mysteriously, to
heroes such as Chingiz Khan or Tamerlane, few Iranians take the
subject at all seriously. "If the word najabat, 'nobility', and
najib, 'noble', are heard, they refer to the rank which an
individual may hold, there is no allusion to birth."17 Thus
mobility was never hindered by a high regard for pedigree.
Another factor which historically facilitated mobility in
Iran was the almost universal practice of selling offices.
Through a system known as modakhel (perquisite or commission),
nearly all official positions in the realm were available to the
highest bidder. The principal offices were, in effect, auc-
tioned at the annual No Ruz or New Year's ceremonies. Lord
Curzon described the practice as it existed at the end of the
nineteenth century as follows:
From the Shah on downwards, there is scarcely an official
who is not open to gifts, scarcely a post which is not
conferred in return for gifts, scarcely an income which
has not been amassed by the receipt of gifts. Every in-
dividual with hardly an exception in the official hierar-
chy . . . has only purchased his post by a money present
either to the Shah or to a Minister or to the superior
governor by whom he was appointed. 1 8
The consequences of this practice for mobility were
striking. Scarcely a post existed which was not available for
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the interested subject willing and able to pay. Meanness of
birth or social status was no more an obstacle to high position
than was a surfeit of mendacity or venality or a lack of ability
or intelligence.19 In this way wealth and power in Qajar Persia
were in a symbiotic relationship. Wealth was frequently a neces-
sary and sufficient requisite for political office. The latter
was, in turn, a sufficient condition for attaining wealth, which
in turn led to a more elevated political position with greater
political power. In this way have Iranians continued to confound
theorists who suggest that wealthy officials would prove to be
honest. One such Persian theorist, Kai Ka'us Ibn Iskandar, had
long since equated officials of the realm with an irrigation
channel and the monarch with a garden, "If the canal supplying
the field or garden is moist and well soaked, it conveys water
quickly to field and garden; but if the earth in the canal is
dry and water has not for a long time passed through it, then,
when water is admitted, until it is itself saturated with mois-
ture, it will not deliver water to the garden or field." 20 Max
Weber has made a similar point in suggesting that " , , , only
economically independent officials, that is, officials who
belong to the properties strata can permit themselves to risk
the loss of their offices."2 1 But in Persia, even well soaked
canals had a penchant for absorbing water and propertied and
non-propertied officials of the bureaucracy, faced with the risk
of loss of position, resorted to the modakhel.2 2
One final factor affecting social mobility in traditional
Iranian society was a general willingness to accept the nouveau
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arriviste. The author of the Qabus Nama warns his son that
"There is no fool greater than he who sees a man of lowly state
risen to greatness and continues to regard him as lowly."2 3
An Arabic proverb is occasionally cited at similar appropriate
moments:
Honor lies in the mind and acquired worth,
Not in origin and noble birth.
The lack of value accorded genealogy, the rise of new
ruling dynasties, a general appreciation of the fluctuations
inherent in human existence, a willingness to welcome the so-
cially mobile, and vaunted examples of mobility all served to
make inter-class movement a possibility. But despite these
factors such mobility was difficult at best and by no means
common.24 For while there existed the possibility, the means
which would make that possibility a reality were generally
lacking. Primarily, of course, Persians of low status lacked
wealth, for by definition in Iran, "high and low rank depend
upon riches or poverty." 2 5 They also lacked the means which
would facilitate the acquisition of wealth. Formal education,
access fo persons of power, military command posts, and mar-
riage with social betters were normally explicitly or implicitly
restricted to the members of the "first" class, the elite. Thus,
while the Amir Kabir has earned a high place in Persian history,
it is less frequently noted that his father had been the chief
steward to the chief vizier of Mohammad Shah, the monarch pre-
ceding Nasr ed-din. (That he met his end by having his veins
opened on order of the Shah only three years after he had been
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elevated to the vizierate is even less cited.)
Basically, despite a fairly common nineteenth century
practice of appointing as vizier " . . . a man of no family,
for it was deemed impolitic to appoint to this post a prince
of the blood or great noble," examples of rapid or far-reaching
mobility in Iran have become fewer.2 6 Those examples of such
mobility which do exist serve primarily to justify the ideology
of an open-class system--an ideology which serves several impor-
tant functions. Firstly, one of the geniuses of the Iranian
system, a genius which has made a particular contribution to
its survival, is that the system approximates a "flexible
autocracy."27 The ideology of upward mobility has made it
possible for the ruler, in times of threat, to accede or grant
power to non-elite, non-aristocratic elements. On numerous
occasions, Iran has found "the right man" who led the nation out
of what appeared at the time to be certain destruction or loss of
identity. Two kingly examples are Reza Shah and Nadir Shah,
but there are many ministers and military leaders who have been
accepted or coopted into the political elite in such times of
danger.
Another function which the ideology of an open class sys-
tem performs is to strengthen the position of His Imperial
Majesty vis-a-vis the elite. By its explicit rejection of the
notion of any "innate" superiority or virtues possessed by the
kelass-e avval or elite, the open class system denies to the
elite any claim over the Shah. In turn, his dependency on the
elite is reduced, for only his system is "closed," being based
___ - - __ - - 4
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on the innate virtue of primogeniture from the late Shahanshah.
All others of the elite, with the exception of certain tribal
leaders, can lay claim to no such native attributes.
This potential for mobility also served to mitigate the
evils of the government and social system for members of the
lower class. The ideology of the open class system was a sop
to the disadvantaged and debased. For if no criterion for
mobility existed save wealth--no attributes inherent to the
individual--then as long as the possibility of acquiring wealth
existed, mobility would certainly follow. The consequence was
a dearth of social conflict defined on class terms, and a pecu-
liarly pacific quality to social relationships in general.
Finally, Iran's rather rigidly defined social structure in
which mobility was always, nonetheless, a possibility gave a
highly "democratic" tinge to the society,
. . for every man sees a chance of someday profiting
by the system of which he may for the moment be the
victim and as the present hardship or exaction is not
to be compared in ratio with the pecuniary advantage
which he may ultimately expect to reap, he is willing
to bide his ti and to trust to the fall of the dice
in the future.
This ideology of an open class system, then, was pri-
marily an ideal. It served a number of useful purposes for
Iranian society, but was mirrored in reality only to the slight
extent which allowed that ideology to remain vital. In concert
with a set of articulated social classes featuring an explicitly
defined elite group, the history of Iran has shown "elitism at
its crudest, the notion that The Few should rule because they do
in fact rule, for The Many do not and never will . . . "29 As
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this has been true for two thousand years of Iranian history,
the contemporary period, not surprisingly, provides us with a
situation not grossly disparate.
The elitist nature of Iranian society is reflected in
the inordinately great benefits which members of the elite de-
rive from the system. We have already discussed the distribu-
tion of these benefits, in the process of recruitment by
cooptation. The fruits of those benefits will be evident in
our discussion below of the social backgrounds of the elite.
One such benefit which deserves special treatment, however, is
political power. As politics is a central feature of Iranian
life, so is political power the prime value for most educated
and involved Iranians. This is yet another value which is dis-
proportionately allocated in Iran.
But a gross view of Iranian politics in the contemporary
era seems to belie this conclusion. For that view reveals a
scene of almost unmitigated political turmoil. Frequent and
sweeping alterations of personnel appear to be the complement
of political violence and change. Even the monarchy itself has
not been immune from the apparent chaos. Since the inaugura-
tion of the Qajar dynasty in the late eighteenth century, only
one Persian king has relinquished his throne through an age-
induced death. More recently, the three monarchs preceding the
present Shah were each deposed: Mohammad Ali Shah was banished
in 1909 by the Nationalists who supported the newly inaugurated
Constitutional Regime against his despotism; his successor,
Ahmad Shah, was deposed (along with the entire Qajar dynasty)
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by Reza Khan; and in turn, Reza Shah Pahlevi, as he was there-
after called, abdicated in response to the British and Soviet
occupation. While Mohammad Reza Shah has successfully main-
tained his grip on the throne, he too has been the intended
victim of assassinations and coups. Wounded by a would-be
assassin in 1949, he was saved from a similar or more serious
fate in 1965 by two personal bodyguards, who gave their lives
to a machine-gun-wielding Imperial Guardsman. Other attempts
have also been formulated to oust the king. In August 1953,
the Shah even abandoned Iran and flew to Europe when Mossadegh
refused his order of dismissal. And since that time a number of
alleged plots against the throne have been uncovered.
If the monarchy has been subject to the pressures of
violent change and political chaos, how much more were those
pressures directed against the political elite. Assassinations
have been one manifestation of such license. Prime Minister
Mansur, shot before the Majles, is only the most recent victim
of such tactics. Prime Minister Hossein Ala was saved from a
similar attempt in 1957. Less fortunate were Prime Minister,
General Haji-Ali Razmara in 1951; Minister of Court Abdul Hossein
Hazheer in 1949; the Chief of Mossadegh's police, General Mahmud
Afshartous in 1953; a noted newspaper correspondent, Ahmad
Dehqan in 1950; and a score of other prominent officials in
earlier years.
A more pacific symptom of this seemingly chaotic system
of politics may be found in the Shah's predilection for the
periodic investiture of new cabinets. The power attributions
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of present-day Cabinet Ministers leaves no doubt that the Cabinet
is the most powerful formally constituted group of civilians.
This contention bears out the observations of Professor Binder
that the Cabinet is "the principal coordinating body in the
Government." 3 1 Yet the ministers remain utterly dependent on
the Royal prerogative for their continuation in office, and with
great frequency the king has exercised his power by dismissing
his Ministers. Since the advent of the Constitution in 1907,
some one hundred and seventeen distinct Cabinets have been desig-
nated by the Shah. Year in and year out over this sixty-year
period, after an average of six months' tenure in office, yet
another set of officials were called to ministerial portfolios.
But a more penetrating analysis of these statistics re-
veals another view, one of more meaningful political order. Over
the life of the 117 Cabinets, only thirty-eight different indi-
divuals served as Prime Minister. These Prime Ministers averaged
nineteen months in office over the period, despite the fact that
any given Cabinet which they might have headed served for less
than one half year.
The number of different Cabinets and individual Prime
Ministers who have served per decade from the advent of Consti-
tutionalism to the present provides an index of the considerable
political stability of Iran. In terms of the average number of
months served by each Prime Minister, the fewest number of dif-
ferent Prime Ministers, and the smallest number of different
Cabinets, one decade is paramount. It is this period of 1927 to
1937 which corresponds most closely with the height of Reza
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TABLE 5.1
PRIME MINISTERS OF IRAN AND TOTAL NUMBER OF
CABINETS HEADED, 1907-1968
Name of Minister Cabinets Headed
1. Ahmad Qavam 11
2. Mostaufi ul Mamalek 11
3. Sepahdar-e Azam 9
4. Samsam ul Saltaneh 7
5. Mohammad Sa'ed 6
6. Mohammad Ali Foroughi 5
7. Mosheer ul Saltaneh 5
8. Vosuq ul Dowleh 4
9. Sardar Sepah (Reza Khan) 4
10. Nasir ul Molk 3
11. Nezam ul Saltaneh 3
12. Ala ul Saltaneh 3
13. Mosheer ul Dowleh 3
14. Ali Soheili 3
15. Ibrahim Hakimi 3
16. Hossein Ala 3
17. Assadollah Alam 3
18. Amir Abbas Hoveyda 3
19. Ain ul Dowleh 2
20. Seyyed Zia ed din Tabatabaie 2
21. Ali Mansur 2
22. Abdul Hossein Hazheer 2
23. Mohammad Mossadegh 2
24. Ja'afar Sharif Emami 2
25. Ali Amini 2
26. Hassan Ali Mansur 2
27. Afkham 1
28. Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, Atabek Azam 1
29. Farman Farma 1
30. Sepah Salar-e Azam 1
31. Mokhber ul Saltaneh 1
32. Mahmud Jam 1
33. Ahmad Matin Daftari 1
34. Morteza Qoli Hedayat 1
35. Mohsen Sadr 1
36. Lt. Gen. Hajji Ali Raznara 1
37. Maj. Gen. Hassan Zahedi 1
38. Manouchehr Eqbal 1
38 Prime Ministers headed 117 Cabinets,
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TABLE 5.2
NUMBER OF CABINETS AND PRIME MINISTERS PER
DECADE IN IRAN,MARCH 1907-FEBRUARY 1968
Number of Average No. Average No. of
Decade Different of Months No. of Cabinets per
Prime Mins. Served Cabinets Prime Minister
3/1907-2/1917 14 8.8 35 2.5
3/1917-2/1927 11 10.9 28 2.5
3/1927-2/1937 5 24.0 6 1.2
3/1937-2/1947 9 14.3 18 2.0
3/1947-2/1957 10 12.0 17 1.7
3/1957-2/1968 6 22.0 13 2.1
55a 117
aNote that the total number of Prime Ministers is
greater than the total of 38 mentioned in the text because
an individual who served in this capacity was recorded sep-
arately for each decade in which he served.
Shah's autocracy. Indeed, that Cabinet with the longest tenure
of the twentieth century served in this period, that of Ahmad
Matin Daftari, Taking office as the youngest Prime Minister in
Iranian history in October, 1935, he served continuously as
Prime Minister over one Cabinet (with some personnel shuffles)
until June, 1940.
Similarly, the most recent decade in Iran's history has
witnessed the second fewest number of Cabinets and Prime Minis-
ters and the second longest tenure, as His Imperial Majesty has
been able to reassert his control over the political process
following the Mossadegh period. The Cabinet and Prime Minister
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with the second longest tenure served in this decade--that of
Dr. Manouchehr Eqbal (April, 1957-September 1960).
Conversely, the periods of recent Iranian history which
witnessed the least stability also possessed the greatest number
of Cabinets. The two decades following the granting the Con-
stitution, 1907-1927, were periods of political chaos, internal
revolution, and foreign invasion, but were ended by the assertion
of Reza Shah's central control. The two decades following the
abdication-overthrow of Reza Shah by the Allies were similarly
characterized by foreign invasion, economic disruption, and poli-
tical chaos. Not until the assertion of decisive control by the
present Shah did relative stablity come about, at least as mani-
fested in the number of different Cabinets and individual Prime
Ministers.
These relations can be demonstrated more decisively by
compressing these six decades of Iranian history into four
periods: 1907-1926 (the initiation of "Constitutional" Govern-
ment under the Qajars to the establishment of the Pahlevi
dynasty); 1926 to 1941 (the rule of Reza Shah); 1941 to 1953
(the period of foreign occupation to the overthrow of Mohammad
Mossadegh); and 1953 to 1968 (the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah).
It may be hypothesized that: (1) Periods of centralized
government in Iran are marked by little political turnover and
infrequent alterations of personnel among the political elite;
(Z) the opening of the Government to greater bargaining and poli-
tical give-and-take is marked by an increase in the turnover of
the political elite; and (3) a breakdown in central control and
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TABLE 5.3
NUMBER OF CABINETS AND PRIME MINISTERS IN FOUR
HISTORICAL PERIODS, 1907-1968
Number of Average No. Average Noe of
Period Different of Months No. o Cabinets per
Prime Mins. Served Cabinets Prime Minister
3/1907-12/1926 17 14.0 61 3.6
1/1926-8/1941 6 31.3 9 1.5
9/1941-8/1953 12 12.0 31 2,6
9/1953-2/1968 8 21.6 16 2.0
43 117
the advent of relative political chaos results in rapid turn-
over of Cabinets and Prime Ministers) 2
The seeming chaos of rapidly interchanging Cabinets was
increased by the previous practice of dismissing a Prime Minis-
ter for a period of months only to recall him to office again.
In past decades, relatively few men alternated in controlling
the Premiership, For example, in the decade 1940 to 1950,
twenty-seven Cabinets were formed by His Imperial Majesty. But
only nine men served him as Prime Minister and these men tended
to replace each other in that office over the entire period.
They served in the following order:
Mansur
Forughi
Soheili
Qavam
Soheili
Sa'ed
Hedayat
Hakimi
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Sadr
Hakimi
Qavam
Hakimi
Hazheer
Sa'ed
Mansur
Only in recent years has there arisen the principle of having
individual Prime Ministers head contiguous Cabinets and then be
permanently displaced from the Premiership.
As with the nakhost vaziri, so with the vozara. The
Ministers tended to replace themselves in office just as did the
Prime Ministers. In his study of the "Role of the Cabinet in
the Government of Iran," Binder notes that from 1941 to 1952,
some 400 Cabinet positions were filled. But these 400 posi-
tions were actually held by only 144 persons. 33
As we have seen, the usual statistics of personnel changes
are misleading. The reality of the most recent sixty years of
Iran's political history is of far less dramatic changes--of far
fewer individuals manning the political "command posts." Rather,
the image Iran presents is of a pool of politically active indi-
viduals into which the Shah, or perhaps the Majles in time of
more decentralized political power, dips periodically for poli-
tical leaders. This game of "musical Prime Ministers," as it
has been described, whereby the "years come and go but the faces
in Iran stay the same" helps account for the peculiarly elitist
nature of Iranian politics.34 Put differently, above a cut-off
point in a hierarchy of political power, individuals move into
positions of greater or lesser importance with fair rapidity.
Mobility up and down this hierarchy, within the elitist universe,
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is common. It is less common, however, for individuals to move
below the elite cut-off point, even when they lose their official
positions, which appear to be the bases of their power and hence
political elite status,
Thus, for example, all living ex-Prime Ministers (N = 11)
were ranked in the 10 per cent of the "general elite" which we
have considered to be the most politically powerful individuals
in Iran, and hence within the Iranian power elite as we have de-
fined it. Indeed, all ex-Prime Ministers fell within the top
3 per cent of the general elite (the least powerful had a rank
of 102), with a mean rank of 29 (when ranking the general elite
from 1 to 3,100 on the basis of reputed power).
Of similar interest are the sources of recruitment into
the Prime Ministership. Of the last ten individuals to have
served in this post, not one was not already considered a member
of the political elite before assuming office. Through the
holding of other important governmental positions, extraordinary
wealth, or personal friendships with important members of the
elite and especially with His Imperial Majesty, these individuals
were counted "politically very powerful" before assuming the
highest political office of Iran. 3 5
As with the Prime Ministers, so with others of the politi-
cal elite. Social background data indicate that the overwhelming
majority of present-day members of the elite boast parents with
social and personal attributes characteristic of the elite of
their own day. The system, in other words, may be thought to
constitute a "modernizing traditional regime" which consists of
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i . . . elite groups predominantly recruited on an ascriptive
basis, from among established, not to say vested, social classes,
strata, or groups." 36 Those less politically elite (than the
top 10 per cent of the general elite) also supply members to the
ranks of the politically powerful,but to a relatively slight
degree. Mobility from the "powerless" to the "powerful" occurs
with relative infrequency in these higher strata of Iranian
society, as will be demonstrated below in an examination of the
backgrounds of the contemporary elite.
In sum, then, the members of the elite have been allocated
the rewards of political power and other values available in
their society in proportions beyond which the populations of more
equalitarian societies are likely to tolerate. If Government in
the United States is in theory "of the people, by the people,
and for the people," and in practice, as all governments to some
degree must be, "of the people, by a political elite, for the
people," then the Government of Iran has historically been and
continues to be "of, by, and for the elite.1
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CHAPTER VI
THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ELITE:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND
The Shah and his elite then together elaborate the
political process of Iran and,as a result, have disproportion-
ately allocated the outputs of their political system in a mu-
tually beneficial fashion. But who are these members of the
elite? What are their social backgrounds? What distinctive
characteristics identify them from their twenty-five million
countrymen?
The questionnaire with which the 167 members of the
political elite were interviewed contained a vast array of
items pertaining to social background. In addition, wherever
possible, biographical data for the 140 members of the elite
not so interviewed were collected. By combining these data
sources, the social backgrounds of the elite as a group could
be analyzed.2
BIRTHPLACE AND RESIDENCE
Isfahan is a paradise full of luxuries;
Were there but no Isfahanis in it . . .
Iranian proverb
The members of the political elite have less diverse
backgrounds than did their fathers, and their fathers had less
diverse backgrounds than the population at large. There are
many indicators of this diminution of social variety and accom-
panying diminution of the bases from which mobility to political
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power is possible, One such indicator may be found in the places
of birth of the members of the elite. In many technically ad-
vanced societies, place of birth has been assumed to be rela-
tively uncorrelated to attitudes and behavior. Even in those
countries with the most developed and integrated communications
networks, however, behavioral and cultural differences attri-
buted to regional variations may be found,3 Where the develop-
ment of internal communication has been less pronounced,
regional peculiarities are far more likely to exist.
Such regional peculiarities are widely recognized in
Iran. The nation's folklore is replete with aphorisms of the
personality characteristics associated with birth and life in
her various cities, Bakhtiaris and Luris are known as simple-
tons; Qazvinis as rustics; Yazdis as braggarts; and the
inhabitants of Shah Abdul Azim (Rey) the shrine of pilgrimage a
few miles south of Tehran, not surprisingly, as inhospitable.4
Similar thoughts are often voiced in poetry--the most
widely employed satirical device in Iran. Some samples of what
constitute a very large body of literature are as follows:
A dog of Kashan is better than the noble of Qum,
Although a dog is better than the native of Kashan.5
From a Tabrizi, thou will see naught but rascality,
Even this is best, that thou shouldst not see a Tabrizi,6
A series of maxims in proverbial form are also used to describe
the alleged weaknesses of the inhabitants of various regions.
The people of Isfahan, for example, have been widely viewed as
avaricious, As the saying goes, "He is as mean as the mer-
chants of Isfahan who put their cheese in a bottle and rub
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their bread on the outside to give it a flavor."7
A striking finding of our data is the relative isolation
of the political elite from these variations based on place of
birth and residence. In gross terms, whereas 5.1 per cent of
Iran's total population of 18,954,704 persons had been born in
Tehran as of 1956, some 35.5 per cent of the fathers of the mem-
bers of the political elite had been born there. And some 54.1
per cent of the political elite themselves had been born in
Tehran.8
TABLE 6.1
BIRTHPLACE BY PROVINCE OF THE POLITI OAL ELITE
AND TOTAL POPULATION OF IRANr
% of Elite % of Fathers of % of Total
Province Born There Elite Born There Pop. of Iran
Born There
City of Tehran 54.1% 35.5% 5.1%
Other than Tehran 45.9 64.5 94.9
Central Province 2.2 4.4 5.6
Khorasan 7.2 9.3 10.8
Azarbaijan 6.7 9.3 16.3
Gilan 6.7 7.3 9.5
Esfahan-Yazd 6.7 7.9 9.0
Fars-Banadar Jonub 4.5 6.9 7.3
Mazandaran-Gorgan 3.2 6.9 9.0
Kermanshahan 2.3 2.0 7.8
Baluchistan-Sistan .9 1.0 2.3
Kerman .9 2.0 4.3
Kurdestan .9 1.0 2,9
Khuzestan-Lorestan .5 2.5 9.9
Outside of Iran 3.2 4.0 0.2
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(N = 222)10 (N = 203) (N = 18,9 54,704)
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More significant than these gross figures on the birth-
places of the members of the elite is an examination of the
proportion of the political elite born in Tehran at differing
age levels. The relationship is inverse, i.e., the younger,
the more likely to have been born in Tehran. With the passage
of time, moreover, the representation of "Tehranis" among the
political elite will continually increase, as no set of factors
has appeared or is likely to appear which would alter the
dominance of the capital and the access it provides.
TABLE 6.2
AGE OF MEMBERS OF ELITE BY
PLACE OF BIRTH
Place of Birth
Age Outside Tehran In Tehran Total N
39 or younger 36.8% 63.2% 100.0% 19
40-49 years 40,4 59.6 100.0 42
50-59 years 46.8 53.2 100.0 47
60-69 years 50.0 50.0 100.0 40
70 or older 78.9 21.1 100.0 19
(x2 = 9.258; df = 4; p = .055; gamma = .281)
But if the younger members of the elite tend increasingly
to begin their lives in Tehran, the older members have not been
lax in escaping the rudeness of the provinces for the capital.
The vast majority of the 45 per cent of the elite born outside
the capital migrated to Tehran and took up permanent residence
there during or before World War II. Only five members of the
elite do not live in Tehran, all five being religious leaders
who risde in Najaf (Iraq), Qom, Meshed, and Shiraz.11
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TABLE 6.3
MIGRATION TO TEHRAN FOR MEMBfF OF THE
ELITE BORN ELSEWHERE -
Date settled in Tehran
(if born elsewhere) Percentage
Not yet permanently settled 6.0%
1955-present 2.8
1945-1954 8.9
1935-1944 12.7
1925-1934 27.8
1924 or earlier 41.8
100.0% (N=79)
The preponderance of the elite in the capital city is
matched by the obvious and immense dominance of Tehran in the
life of Iran. Binder, for example, has commented that:
The urban-rural division in Iran, as in many under-
developed countries, places the bulk of the population
in the countryside and concentrates political power in
the capital city . . . the fate of the nation being de-
cided in Tehran. By any yardstick, it would seem that
the political action of Tehran street sweepers is more
significant for the future of the regime than the pains
and pleasures of the elite of a host of provincial
towns. 1 3
If this holds for the street sweepers of Tehran, how much more
relevant for the national political elite! That all but five
of the political elite make their permanent residence in the
city, or that 54 per cent of the present elite were born there;
or that of the elite born elsewhere, 70 per cent migrated per-
manently to the capital at least thirty years previously all
attest to this fact.
While this is decidedly the case for political affairs,
the dominance of Tehran is no less manifest in other areas.
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The 10 per cent of Iran's population who live in the city and
among them virtually the entire political elite enjoy inor-
dinately disproportionate amounts of the values of Iranian
society, and in the process give form and content to all areas
of Iranian life:
Educatioi:
- 33% of'the nations secondary school students study in
Tehran.14
- 34% of all Iranian literates live in Tehran.15
- 69% of all those who have any college education live in
Tehran.16
- 73% of all university students in Iran are studying in the
Capital's institutions of higher learning.17
Health:
- 48% of all licensed physicians live in Tehran.18
- 77% of all beds in medical hospitals are in the Capital.1 9
- 79% of all beds in mental hospitals may be found in Tehran.20
- In 1955, infant mortality was estimated at 71 per 1000 live
births in Tehran and 217 per 1000 in villages adjacent to
Tehran.2 I
Communications:
- 43% of all cinemas in Iran are located in th2 Capital. All
cinemas rated "first class" are in the city.
- 62% of all the natigp's passenger automobiles are owned and
driven by Tehranis.,3
- 71% of Iran's telephones are operating in the Capital.24
- 83% of Iran's te pvision receivers may be found in Tehran
and its suburbs.
- 95% of all daily newspapers are published and read in Tehran.26
-u -
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Economy:
- 37% of all workers in the electric ty, gas, and water
industries are employed in Tehran. 7
- 56% of all workers employed in factories of ten persons
or more work within the city limits.2 8
- 100% of all banks, insurance companies, and othg fiduciary
institutions have their headquarters in Tehran.
Thus the elite tend to be immune from the variations of regional
residence and birth. But, in addition, the very concentration of
those factors which serve to minimize such variations tends to
enhance the relative unity of the elite, while exacerbating the
urban-rural, capital-hinterland, and elite-mass bifurcations of
the society. In short, while those traditional regional varia-
tions are being reduced by the dissemination of the mass media,
education, and modern means of communication, the concentration
of these in the capital is contributing to new forms of social
discontinuities.
While Tehran dominates the life of the nation, large
cities in general play an increasingly dominant role vis-a-vis
smaller centers of population. If we compare the birthplaces
of the elite with those of their fathers, we note that in 63.5
per cent of the cases, the places of birth of the two genera-
tions were identical. Of the remaining elite who were born in
cities different from the birthplaces of their fathers, some
90 per cent were born in cities which were larger in 1956 than
were the birthplaces of their fathers in 1956. That is, the
use of identical census data for determining the size of places
of birth for both generationas revealed that the elite not born
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in the birthplaces of their fathers were born in larger cities.
What is at work here is not that cities have grown larger over
the years between the birth of father and son (which is gener-
ally true), but that the process of urbanization which has beset
much of the developing world and Iran in particular has enhanced
the importance of the larger cities in the nation's political
life.
Urbanization in Iran, however, has been peculiar in at
least two senses. Firstly, it has not been a general, nation-
wide phenomenon. And secondly, where it has occurred, it has
persisted doggedly in a steady and often rapid compounding of
urban populations. It is impossible to establish with certainty
the rate of population growth in Iran, but most demographers
would put the total annual percentage increase somewhere between
2.3 and 2.7 But urbanization represents a different pattern.
Certain cities show a net annual decline in population over the
fifteen-year period (1941-1956) for which rudimentary data are
available; e.g., Bandar Phalevi: - LO per cent; Meshed: - 0.6
per cent; or Hamadan: - 0.2 per cent. Other cities indicate
growing populations, but at a rate slightly below or approxi-
mately correspondent with the average annual population growth
for the country as a whole; e.g., Esfahan: 1.5 per cent; Shiraz:
2.1 per cent; or Tabriz: 2.2 per cent. One city, Tehran,
dominates statistics on population growth as it is able to
dominate all other statistics in Iran. Its annual average
growth rate from 1941 to 1956 was some 11 per cent. 30 In the
period from 1956 to the present a special study reveals that
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the rate of growth has increased and now hovers at 15 per cent
per year.31
The dominance of the capital city over the life of Iran,
its population growth, and its "production" of political elite
is parallelled by and reflected in the life chances of the elite
themselves. The members of the elite born in Tehran are eligible
for "the best of everything" and they usually get it in propor-
tions greater than their country cousins. Furthermore, Lerner
has argued that " . . cities alone have developed the complex
of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial
economy."32 Being born in Tehran usually meant that the elite
were born into households already amenable to the contemporary
world.
For one thing, their fathers were more likely to have had
modern, rather than traditional or maktab, educations. Whereas
only one-seventh of the fathers of elite born outside Tehran had
studied in modern educational institutions, nearly twoefifths of
the fathers of elite members born in Tehran had been so educated.
Similarly, the fathers of the "Tehranis" are more likely to have
been Government employees and primarily highly placed officials.
In addition to having fathers in Government service,
elite members born in Tehran had other family assets. Iran is a
society for which "nepotism, where possible under modern cQndi-
tions, is a strict family obligation." 3 3 As such, the power of
one's extended family can be of crucial significance in deter-
mining one's career. Members of the political elite born in
Tehran are much more likely to be related to the Pahlevis and
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TABLE 6.4
FATHERS' EMPLOYMENT BY BIRTHPLACE OF THE ELITE
Father's Employment Birthplace of Elite
Tehran Not Tehran
Government 64.0% 46.2%
Non-Government 36.0 53,7
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(N 86) (N u 80)
(x2  5.258; df = 1; p = .022; gamma = -.347)
to the former ruling dynasty, the Qajars (interestingly, how-
ever, neither ruling family originated in Tehran, the founders
of both having been born in the province of Mazandaran).34  All
of the political elite related by blood to His Imperial Majesty
are Tehranis by birth. Of the 47 members of the elite who count
themselves Qajars, some 11 per cent were born in towns of less
than 100,000 persons. Another 21 per cent were born in the pro-
vincial cities. But 68 per cent, or thirty-two former princes
or princesses, are from the capital. Aside from membership in
the extended families of Iran's duling dynasty or preceding
kings, the Tehranis are also more likely to be from non-royal
families whose members, nonetheless, were politically influen-
tial. Two and one half times as many of the elite born in
Tehran, compared to those born in cities of fewer than 100,000
persons, could claim such influential relations.
Tehranis, then, have had a number of. advantages affecting
their life chances vis-a-vis those of the elite born outside
Tehran. Fathers with modern educations; with positions within
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the Royal Court, the civil or military bureaucracies; and fami-
lies with ties to the ruling houses or other influentials, pro-
vide access to the values in Iranian society over which they had
control, For example, a combination of political and intellec-
tual influence at home and the greater educational opportunities
of the capital made it possible for the elite born in Tehran to
pursue their educations to high levels35
TABLE 6,5
ELITE EDUCATION BY PLACE OF BIRTH
Highest Place of Birth
education Total
level Tehran Not Tehran
Maktab or
secondary school 31,2% 68,8% 1000%
(N!,28)
University 431 56.9 100,10
(Ne51)
Post-Graduate 62,5 37,5 100.0
(N=88)
(x2 = 9.891; df = 2; p = 007; gamma = -.409)
There are other advantages which accrue to Tehranis One of
them is the chance to travel abroad with greater frequency
than is true for non-Tehranis, While 3721 per cent of the
elite who were born in Tehran had made ten or fewer trips out-
side their native land, the comparable figure for those born in
towns of less than 100,000 is 57.1 per cent, Conversely, only
23.8 per cent of the small-towners have made more than twenty
trips, while 45 per cent of the native Tehranis have done so..
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But foreign travel and higher education are only inter-
mediate to a more highly sought-after value in Iran--political
power. Once again, there is a positive (albeit weak) relation
between birth in Tehran and reputed political power. Education,
travel, power--these and other values accrue disproportionately
to those of the elite born in Tehran, They also accrue dispropor-
tionately, but to a lesser extent, to those born in the larger
provincial cities. (While 75 per cent of the elite were born in
major cities and only 6,0 per cent in towns of less than 10,000,
the comparable figures for the rest of the nation are 16.5 per
cent and 73 per cent, respectively.) The townspeople and
peasants--most of the population--are born into an environment
which has less to offer, and receive less. 36 The traditional
rnzcbnnal variations, in the process, become secondary to new
types of variations represented by the great proportion of the
elite born in Tehran (or early migrating there) and by the inor-
dinately disparate distribution of resources to the capital. One
danger in these new discontinuities may well be a growing dis-
interest in national development as the elite seek to preserve
their special privileges, if necessary at the expense of that
development.37
AGE
Send not an old man to buy an ass, nor a young
man to choose a wife--the one is satisfied with any
speed, the other with any beauty
Iranian proverb
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As is true of any political elite, the age distribution
of the most politically powerful Iranians is considerably dif-
ferent from that of the Iranian population as a whole.
TABLE 6.6
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL
ELITE AND THE WHOLE POPULATION 38
Age in Years Political Elite Total Population
Under 40 8.5% 78.6%
40-49 26.0 8.7
50-59 29.3 6.5
60-69 25.6 3.9
70 and older 10.6 2.3
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(N=246) (N13,947 ,641)
Members of the political elite are considerably older than the
total population; the median age of the former is 54.0 and of
the latter, 20.2 years. 39 Insofar as longevity and age are
valued in Iranian society, it is obvious that the political
elite are disproportionately rewarded in this area as in so
many others.
Numerous observers have made the point that in more
traditional, non-Western societies power is a concomitant of
age. 40 That association has been even more vociferously
claimed in Iran.4 1 Our data bear out these generalizations,
albeit to a very slight extent. Of the elite under the age
of fifty, 23.5 per cent were at the lowest levels of reputed
power, i.e., with reputed power scores of 6 or less. Of those
sixty years of age or over, the percentage in the lowest rating
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of reputed power is a similar 27.1 per cent. At the higher
levels of power, however, the differences are slightly more
pronounced. Of the younger elite, 37,6 per cent had found
access to the most powerful group, i.e., with reputed power
scores of 10 to 20; whereas 43.8 per cent of the older elite
were among that group. Put differently, whereas the elite
sixty years of age or older constitute 36.2 per cent of the
entire elite, they make up 40.6 per cent of the most powerful
group. Conversely, 34.6 per cent of the politically powerful
are under the age of 50 but only 33.3 per cent of the most
powerful are in that age group.
But while the association between age and power is
positive, the relationship is not statistically significant.
We would suggest that whatever positive association exists is
not that between power and age qua chronological longevity,
Rather, the older elite tend to be more powerful because age
tends to be correlated with the length of one's active poli-
tical life which is, in turn, correlated with mobility to posi-
tions of political power. Put more simply, the older elite
would be expected to be more powerful because they have spent
more time gathering and controlling bases of political power.
But why, then, is the association not more significant
for these older elite? The answer lies in the course of recent
political history in Iran. For with the advent of Hassan Ali
Mansur to the Premiership in 1964, a group of younger "techno-
crats" were brought into the Cabinet. In most cases, these
Ministers had never previously held a major post within the
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bureaucracy. (One of these men was even younger than the Con-
stitutional age level for Ministers of thirty. When questioned,
he abruptly raised his age to the minimum.) But despite the
youth of these "new" elite, their formal positions served as
sufficiently important bases of power to thrust them, literally
overnight, to high levels of reputed power. The following table
reflects this development.
TABLE 6.7
AGES OF THE ELITE BY FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL POSITION
Occupational Position
Age in Years Director, Minis- Senate Majles
terial Dept.
Less than 50 53.6% 39.3% 4.3% 57.9%
50-59 21.4 39,3 21.6 26.3
60 or more 25.0 21.4 76.1 21.1
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1000%
N (28) (28) (47) (20)
The most distinctive feature of this table is the high
proportion of Cabinet Ministers in the youngest category and
the even greater proportion of Senators in the oldest age
group. The members of the Senate most nearly approximate
the conventional model between age and power. For the Senate
itself has little institutional influence (being a captive of
the Royal prerogative) and membership in the Senate, while con-
ferring status, confers no political power. The high levels of
reputed power achieved by its members are based on their past
positions and lengthy careers in the service of Iran. The
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Cabinet represents the reverse side of the coin. For the
bureaucracies which its members direct control and expend
huge budgets and employ tens of thousands of persons. There,
power is associated with position (and not vice versa, as is
the case with the former group).
The remaining positions represent a middle ground. The
Directors of Ministerial Departments are more nearly equally
divided among the three age categories and such a position is
one to whose holders intermediate levels of reputed power were
assigned. The members of the Majles, like the Cabinet Minis-
ters, are predominantly younger men. But like the Senate, the
Majles has little influence over the political process. Con-
sequently, its members who lack lengthy service were accorded
low levels of power.
Thus within the political elite, at least, there is no
simple relationship between age and power. While the latter
seems to accompany the former, the influence of formal posi-
tions appears to over-ride the importance of age. And as His
Majesty has demonstrated an increasing penchant for technical
competence rather than experience among the elite, age will
continue to decline in importance. One member of the elite
violently disagreed with this prediction. "Science," he argued,
"is the basis of our government and science is the fruit of
experience." But he clearly spoke for a dwindling minority.
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RELIGION
Free thought and faith--the upshot's one;
they wrangle o'er a name:
Interpretatigs differ, but the dream is still
the same.
The political elite are basically unified in their pro-
fessions of religious belief. Ninety-seven per cent of the
respondents noted that Islam was their preferred religion. The
remaining five individuals counted one Christian, one Baha'i,
and three who refused to answer on the grounds of "invasion of
privacy.' This overwhelming preponderance of Moslems among the
responding elite is matched by the preponderance of Moslems in
the population at large. The 1956 census indicated that some
98.4 per cent of all Iranians considered themselves Moslems. 4 3
Once past this rather indiscriminate tally of Islam ver-
sus non-Islamic religions, howevermore interesting divergencies
appear. The elite were also asked to relate the extent to which
they actively pursued the dictates of their religion.
TABLE 6.8
EXTENT TO WHICH ELITE RESPONDENTS EXECUTE THE
DUTIES OF THEIR RELIGION
Degree Per Cent
Very much, completely 24.0%
To an extent 18.0
Little 22.2
None at all 19,2
Other answers, miscellaneous 1606
Total 100.0%
N (167)
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The distribution of approximately equal answers across these
categories may be surprising to students of American politics
familiar with the readiness with which leading politicians ful-
fill the public requisites of religious observance. It is
similarly unexpected to those who are familiar with the perva-
sive qualities of Islam.
But the willingness of 41,4 per cent of the respondents
to admit that, at best, their religion sat light y on them is
not particularly remote from the secular trends evident through-
out Iran. Be it in the area of the reduced political leadership
provided by members of the Islamic clergy or the diminution of
clerical influence on the educational system of Iran, it is
obvious that secularism in the form of "a-religiousness" rather
than "anti-religiousness" is growing. The efforts of groups and
individuals to "purify" or "regenerate" Islam tend to fail,
unheeded. 44 Religion is not so much frontally challenged as a
system of beliefs by the political elite, as it is peripherally
ignored. Where religion is accorded deference by the elite, it
is most often as a political force.
Additional insight into the relevance of religion for the
elite may be gained from a closer examination of their stated
religious preferences. Elite respondents specified their
preferences for Islam in three ways. One group of respondents
replied that they were "Shi'ites" (N=63). Another group re-
plied that they were "Moslems by birth" (N-24), and yet another
group identified themselves as "Moslems" (N=74).45 A breakdown
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of these preferences by the extent of religious practice re-
veals the following:
TABLE 6.9
CLAIMED EXECUTION OF RELIGIOUS DUTY
Stated Religious YES NO
Preference Completely or Little plus Total NTo an extent Not at all
Shiite 81.5% 18.5% 100.0% 63
Islam 37.5 62.5 100.0 24
Islam, by birth 0.0 100.0 100.0 74
42,402; df = 2; p = .001; gamma ='.848)
Those of the elite for whom religion means Shi'a Islam
find that religion salient and practice their religion. Those
members of the political elite who profess the faith of "Islam"
or "Islam by birth" are those who tend not to practice their
religion. (But only 37 per cent of the elite explicitly con-
sidered themselves to be Shi'ites.) This phenomenon of the
majority of the elite considering themselves "Moslem" while
that designation bears with it little personal saliency has
additional significance as it lies at the root of the foreign
relations dilemma of Iran in the Middle East. The country is
an Islamic nation whose interests would be assumed coincident
with the "Islamic bloc," but the very root of the connection,
i.e., Islam, is of little salience among many present members
of the political elite. When religion does become salient for
the elite, it is Shi'a Islam, which by its very nature and by
the tradition of its longstanding doctrinal and political
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disputes with Sunni Islam, tends to isolate and segregate Iran
from her Islamic brethren.4 6
The historical development of Shi'ism and its differences
with Sunni Islam amplify these findings. For the adoption of
Shi'ism as the official state religion of Iran by the Safavids
in the sixteenth century had the major effect of defining the
nation of Iran and of isolating Iran from her Sunni Arab and
Ottoman neighbors to the West and Afghans to the East. The
doctrines, which are essentially identical with those of Sunni
Islam, differ in conceding to Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet
Mohammad and the fourth Caliph, and his descendants the sole
legitimate claim to the Caliphate. "Shi'ism began as a purely
Arab and purely political faction" following the death of Ali
and " . . appealed with great success to the discontented
masses and especially to the Mawali [Moslem converts who were
not full members by descent of an Arab tribe]." 4 7 With its
original home in present-day Iraq, the sect spread to Iran and
"served as a cloak for the introduction into Islam of all sorts
of old oriental beliefs, Babylonian, Persian, and even Indian."48
From its very inception, then, Shi'ism served as a divisive
force within the umma, or Community of theFaithful.
Another effect of the lack of saliency which religion
bears for the majority of the elite is a domestic one. In con-
trast to the non-religious elite,the majority of the population
of Iran, or at least the urban, mobilized segment of the popu-
lation, are allegedly committed Shi'ites.4 9 Certainly there
exists a highly vocal (albeit privately highly vocal) cadre of
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religious leaders and activists who have immense influence with
the urban population and who are unalterably hostile to the
elite in this regime. Moreover, there is a long and revered
tradition of religious officials leading mass movements into
the midst of major political controversy. The activities of
principal mullahs in the Tobacco Concession controversy of
1891-1892, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1907, and the
initial resistance to Reza Shah are well remembered.50 Thus,
the failure of the political elite to accord great seriousness
to their religion--insofar as that is perceived--results in the
further estrangement of the defenders of the faith. Major,
violent, anti-Government demonstrations in cities throughout
Iran in June, 1963, are but the latest testament to that
estrangement. Coming, as it did, on the heels of the passionate
Moharram ceremonies, touched off by the untimely arrest of
prominent Ayatollahs, and led by religious fanatics, it suggests
that religious leadership of political movements is not a
curious relic of past history. The more recent arrest and
exile of the Ayatollah Khomeini suggests that the Government
is also fully aware of this phenomenon.
These blatantly anti-religious acts in concert with the
perceived lack of personal relevance which Shi'ism apparently
holds for the elite exacerbates anti-regime sentiment and the
reputed illegitimacy of the present regime. In recognition of
this, His Imperial Majesty and the elite frequently manipulate
religious symbols in an attempt to make credible their publicly
expressed concern for religion. The Shah invites religious
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dignitaries to formal and highly publicized Court audiences. At
a recent salaam ceremony, for example, the "official" religious
leaders (the only ones invited to such functions) paid homage to
the king as "herald-bearer and defender of the Shi'a world."5 1
In addition, the Shah offers financial support for the repair
and maintenance of religious shrines; religious dignitaries are
on hand to bless the safety of His Majesty on his foreign travels;
the Shah and political leaders make pilgrimages to holy places in
Iraq and Meccah and Medinah; and finally, the bureaucracy, at
least half-heartedly, does enforce Islamic laws during the
Moharram and Ramazan mourning and fast days. 5 2
But despite the frequency of these efforts, there is a
failure to overcome the bifurcation between elite and mass
stemming from the secularism of the former. For one thing, the
official religious leaders who publicly perform Shi'ite rituals
or appear at court functions are widely viewed as "kept"
mullahs. Their stock in the knowledgeable community at large
is nil. For another, even profound acts of piety by the elite
cannot overcome the hostility which popular religious leaders
acting in both their religious and their political capacities
bear for the elite.
Our data show little likelihood that these untoward
foreign and domestic consequences of elite "a-religiousness"
will abate on account of changes in elite attitudes. In fact,
in the absence of significant secular trends among Iran's
neighbors and people, these patterns are likely to worsen in
the future. For younger members of the elite are less likely
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TABLE 6.10
ELITE EXECUTION OF RELIGIOUS DUTIES BY AGE
Execution of Age of Respondents
religious duties 49 or younger 50-59 60 or older
YES, Completely,
plus To an Extent 28.8% 54.1% 70.0%
NO, Little, plus
Not At All 71.2 45.9 30.0
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (52) (37) (50)
(x2 = 17.545; df = 2; p = .001; gamma = -. 543)
than their elders to take their religious duties seriously.
In Iran, as in other countries, one frequently hears the
argument that "the youth will return to the fold" and one need
not fear their transitory lack of religious fervor. In fact,
the data do not show whether Iranians become more religious as
they grow older or whether younger people in Iran are less reli-
gious than their fathers were at the same ages. But there is
evidence which suggests that the latter is more nearly true.
We can compare religious performance with education level:
TABLE 6.11
ELITE EXECUTION OF RELIGIOUS DUTIES BY
EDUCATION LEVEL AND AGE
Religious Less than 50 50-59 60 or older
Execution M-S* U PG M-S U PG M-S U PG
YES 33.3% 42.9% 22.9% 66.7% 83.3% 35.3% 68.7% 57.1% 80.0%
NO 66.7 57.1 77.1 33.3 16.7 64.7 31.2 42.9 20.0
Total 100.0'/,100.O'l00.0% 100. 0 100.0%l00.0% 100.0%100.0%100.0%
N (3) (14) (35) (3) (12) (17) (16) (14) (20)
*M-S represents education at the Maktab or Secondary level; U re-
fers to University; PG, to post-graduate.
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While the few cases make analysis difficult, it seems clear that
for all but the oldest of the elite, higher levels of education
are associated with the lower performance of religious obliga-
tions. We can expect, then, that as the political elite becomes
better educated, it will be increasingly non-religious irrespec-
tive of the age level. And there is ample evidence that age and
highest level of formal education achieved are inversely corre-
lated among the elite.
That the younger elite are unlikely to grow in religious
fervor as they gain in years is also suggested by the following
table. Holding education level constant, we can compare
knowledge of the Arabic language with lack of it for each age
group. (Inasmuch as the "liturgy" for Shi'ite religious obser-
vances is given in Arabic, it might be assumed that familiarity
with Arabic would be essential for absolutely proper conduct of
religious ritual.) The table shows us that, indeed, knowledge
of Arabic does increase with education level, irrespective of
TABLE 6.12
KNOWLEDGE OF ARABIC BY AGE GROUP, GIVEN
VARIOUS LEVELS OF ELITE EDUCATION
Claimed Elites' Highest Education Level
knowledge Maktab-Secon- University Post-Graduate
of Arabic dary School
To 50- 60 or To 50- 60 or To 50- 60 or
49 59 more 49 59 more 49 59 more
YES 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 16.7% 29.4% 50.0% 25.0% 40.7% 54.2%
NO 100.0 50.0 50.0 83.3 70.6 50.0 75.0 59.3 45.8
Total 100. 0 100.0%100.% 100 10T1001.T100.0% 00.%1001.010290.0%
N (4) (4) (4) (18) (17) (20) (40) (27) (24)
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the age of the elite. But while familiarity with Arabic in-
creases with education, knowledge of Arabic is vastly different
within similar educational levels according to age level. Thus
of all elite 49 or younger, 20.9 per cent claim a knowledge of
the holy language. Fifty-one per cent of those 60 years or
older do so. On the assumption that Arabic is not something
learned late in life, then,this is another indication that even
in the future the better-educated younger elite of today are
likely to manifest even less genuine religious interest than
the older elite do at present. In secular thought as in any
other value area, the elite will always lead the remainder of
the population. Whether they will remain as perilously out of
line with popular sentiment and with Arab States' policies as
they are at present isan open question. Our data suggest no
reason to assume otherwise.
ELITE FATHERS, ELITE SONS
Granted that your father was learned; but of
what use is that to you . . . ?
The offspring of a cruel man becomes a tyrant .
Iranian proverb
Members of the political elite had disproportionately
higher opportunities for access to their positions in Iranian
society and especially to the Governmental bureaucracy than did
other members of the society, positions which served as the
principal base value for gaining political power and thus con-
sideration as members of the political elite. One of the fun-
damental issues in elite studies is the degree to which access
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to an elite is restricted to descendants of members of that
elite. The issue centers on the extent to which the "power
elite" is, in fact, a "ruling class."
Popular mythology about Iran's powerful families
suggests that such is the case. The "One Thousand Families"
reputed to rule Iran are also alleged to deny political power
to others. Indeed, the family connections of the current poli-
tical elite usually do spread to other members of the elite.
To take but one prominent example, the late Hassan Ali Mansur
was related by blood or marriage to the following prominent
Iranian families: Amini, Qavam, Farmanfarmaian, Vossuq, Pirnia,
Moshiri, Vakil, Teimurtash, Malek, Varasteh, Qaragozlu, A'lam,
Emami, Zia'i, Azodi, Mo'tamed, Loqman, Naficy, Loqman-Adham,
Vahabzadeh, Mo'aven, Nasr, Mojtehi, Ashtiani, Esfandiary,
Ebtehaj, Ghavam al Saltaneh.53 Those familiar with the history
of contemporary Iran will recognize the names of Prime Ministers,
Cabinet Ministers, Senators, Aides and Adjutants to the Imperial
Court, etc. Evidence from these family ties alone would suggest
that one thousand would be a grossly inflated estimate of the
number of ruling families.
But although Mansur had an unusually large number of
influential relatives, others of the 307 Iranians we have de-
fined as the political elite also could boast of important
family ties. Looking at the closest blood relationships within
the elite itself, one may find fifteen pairs of brothers, two
sets of three brothers each, and one group of four brothers,
There are eight members of the elite who can also count ten of
Position
Prime Minister or Minister
Provincial Governor-General or Governor
Department Chief (Civil Service)
Parliamentarian (Majles or Senate)
Imperial Court (Aide, Adjutant, or Secretary)
Ordinary Civil Servant
Child of Reza Shah Kabir
Officer of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces
Ambassador
Total
Non-Government Posts
No data
Total
N
Per Cent
9.2%
8.4
6.8
5.6
4.8
4.4
3.2
2.8
1.6
2506
27.6
(250)
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their sons within that elite. As a group, 75 per cent of the
elite claimed to have at least one influential relation (although
not necessarily among the 307). They claimed 18 Prime Ministers,
48 Cabinet Ministers, 20 Senators, and 21 members of the Majles
as such relations. That fully one quarter of the elite (N = 40)
claimed no influential relationships whatever seems to indicate
that this group does not form a totally closed "ruling class."
Access to its ranks is not limited solely to the scions of its
present members. But if this elite group does not form a"ruling
class", neither is it composed primarily of nouveau arrivistes.
Perhaps the most striking demonstration of this point is through
an examination of the fathers of the elites. Despite the rela-
tively recent burgeoning of the civil service, some 64.4 per
cent of the elite for whom data are available had fathers who
held posts in the Government or Imperial Court.
TABLE 6.13
HIGHEST POSITION HELD BY FATHERS OF THE
POLITICAL ELITE
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It is possible that the fathers of the present poli-
tical elite held posts in the civil and military bureaucracies
because of the intervention of their sons, The implausability
of this notion is revealed by data on the number of years ago
that the elites' fathers held their most important positions. 54
TABLE 6.14
NUMBER OF YEARS AGO THAT ELITES' FATHERS
HELD THEIR MOST IMPORTANT POSITIONS
Number of Years Ago Per Cent
Holds post now l.17%
1-5 years ago 3.2
6-10 years ago 3.2
11-19 years ago 7*5
20-24 years ago 7.5
25-44 years ago 35.3
More than 45 years ago 42.0
Total 100.0%
N (93)
The father of only one member of the political elite is now
serving in the Government. In fact, both this father and his
son are included in the political elite. It is widely recog-
nized that the father prevailed upon higher authorities to place
his son within the Civil Service (and not vice versa). One
other case of a father-son inclusion in the "power elite" and
in Government service should be noted, that of Ali Mansur and
his son Hassan Ali Mansur. The elder Mansur held the post of
Prime Minister in 1940 and again in 1950. His son held that
post in 1964-1965. The elder Mansur was reputedly instrumental
in obtaining political power and position for his son.
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Nonetheless, this pair has been excluded from these data due to
the untimely assassination of Hassan Ali Mansur in 1965. Aside
from these two examples, however, almost 80 per cent of the
fathers of the elite who did hold Government positions held
those posts twenty-five or more years previous. And not only
were the fathers likely to have held their Government positions
prior in time to their sons, but, more importantly, almost all
of the fathers held high positions within the Civil Service.
Because the fathers of present members of the political
elite held important and influential Government positions, they
thus were themselves likely to have been members of the political
elite of their day. So were they members of the intellectual
elite of their day. Ninety-five per cent of the fathers of mem-
bers of the political elite are reported by their sons to have
been literate. This literacy figure compares with data for all
Iranians over the age of seven, of whom only 15.4 per cent were
literate in 1956, and for all Iranians over the age of 55, of
whom 93.5 per cent were illiterate in 1956.55
These elite fathers are not merely literate, however.
One quarter of them have had modern educations, twenty-one having
studied outside Iran. Given the relatively recent introduction
of secular, modern institutions of learning, this appears all
the more striking. As recently as 1923-1924, there were only
227 Iranians studying above the secondary level at institutions
which were clearly etablissements superieurs and not merely
secondary schools with lengthened curricula.5 6 A school of law,
established by the Ministry of Justice and meant to prepare its
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students for the judiciary, boasted 69 pupils. And a school of
medicine, run by the Ministry of Health, claimed 158 students at
all stages of medical training. Only 3,300 pupils were studying
at modern secondary schools throughout the country, 2,000 of
whom were in Tehran.5 7 Secular, modern education appears to have
been an important base value in contributing to the acquisition
of influential Government positions for the fathers of the
present elite.
TABLE 6.15
FATHERS' TYPE OF EDUCATION BY FATHERS'
POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT
Type of Highest Position Held
Education58  Prime Department Court Majles/ Lower No Gov.
Minister Chief Officials Senate Pos. Pos.
Modern-
Secular 58.8% 53.3% 41.7% 33.3% 9.1% 10.6%
Traditional-
Religious 41.2 46.7 58.3 66.7 90.9 89.4
Total 100.0% 100. 0. 100.0% 100.10/ 100.0% 100.0%
For the fathers of the contemporary elite, a striking
positive association clearly existed between modern, secular
education and influential Government positions. This emphasizes
the original relationship between these structures, to be noted
below: the educational system being developed to meet the per-
sonnel needs of the bureaucracy. The table also highlights the
relevance of education for political power, a phenomenon clearly
operative at present, but obviously important in the previous
generation.
Number of Whole Villages Owned
1 or less 2 to 4 5 Undetermined Alone No Land Total
20,5% 11.8% 22.4% 22.4% 22.9% 100.0%
(N=170)
land-holding of the elite and their parents were most difficult
to acquire, for at the time of the interviews, land reform was
being pursued vigorously. Even those of the elite whose proper-
ties had already been distributed were wary of association with
the "Black Reactionaries," as the Shah was then branding those
who opposed the land reform. One means of avoiding that charge
was to deny any association with agricultural land at all.
Therefore, the percentage of elite parents owning large holdings
has undoubtedly been underemphasized. Nonetheless, a startling
connection among a number of variables is beginning to appear.
Wealth, power, knowledge among fathers are all associated with
power among sons.,
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But not only were the fathers of the political elite dis-
proportionately powerful and well educated, they were also dis-
proportionately wealthy--at least as measured by the conventional
standards of Iran. Some 76.5 per cent of the respondents'
fathers or mothers owned land and at least one-fifth of the
respondents' parents owned more than five villages. Data on the
TABLE 6.16
PARENTS' AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS
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But wealth and power are also clearly associated among
the fathers themselves. Our data do support the frequently
noted observation which connects land ownership and positions
of power within the Government, Of the fathers of the elite
who owned land, 61.9 per cent were employed by the Government.
But of those who did not own land, only 38.5 per cent held
Government posts. But this rather gross relationship masks a
more significant finding: The higher the father's position
within the bureaucracy, the greater is the likelihood of that
father's owning land. That members of the Majles and Senate
TABLE 6.17
FATHERS' POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT BY
FATHERS' LAND OWNERSHIP
Position Land Ownership
Yes No Total N
Majles or Senate 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 12
Ministry or Court 88.9 11.1 100.0 12
Prime Minister or
Minister 88.2 11.8 100.0 17
Dept. Director, Offi-
cer of Armed Forces,
of Governor 84.2 15.8 100.0 38
Lower level position:
Govt. clerk, etc. 45.5 54.5 100.0 11
(in previous generations of Government officials) universally
owned land is not surprising. These Parliamentarians used a
local power base to assure their being returned to office in
Tehran. And they used the ownership of land to assure their
control over the local power base. But the preponderance of
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land ownership among other Government officials suggests the
acute interconnection between the possession of wealth and the
possession of political power in Qajar Iran.
As discussed above, however, it is fruitless for us to
attempt an assessment of causality. Surely, many of the fathers
of the present-day elite acquired political power and elite mem-
bership through their large holdings of agricultural land. And
as surely, others of the previous generation acquired lands
through their Government positions or commercial wealth to add
elite status to their elite power positions. Possession of
land conferred a not inconsiderable economic benefit upon the
holder. It also justified the maintenance of a body of armed
retainers to protect the holdings from bandits or marauding
tribesmen and, in turn, gave the landlord considerable power.
In effect, it meant that the Government had often to defer to
the larger landowner in the areas in which he held land. This
again gave the landowner social prestige as well as pclitical
power. The fact that land offered both a profitable field of
investment and conferred social prestige meant also that the
ranks of the land-owning classes were increased, not only by
Government officials who made use of their official position
to buy up property in the areas to which they were appointed,
but also by merchants and others who had money to invest. 59
Possession of land and political power had additional benefits:
the landlord could demand and often receive high-level posts as
his price for cooperating with rather than obstructing the
Government. Or, such posts might be offered by the Government
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as a form of pre-emptive cooptation.60 However accomplished,
with land came political power and social status.
The fathers of the political elite were radically un-
representative of Iranian society in other significant ways, and
in the process were able to provide their sons with greater
access to values useful for the acquisition of power. We have
already mentioned that some 30 per cent of elite fathers were
born in Tehran, when but twenty-five years previously, in 1940,
the population of the city had been merely 540,000, in all
probability not more than 5 per cent of the total population61
Of the fathers not born in the capital, the vast majority were
from the larger cities. 6 2
In addition to being born in larger cities, fathers of
present-day political elites pursued urban-based occupations.
Of the members of the elite for whom information is available,
the following represents a distribution of fathers' principal
occupations:
TABLE 6.18
PRINCIPAL AND SECONDARY OCCUPATION OF FATHERS
Occupation Per Cent
Government Service 6 3  39.6%
Landlord 26.2
Merchant 11.9
Religion 8.5
Professional 7.6
Unskilled and Miscellaneous 6.2
Total 100.0%
N (328)
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Of the 328 occupations represented, only seven refer to manual
occupations such as baker, agricultural laborer, peasant pro-
prietor, craftsman, herder, etc. In one respect, this sur-
prisingly low percentage might represent an attempt on the part
of elite respondents to magnify the member of their fathers and,
in the process, their fathers' importance, by inflating the
status of their occupations. On the other hand, the paucity
of lower status or manual jobs represented so well correlates
with other evidence on social backgrounds presented here that
this phenomenon is assumed to dramatize the low level of
mobility from non-elite to general or political elite positions.
The remaining occupations in the table pursued by the
fathers of the elite--karmandane dowlat, sahebane malek, tajerat,
ulema, and ahaliye herfe--are specifically those which would pro-
vide the greatest physical mobility and access to diverse intel-
lectual currents and experiential stimuli in the performance of
the tasks of that occupation. Government officials represent a
group whose locale of service frequently required movements to
different areas of Iran, or at least inspection tours of the
country. The landlords of Iran are widely recognized as an
absentee-landlord group who make their home in the capital,
periodically visiting their estates and indulging in a vast
amount of travel for pleasure. The fathers of the elite in com-
merce represent primarily just that--the import-export or
wholesale trade rather than production or industrial enterprise.
A great deal of foreign travel has traditionally been associated
with this trade. At the least, its successful pursuit requires
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one to be familiar with foreign developments, markets, etc.
Similarly with religion, where pilgrimage is one of the five
cardinal duties of a proper Moslem. Moreover, the Shi'a sect,
overwhelmingly preponderant in Iran, is especially devoted to
pilgrimages in connection with visits to shrines and tombs of
especially revered religious figures, the Imams. The chief
focus of Shi'ite pilgrimages are the Iranian cities of Meshed
and Qum, Nejef and Kerbela in Iraq, and the centers of Mecca and
Medina in Arabia. As such, religious leaders in Iran have always
been especially well travelled within the country and much of
the Arab world. These pilgrimages result in a cross fertiliza-
tion and communication of ideas and information. As Sir Richard
Burton described one caravan outside of Mecca: "And nothing
stranger than the contrasts: a band of half naked Takruri
marching with the Pasha's equipage, and long-capped, bearded
Persians conversing with Tarbush'd and shaven Turks.164 Finally,
the professional groups in Iran have frequently traveled in the
retinue of important political figures, as aides to branches of
the Iranian Armed Forces, or as Iranian representatives to inter-
65national forums and meetings.
What the generation of Iranians who fathered the political
elite of today represents, then, is a group of individuals who
have, in manifest ways, been subject to those experiences which
result most directly in the development of "empathy." As Pro-
fessor Lerner has argued, such "high capacity for identification
with new aspects of [the] environment" is the predominant per-
sonal style only in modern society."66 Better educated,
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physically mobile, urban-based, relatively wealthy, and working
in occupations with decision-making responsibilities which
facilitated an exposure to diverse currents, these fathers were
already the "'new men" of their time.67 In all likelihood, they
provided a relatively cultured and wide-ranging home atmosphere
for their sons. This socialization to wider and more modern
horizons in combination with the resources and opportunities
which they could make available to their sons, would almost in-
sure the inclusion of their offspring in the subsequent genera-
tion of general elite.
That those who disproportionately possess that which a
society values should have sons who do likewise is not sur-
prising. That the present-day political elite of Iran is so
overwhelmingly composed of such sons of elite fathers is, how-
ever, rather unexpected after the events of the past seventy
years, especially in the face of a Constitutional Revolution;
the forced abdication of monarchs; a change of dynasties; two
World Wars in which Iran was occupied by the U.S.,Russians, and
British; tribal uprisings; and all the sordid and not so sordid
political machinations to which Iran has been subject from
foreigners and Iranians. Thus, while the present political
elite of Iran do not constitute a ruling class--access is not
restricted solely to children of the elite--there is a marked
continuity whereby elite fathers are able to make available the
tangible and not so tangible factors which would help insure
their sons membership in the political elite of their own day.
EDUCATION
"Oh Ahuramazda, endow me with an educated child . . . .168
So begins an early Zoroastrian prayer, a prayer which illustrates
the dominant wish of parent for child in early Iran. From these
first fragments of ancient evidence this high value placed on
education has been a continual theme in Iranian culture. Herodo-
tus and Xenophon both noted and commented on the importance
accorded education in Achaemenid times. 69 Education was still
an important priority fifteen hundred years later when a prince
of the South Caspian provinces composed a set of guides for
living and ruling for his son and eventual successor. The
author, Kai Ka'us ibn Iskandar, remonstrated with the future
ruler to:
Accustom yourself to acquiring wisdom and merit and
learn those useful arts of which you are ignorant.
Socrates says that there is no treasure better than
virtue, no honor more glorious than knowledge, no
ornament more beautiful than molgsty, and no enemy
worse than an evil disposition.
The prince reminded his son that knowledge was not only for
oneself but must be passed on to subsequent generations and,
moreover, that learning possessed utility other than prestige:
You must . . . teach your children all that needs
learning in various acts and accomplishments in ful-
filment of your duty as a father and the exercise of
your loving kindness as a parent. One can never be
secure against the accidents of fate nor foresee what
can occur to men whether of good or ill. Every a
and accomplishment is of service some day . . . 7
Education, then as now, was valued as an intrinsic good worthy
of honor and prestige and as an important instrument for self-
protection, for self gain, and for social mobility. Indeed,
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the foundation of Iran's modern educational system was con-
structed from just such principles. In 1851, the Dar ul-Fonun,
or Gate of Knowledge, was founded in Tehran as the first
Government-sponsored institution of learning and the first
school in Iran to be operated on contemporary Western lines. 72
This school was established,and the reform of an antiquated
and practically non-existent educational system begun, in re-
sponse to a series of deleterious encounters with foreign
governments. In a manner reminiscent of the American response
to Sputnik I, the Iranians came to accept the notion that the
infidels were not necessarily barbarians and that one antidote
to their successes would be found in the reform and development
of education in Iran.
Beginning in 1797, Iran had suffered fifty years of in-
creased contact with Western powers--contact which proved almost
totally disastrous to Iran. This fateful half century began
with the assassination of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, the "Eunuch-
Shah," who secured the throne for the Qajar dynasty through pur-
suit of his three passions--power, avarice, and revenge.73
There followed a series of missions from Napoleon seeking to
draw Persia into alliance against the British in preparation
for a French march on India. And equally rapidly, a series of
British missions made their way to Tehran to prevent such an
occurrence. Despite the fact that the recently crowned Fath
Ali Shah was horrified at the regicide nation, Persia and
France signed the preliminary Treaty of Finkenstein in 1807,
pledging mutual support for an invasion of India. 74 British
273
pressure on the Shah increased. Finally, with the failure of
the French to aid the Persians in their wars with the Tsar, Iran
abrogated its earlier agreements and signed a new mutual assis-
tance pact with Great Britain. Besides many provisoes almost
identical with the Treaty of Finkenstein, the new agreement had
the added advantage of providing an annual subsidy to Iran of
150,000 pounds, to be spent under the supervision of the British
75Ambassador.
In addition to these intra-European political contests
fought out on Iranian territory, Persia waged a series of
debilitating and destructive wars with her more powerful neigh-
bors to the North and West. From 1804 to 1812, Iran contested
Russian pressures on Georgia and Armenia, but by 1813, in defeat,
Iran recognized Russian demands on much of the Caucasus as well
as ceding Baku and other Persian cities to her and agreeing to
maintain no navy on the Caspian Sea. Only eight years later,
Persia fought her last campaign with Ottoman Turkey. After a
number of initial successes, the Iranian army was decimated by
cholera and sued for peace. But Iran had yet to engage in her
last major and degrading military epcounters with Russia. These
occurred from 1825 to 1827 and culminated in the Treaty of
Turkomanchai. This document not only specified the cessation
to Russia of the Persian provinces of Nakhjavan and Yerevan
and the payment of an indemnity of 3,000,000 pounds, but also
marked the institution of extra-territoriality. Swiftly extended
to the subjects of other European powers, these capitulations
marked the end of an "entirely independent" Persia, dramatized
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by the increasing intervention of the British and Russians in
the internal affairs of Iran. 7 6
Other events in the later years of the first half of the
eighteenth century gave witness to the change in Iran's relations
to the Great Powers. A Persian Expedition to wrest what it con-
sidered its rightful territory from Afghan control in 1836-1838
was finally suspended on pressure from the British. (As the Per-
sians laid seige to Herat, the British landed troops in Persian
Gulf ports. When finally broached to the Shah, this "invasion"
had assumed gargantuan proportions.) Later, British and Russian
"advice" resulted in the retirement of the Iranian Prime
77Minister.
By the accession to the throne of Nasr ed-din Shah in
1848, it must have been clear to the young king and his Vizier,
Mirza Taghi Khan, that the Western powers were superior to
Persia. Not only were they superior, but their superiority
appeared to lie in advanced education. Official records of the
Imperial Court support this contention. In them are found such
thoughts as "The Russian Government at the time of Peter the
Great used modern education from the West and the teaching of
the natural sciences and military skills to form an organized
army using modern weapons to become powerful and attack the
Empire of Iran and wrest the rich lands of the Northern Caucasus
from us," or "Britain had gotten very powerful from the adoption
of modern science and industry."78
The Dar ul-Fonun was the response. Admitting students
aged 14 to 16, the school was an attempt to provide educated
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cadres for the Government's civil and military bureaucracies.
With a core curriculum of foreign languages, natural sciences,
mathematics, history, geography, and drawing, students could
specialize in infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, medi-
cine, pharmacy, or geology.79 Boasting foreign (mostly Austrian)
instructors and textbooks, the Dar ul-Fonun set intellectual
standards and social and educational precedents which hold true
to the present day. Education was perceived as preparation for
Government service and students were to be instructed in sub-
jects which would be of direct relevance to strengthening that
service. Since education existed to fill slots within Govern-
mental bureaucratic structures, no move towards mass education
was made. In fact, entrance tended to be restricted to the
children of the social, economic, and political elite.
The Dar ul-Fonun remained in its isolated position--a
modern innovation capping a traditional maktab (Islamic educa-
tional system) for some fifty years. But when other institu-
tions of higher learning were founded, they were formed of
basically the same mold. For example, a School of Political
Science was opened in 1901 under the sponsorship of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Initiated and supervised by Mirza Hassan
Khan, Moshir ed Dowleh, a graduate of Moscow University in
political science, the school trained prospective diplomats.
In fact, graduates of the five-year curriculum were obliged to
serve in the Ministry for a number of years without pay.80 (The
necessity to serve without pay was another means of insuring
that only well-to-do young men would find their way into the
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higher educational system and the Ministry or other Govern-
mental service.)
Thus the educational system as developed in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries in Iran had profound social
effects. The gap between elite and mass was widened by the addi-
tion of yet another criterion for elite membership, another
distinction which the elite would possess. Not only was the
gap widened but it was made nearly unbridgeable. For with the
tendency to restrict higher education to scions of elite families
and the establishment of higher, or at least modern, education as
a chief requirement for service in the upper reaches of the
administrative or military bureaucracies and the foreign service,
access to elite status through official channels was closed.
Modern education became a distinguishing characteristic of the
elite, but an education which it was all but impossible for
children of the masses to acquire.
The political elite of today reflect this emphasis. In
a country where illiteracy is paramount--some eighty-five of
every one hundred Iranians can neither read nor write--the elite
are astoundingly well educated.8 1 The table below presents
graphic evidence that members of the elite have had the benefits
of formal education to a greater extent and to far higher
levels than other segments of the Iranian population. In his
study of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, Frey noted a
similar phenomenon: "Within a political system or subsystem,
the higher the level of formal authority of the concrete unit
selected for examination, the greater the incidence of personnel
HIGHEST E
MEMBER.
TEH
Education
No formal
education
Elementary
Secondary
University o
post-seconda
Post-graduat
Total
N
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TABLE 6.19
DUCATION LEVEL ACHIEVED BY THE POLITICAL ELITE,
S OF THE 21ST MAJLES, THE MALE POPULATION OF
RAN, AND THE MALE POPULATION QF IRAN OVER
THE AGE OF TEN YEARS 8 2
Elite8 3  Majles Tehran Iran
0.0% 0.0% 67.6% 83.3%
0.0 16.2 21.9 12.2
8.2 14.5 8.4 4.1
r
ry 41.1 39.7 1,8 0.4
e 50.7 29.6 0.3 001
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(231) (179) (991,365) (6,542,181)
of high social prestige among the members of that unit.r18 4  In-
dicating that education is a prime source of social prestige, he
goes on to explain this relationship principally in terms of
legitimizing the power of the influencer.
Statistics presented here are only partly relevant to
Frey's work, for they contain educational levels of social or
residence groups rather than occupational groups alone. None-
theless, in the Iranian context, the same relationships between
levels of prestige and of actual power are present. Turning
to the political elite alone we note the breakdown in their
educationl attainments stated in Table 6.20. Where did this
highly educated political elite receive their educations? Some
85 per cent of the political elite attended secondary schools
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TABLE 6.20
HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ACHIEVED
BY THE POLITICAL ELITE
Level Percentage
Maktab 6.5%
Secondary school 7.7
Post-secondary institute 9.3
University 29.1
Post-graduate studies 47.4
Graduate training 6.1%
Master's degree 7*3
Doctorate degree 25.9
Ph.D. 3.6
MD, 4.5
Total 100.0%
N (247)
in Iran. The two schools which graduated the largest number--
fifty-one pupils--were the Dar ul Fonun and Alborz College.
Thus the former institution has continued to serve its original
function of training its graduates for positions of responsi-
bility. The latter school until World War II was run by the
American Presbyterian Mission. Subsequently taken over by the
Government, it is now the largest secondary school in Iran.
Together the two schools have dominated Iranian secondary edu-
cation until recently, and in terms of facilitating access to
the general elite serve much the same function as the Galat-
saray School in Istanbul.8 5
Indeed, as one measure of "eliteness," the Dar ul F
sent a greater percentage of its graduates who are now in the
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TABLE 6.21
SPONSOR OF SECONDARY SCHOOL BY ELITES'
HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL
Maktab or
secondary school scodary University graduate Total N
Private 45.5% 27.3% 27,2% 100.0% 33
Foreign Government 11.5 30.8 57.7 100.0 26
Iranian Government 7.7 34.6 5707 100.0 26
Dar ul Fonun 5.7 20.0 74.3 100.0 35
political elite to higher education than did other institutions.
But the success of the Dar ul Fonun is largely a phen-
omenon of the past. ''Privately sponsored" has come to mean
not the maktab, but the modern secondary school operated on
the lines of the English day school. Government-sponsored
schools have expanded rapidly and generally improved in quality.
Taken together, they have deprived the Dar ul Fonun of the
status it commanded for nearly one hundred years. The recent
replacement of its name by a more "up-to-date" title has com-
pleted its denouement.
At higher levels of education, slightly more than half
the elites who attended colleges or universities studied in
Iran--almost all at the University of Tehran. The 43.7 per
cent of those who pursued their undergraduate education abroad
did so primarily in Europe. France, with 40 per cent of the
Iranian undergraduates abroad, was the most receptive of the
host countries, while the United States with some 20 per cent
was second. As with other traditional elites, Law was the
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most popular of the undergraduate majors (27%), followed by
Government and the Social Sciences (22%), Natural Science and
Engineering (16%), Humanities (15%), Military Science (12%),
and Medicine (5%).
The post-graduate studies pursued by the political elite
accentuate patterns already noted. France now becomes that
country with the largest number of Iranian post-graduate stu-
dents (including even Iran itself). Some 47 per cent of all
elite members who pursued post-graduate studies did so in
France, Iran with 17.2 per cent and the United States with
14.1 per cent place a low second and third. Again, Law was the
most frequent field of specialization for post-graduate studies
(35%), with Government and Social Sciences (19%), Natural
Sciences or Engineering (16%), the Humanities (11%), Medicine
(9%), Military Science (6%), and Public Administration (3%)
following.
The reputed predilection of Iranians for metaphysical
speculations may be a valid generalization. But this predilec-
tion does not seem to have affected the elite's choice of
academic specialization. Although a plurality of the elite
did choose the law as their principal undergraduate or graduate
major, some two-thirds pursued "practical" subjects, e.g., the
social and natural sciences, engineering, medicine, military
science, and public administration. This emphasis attests to
the relatively low repute in which lawyers and the law are held
in Iran, the weakness of judicial institutions, and the absence
of a legalistic tradition, especially a colonial legalistic
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tradition. In no sense can legal training be viewed as a pre-
requisite for high posts in the Civil Service.
As might be expected, age and educational achievement
within the ranks of the political elite are inversely related.
The younger elites have the better education.
TABLE 6.22
AGE OF ELITE BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Maktab or
Age secondary University Post-graduate
49 or younger 14.3% 35,3% 44,.3%
50-59 14.3 31.4 30.7
60 or older 71.4 33.3 25.0
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (28) (51) (88)
(x2  20.620; df 4; p4 .001; gamma -.396)
To put it differently, whereas 64 per cent of the poli-
tical elite 49 years of age or younger have had post-graduate
studies, only 37.3 per cent of those 60 or over have had such
training. Conversely, where only 6.6 per cent (N = 4) of the
elite under 50 have had only traditional or maktab education,
one-third of the oldest elite have ended their educations at
that level. 87
As indeed would be expected, sons of educated fathers
were themselves educated. More revealing is the extent to which
present elite members are generally better educated than were
their fathers, and the extent to which educational distinctions
persist over the generations.
I Highest level Highest level of fathers
of sons Maktab Secondary University
Maktab or
secondary 20.9% 0.0% 3.8%
University 30.4 35.3 23.1
Post-graduate 48.7 64.7 73.1
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (115) (17) (26)
(x2 = 10.166; df = 4; p = .038; gamma = .439)
Even for members of the political elite, better educated
fathers have raised heirs who are also better educated. If
these trends are true for the politically most powerful, how
much more applicable they must be for the population as a
whole. Our data bear on this in another way. When we examine
the educational levels of the elite by the occupations of their
fathers, it becomes clear that the three occupational categories
most closely associated with wealth and political power--through
easier access to the Government--produce the larger proportion
of sons who have matriculated through modern higher educational
institutions. Fathers whose principal occupations were the pro-
fessions, Government service, or landlord boasted elite sons
93 per cent of whom had university or post-graduate training.
Only 63 per cent of the elite sons of merchants or religious
leaders enjoyed such education.
Merchants and religious leaders have long been associated
in Iranian history, the coalition of the two groups at the time
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TABLE 6.23
EDUCATION LEVEL OF SONS BY THE EDUCATION
LEVEL OF THEIR FATHERS8
of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1907) being perhaps the
most manifest example.89 In more recent times, the cooperation
of the bazaris and mullahs has ignited fundamentalist religious
sentiment and hostility to the Government with dire consequences.
It was just such a coalition that lay at the root of the lethal
urban riots of June 1963, following the Moharram ceremonies. If
we assume that the merchants and religious leaders who are mem-
bers of the political elite are the vanguard of all merchants
and religious leaders, i.e., that they differ in degree, but not
in kind, then herein lies one sociological explanation for their
persisting political alliance. Both groups have consistently
failed to participate in the formal, Western, modern educational
system in anywhere near the proportions of other groups in the
society.90
The pay-offs to the elites for persisting in their
academic pursuits come about principally in the occupational
positions which they are able to attain. We have already noted
that institutions of higher education in Iran owe their origin
and early support to the needs of the Government for trained
personnel, Initially, then, these institutions were conceived
as necessary fixtures for supplying skills for the Government
bureaucracy. But in time, the converse belief developed--that
the Government bureaucracy ought to be expanded to satisfy the
employment needs of the graduates. A modern education had been
perceived as a necessity for Government service. More recently,
Government service has come to be seen as a necessity, or at
least a rightful reward, for all those with modern educations. 91
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Level of education
Employer Maktab-Secondary University Post-Graduate
Government 65.4% 74.0% 80.7%
Non-Government 34.6 26.0 19.3
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (26) (50) (88)
(x2 = 2.786; df = 2; .25 p 4.10; gamma = -.249)
Within the narrow stratum which we have identified as the poli-
tical elite, the Government is the chief employer. Critical
observation and popular sentiment suggest that below the level
of the political elite these trends are heightened to the point
where Government employment absorbs almost all college gradu-
ates and, with the exception of relatively menial positions in
the Civil and Military Services, almost no non-college gradu-
ates.92 C. Arnold Anderson has referred to the practice of
filling positions in the governmental bureaucracies through the
principal criterion of formal educational achievement as "occu-
pancy by certification,"9 3 This practice does not necessarily
lead to greater efficiency or productivity, although implicit
in such employment patterns is the possibility of a government
of "technocrats." 94
Another phenomenon of Iranian society is suggested by
this analysis. As the political elite of Iran have dispropor-
tionately captured values in addition to political power, and
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This employment pattern is reflected in the following table:
TABLE 6.24
EMPLOYER IN PRESENT PRINCIPAL POSITION BY LEVEL
OF EDUCATION FOR THE ELITE
become in the process the "elite of elites," so the Government of
Iran is the "most elite" of institutions. The disparity in terms
of the employment patterns of the public and private sectors in
Iran assumes the form of a "vicious circle." The less well edu-
cated its members, the less able the private sector is to compete
with or challenge the public sector with its highly educated
elite in a society in which education is highly valued. The less
able to challenge the public sector, the weaker the private sec-
tor becomes. The weaker the private sector, the less able it is
to bid for and attract the highly educated. The less well
educated . * . .
This process, moreover, is not one whereby the better
educated gain their apprenticeships in the private sector and
then move up to Government service. The ability of the Govern-
ment to attract the better educated begins with the very first
job a member of the elite undertakes.
TABLE 6.25
EMPLOYER IN FIRST FULL-TINE PAID POSITION HELD BY
MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE BY EDUCATION LEVEL
First
Employ
Governi
of Ira
Privat
sector
Tot
N
(x2 =
Education Level
r Maktab-Secondary University Post -Graduate
ment
42.3% 75.0% 81.9%
57.7 25.0 18.1
al 10090% 100.0% 100.0%
(26) (48) (83)
15.968; df = 2; p < .001; gamma = 1.479.)
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The public sector has been able successfully to challenge
the private sector in Iran for the employment of the better
trained and educated young men. This not only enhances the
appeal of Government service for future job seekers but it les-
sens the ability of the private sector to contribute meaning-
fully to the development of Iran when compared to the public
sector. This bifurcation may also, in some measure, account
for the apparent hostility of the relatively better educated
Government Civil Service to the less well educated private
businessman. Intra-elite rivalries may, in fact, polarize
about underlying issues of formal educational achievement and
an innate superiority associated with that achievement.
On at least four accounts, therefore, the private sector
is at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the public sector with
regard to the contribution which it can make to Iran's develop-
ment. Firstly, the private sector has not been able to attract
educated young men to its ranks in proportions comparable to
Government. Secondly, the very differences in the educational
levels of the two sectors contribute to an intensification of
the rivalries which would exist on other grounds and serve to
denigrate the value of the private sector for the educated.
Thirdly, traditional Iranian culture has always placed a low
value on commercial undertakings. Indeed, one Iranian historian
notes that even the Achaemenids " . . . regarded buying and
selling in the market place as ignoble" and goes on to add that
"t. . . even today, no Persian of position will condescend to
enter a shop." 95 This aspect of traditional culture has
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persisted to the present and is reinforced by the development
ideology emanating from the socialist countries. And finally,
with no command over the oil resources of the nation and the
annual dollar flow which it produces, the private sector cannot
hope to compete with the Government in bidding for resources
or undertaking development projects.
Not only are the better educated of the elite more often
found in Government service to the detriment of the private
sector, but those officials are by far the most active in the
social life of their nation. While three-fourths of the elite
with post-graduate education are members of three or more or-
ganizations, only one-third of the maktab or secondary school
graduates belong to as many organizations (p<.001). The greater
activity of the better educated elites may indicate that the
talents of the educated, in a society which is underendowed in
this regard, are more fully utilized.96 But it also attests
to the extent to which the educated elite are able to dominate
the life of Iran and the importance of the acquisition of educa-
tional qualifications for inclusion in the elite.
FOREIGN LANGUAGES
The ass driver understands the ass's
tongue . . .
Iranian proverb
Knowledge of a language different from one's native
tongue is frequently viewed as the mark of a cultured man.
This is especially true in Iran. By this criterion, the members
of the Iranian political elite are cultured men: only one member
Langua
known
ges Percentage of
elite knowing
None 0,6%
One 16.2
Two 38.9
Three 26,3
Four or more 18.0
Total 100.0%
N (167)
The predilection of Iranian political elite members for
foreign languages is in some measure a reflection of the
national cultural bent for language and word-play in general.
Iran has long been known for the richness of its language, as
its people have been known for their facility with it. But of
more direct relevance than the linguistic facility of the entire
elite is the relation between the languages known and other
variables. As mentioned above, age and number of languages
known is positively correlated (R = .267; P u .001). But the
correlation between level of reputed power and knowledge of
foreign languages is not statistically significant. Whereas
81.8 per cent of the elite in the lowest power category know
more than one language, 84.5 per cent of the medium power group
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of the elite did not know a language other than Persian. The
166 persons who did claim to know foreign languages averaged
2.5 languages among them. Almost one-fifth of the respondents
claimed to know four or more languages.
TABLE 6.26
NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CLAIMED
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and 86.0 per cent of the most powerful elite claim such knowl-
edge. Clearly, members of the elite at all power levels know
a variety of languages.
TABLE 6,27
LANGUAGES OTHER THAN PERSIAN FOR WHICH
RESPONDENTS CLAIMED KNOWLEDGE
Language Percentage Knowing
French 86.8%
English 81.4
Arabic 34.1
German 21.6
Turkish, Turki 13o8
Russian 8.4
Other language 10.2
(N = 166)
These facts are relevant on a number of grounds. The
overwhelming number of individuals who know English or French
suggests the extent to which this group can maintain personal,
first-hand contacts in Europe and the United States. These
contacts which are maintained, through foreign travel, the
foreign press or other media, and personal communication with
foreigners within and without Iran serve to keep the elite
apprised of events relevant for their country and its develop-
ment. But this intimate familiarity with foreign cultures also
serves to feed and facilitate the elite's propensity for making
the invidious comparisons which are so harmful to Iran. That
the percentage of the elite claiming French is slightly greater
than that claiming English is a reminder of the predominant role
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which French culture assumed in earlier times. This is defi-
nitely a phenomenon of the past, however, as the table below
reveals a decline in the younger group's percentage claiming
to know French best and a corresponding rise in the percentage
claiming to know English best. Note that at all age levels,
the elite continue to know both French and English in over-
whelming proportions. It is striking, however, that the pro-
portion of the elite feeling most at home in a given foreign
language alters so radically over the age groups,
TABLE 6.28
PERCENTAGE OF IRANIAN ELITES CLAIMING ENGLISH
OR FRENCH AS THEIR BEST KNOWN LANGUAGE,
OTHER THAN PERSIAN, BY AGE
Language 39 or less 40-49 50-59 60 or more
English 61.1% 42.1% 29.7% 29.3%
French 38.9 57.9 70.3 70.7
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (18) (38) (37) (41)
The dominance of French and English together vis-a-vis
any other or all other foreign languages is an indication of
the traditionally preponderant cultural and educational posi-
tion of France and Great Britain, and more recently, the United
States. All other languages fall far behind. That only one-
third of the political elite know Arabic suggests the extent to
which Iran is a distinct entity in what is loosely known as the
"Muslim World.''9 7 The elite who knew German tended to have re-
ceived technical training in Germany before World War II. The
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relatively few Persians who claimed to know Russian were,
similarly, older men--an indication of the extent to which Iran
has insulated herself from her neighbor with whom a common bor-
der of some 1,100 miles is shared.
But the elite are linguistically isolated from domestic
populations as well as from foreign neighbors. The tiny frac-
tion of the elite who know any contemporary Iranian language
other than Persian indicates the extent to which this narrowly-
based, Tehran elite is divorced from vast sectors of their
nation. While accurate statistics on the size of linguistic
minorities within Iran are notoriously difficult to obtain,
the following are representative:98
TABLE 6.29
MAJOR LANGUAGES OF IRAN BY NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS
SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE 9 9
Language Individuals SpeakingNumber Per Cent
Turki 3,900,000 20.6%
Gilaki 1,160,000 6.1
Luri-Bakhtiari 1,080,000 5.7
Kurdi 1,060,000 5.6
Mazandarani 920,000 4.9
Baluchi 430,000 2.3
Arabic 380,000 2,0
Turkomeni 330,000 1.7
Armenian 115,000 0.6
Assyrian 70,000 0.4
Total 9,445,000 49.8%
Persian 9,509,704 50.2
Total 18,954,704 100.0%
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Almost 10,000,000, or half the total population, speak a
language other than Persian. The medley of linguistic and eth-
nic groups which are governed by the Shah and his elite attests
to the aptness of the official name for the country, Shahanshiye
Iran, the Empire of Iran.10 0 But only 17 per cent of the elite
(N = 28) speak any one of these languages (other than Arabic).
Of the vast diversity of ethnic groups which make up Iran, only
those which are variants of Turkish are represented by any num-
ber of the wielders of political power, for twenty-three of the
elite speak Turkish or its local variant, Turki. Only five of
the elite claim any fluency in other languages indigenous to
Iran.
In yet another way, then, this elite is by no means repre-
sentative of the population as a whole in relation to which it is
elite. Individuals with strong regional bases of power or provin-
cial, rural, or tribal constituencies are relatively rarely
found in this group of the national elite. To some extent, this
is a function of the selection procedures initially used to
identify them. To a greater extent, however, it is an accurate
reflection of the conditions of political power in Iran today.
Local, regional, tribal, or ethnic bases of political power are
of little consequence in the game of politics now played in
Tehran. And unlike past decades and centuries, that game is
now initiated and played out in Tehran. No longer do the out-
lying centers play the roles they did in the past. The Tabriz
of the days of the Constitutional Revolution; the Shiraz and
Isfahan of the tribal uprisings; or the Abadan of the
293
pre-Nationalization days have now lost their potency and poli-
tical import. With the diminution of their power, the practice
of local heroes assuming key roles in national politics has also
disappeared, No longer would a Samsam from the Bakhtiari, who
parlayed Bakhtiari tribal military strength into leadership of
the Nationalists after the deposition of Mohammad Ali Shah; nor
Taghizadeh of Tabriz, who won prominence throughout Iran for his
heroic defense of Tabriz from the anti-Constitutionalists; nor
Alam of the Ghaenat, whose private army was the dominant mili-
tary force in Eastern Iran before Reza Shah, be able to claim
national political stature from a local base.
Such centralization of recruitment into the national
political elite is the logical and quite natural culmination of
the processes initiated by Reza Shah and carried on by his son
and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah. In the course of creating a
truly national armed force, Reza Shah also created administrative
and educational systems and an industrial base to support that
force. With these instruments, he spent much of the first
decade of his rule in meeting and successfully overcoming chal-
lenges to central authority. This series of military actions
highlights the relationship between internal or external con-
flict and political development.
The prevalence of war directly promoted political
modernization. Competition forced the monarchs to
build their military strength. The creation of
military strength required national unity, the sup-
pression of regional and religious dissidents, the
expansion of armies and bureaucracies, and a major
increase in state revenues.101
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Such was done in Iran--indeed, it was the major focus of the
political efforts of Reza Shah. With his abdication and the
succession of his son, the process was interrupted. Only with
the overthrow of Mossadegh in the summer of 1953 did Iranian
policy once again move in that direction. Centralization was
the logical outcome; a centralization mirrored in the linguistic
capabilities of the political elite. 10 2
FOREIGN TRAVEL
He who has seen the world is better than he
who has merely consumed its goods . . .
Iranian proverb
The members of the Iranian political elite have had far-
ranging, frequent, and often lengthy personal and first-hand
contact with diverse cultures and countries. Travel beyond the
confines of Iran has been a traditionally valued pastime in that
society. Virtually all of the politically powerful have been
able to enjoy it.
TABLE 6.30
NUMBER OF TRIPS OUTSIDE IRAN BY MEMBERS OF THE
IRANIAN POLITICAL ELITE
Number Number of
of Trips Individuals
None 2 1.0%
One to five 36 18.3
Six to ten 35 17.8
Eleven to twenty 30 15.2
Twenty-one or more 94 47.7
Total 197 100.0%
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Not only have these elite members traveled frequently,
they have also traveled recently. Hence, their foreign travel
was not solely a concomitant of their education or youthful
grand tours, but has been a continuing activity.
TABLE 6.31
RECENCY OF FOREIGN TRAVEL FOR MEMBERS OF
THE IRANIAN POLITICAL ELITE
Most recent Number of Percentage
trip abroad individuals
Six months or less 103 49.8%
Seven months to one year 50 24.2
More than one year
to four years 29 14.0
More than four years 25 12.0
Total 207 10.0%
If, in gross terms, the foreign travel of the elite has
been frequent and recent, it has also tended to be an "in-depth"
experience. Almost one-half of the elite have spent more than
ten years outside their native home. 10 3
TABLE 6.32
LENGTH OF TIME SPENT OUTSIDE IRAN BY MEMBERS
OF THE POLITICAL ELITE
Number of Number of Percentage
years abroad individuals
One year or less 22 11.2%
More than one to four 34 17.2
More than four to ten 51 25.9
More than ten years 90 45.7
Total 197 100.0%
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That ninety members of the political elite have lived
"more than ten years abroad" belies the lengthier foreign
residence of some. In fact, fifty-nine individuals, almost
one-third of the total, have lived more than fifteen years
outside their own country. The record for foreign residence
among the elite is currently held by one of the wealthiest
businessmen in the capital, who has lived forty-five of his
sixty-odd years in the Far East, Europe, and America. The
ability of certain of the elite to remain outside Iran for years
but, nevertheless, to find a place among the most politically
powerful, attests to the cooptation process noted above. The
elite need not pass lengthy years moving up the administrative
hierarchy. Despite, or perhaps because of, their years abroad,
these individuals could still capture political power.
But what of this point? Is the power of the elite mem-
bers attributable to their foreign travel? Or do they enjoy
more travel as they gain greater power? Unfortunately, our data
do not allow a resolution of this issue. But they do reveal
that the greater the reputed political power, the greater the
amount of foreign travel (r = .401; p = .001).
TABLE 6.33
NUMBER OF FOREIGN TRIPS BY REPUTED
POLITICAL POWER
Number Political power
of trips Low Medium High
None to ten 57.8% 48.4% 28.1%
Eleven to twenty 11.1 15.6 26.3
Twenty-one or more 31.4 35.9 45.6
Total 10060% 100.0% 100.0%
N (45) (64) (57)
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Viewed in another way, whereas 36 per cent of the elite who
have made ten or fewer trips abroad are among the least power-
ful, only 22 per cent of the less traveled are found in the
most powerful category. At the opposite end of the hierarchy
of foreign travel, the percentages are reversed, Only 22 per
cent of the most highly traveled elite are among the least
powerful, while 35 per cent are among the most powerful cate-
gory of the elite.
As power is related to such travel, so is education.
The higher the education level of the respondents, the greater
the years spent abroad; years spent, of course, primarily in
pursuit of that education (r = .335; p - .001). This relation-
ship is strengthened by the addition of another set of variables
also positively associated with foreign travel--father's socio-
economic status. Those fathers who were wealthier or better
educated or more frequently employed by the Government had
sons who were more widely traveled (even holding education
constant).
Statistics which indicate a positive correlation between
the status and power of elite families of orienation and foreign
travel are but an additional indication of the agglutination
of values in Iranian society. More specifically, there is not
a simple additive quality to these relations, but a geometric
one. Not only does the possession of a given value lead more
easily to the acquisition of other values, but still other
values are acquired at an even faster rate. Family status and
family power leads to more power in the future and also leads
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to greater foreign travel, but status plus travels leads to even
104higher levels of power.
These data also support one of the charges frequently
leveled against the political elite by its opposition. The
elite are often branded, in the words of two respondents, as
being "oriented to the foreign" or as having "left the customs
of Iran for the ways of the farangi [European]," Insofar as
the powerful have spent so many years of their lives away from
their own land and insofar as their contact with foreign lands
remains frequent and recent, these charges gain widespread
credibility.10 5 The saliency of this charge is supported, in
fact, by an examination of the countries visited by members of
the elite.
TABLE 6,34
PERCENTAGE OF POLITICAL ELITE HAVING
VISITED FOREIGN AREAS106
Foreign Area Percentage N
Western Europe 97,9% (233/238)
Turkey 64.6 (124/192)
United States 64.3 (153/238)
India 60.7 111/183
Iraq 58.8 (107/182)
Eastern Europe or U.S.S.R. 49,7 (94/189)
Japan 45.4 (83/183)
Egypt 45.1 (82/182)
Pakistan 41.1 (79/192)
Saudi Arabia 36.3 (66/182)
A fghanis tan 17.7 (34/192)
Africa (Sub-Saharan) 13.5 (23/171)
South or Central America 8.4 (20/233)
Australia or New Zealand 3,5 (6/171)
Communist China 1.1 (2/189)
299
Several interesting facts emerge from these statistics.
Firstly, those areas which have been visited by the largest
numbers of elite have been the capitals of farangistan--Western
Europe and the United States. Opportunities for primary encul-
turation were certainly present. The elite may very well have
learned European or Western styles through travel and residence
in the West, and they certainly developed a cosmopolitanism
manifest in many of their life styles.
Secondly, the large number of elite who have actually
visited Western Europe and the United States may account for
another Iranian phenomenon. When a member of the political
elite seeks a yardstick against which to measure the accomplish-
ments or shortcomings of his own country, the yardstick is not
likely to be a neighboring developing society. Almost always,
Iran is compared to the United States or Western Europe. 10 7 A
primary result of these invidious comparisons is to minimize the
achievements of Iran and maximize her weaknesses. Irrespective
of what it does, Iran can never win. A chief result of using
the West as the "reference figure" for Iranian development,
therefore, is a widespread sense of national backwardness, in-
cessant criticism over the pace of change, and efforts to locate
a 'scapegoat" to displace blame for perceived failure.
Thirdly, the Iranian elite have had relatively little
personal contact with their immediate neighbors. A natural
basis for closer political or economic ties does not exist to
the same extent as is true with some European countries.
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Fourthly, only half the political elite have ever visited
a country under Communist rule, and these are primarily men in
their fifties and sixties who passed through the U.S.S.R. en
route to Europe in the earlier days of poorly developed trans-
portation. The majority of the elite have never been able to
witness at firsthand the accomplishments or shortcomings of
these regimes. This appears to be the result of regime pressures
against such travel, pressures based on the assumption that
familiarity breeds friendship. (No recognition is accorded the
possibility of familiarity breeding contempt.)
Finally, Iran's failure to play any significant role in
the affairs of the "third world" of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America is mirrored by the dearth of elite visits to those con-
tinents.
All of these factors lend credence to the charges of the
"non-Iranian" or "Western" nature of the elite. Such charges
are supported and even reified by a set of statistics ostensibly
unrelated to this issue. Elite respondents were asked to report
the frequency of conversations or discussions they had with
various groups in Iranian society. Of eleven such groups,
"foreigners" were the third most frequently contacted group (on
the basis of the number of members of the elite who reported
discussions with these groups "a few times per week" or more
often). Members of the elite communicated more frequently only
with "Members of the Cabinet" and "big businessmen." Since
communication with these last two groups would entail intra-
elite communication, it appears even more surprising that of
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all the groups in Iranian society not composed primarily of
members of the political elite, the "foreigners" are the group
with whom the most politically powerful members of the society
most frequently communicate.
TABLE 6.35
FREQUENCY OF ELITE COMMUNICATIONS
KEY GROUPS IN IRAN
WITH
Group Less than a few More than a few No Total
times per week times per week answer (N = 167)
Cabinet 35.6% 50.9% 3.5% 100.0%
Businessmen 48.6 47.9 3.5 100.0
Foreigners 51.3 45.2 3.5 100.0
Students 55.8 40.8 4.4 100.0
Workers 56.4 40.0 3.6 100.0
Military 59.4 36.5 4.1 100.0
Peasants 65.9 30.6 3.5 100.0
Royal Family 74.3 22.2 3,5 100.0
Union Leaders 78.1 18.6 3.3 100.0
Ulema 85.1 11.4 3.5 100.0
OCCUPATIONS
A man's profession is his identification 0
Iranian proverb
A variety of professions are represented among members
of the political elite--physicians and soldiers, tribal lead-
ers and ladies-in-waiting, even astrologers and riding masters
are to be found in their ranks. Whatever their particular
areas of vocational competence, however, one general charac-
teristic is salient: they constitute an official, governmental
elite. Some four-fifths of the political elite were employed
by the Government--the civil or military bureacracy or the
Royal household. What is considered the private sphere of free
professions, business, religion, or tribal affairs is repre-
sented by only one-fifth of the elite.
TABLE 6.36
EMPLOYERS OF MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN
POLITICAL ELITE
Employer First occupation Second occupaW n
or position or position
N % N %
Government of Iran 217 71.1 95 46.1
Imperial family
or Royal court 25 8.9 31 15.1
Private, self 61 20,0 38.8
Total 305 100.0% 206 100.0%
Even more significant for our purposes is the fact that
with the exception of a handful of individuals (less than 25),
all members of the elite are occupationally dependent on the
Government in at least one of their positions. Many of the
elite in non-Governmental occupations receive incomes from the
Government on the basis of past employment in the form of pen-
sions, which are granted to all ex-Cabinet Ministers, Parliamen-
tarians, and other high-level personnel with the termination
of their employment in that particular post. Others of the
elite, while primarily occupied with private concerns, serve
the Government as members of Ministerial "high councils" (The
High Council of Foreign Affairs); officers of Government-
sponsored and operated professional associations (The Iranian
Bar Association); charities (The Red Lion and Sun Society); or
in a variety of consultative or advisory roles.
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This overlap between the political elite and Govern-
mental bureaucracies is one indication of the importance of
Government service for attaining political power in Iranian
society. And this relationship is well recognized. Govern-
mental positions are constantly sought after by the vast majority
of articulate, educated Iranians. Government service can pro-
vide one with the formal trappings of authority and assure a
flow of deference on the basis of that authority. It also
provides an opportunity to form and preserve a clique of bureau-
crats who can act and support all other members of the clique.
Most importantly, Government employment institutionalizes
legitimacy of access to the bureaucracy. In this society where
the role of the Government is dominant and comprehensive and
where bureaucratic norms and rational criteria are far from
universal, a position which assures participation in the bureau-
cratic communications net is crucial.
One of the many complementarities which characterize
Iran may be found here. As the elite seek to hold positions
within the bureaucracy, the Shah operates the bureaucracy as
an inclusive, rather than exclusive, body. As we have noted,
he seeks to have the civil bureaucracy encompass all those who
have the skills or sophistication to operationalize and express
their actual or potential dissatisfactions.10 9 Moreover, by
constantly expanding the size of the bureaucracy, especially
at the upper levels, there is an increased likelihood of being
able to satisfy the demands of the elite for posts and power.1 10
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One other feature of the official character of the elite
is their loss of independence vis-a-vis the Government. Being
part of the Government, they must assume some responsibility for
official activities. Being responsible, their value as critics
of existing policy, at least in the eyes of the most ardent op-
position to the Shah, is reduced. So is their ability, then,
to serve as foci about which that opposition might rally.
But besides the relevance of formal positions for poli-
tical power, these statistics illustrate the extent to which
members of the political elite occupy a variety of positions at
the summit of their society. Of the 167 respondents, only 34,
or 20 per cent, did not have more than one position for which
they were remunerated.
TABLE 6.37
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS' POSITIONS FOR WHICH
REMUNERATION WAS RECEIVED
Number of Positions
1 2 3 4 5 6 or more Total
N 34 81 31 9 8 4 167
% 20.3 48.5 18.6 5.4 4.8 2.4 100.0%
This "moonlighting" not only serves the obviously beneficial
purpose of augmenting the incomes of the elite, but other ends
as well. The practice of holding more than one job contributes
to one's power by providing additional institutions on which to
count for support. Furthermore, it provides another means of
ingress to the complicated morass of Iranian politics. In
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other words, the elite have at their command yet another lever
for affecting the Government in beneficent ways. But a negative
effect of the intense activity which the holding of more than
one full-time position entails is the great toll it exacts in
time and intellectual energy. Finally, it might be mentioned
that this intense elitist activity serves to keep positions in
the command structure of society out of the hands of the non-
elite; narrows the size of the political elite insofar as elite
status is based on the holding of official or formal positions;
and materially enhances the difficulties of mobility from non-
elite to elite status.
Let us turn from this discussion of elite employers and
numbers of posts to an examination of specific occupations. Of
the 307 in the elite, some 8.5 per cent (N = 26) have retired
from their life's work and remain inactive. (The political
elite include 26 individuals who are 70 years of age or older.)
The remaining elite are all active and employed, although 21
persons have been retired (voluntarily or involuntarily) from
their principal occupations and taken on new work, e.g., Army
officers retired from active duty and now serving as Senators.
Clearly, then, this is not an elite resting on its former occu-
pational laurels, despite its advancing age. What do the elite
do?
The distribution of occupations among the elite is
directly relevant to much of Iranian politics4 For one thing,
it dramatizes an aspect of the divide et impera policy used by
His Imperial Majesty when dealing with the political elite. No
TABLE 6.38
PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONAL POSITIONS OF THE ELIT&"
Position Number Per Cent
Senator
Director of Ministerial Department;
Director or Member of Board of Govern-
ment or Semi-Government Organization
Director or Member of Board
of Private Company or Bank
Cabinet Minister
Officer in Imperial Army, Gendar-
merie, or National Police
Ambassador
Representative of Majles
University Chancellor,
Dean or Professor
Journalist
Member, Pahlevi Family
Official of the Imperial Court
or Imperial Foundation
Ulema
Governor-General, Governor,
or Mayor of Tehran
Professional: M.D., Lawyer
Landowner; Commercial Farmer
Other
No Information
49
Total 307
16.0%
9,8
9.8
9.4
9,4
8.5
7,2
6.2
4.9
4.6
4.2
3.3
2.5
110
.6
2.0
.6
100.0%
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one particular occupation represents as much as one-sixth of
all the occupations of the elite.11 2 Eight different occupa-
tional groupings fall within ten percentage points of each
other. As a result, no particular occupational group can
dominate the political life of Iran. And none can ever pose
a serious threat to the control of the regime in terms of its
ability to impose its will on other sectors of the elite based
on the number of its members within the political elite.
Correspondingly, this distribution of powerful indivi-
duals over a range of institutions helps explain the uncanny
predilection of the Iranian political system for inactivity.
Each institution with its coterie of politically powerful
individuals is able to check the activities of every other
institution. Simultaneously, it is unable to force its own
policies on other groups in the society. When clearly acting
within the area generally recognized as its legitimate sphere,
an institution,especially a Governmental institution, can, and,
of course, does function to implement policy. Often, however,
an institution moves to policy matters which are not generally
recognized as legitimate to its sphere or which are perceived
as threatening to the institutional or personal interests of
another institution and its elite officials. At such times,
system power blockages, which are based on the fairly wide-
spread distribution of politically powerful individuals over
the major institutional positions, can go into action. One
result is institutional immobilisme and a failure of the
bureaucracy to cope with the requirements of modernization.
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Insofar as this system has been created by the Shah and
he has pressed for the implementation of development plans, this
feature of the bureaucracy defeats his purposes. On the other
hand, it serves other of his interests insofar as the immobilisme
of the bureaucracy reduces the likelihood of any organized
effort to unseat him. These very tensions--between stability
and change; control and independence--are central to the dilemma
of the Shah in coping with Iran's political system. (We shall
return to that dilemma in the concluding chapter.)
Yet another way to illustrate this same phenomenon is
from the perspective of reputed political power, The next
table is a rank ordering of the occupational categories by the
mean reputed power of the members of each occupational category
and of the sum of the reputed political power for all the mem-
bers of a given occupational category.
It is clear that the average reputed power scores for
the occupations cover a far narrower range of scores than does
the range for individuals. While the least powerful individual
included within the political elite had a reputed power score
of 4, and the most powerful, 20, these extremes have been
eliminated between occupational categories0 A sixteen-point
range has been reduced to five. This compression of reputed
power lies at the heart of the institutional blockages within
the system and helps explain the failure of any single group
to dominate other groups. Herein lie the institutional checks
and balances which characterize the system and which reflect
His Majesty's style of rule.
TABLE 6.39
MEAN POWER AND AGGREGATE POWER RANKS,
BY OCCUPATION
Reputed Power Score AggregatePosition Mean Median S.D. Rank Power Score Rank
Pahlevi 11.93 12.50 5.11 1 167.00 7
Cabinet 11.83 12.00 3.98 2 343.01 2
Professional 11.33 11.50 3.50 3 33.99 14
Ulema 11.00 11.50 3.55 4 110.00 11
Military 9.62 8.00 4.11 5 279.01 3
Senate 9.33 9.00 2.99 6 457.02 1
Director-
Governor 8.73 8.00 3.05 7 261,99 4
Ambassador 8.65 7.50 2.73 8 225.00 6
Journalist 8.53 8.00 3.40 9 127.99 10
University 8.53 8.00 3.45 10 161.99 8
Governor 7.88 7.50 1.69 11 63,00 13
Business 7.80 7.00 2.11 12 234.00 5
Court 7.54 7.00 2.10 13 97.99 12
Majles 6.96 7.00 1,52 14 153.01 9
The ranking based on total reputed power for each occu-
pational category represents a different phenomenon. What lies
at the heart of the differences here is the number of the elite
included in each occupational category. This suggests, quite
logically, that in order for an institution to merit considera-
tion as a significant institutional actor, it must include in
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its ranks some minimal number of powerful individuals. But a
comparison of the two rank orderings demonstrates that this is
not frequently the case. A rank order correlation (rho) of the
two lists indicates no significant relationship between them.11 3
Occupations which include a greater number of the politically
powerful do not tend to be those occupations with the most
powerful of the political elite in their ranks.
Only the Cabinet occupies the same position on both rank
orderings, indicating its central position within the bureau-
cracy. The Royal Family, surprisingly, does not occupy such a
position. Three factors would seem to account for this. Firstly,
the mother and step-mother of His Imperial Majesty have tended
to fall in political status in recent years as their advancing
age has forced a curtailment in their activities. Secondly,
two step-brothers of the Shah have been denied official access
to the Royal Court, with consequent diminution in their poli-
tical power. And thirdly, besides the direct issue of Reza
Shah, the Royal Family is composed of spouses and ex-spouses
of his children, and their reputed power tends to be low. If
we were to consider the Royal Family as only the King and his
brothers and sisters, their average reputed political power
would be 12.10. Excluding the two disenfranchised "black sheep,"
their average power would be 14.5, far above the mean for any
other group.
The three occupations with the widest spread in their
positions on the rank orderings are the professionals, reli-
gious leaders, and businessmen. Therein lies another clue to
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understanding Iranian politics. The private businessmen rank
fifth in total power, but twelfth in mean power. In other
words, businessmen are powerful as an institutional group in
Iran because there are so many of them--thirty--within the
elite universe. But the average individual power qf each of
their members is amongst the lowest within the political elite.
The mediocre power level of each businessman weakens their
ability to act as a significant institutional force within
Iranian politics.
The converse is true of the other two cases. The ulema
have but ten representatives within the entire political elite
and an aggregate power position of eleventh. But these ten
men are unusually powerful individuals, ranking fourth on mean
individual power. The significance of this wide deviation cen-
ters primarily on the question of access. More than any other
occupation or institution within the elite, they represent a
group to which access is closed. A concerted and determined
Government campaign, certainly since the death in 1962 of
Ayatollah Borujerdi, the most venerated cleric of Iran, has
denied political elite status to the Ayatollahs, Since that
time, only Ayatollah Khomeini has risen to national prominence.
The nine other ulema who are accorded such status have been
figures of nationalreligious and political prominence for many
years. It is highly significant, then, that Government efforts
to control the religious sphere culminated in the forced exile
of Khomeini, the one nouveau arrive of the lot. Only members
of the ulema tested over the years and found willing to play
i
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by existing rules of the political elite game are tolerated and
every effort is made to prevent the rise of other ulema. House
arrest, withdrawal of vaqf (endowment) funds, restrictions on
travel, forbidding the mullah in question from publicly speaking
in the mosques or informing him that SAVAK agents attend his pub-
lic appearances, closing religious presses, banning gatherings
for religious purposes, and infiltrating the Sufi orders are all
some of the more or less serious techniques available to the
Government in their campaign. These have restricted ulema access
to elite status, prevented the rise of ulema into lower-level
elite positions, enhanced the relative importance of those ulema
already within the elite, and resulted in the rank order dis-
parity noted above. The religious leaders, constrained by
their small numbers, assume relevance for national politics, not
as a major institutional group, but as important individuals.
Finally, the members of the elite within the "free profes-
sions" demonstrate the widest disparities in the two rank
orderings. That this is the result of their small numbers
within the total elite is an illustration of the success of His
Majesty's policy of cooptation. Those who acquire the training
to join the professions and then status as outstanding prac-
titioners within their professions are coopted into the bu-
On the one hand, their professional skills are
valuable to an understaffed bureaucracy, But on the other,
that their professional skills are usually not employed by
the Civil Service implies that they are coopted more for the
threat to the regime which they represent as free professionals
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than for those skills. (Physicians, for example, serve as
Director of the National Iranian Oil Company, Chancellor of
the University of Tehran, Cabinet Ministers, and members of
the Majles and Senate. 114)
To summarize, then, what we have suggested is that the
phenomenon of bureaucratic immobilisme is a common one in Iran
for a variety of reasons. One reason discussed here is that
frequently those parts of the political process which count
highly powerful members amongst them tend also to have rela-
tively few of their members within the political elite. Let us
turn briefly to individual reasons for the same phenomenon. Just
as bureaucratic cross-checking based on similar or conflicting
power ranks tends to vitiate institutional independence and
initiative, so do the cross pressures on individual members of
different organizations.
Of the elites for whom information is available, 204, or
69 per cent, hold at least two full-time paid positions.115 Some
of the effects of multiple job-holding have been discussed above.
Here we note that this practice may subject the holder of such
positions to cross pressures. Certainly, the holdings of two
positions does not, by definition, produce cross pressures.
There is no necessary incompatibility between holding a posi-
tion as Cabinet Minister and poet, nor between Cabinet Minister
and Director of a Government Department, We suggest, however,
that the elite simultaneously responsible for the latter two
positions would be more subject to conflicts than the former.
Conflicting, and often incompatible, demands for the allocation
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of time, energy, loyalties, financial resources, and budgets
are likely to beset a member of the elite who seeks to fulfill
the responsibilities of his diverse positions. To discuss
these multiple job holdings from but one occupational category;
members of the elite whose principal position is in the
Cabinet also hold other posts as follows: Two hold a second
ministerial portfolio, seven are directors of Government de-
partments, two are active-duty military officers, four are
active in business, two hold positions in the Imperial Court,
one is a member (by marriage) of the Pahlevi family, two hold
professorships at the University of Tehran, and two run large-
scale agricultural enterprises'
We note, then, the tendency for elite employment patterns
to reflect variety, diffuseness, and potential for individual
conflict based on incompatible demands made on the individual
from his institutional employers. The individual is pressured
by many and frequently conflicting demands for loyalty and sup-
port from the multiplicity of groups to which he belongs or by
whom he is paid. The result is often a reduction of his own
effectiveness in any one area and a tendency for his efforts
in any given sphere to be countered or checked by his or
others' efforts in other spheres.
These institutional and occupational memberships which
exist in Iran have effects within elite politics which are re-
markably similar to those uncovered by research on voting
behavior and social conflict in other societies. Voting
studies, perhaps the earliest and most developed empirical
research on cross pressures, indicates that individuals are
subject to cross pressures from the holding of conflicting
affiliations, institutional memberships, or attitudes. Such
cross pressures are likely to result in lower stability of
attitudes and interest, less participation, and a tendency to
"leave the field" entirely.ll6 But the effects of cross pres-
sures manifest themselves in areas other than voting research.
Studies of community conflict indicate that the presence of
multiple loyalties and identifications in a society--cross
pressures--reduce the likelihood of conflict in that society.117
Many studies which deal with conflict suggest that social mobil-
ity is the primary source of the multiple loyalties and iden-
tifications which reduce conflict.ll8 We suggest that institu-
tional memberships which demand that the individual simult'aneously
fulfill responsibilities to diverse institutions may also serve
as a basis for cross pressures. The reduction of intra-elite
conflict would be one result, a result to be discussed in
greater detail below.
In his search for a "gestalt", the individual member of
the political elite can lower the cross pressures on him in at
least two ways. On the one hand, he may withdraw membership
from the competing institutions. This might be effective in
psychological terms, but would be politically injurious. On
the other hand, the individual may maintain his memberships but
lessen the personal saliency of membership in any one institu-
tion, or attempt to establish some rank ordering or priority
system of loyalties.
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These latter techniques are most frequently used with
similar results, i.e., a marked lessening in the ability of
groups to function effectively. The operation of cross
pressures and efforts by individuals to lessen such pressures
or their attendant discomfort minimizes the saliency of insti-
tutions and the commitment of individuals to them, lessens
participation in institutional affairs, and contributes to
shifting attitudes and interests. All of these contribute to
the growing irrelevance of institutions in Iranian politics,
the individualization of the elite "game of politics" as it is
played in the capital, and to the peculiar kind of "basic
democracy" which we have suggested exists at the elite level.
Finally, these data offer graphic evidence for the low
level of political development which characterizes Iran. While
numerous definitions of this concept are abroad in the discip-
line, a central feature of many centers about the institution-
alization of politics and the political. At low levels of
political development, the political sphere and the nature of
political participation is defined by each institutional or
individual actor. This stage of "praetorian politics" is
characterized by each actor's attempting to influence politics
by his own chosen means: "the rich bribe, students riot, and
the military coup." 119 Put another way, Lucian Pye has
suggested that "In the non-Western political process, there is
a high degree of substitutability of roles." 120 Pye offers two
examples of this substitutability on the social and personal
levels. Institutions and individuals both have functionally
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diffuse political roles: "For example, the civil bureaucracy
is not usually limited to the role of a politically neutral
instrument of public administration but may assume some of the
functions of a political party or act as an interest group.
Sometimes armies act as governments. Even within bureaucracies
and governments, individuals may be formally called upon to
perform several roles." 121
The occupations of the political elite of Iran demonstrate
the ill-defined and poorly articulated nature of politics in
that society. Where no particularly "political" profession or
occupation exists, all become so. And every individual is as
prepared for political roles as every other. It should come as
no surprise, then, that a physician would direct the operations
of the National Iranian Oil Company; that a professor of hyd-
raulic engineering would lead the Parliament; that a businessman
would be president of the Senate; or that a military officer
would be Minister of Agriculture. A variety of factors contri-
bute to this condition: the centrality of politics, the shortage
of trained persons, and His Majesty's style of rule. But the
consequences, irrespective of the causes, are the same: inef-
fectiveness and inefficiencies in the bureaucracy, a quality of
the pervasiveness of politics, and the absence of any distinct
set of "politicians" or a political sphere to serve as a locus
of power.
This analysis of the social backgrounds of the contem-
porary political elite not only sheds light on the men whose
orientations and attitudes, actions and activities give substance
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to Iranian politics. But the analysis also reflects changes
occurring throughout Iranian society. For the political elite
both mirror those changes and, frequently, are in their fore-
front.
As Tehran has come to dominate all aspects of Iranian
life, so have the elite tended to be born in the capital in
proportions greater than their own fathers and than the society
as a whole. While the median age of the political elite bears
no relation to the age distribution of the population at large,
political power has begun to pass from the elders of the elite
to younger men. Similarly, while the elite as a whole were
born of families who claim disproportionately high social status
and are extremely well educated, younger men of lower social
status but with equally high education have found their way into
elite ranks. The far-ranging foreign travel and language
abilities of the elite both reflect and foster the political
ties of their country to Europe and the United States, fre-
quently at the expense of Iran's immediate neighbors. Finally,
the multiplicity and diversity of occupations pursued by the
elite are central factors in the game of politics and in the
ineffectiveness of the Government's bureaucracy.
But our interests in analyzing the politics of Iran ex-
tend beyond the Shah's style of rule and the men he has selected
to staff the highest levels of his bureaucracy. We wish to note
their attitudes and values and their political behaviors which
ensu.,
FOOTNOTES
1. Published registers of biographical data are unfor-
tunately rare in Iran. The most adequate sources for such
material are the Echo of Iran's Annual Almanacs, op. cit.,
which contain a "Who's Who in Iran" section. In addition,
the Echo of Iran publishes two biographies of prominent
Iranians per week. Those were kindly made available to me
by Mr. Jahangir Behrouz, publisher of the Echo. In addition,
the Kayhan and Ettela'at newspapers have published a certain
amount of biographical data.
2. For a separate analysis comparing respondents to non-
respondents, see Appendix II.
3. For a classic, fictional treatment of regional varia-
tion in England, see Mrs. Elizabeth Gaskell, North and South,
London: Chapman and Hall, 1855. Also see: Merrill Jensen,
ed., Regionalism in America, Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1951; Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore, American
Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National
Integration, New York: H. Holt and Company, 1938; Richard E.
Engler, Jr., The Challenge of Diversity, New York: Harper and
Row, 1964; and, of course, Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and So-
cial Communication, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, esp. Ch. 2.
4. These and other urban peculiarities may be found in
the general travel literature of Iran as well as in S. Khaim,
Zarb Al Masalhaye Farsi va Englisi (Persian-English Proverbs),
Tehran: B. & D. Beroukhim Booksellers, 1956, passim.
5. Browne, A Year Amongst . . ., op. cit. This couplet
is recounted on p. 184.
6, Ibid., p. 84.
7. Ibid., p. 214.
8, An interesting finding on place of birth of Iranian
political elite is made by G. Hossein Razi, Social Change and
Political Leadership in Iran, A Case Study of the Politics of
Transition, unpublished manuscript, n.d. Razi, in analyzing
the places of birth of 43 "government leaders" and 12 "opposi-
tion leaders" mentions that 64.3 per cent of the former were
born in Tehran versus only 16.8 per cent of the latter. Unfor-
tunately, our data do not permit a similar comparison.
9, Percentages for the total population of Iran were
calculated from data given in Ministry of Interior, op. cit.,
Vol. II, Table 13, pp. 162-164. It is not surprising that
the least represented of the four provinces among the
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birthplaces of the political elite are Baluchistan-Sistan,
Kerman, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan-Lorestan. Collectively,
they are the poorest regions of Iran as measured by the wel-
fare of the indigenous inhabitants; the homes of Iran's major
ethnic groups (Arabs, Kurds, and Baluchis); and with the ex-
ception of Khuzestan, the most sparsely inhabited provinces of
Iran.
Baluchistan-Sistan has always been the poorest province
in Persia. In the time of Darius, the Achaemenid, "The lowest
revenue was that paid by the land known in modern times as
Baluchistan, then, as now, poor and sterile, which was assessed
at 170 talents of silver. Babylon, on the other hand, was
assessed at 1000 talents, and Egypt at 700 talents of gold. .
Sir Percy M. Sykes, op. cit., I, p. 163.
Until the discovery of its huge oil fields, Khuzestan,
in contemporary times, was also among the poorest provinces
in Iran:
In the late Sassanian period, tax receipts in Khuze-
stan had reached 50 million dirhems, equivalent to
$5 million or more at current price levels--and some-
thing on the order of 12 times more than the annual
tribute exacted from approximately the same area by
the Achaemenian kings a thousand years earlier. While
they fluctuated widely afterwards, receipts never again
reached this figure, and within three centuries or so
after the Arab conquest they had been reduced to less
than 40 per cent of it. Four centuries later they were
reported to have been only the equivalent of about 6 per
cent of the Sassanian amount--even ignoring the effects
of debasement of the currently. In the mid-19th century,
before the consolidation of modern Iran had begun, col-
lections still remained at approximately the same level4
Robert M. Adams, "Agriculture and Urban Life in Early South-
western Iran," Science, Vol. 136, No. 3511, April, 1962, p.
119.
For information on ethnic distribution in Iran, see
U.S. Army, op. cit., pp. 85-93; Vreeland, o. cit., pp. 37-
55; Cottam, op. cit., esp. Ch. 3-8; and articles on the
tribes of Iran by V. Minorsky and others in the Encyclopedia
of Islam.
10. Here and elsewhere in this manuscript the number of
non-respondents plus the number of respondents does not total
307. This is true because biographical data for all 140 non-
respondents were unavailable. The situation is confounded
becaue the number of non-respondents for whom data are avail-
able varies with the nature of the biographical variable.
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Data for elite occupations, for example, were more readily
available than data for elite birthplaces.
11. Actual statistics on the population of the birth-
places of the elite and the percentage of the total popula-
tion of Iran residing therein, by size of place in 1956, are
as follows:
TABLE 6.40
POPULATION OF BIRTHPLACES OF THE ELITE AND
PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION RE-
SIDING THEREIN, AS OF 1956
Size of Political Elite Percentage of Total
Place born there Population of Iran
Number Percentage Residing There
1,000,000 or more 120 55.3% 8.0%
300,000 - 999,999 0 0.0 0.0
100,000 - 299,999 48 22A1 8.5
25,000 - 99,999 24 11.1 6.6
10,000 - 24,999 12 5.5 4.5
5,000 - 9,999 5 2.3 3.8
1,000 - 4,999 7 3.2 17.3
999 or less 1 .5 51,3
Total 217 100.0% 100.0%
(Source: Ministry of Interior, op. cit., I, Table 9, p. 12)
Unfortunately, data for the size of the birthplace for the
total Iranian population are not available. As a standard
of comparison, size of place by residence was used. It has
been assumed that differences in internal migration will
tend to cancel out and result in the approximately relevant
proportions used here, Where this is not the case, data on
per cent of population residing in a given place will under-
state the differences in proportion of persons born in a
given size of place because migration in Iran has been from
smaller towns of birth to larger cities of residence. That
is, this comparison probably underemphasizes the dispropor-
tionately greater birth of the political elite in large
cities. For example, while 8A0 per cent of the population
of Iran resided in the city of Tehran in 1956, only 5.1 per
cent of the population was actually born there. (Ministry
of Interior, opo cit., II, Table 13, pp.162-164)
12. A handful of the political elite live in the capital
but maintain their official residences outside Tehran.
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Nevertheless, one need not fear for their welfare as they
have assured themselves the ability to return to the luxuries
of the Capital as efficiently as possible. Thus one of the
most powerful of the elite has had the government construct
an airport with modern lighting in the seat of his family do-
mains, a town of 13,000 people, where he maintains his offi-
cial residence. (There are only four other civilian airports
in all of Iran which can boast of such lighting facilities.
See Department General of Civil Aviation, Government of Iran,
Aerodrome Directory (in Persian), Tehran: 1963, n.p.)
13. Binder, op. cit., p. 161.
14. Ministry of Education, Office of Studies and Pro-
grams, op. cito, p. 11. Of a total of 326,856 secondary
school students, 109,281 were studying in Tehran and Shemi-
ranat.
15. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., II, Table 7, pp.
45-76. Of the 1,910,630 total of literates over the age of
10 in Iran, 644,478 lived in the Tehran census province.
16. Ibid., II, Table 9, pp. 80-142. Of the 32,471
Iranians ofboTth sexes with any university training at all,
22,465 resided in the Central census province.
17. Ministry of Education, Office of Studies and Pro-
grams, op. cit., Table 5, p. 98. Of 24,456 students in
institutions of higher learning in Iran (1964), 17,736 were
studying in Tehran.
18. Speech by Dr. N. Rahnavardi, member of the Public
Health Committee of the Iranian Majles, before the Health
Committee of the Tehran Chapter of Lions International, Decem-
ber 21, 1964. The figures which he gave were 1,796 physi-
cians of a total of 3,722.
19. From a speech by Majles Deputy Maku'si to the lower
house as reported in the Tehran Journal of November 16, 1964.
14,000 of 18,000 medical hospital beds are concentrated in
Tehran.
20. The Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts,
1964-1965, op. cit., p. 498; 1750 of 2200 sanatoria beds are
in Tehran.
21, U.S. Army, op. cit., p. 146.
22. Echo of Iran, Iran Am&nac .. -, op. cit., p. 639.
The statistics are that 82 of the 190 cinemas of Iran are
located in the capital,
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23. Ibid., p. 486. The figures for 1964-1965 are 75,833
of a totalTorall of Iran of 122,745. This ratio has re-
mained constant in recent years. Similar figures for 1960-
1961 were 57,868 automobiles of a national total of 93,079,
or 62 per cent.
24. Ibid., p. 444. Of a total of 118,000 telephones,
84,000 operate in Tehran,
25. Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac . . 1966, op.cit.,
p. 515, gives the statistics, 100,000 of 120,000 television
sets.
26. Ibid., pp. 219-221. Press circulation statistics
are not aggregated and reliable figures are notoriously im-
possible to gather. The Government's Press Law of 1963
specifies that newspapers with circulation of less than 3,000
and magazines of less than 5,000 could no longer be published.
A commission was established by the terms of the press law to
ascertain circulation figures for all printed media. The
commission has never met. (Personal interview)
27. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., II, Table 23,
"Industry Division by Age and Set of the Employed Population
10 Years and Over by Urban-Rural Residence for Iran and the
Census Provinces, November 1955," pp. 326-339.
28. Department General of Publications and Broadcasting,
Bulletin (in Persian), Tehran, April, 1961,pp. 2 ff. (Statis-
tics exclude the oil industry.) Tehran dominates the indus-
trial sector to a large degree and in surprising ways. Thus
the Under-Secretary of Agriculture in a speech reported in
Kayhan International (November 2, 1964, p. 2) related that
tractor motors from rural areas all over Iran must be brought
to Tehran for overhaul,
29, Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac . . . 1966, op. cit.,
pp. 465, 467.
30. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., I, Table 6, p. 5.
31. From a continuing demographic study by Professor
M. Ecochard of Paris University, as reported in Kayhan Inter-
national, November 16, 1964, p. 2.
32. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East, New York: Free Press of Glencoe,
1958, p. 60.
33. Binder, op. cit., p. 159.
34. For information on the Qajars, see Sir Percy Sykes,
op. cit. II, pp. 277, 289 ff.; for the Pahlevis, see H.I.M.
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, op. cit., pp, 35-36.
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35. This is an interesting example of the problems of
differential access and unbalanced development of educational
facilities. See, for example, James S. Coleman, "Introduc-
tion," in James S. Coleman, ed., Educational and Political
Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965,
pp. 30-31.
36. But the "country cousins" do manage to receive a
greater share of certain desired items than would be expected
from their numbers alone. One such item is landownership,
another is children.
TABLE 6.41
NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY SIZE OF ELITE
BIRTHPLACE
Number of Size of Birthplace
Children Tehran 100,W0-990 999 99,999 or less
0 - 2 55.4% 48.5% 41.5%
3 or more 44.6 51.5 58.5
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (83) (33) (41)
37. Mary Jean Bowman and C. Arnold Anderson, "Con-
cerning the Role of Education in Development," in Clifford
Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, New York: Free
Press of Glencoe, 1963, p. 277, make this point also.
38. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., II, pp. 1-2. A
finer breakdown of these data reveals, more clearly, the
astounding youthfulness of the Iranian population:
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TABLE 6.42
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE IRANIAN
POPULATION, 1956
Age in Years Percentage
9 32.6%
10 - 19 17.1
20 - 29 15.9
30 - 39 13.0
40 - 49 8.7
50 - 59 6.5
60 - 69 3.9
70 or over 2.3
Total 100.0%
39. Ibid., pp. 5-18.
40. Kusum Nair, Blossoms in the Dust, New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Inc., 1962, pp. 153-155. Miss Nair also discusses
the tensions in India which arise from a conflict over these
values. The aged continue to expect deference from the young,but, increasingly, the young expect deference from the aged
based on their higher levels of formal education.
41. U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 134; Vreeland, op. cit.,
p. 236: "Since it is also a period of maximum power, influence,
and wealth, old age rather than youth is often regarded as an
ideal time of life."
42. Browne, Year Amongst . . , op. cit., p. 133; by
the Persian poet, Sa'ib.
43. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., II, p. xvii or
Table 11, pp. 146-159. Census data on religious preferences
were glaringly inadequate, as Baha'ism was not considered an
officially recognized religion but a heretical and deviant
Islamic set Kn. "Baha'i" does not appear in census code cate-
gories under religion. The category for "other" religions
contains 59,256 individuals (0.3 per cent of the entire popu-
lation) which is vastly below even the most conservative
estimates for the number of Baha'is in Iran, One is forced
to conclude that Iranians who were so rash as to report their
religion as Baha'i were counted under Moslems. The remainder,
perhaps yielding to the traditionally approved taqiya
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(dissimulation or bending to the inevitable), undoubtedly
announced to the census takers, "Islam."
44, The efforts of the followers of Ahmad Kasravi to
make Islam meaningful for our times has, by and large, been
greeted by derision from religionists and the ulema and
neglected by the rest of the population. (Cf. theforth-
comiing book by William Staley, Princeton University, on Ahmad
Kasravi and his followers, the Azadegan (the Partisans of
Freedom). Groups such as the Soc iefyTor the Propagation of
Islam or Society for the Regeneration of Islam do exist, but
without tangible effects.
45. Actually, one Moslem respondent specified his pref-
erence as "Sunni Moslem." Given that he represents but one
individual of the 97.0 per cent who are Moslems, he will not
be included in these calculations.
46. It is not meant here to suggest that there exists
any uni-dimentional or uni-causal phenomenon to explain Iran's
relations with other Islamic countries, but rather to raise
what certainly must be considered one of the central factors
in those relations.
47. Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1958, p. 71.
48. H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey,
London: Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 121.
49. Empirical evidence on the saliency or meaning of
Islam is sadly lacking and our data bear no relevance to this
point. Observation of mass participation in religious mourning
and festive days and the ability of the ayatollahs and mullahs
to bring "their" people out onto the streets in huge numbers
do suggest the correctness of this assumption. Similarly,
rare has been the diplomat, author, or traveller in Iran who,
feeling able, or more likely, obliged, to write on his
Iranian experience, has failed to mention the importance of
Shi'ism for the "people." These indications notwithstanding,
this author prefers to reserve final judgment in the absence
of better evidence. It may be appropriate, however, to relate
my assumptions. The burden of Shi'ism is, I would suggest,
carried as easily by the majority of the people as by the
elite. There is indeed a great deal of popular emotion gene-
rated on religious holidays and religious leaders do exert a
considerable influence over the faithful. Popular behavior
reflects cultural or political phenomena rather than religious,
however, Shi'ism as an ordered body of earthly and transcen-
dental doctrine is far less important than Shi'ism as a cul-
tural and political phenomenon. It is of great aid and comfort
to the regime and the majority of the political elite that the
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institutional embodiment of the religion is week and un-
structured Accordingly, the religion as a political force
cannot bring sustained and serious pressure to bear on the
Government.
50. See Keddie, OP. cit; Firuz Kazemzadeh, Britain and
Russia in Iran, 1864-1914, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968; Ann K. S. Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to
Revolution,'r Studia Islamica, XXII, pp. 71-90; and Peter
Avery, Modern Iran, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1965, pp. 266-
267.
51. Kayhan International, May 2, 1964, reports these
remarks on the occasion of an audience for the Shi'a celebra-
tion of Id-e Ghadir (to commemorate the day when Mohammad
allegedly designated Ali as his true successor).
52. Kayhan International, April 25, 1965, p. 3, entitled
"No Films During Mourning Period," goes on to relate that
cinemas would be closed for five days, liquor stores for
seven days, and that all secular music would be banned from
the mass media for the full month of Moharram. Kayhan, Decem-
ber 11, 1966, p. 2, related that "The General Police Admini-
stration requested the public yesterday to refrain from
eating, drinking, or smoking in public throughout the month
of Ramazan." These and other articles go on to elucidate the
dire consequences to flow from violating such codes. In fact,
they remain unenforced in all but the most traditional sec-
tions of Iran's cities.
53., Echo of Iran, "Hassan Ali Mansur," For Your Infor-
mation, Numbers 467-468, January 30, 1965; augmented by per-
sonal research.
54. For lack of other data, we have here considered
that the date which the father of a member of the elite
held his most influential position was as relevant to the
question of father to son or son to father influence as
would be the date of the father's last position.
55. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., II, Table 8, pp.
77-79.
56. Ministere de l'Instruction Publique, op. cit0 ,
p. 68.
57. Ibid., p. 69.
58. "Modern-Secular" education is here defined as formal
schooling at public or private elementary, secondary, or
higher institutions of learning in Iran or abroad. "Tradi-
tional-Religious" education refers to study at maktab schools
and all other institutions for Islamic education.
59. Ann K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia,
op. cit., p. 140; see also, Ch. XIII.
60. Skrine, op, cit., pp. 100-101, details the fate of
the Shaukat ul-Mulk, Amir Mohammad Ibrahim Khan Alam. Reza
Shah alternately forced Alam to reside in the capital or of-
fered him Cabinet or ambassadorial posts, all to keep him
away from his large estates in the Qaenat. (Alam's son, Amir
Assadollah Alam, partly as a result of his father's enforced
residence in Tehran, became a boyhood playmate to the present
Shah.)
61. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., I, Table 6, p. 5
and Table 9, p. 12.
62, A detailed breakdown is as follows:
TABLE 6.43
SIZE OF BIRTHPLACE OF FATHERS OF ELITE
Population Percentage of Number of Percentage of All
of City Fathers Born Places Iranians in Resi-
by Place Size in Irana cence by Place Size
1,000,000
or more 32.5% 1 8.0%
300,000 to
999,999 0.0 0 0.0
200,000 to
299,999 16.0 2 2.9
100,000 to
199,999 8.0 7 5.6
25,000 to
99,999 17.8 30 6.6
10,000 to
24,999 10.4 55 4.5
5,000 to
9,999 3.7 91 3.8
1,000 to
4,999 10,4 1,938
500 > 999 0.6 4,314 15.5
0 to 499 0.6 42,802 34.6
Total 100.0% 49,240 100.0%
aSource: Ibid., Table 9, p. 12.
The percentage of total Iranians resident by size of place
not add up to 100.0 per cent >ecause 1.2 per cent of
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the po.ulation is officially considered to have "temporary
residences," undoubtedly some meager concession to the
country's migratory population.
63. Data given here on percentage of fathers with Gov-
ernment occupations differ from data given above because the
former refer to all occupations, while the latter refer to
principal occupation alone. An individual might hold a
succession of official posts and still consider himself, or
be considered by his son, as primarily a "landlord" or a
"merchant,' etc.
64. Sir Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pil-
grimate to Al-Madinah and Meccah, London: Tylston and Edwards,
1893, II, p. 66. A scholar of Islam has described this func-
tion of the pilgrimage as follows:
Islam has acted strongly . . . to unify in the same cl-
ture as much as possible the populations who have adopted
it as a religion; the Pilgrimage to< Mecca remains .
the living symbol of this monistic drive.
Robert Brunschvig, "Perspectives,"' in Gustave E. von Grune-
baum, ed., Ui y and Variety in Muslim Civilization, Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, p. 56.
No less an authority than His Majesty, King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia, has noted this same phenomenon. In addressing
leaders of the various national pilgrimage delegations, he
commented:
Muslim Brothers: God Almight has imposed the pil-
grimage on the Muslims to realise noble benefits and
objectives, such as the exchange of views and ac-
quaintanceship among themselves to promote their
religious and worldly interests . . . .
As reprinted in Echo of Iran, Daily Bulletin--Political Edi-
tion, Vol. XV, No. 69, April 3, 1967, p. 3.
65. See, for example, the retinue of professionals
which accompanied His Imperial Majesty, Nasr ed din Shah
on his visits to Europe in the Nineteenth century: Nasr
ed e Shah Qajar, A Diary . , . 1878, passim.
66. Lerner, op. cit., pp. 49 and 50.
67. William R. Poll-, "The Middle East: Analyzing
Social Change," Bulletiui of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.
XXIII, No. 1, 1967.
68. Reza Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening in
Iran, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962, p. 2,
~~-1
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69. See, for example, Herodotus, op. cit., p. 70; and
Xenophon, The Cyropedia, London: Henry A. Bohm, 1924, p. 14
(as quoted in Arasteh, ibid., p. 4).
70. Iskandar, op. cit., p. 28,
71, Ibid., p. 122.
72. For information on the Dar ul-Fonun, see Arasteh,
op. cit., pp. 20-21; Sadiq, op. cit., pp. 332-334; Issa Sadiq,
Dowreye Mokhtasere Tarikhe Farhange Iran ("The Contemporary
Era of the History of Iranian Education"), Tehran: Sherkate
Sahamiye Tabqe Ketab, 1340 (1961), esp. pp. 163 ff.; and Hafez
Farmanfarmaian, op. cit.
73. Sir Percy Sykes, op. cit., II, p. 295.
74. Sykes reports that in his first audience with the
French ambassador, Fath Ali Shah allowed himself to ask but
three questions, "How are you?" "How is Bonaparte?" and "What
made you kill your king?" Ibid., p. 304.
75. Ibid., p. 309. The subsidy was to continue in force
indefinitely, to be halted only in the event that Iran en-
gaged in a war of aggression. Also see, Ahmad Matine-Daftary,
La Suppression de Capitulations en Perse; L'ancien regime et
le statut actuel des etrangers dans l'Empire du "Lion et
Soleil," Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1930.
76. Ibid., p. 320. These capitulations were in force
until their unilateral revocation by Reza Shah on May 10, 1928.
77. Ibid., p. 339.
78. Issa Sadiq, History of Iranian Education . ., op.
cit., pp. 330-334.
79. There had been, of course, a previous tradition of
state supported educational institutions in the Islamic world.
The Persian Vizier Nizam ul Mulk completed the construction
of the Nizamiya Madresseh in Baghdad in 1067 A.D. While cer-
tain madresseh had been state-supported in the past, Nizam
ul Mulk was the first to regularize their financing, to
strengthen markedly their training of government servants, and
to appreciate their potential for the stabilization of the
Seljuq Empire. Cf. Aydin Sayili, Higher Education in Medieval
Islam: The Madrasa, Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Yilligi,
Vol. 2, 1948, gp. 50 ff. Unfortunately, this practice of
s- te-supported education had been abandoned early in Iran.
80. Arasueh, op. cit., p. 24. See also Abdullah
Mostaufi, Sharhe Zendeganiye Man ya Tarikhe Ejtema'i va
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Edariye Dowreya Qajariyeh ("The History of My Life or A So-
cial and Administrative History of the Qajar Period"), Tehran:
Ketab Forushi Zavvor, 2nd printing, n.d., Vol. II, pp. 67-74.
81. Ministry of Interior, op. cit., Vol. II, Table 8,
tPercent Literate by Age and Sex for Iran, The Census Prov-
inces, and Census Districts, November, 1956," pp. 77-79.
82. Statistics for Tehran and Iran are for males only
in order to enhance comparability with the political elite and
the 21st Majles, whose members are overwhelmingly male; from
Ibid., II, Table 9, pp. 80-142. Data for members of the 21st
session of the Majles from Zahra Shaji'i, yandegan-e
Shoray-e Melli dar Bist-o-Yek Dowreh-ye Qanungozari ("Repre-
sentatives of the National Assembly in Twenty-One Lgislative
Assemblies"), Tehran: Institute for Social Research and
Studies, University of Tehran, Mordad 1344 (1966), Table 20,
p. 282.
83. The sixteen members of the political elite who had
only maktab educations (6.5 per cent of those for whom infor-
mation is available) were excluded from this table for lack of
comparable data in the Iranian population as a whole or the
Majles.
84. Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, op.
cit., p. 400.
85. See Frey, op. cit., p. 36; Issa Sadiq, Dowreye . .
op. cit., passim. Alborz College served much the same function
as didrthe Dar ul-Fonun, i.e., a conduit for elite membership.
An earlier observer noted of Alborz:
One of the remarkable things about this school is the
class of students enrolled. While students from every
grade of society and every race and creed are accepted
without discrimination, an unusually large proportion
are children of the nobility and the aristocracy . . . .
It is as if a comparatively small "prep" school in America
should number among its students two brothers of Presi-
dent Harding, a son of Woodrow Wilson, two grandsons of
William H. Taft, three grandsons of Theodore Roosevelt,
and a grandson of Grover Cleveland, to say nothing of
the sons of governors too numerous to mention. In
addition to these there are studying in the American
schools the sons of the imperial princes . . . . Seldom,
if ever, has any school had such an opportunity to mould
the new life of an awakening nation.
E, Alexander Powell, By Camel and Car to the Peacock Throne,
GCrden City, New York: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc.,
1923, pp. 262-263.
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86. For information on lawyers in Egyptian society, see
Malcolm H. Kerr, "Egypt," in James S. Coleman, ed., Education
and Political Development, op. cit., p. 189.
87. The inverse relation between age and education does
not seem to be borne out by statistics on the number of for-
eign languages which members of the political elite claimed
to know. In that case, the relationship is positive:
TABLE 6.44
NUMBER OF LANGUAGES OTHER THAN PERSIAN FOR
WHICH RESPONDENTS CLAIMED KNOWLEDGEBY AGE
Number of Age
Languages 49 or less 50-59 60 or more
One or two 67.2% 59.6% 37.9%
Three or more 32.8 40,4 62.1
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (52) (37) (50)
This seeming paradox can be explained in a number of
ways. Most obvious is that there is no necessary correla-
tion between formal education and a knowledge of foreign
languages, which may be learned experientially. A second
explanation lies in the area of religious practice. We have
already noted that with increasing age there is an increase
in the exercise of religious duties. (Whereas 28.8 per cent
of the elite under the age of fifty reported that they did
carry out their religious obligations, 70.0 per cent of those
over sixty so responded.) And a knowledge of Arabic is es-
sential for a rigorously correct execution of those duties.
Thus besides knowing French and English, the standard reper-
toire of foreign languages, more of the older respondents
than the younger also claim a knowledge of Arabic (52% vs.
21%).
A third explanation which might be advanced is that the
decline in the knowledge of foreign languages by the younger
of the elite is a reflection of the lower cultural value now
accorded language and linguistic ability in comparison to the
recent past when verbal skills and word play were an important
attribute of status. Cf. Edward G, Browne, Literary History
O , Op. pajssm; and A. A. Brill, "poetry as an Oral
Otlet,"tI Psychoanalytic Review, XVIII, October, 1931. For
information on the importance of poetry in another society,
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see Donald N. Levine, Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation
in Ethiopian Culture, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1965, esp. pp. 218-237.
88. The marked differential between the levels of sons'
and fathers' educations necexsitated the advancement of sons'
education levels by one entire category. It will be noticed
that we are comparing sons' educations with fathers' educa-
tions one category less advanced, e.g.:
TABLE 6.45
HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL
Fathers Sons
1. Maktab Maktab and
Secondary School
2. Secondary University
3. University Post Graduate
Even after making this categorical differentiation, the sons
are far better educated than their fathers.
89. See Edward Granville Brown, The History of the Per-
sian Revolution, 1905-1909, London: Adam and Charles Black,
1910, passim; Nikki Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in
Early Iranian Nationalism," Comparative Studies in Society
and History, April 1962, ppo 265-295; Ann K. S. Lambton,
Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-1906,"
St. Anthony's Papers, No. 4, 1958; and McDaniel, op. cit.
90. This "national coalition" of merchants and reli-
gious leaders is demonstrable in other ways. For example,
the merchant and mullah fathers of present members of the
elite had a far greater proportion of maktab educations
than did other fathers:
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TABLE 6.46
FATHERS' EDUCATION BY FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS
Occupation Highest Education Level
University Secondary Maktab Total N
Professional 50.0% 8.3% 41.7% .2% 12
Government 21.2 18.2 42.4 1000. 66
Landlord 6.9 1.3 82.8 100.0 29
Merchant 10.3 3.5 86.2 100.0 29
Religion 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 20
91. Kerr, op. cit., p. 184,makes a similar point about
education and government service in Egypt.
92. Dr. Hassan Afshar, Dean of the Faculty of Law,
Economics, and Political Science at the University of Tehran,
informed me that while he had no statistics about the subse-
quent employment of his graduating seniors, he was certain
that "the overwhelming majority of them sought and soon found
government employment." (Personal interview, February 17,
1965) While graduates of this faculty are not representative
of all university graduates, their employment patterns are not
atypical.
93. C. Arnold Anderson, "Society and Education: An
Elementary Ethnography of Formal Education," Lecture delivered
October 24, 1966, at the University of Chicago.
94. See, for example, William R. Polk, "Social Moderni-
zation in the Middle East: The New Men," mimeo, 1963.
95. Sir Percy Sykes, op. cit., I, p. 171.
96. This finding is similar to findings from voting and
other studies in the United States which have identified a
positive relation between level of education and participation
in extra-familial activities. See Bernard Berelson and
Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific
Findings, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964, p.
379. Also see Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Volun-
tary Association Memberships," American Sociological Review,
Vol. 23, No. 3, June 1958, pp. 284-294.
97. Charles F. Gallagher, Contemporary Islam: The
Plateau of Particularism--Problems of Religion and Nationalism
in Iran, American Universities Field Staff Reports Service,
South West Asia Series, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Iran), 1966.
98. "The government has acknowledged that the only
nationwide census--that of November 1956--under-reported the
(ethnic) population by almost ten percent." U. S. Army,
Area Handbook for Iran, op. cit., 1962, p. 772.
99. U. S. Army, op. cit., p. 87; and Echo of Iran,
Alrcnac, op. cit., 1962, p. 772.
100. George K. Schueller has demonstrated that the Polit-
buro was more repesentative of :he Soviet population as a
whole than the Iranian elite is of that country. This is all
the more surprising because the total membership of the Polit-
buro which he considered was 27, allowing for less ethnic
diversity than would the far larger elite of Iran. See
Schueller, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
101. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization:
America vs. Europe," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, October 1965-
July 1966, p. 402.
102. The Government of Iran has continued to move in
that direction irrespective of the actual level or even threat
of internal or external war. The consequences--extreme cen-
tralization, bureaucratic ineffectiveness, reduced or low
political participation, and little reciprocity of power--
argue that the relationship between war and development is not
unidimensional; nor is it unidirectional.
103. Information on all three of these variables has been
presented on the assumption that some combination of the three
is essential for describing the effects of personal foreign
contacts. We suggest that the interaction of (a) number of
different trips abroad, (b) recency of foreign travel, and
(c) length of time spent abroad, collectively affect indi-
vidual attitudes, cognitions, etc., which contribute to the
facilitation or impedance of political development. In the
Iranian case, a high correlation was found among these
variables.
TABLE 6.47
CORRELATION (R) AMONG FOREIGN TRAVEL VARIABLES
Number of Recency of Years of
Trips Last Trip For. Residence
Number of trips -
Recency of last trip .423
(p=.00l)
Years of foreign res. .614 .186
(p=.001) (p=.05)
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104. One value, at least, is not positively associated
with foreign travel--those of the elite who travel outside of
Iran have fewer children than those who remain closer to home'
TABLE 6.48
NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY NUMBER OF TRIPS
OUTSIDE IRAN
Children Trips
0-10 10-20 21 or more
0 2 43.9% 50.0% 55.9%
3 or more 56.1 50.0 44.1
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.J%
N (66) (30) (59)
105. Unfortunately, we have no data which would allow us
to compare the elite considered to be "in the opposition"
with the non-opposition elite with regard to foreign residence
or education. One might suppose that alternative patterns of
foreign experience would result in alternative political
orientations. We would hypothesize, however, that there is
little actual distinction in the amount or locale of foreign
experiences among all the elite (aside from the religious
leaders) and that the roots of political opposition are to be
found elsewhere.
106. Because a variety of data bases were used to
gather and compute these statistics, the number of the elite
having visited the area and the base used to calculate the
percentages are given separately for each area. Percentages
do not add up to 100, as almost all of the elite have visited
more than one area.
107. An example of such an invidious comparison was
written by Mr. A. A. Amirani, editor of Khandaniha, in that
journal on October 9, 1965:
No other country in the world offers citizens as many
causes for anger and frustration as our country does.
Ordinary people are constantly annoyed, frustrated, and
exasperated by everything from unnecessary hooting of
car horns, to the ill-manner of drivers and bad driving
of taxis, to the delays in cashing checks; from the high
cost of education to the high cost of bank loans; to the
unscrupulous rivalry between capitalists and between the
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Government and the people. Any one of them would be
enough to drive an average Swede or Englishman or
American stark, raving mad. litalics added]
108. Data on the "moonlighting" propensities of all
307 members of the Iranian elite is difficult to obtain. The
206 whose second positions are represented here refer to those
for whom information is available. It cannot be assumed that
101 of the elite not listed here have but one occupation or
profession and thus only one employer. Rather, the 101 rep-
resent primarily those for whom information is unavailable.
Members of the elite who have two occupations but one employer,
e.g., who hold two different posts within the Government
bureaucracy, are listed twice for purposes of this table.
109. We have also noted above the attempts through
manipulation of university entrance regulations and fees to
limit the overall number of such persons.
110. In 1950 there were 13 Cabinet-level ministerial
portfolios. In 1957, there were 17; in 1964, 21; in 1965,
24. Concomitant with this increase in the size of the Cabinet
has been a marked expansion in the number of deputy ministers,
undersecretaries, and other secondary and tertiary bureau-
cratic positions, all designed to make "room at the top."
In addition, the size of the civil bureaucracy as a whole
is now reputed to have reached 300,000 men.
111. The Persian word shoght has a dual connotation. It
implies both "profession" and "occupation." A respondent who
was graduated from a medical school with an M.D. might respond
that his "shoghl t was "Imedical doctor," even though he prac-
ticed no medicine and saw no patients. When asked if he had
another occupation he would reply "Cabinet minister" or
"senator." Often, the respondents referred to their occupa-
tions in terms of what their lifelong interests have been or
the field in which they were educated. Therefore, they were
also asked to mention a second occupation. In many cases, the
second mentioned occupation was the source or arena in which
the respondent exercised the greatest political power. For
purposes of this analysis, then, the author made an estimate
as to which of the individual's positions was likely to be
most associated with his then-elite status. That position
has been labelled "Present Principal Position" and is the
basis of the following table.
In addition, where members of the elite are retired, data
are presented for last principal position.
112. We would argue that these conclusions are not the
spurious artifact of our categories. Had we grouped the
elite differently, other results might conceivably have been
produced. But these categories were designed to conform, as
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closely as possible, to the way in which the Iranian elite
itself conceives of occupational groupings in terms of
"inatural" groupings as well as comparative power.
113. Rho : .270. In order to reach a significance
leve of .05, rho would have had to reach .425. The correla-
tion, note, is positive and not inverse, but, nonetheless,
not significant,
114. This situation, apparently, is similar to one which
formerly pertained in the United States. Five physicians,
for example, were among the signers of the Declaration of
Independence. In a study of this phenomenon, one author
suggests that as these professions become more "professional-
ized," their members participate less frequently in politics.
See William A. Glaser, "Doctors and Politics," American Jour-
nal of Sociology, Vol. LXVI, November, 1960. This is cer-
tainly the case for Iran with the added provision that the
policy of cooptation hinders that professionalization.
115. This percentage for the elite as a whole is con-
siderably below that for the 167 respondents mentioned above.
This may be a function of the fact that the elite happens, in
fact, to be more active than non-respondents. It appears
more likely to us, however, that this difference is to be
explained rather by the more concise and definitive informa-
tion provided by interviews. Published biographies used to
gather biographical data on non-respondents were cursory, at
best. It is likely then that the figure of 69 per cent is
a gross understatement of the percentage of the elite holding
more than one paid position. Furthermore, no information at
all is available on the third, fourth, and other positions of
the non-respondents.
116. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and
William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a
Presidential Campaign, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1954, p. 284 et passim. See also Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard
R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1948.
117. See, for example, James S. Coleman, "Community
Disorganization," in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet,
eds., Contemporary Social Problems, New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1961, pp. 553-604.
118. "In a society where movement from a lower to a
higher class occurs to a great extent and where the workers
are not politically subordinated, class conflicts are alter-
nated and the ideology of the class struggle finds it diffi-
cult to gain a foothold." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham
Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 36.
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119. From a talk by Samuel Huntington, delivered at the
University of Chicago, February 28, 1967.
120. Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, August, 1958, p. 479.
121. Ibid.
CHAPTER VII
ORIENTATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
ELITE: INSECURITY
Members of the political elite, as we have seen, are
drawn from a narrow segment of Iranian society, commandeer the
highest formal and informal positions of power, and allocate the
values of their society in a disproportionately elitist fashion.
But the immediate significance of the elite for us lies else-
where. Their behavior--what they do in the course of their
daily rounds--constitutes the essence of politics in Iran. It
is a major assumption of this study that the attitudes held by
these individuals underlie and sustain their behavior. That is,
the political elite of Iran will so behave as to maximize "the
fit" or resolution between their attitudes and their behavior.
There are, of course, a host of influences which might cause the
elite to act in other ways. The material and human resources
which they can marshal, pressures from foreign nations and others
of the elite, and most importantly, the wishes of His Imperial
Majesty may all run counter to the attitudes which they them-
selves hold. Nonetheless it is assumed that they will so act
within these constraints as to minimize the disparities between
their behavior and their attitudes.
In this sense, there may be some substance to the fre-
quently levelled charges that the elite serve to temper the
policies of the Shah. Whereas the shah-parastis argue that
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the elite subvert the liberalizing and reformist policies of the
monarch, the latter's critics consider the elite as protectors
or buffers, guarding the nation from the King's despotic in-
clinations. Both charges are predicated on the notion that the
elite cannot block the sovereign's wishes, for that would result
in their dismissal or in more threatening eventualities. But
they can so orient their responses that their behavior and his
wishes may be considered generally congruent. While the resul-
tant policy outcomes may not necessarily satisfy the monarch,
neither would they be too distinctive from what the members of
the elite would have done in the absence of royal pressures.
In this sense, elite attitudes are assumed to be more reliable
indicators of the elite's future behavior than information on
their present behavior. 1
There is yet another reason for dwelling on elite atti-
tudes, however, and that is a methodological one. No valid
measures of elite behavior within the Iranian political system
are currently available. Votes cast by the elite within the
Majles, Senate, or Cabinet are largely irrelevant, for they
reflect more the power of His Majesty to gain formal accession
to his wishes than the behavior of the elite in implementing
the decrees which have been submitted to them. In addition, a
large proportion of the political elite are not members of
these bodies, An alternate method for studying elite behavior
would be an analysis of decision-making outside the Parliament.
Unfortunately, such an analysis proved impossible for two
reasons. When pressed to discuss the actual process of
decision-making, the elite were inclined to attribute all power
to His Imperial Majesty. Secondly, the tangled skeins of power
and authority in the civil and military bureaucracies mask the
actions of their members and diffuse responsibility to the
point where none are accountable and few seem even relevant.
For both conceptual and practical reasons, then, we have
concentrated more on elite attitudes than elite behavior. The
schedule used to interview members of the elite contained a
variety of questions designed to elicit a spectrum of atti-
tudes. These ranged from issues of immediate political import
then agitating the entire elite to very diffuse attitudinal
indexes of general characterological orientations. The con-
tinuum between these is filled by questions whose foci become
increasingly less specific0 Examples of questions which mirror
this continuum from the more specifically political to the more
general character orientations are as follows:
In your opinion, what have been the actual results
of land reform to this date?
Do you consider foreign military assistance as bene-
ficial or harmful to Iran?
To what extent do you agree or disagree that the
average Iranian is overwhelmingly motivated by self-
interest, that is the pursuit of his own personal
interests?
The present is an immeasurably small fragment of time
which has taken its place in the past almost before we
are aware of its existence. To what extent do you agree
or disagree?
The approximately two hundred variables generated by such ques-
tions in the elite interviews were grouped into three major
conceptual areas--social background data, general character
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orientations, and political and social attitudes. The variables
in each category were subject to separate factor analyses. The
pripcipal components factor matrixes were then orthogonally ro-
tated to approximate a simple structure by the quartimax rota-
tion, producing statistically independent factors.
In seeking to predict the political attitudes of the
elite, those attitudes assumed most relevant to their behavior
in the political process, it was found that the more diffuse
character orientations were far more efficient than other
variables. The political experiences, personal attributes,
general socialization patterns or social backgrounds of the
elite were all less statistically relevant predictors than were
those general orientations. In turn, however, the social back-
ground variables proved to be generally adequate predictors of
elite orientations, The tri-partite model proposed in the
introduction--social backgrounds--- general orientations
focused political attitudes--was supported by the data.2
The general orientations, then, appear to be the most
critical set of variables in predicting the political attitudes
of the elite. In the factor analysis of the former variables,
four principal clusters were produced. These factors have been
labelled manifest insecurity, cynicism, mistrust, and manifest
insecurity, and it is to these which we now turn.
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INSECURITY
When the court is corrupt, innocence is no
security . 0 9
John Malcolm, 18153
Max Weber in his study of The City noted the connection
between the prevalence of walls in urban areas of the Mediter-
ranean world and a "centuries-long insecurity."4 The existence
of walled cities as well as walled compounds surrounding resi-
dences in Iranian cities evinces the same phenomenon. No
visitor to Tehran can be oblivious to the presence of the
"compound style" of architecture which prevails in urban con-
struction in both the poorest and richest quarters, for homes
built in the days of the Qajars as well as the most recent
additions to the landscape.
Iranians themselves are well aware of the purposes of
these walls and the individualism and familistic independence
they foster. The hindrance which they offer to inter-residence
communication is both a symptom of and a contributory factor to
the lack of social cooperation and the nepotism for which
Iranian life is so justly noted. Both Iranian and foreign
observers alike tend to lay the blame for these walls on a lack
of "security" defined as a condition of peril, as being exposed
to hazards and dangers, And both agree that the danger and
personal vulnerability can be attributed to the condition of
politics in Iran. Ann Lambton, for example, in commenting on
the conditions in the early twentieth century, has noted that
Intrigue and corruption (which Mirzi Husayn Khan Mushir
ud-Dowleh once called the mother of all evils) were the
constant concomitants of public life. Both derived from
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the prevailing insecurity and both, in turn, fostered
that insecurity. 5
More recently, the perceptive editor of Khandaniha has attacked
the Government of Iran for just these reasons. The American
Government, he claimed,
. fully discharges its own obligation of protecting
American lives and property--both inside and outside
America, whereas in Iran, the first one to violate the
people's rights is the government itself. The Americans
have no daily problems such as we have, like lack of
security, like the enforcement of the law, the daily
bread, the evening warmth, the children's schooling, the
arbitrary arrests, and the very right to live--all of
which pose as puzzles for us. 6
Security, then, is a commonly recognized desideratum
which has traditionally been viewed as sadly absent from Iranian
life. In its most frequent Iranian usage, referring to safety
from physical harm, the term evokes images of marauding nomads,
invading Turks or Mongols, or depredatory government troops.7
But with the enforcement of at least minimal levels of law and
order by Reza Shah, this simplistic notion of security was
elaborated. Besides being secure from physical attack, Iranians
began to demand other types of security: security from arbit-
rary arrest; from dismissal from their occupations without due
cause; from financial manipulation and economic confiscation by
the Government or the elite; from all the extortions and venal-
ity and instabilities for which the political system has been
renowned. But these additional sources of security were more
difficult to achieve; in part, certainly, because they are more
difficult to conceptualize. Protection from the attacks of
tribal nomads is a palpable demand in the face of equally
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palpable external threats to ones well-being. But with the
satisfaction of that elemental, low-level need for physical
safety and well-being, demands for security are advanced which
prove to be a good deal more abstruse.8
In some general way, all demands for security appear to
be based on fear; fear which is aroused by a present or antici-
pated external stimulus, Freud noted, however, that not all
fear was free of neurotic content. "A real danger," he argued,
"is a danger which we know, a true anxiety, the anxiety in re-
gard to such a known danger. Neurotic anxiety is anxiety in
regard to a danger which we do not know."9 Freud referred to
"real anxiety" as fear and "neurotic anxiety" as anxiety. In
these simplistic terms, one might argue that in seeking an in-
crease in security, Iranians intended a reduction in the exter-
nal stimuli we have listed, those "known dangers" producing
fear. Certainly, 'tat Iranians desire to live free from fear
need occasion no surprise.
But a fundamental difficulty mars this hasty resolution.
For as Freud also noted:
There are cases in which the attributes of true and of
neurotic anxiety are intermingled. The danger is known
and of the real type, but the anxiety in regard to it is
disproportionately great, greater than in our judgement
it ought to be.10
What is at issue is a response to the external stimulus which
appears, to an outside observer, to be incommensurate with the
threat the stimulus represents. This behavioral response, be
it only in the form of heightened tension or anxiety, lies at
the root of what, in a general way, we refer to as insecurity.
F
The following table illustrates this:
TABLE 7.1
NATURE OF EXTERNAL STIMULUS
PERCEIVED AS DANGEROUS
REAL
C INCOMMENSURATE
H (over-response)
I
C
R COMMENSURATE
E
S
P
0
N INCOMMENSURATE
S (under-response)
anxiety
fear
INNOCUOUS
anxiety
no significant re-
sponse
passivity
One point which the table suggests is the possibility
of an insufficient psychic response to external stimuli. Fail-
ure to come to grips with "real" challenges and dangers is
a charge frequently levelled against the political elite of
developing societies. When internal social, political, and
economic problems are neglected, the faults may be less in the
intractibility of these problems than in the affective struc-
ture of the elite,
A more telling point which this table illustrates is
that the removal or lessening of "real" dangers by no means
frees the individual from the anxiety which we equate with
insecurity. For such a reason the establishment of domestic
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tranquillity by the control of the Iranian tribes and the poli-
tical process has not served to eliminate the presence of per-
ceived insecurity among the Iranian people. The case here
appears to be one in which the perception of any stimulus, no
matter how innocuous it may appear to some outside observer,
may elicit, for a variety of primary and secondary reasons,
feelings of intense anxiety or insecurity.
But once this is said, problems associated with the con-
cepts security-insecurity, their importance, and their relevance
are by no means resolved. After an examination of some ninety-
eight published sources purporting to explore the nature and
effects of insecurity, two earlier students of the problem
concluded that " no consistent definitions or theory have
yet been developed around the concepts of security and insecu-
rity and the prerequisite empirical testing of the hypotheses
which might be derived by objective research has hardly begun."1
A perusal of studies subsequent to that report reveals no more
definite answers to the issues already raised.13 Perhaps the
recent marked decline of interest in the concepts of security-
insecurity can be traced to a failure of intellectual progress
on just these problems.,14
One fundamental difficulty in defining insecurity is the
multiplicity of sources from which the concept of insecurity
achieved its current notoriety.
It had its origins in the whole range of the social and
humanistic disciplines--psychology, economics, sociology,
anthropology, philosophy. The intricate network of the
origins of the concept of personal security includes
such things as the hedonistic principle, the instincts
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of self-preservation and gregariousness, etc., MacDou-
gall's self-regard and emotions of desire, the self-
esteem of Bain and of James, the anxiety of Freud and
also his life and death instincts, the feelings of
inferiority and superiority of Adler, the introversion-
extroversion of Jung and his emphasis on the future, the
dynamic principles of Lewin, Murray's needs, Stern's
"system of purposes," etc.--to mention but a few.15
Partially as a result of these diverse progenitors, the concept
has tended to be used virtually interchangeably with concepts
of "inferiority," 1 6 "stress, "17"anxiety,"1 8 "fear," 1 9 "adjust-
ment,"20 and, more recently, "national, military defense."
2 1
Users of the concept have also differed over the extent
to which insecurity is specific to functional areas or is a
general personality characteristic, Some have argued that while
insecurity tends to be manifest in certain areas of an indivi-
dual's striving, it has a more general effect on the personality
by which no functional area is left totally untouched.
But if the term insecurity eludes definition, general
agreement exists that the presence of insecurity is psychically
unwelcome, producing a state of tension. It serves as a motive
for behavior to reduce to some undefined but "tolerable" limit
the amount of insecurity experienced. Insecurity then consti-
tutes a "need" or "urge" or "drive" and " is the core of
a theory of action: security becomes a motive whether one
chooses to regard the organism as striving to attain security
or struggling to allay the tensions attached to insecurity,
environmental or intra-personal."22 In this sense, then, the
presence of some insecurity is seen as a desirable, for it
serves to motivate the individual to action--action which will
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reduce the insecurity to some tolerable level. A. I, Hallowell
has suggested that "certain anxieties may be inculcated in
individuals [in the course of general socialization] in order to
motivate them in the performance of patterns of behavior that
are socially approved."2 3 Indeed, one writer has suggested that
when faced with conditions of contact with an exotic culture,
certain social systems respond to the psychological dimensions
of this contact by "a conscious strict control or even rejection
of available anxiety reducing patterns." 24 It seems obvious,
however, that if the existing level of perceived psychic insecu-
rity is too great, the result will not be a positive behavioral
response, but an inability of the individual to come to grips
with the problem in a functional manner. Certainly there arises
the specter that individual behavior, motivated by a desire to
reduce psychic insecurity, will be dysfunctional for the poli-
tical or social system as a whole. These are issues to which
we shall return.
PRIMARY INSECURITY--SECONDARY INSECURITY
Maslow, one of the earliest and most articulate students
on this problem, has long argued that the concept of insecurity
is one which must be considered as a phenomenon of the total
personality. 5  As a more precise definition of the concept,
Maslow offers fourteen "sub-aspects or sub-syndromes" of insecu-
rity.26 The sub-syndromes are:
1. Feeling of rejection, of being unloved, of being
treated coldly and without affection, or of being
hated, of being despised.
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2. Feelings of isolation, ostracism, aloneness, or
being out of it; feelings of "uniqueness."
3, Constant feelings of threat and danger; anxiety.
4. Perception of the world and life as dangerous,
threatening, dark, hostile, or challenging; as a
jungle in which every man's hand is against every
other, in which one eats or is eaten.
5. Perception of other human beings as essentially bad,
evil, or selfish; as dangerous, threatning, hostile,
or challenging.
6. Feelings of mistrust, of envy or jealousy toward
others; much hostility, prejudice, hatred.
7. Tendency to expect the worst; general pessimism.
8, Tendency to be unhappy or discontented.
9. Feelings of tension, strain, or conflict, together
with various consequences of tension, e.g., "nervous-
ness," fatigue, irritability, nervous stomach, and
other psychosomatic disturbances; nightmares; emo-
tional instability, vacillation, uncertainty, and
inconsistency.
10. Tendency to compulsive introspectiveness, morbid
self-examination, acute consciousness of self.
11. Guilt and shame feelings, sin feelings, feelings of
self-condemnation, suicidal tendencies, discourage-
ment.
12. Disturbances of various aspects of the self-esteem
complex, e.g., craving for power and for status,
compulsive ambition, over-aggression, hunger for
money, prestige, glory, possessiveness, jealousy of
jurisdiction and prerogative, over-competitiveness
and/or the opposite; masochistic tendencies, over-
dependence, compulsive submissiveness, ingratiation,
inferiority feelings, feelings of weakness and help-
lessness.
13. Continual striving for and hunger for safety and
security; various neurotic trends, inhibitions,
defensiveness, escape trends, ameliorative trends,
false goals, fixations on partial goals; psychotic
tendencies, delusions, hallucinations, etc.
14. Selfish, egocentric, individualistic trends.
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Maslow argues that the first three of these subsyndromes are most
probably primary in the sense of being "relatively prior (causal)"
while the other subsyndromes are "relatively consequent (ef-
fects)" with regard to the developmental sequence of insecurity
"even though they have equal priority and 'causal' efficacy in
the cross-sectional, contemporaneous, dynamic analysis of the
personality."27 Building on this dichotomy, a more recent
examination of the nature and origins of anxiety gives a com-
parable schema which separates the primary sources of anxiety
assumed to be events occurring in childhood from those secondary
or manifest sources of anxiety likely to occur in later adult
life. While positing that "at least theoretically, every emo-
tional conflict has its earlier antecedents," it is not neces-
sarily the case that the emotionally disturbing events of
childhood will affect adult behavior without the accompaniment
or intervention of the secondary sources of anxiety.28
On the assumption that two separate sources of anxiety or
insecurity were conceptually discernable, two separate groups of
questions were included in the survey instrument administered to
the Iranian political elite, On the one hand, a section of the
Maslow "Security-Insecurity Index" was included as an index of
the responses which would be expected to follow from the
presence of insecurity in large measure attributable to the emo-
tionally disturbing events of earlier childhood. On the other
hand, a group of questions was included which aimed at tapping
insecurity attributable to "secondary" or adult life experiences.
PRIMARY INSECURITY
The testing instrument designed by Maslow is composed of
seventy-five items divided into three groups of twenty-five
questions, The subsets of questions were designed to be equi-
valent and interchangeable forms of the test. Each of these
subsets correlated greater than 90 with the total score.29 For
efficiency of administration, only one-third of the entire
instrument was included in our questionnaire.
questions, and elite responses to each, are as
TABLE 7,2
RESPONSES OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL
TO THE MASLOW S-I INVENTORY
The individual
follows:
ELITE
Don't ToaNo, Question Yes No Know Total
1, Are you generally an
unselfish person?
2. Are you often self-
conscious?
I Db you consider yourself
a rather nervous person?
4. Do you tend to avoid
unpleasantness by
running away?
5.4 Do you feel that life
has trea8d you with
justice?
6. When your friends
criticize you, do you
usually take it well?
7. Do you feel that you
get enough praise?
44.6% 31,8%
3204
29.7
30 4
58.8
63,5
50.0
52,7
5498
128
9,5
64,9 88
23,6%
17.6
17,6
14.8
28.4
27 0
2623
100.0%
100o0
100l0
100o0
100.0
100"o
100.0
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No. Question Yes No Don't Total
Know
8, Do you think people
like you as much as
they do others? 67.6% 6.1% 26.3% 100,0%
9. Do you often have a
feeling of loneliness
even when you are
with people? 14.9 69.6 15.5 100.0
10. Do you ordinarily like
to be with people
rather than alone? 71,7 18.3 10.0 100.0
11. Do you worry too long
over humilitaring ex-
periences? 14.9 73.7 11.4 100.0
12. Are you frequently in
low spirits? 841 76.4 15.5 100.0
13, Do you have social ease? 79.1 11.5 9.4 100.0
14. When you meet people
for the first time, do
you usually feel they
will not like you 4.1 81.1 14.8 100.0
15. Do you often have a
feeling of resentment
against the world? 8.1 82.5 9.4 100.0
16, Are you in general a
happy person? 83,8 2.7 13.5 100.0
17. Do you tend to be
dissatisfied with
yourself? 13.5 75.7 10.8 100.0
18, Do you lack self-
confidence? 6.8 87.9 5,3 100.0
19. Do you often feel that
life is not worth
living? 4.0 89.2 6.8 100.0
20. Do you get discouraged
easily? 4.7 90.6 4.7 100.0
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No. Question Yes No Don't Total
21. Do you have enough
faith in yourself 91.3% 2.7% 6.0% 100.0%
22. Are you generally
optimistic? 91.3 2.0 6.7 100.0
23. Can you be comfort-
able with yourself? 92.6 2.7 4.7 100.0
24. Do you usually feel
friendly towards most
people? 94,0 2.0 4.0 100.0
25. Are you ordinarily
quite sure of your-
self? 94.6 2.0 3.4 100.0
(N=148)
To test the internal compatibility of these twenty-five
items, they were included in a factor analysis of 141 attitu-
dinal variables. Orthogonally rotated factor loadings were
derived for all variables. The third factor drawn in this
fashion included no variables other than the Maslow Security-
Insecurity items. Of the twenty-five questions, nineteen had
factor loadings greater than .3, a generally accepted minimal
level for including a given variable in a factor. The remaining
six questions had loadings on this factor of above .2.
It should be immediately obvious that this testing instru-
ment contains rather severe limitations. Basically, of course,
the test is not one whose intent is difficult to uncover. Those
answers which would be most "correct" on social, cultural, or
personality grounds are easily discernible. The willingness of
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the respondents to reply in a truthful manner is strained to the
utmost by the patency of the questions. Furthermore, the in-
clination of the political elite to respond in a less than
candid fashion was enhanced by the rather direct connection
between the questions and a general notion on the part of some
of the elite that what was being sought here was neither their
political attitudes nor social backgrounds, but rather some
measure of "personality" or, even more threatening, their "men-
tal health." While this thought was conveyed directly to the
interviewer on less than a dozen cases, it is not unlikely that
similar thoughts affected the perceptions of other respondents.31
Another important shortcoming of these questions is that
the value of their responses is based on self-knowledge. Even
with complete honesty, a respondent who is not conscious of his
feelings or emotions can hardly present an adequate representa-
tion of those feelings. This issue is no different, of course,
for every other item in the survey. But it is assumed that
questions which are manifestly oriented towards more general
character orientations will be especially liable to this short-
coming.
Finally, these questions and all others in the question-
naire are subject to charges that they will be answered in
accordance with the extent to which the respondents feel their
answers will contribute to their own occupational success.
Again, this is no less true for all other items in the survey
instrument. But the general assumption under which all data were
analyzed was that while they suffered from certain inherent
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shortcomings, those shortcomings were not so limiting as to
obviate their usefulness. It is not entirely clear that such
an assumption is operative for Maslow's Security-Insecurity
Inventory. While virtually all the charges which may be
levelled against these items are applicable to others, the former
are culpable to an extent which seriously calls into question
their validity and reliability. Given these caveats, then, any
analysis of these results must be treated most gingerly.
In order to establish a set of norms for the Inventory,
Maslow administered the test to some two thousand subjects in
thirteen institutions in the United States, ranging from a
Brooklyn, New York high school to a women's prison on the West
Coast. The distribution of test scores, means, etc., are avail-
able but, unfortunately, no similar application of the Inventory
has been made outside the United States.32 Clearly, the meaning
of the scores obtained in Iran should not be assumed equivalent
to scores obtained in the United States. Accepting this lack of
comparability based on diverse cultural factors, it is inter-
esting, nonetheless, to compare these results. The mean score
for respondents in Iran is 19.5, exactly equal to the mean score
for all respondents in the United States and falling in the cen-
ter of a range of means from a low of 14.5 (a Midwest state
university) to 27.2 (a women's city jail on the West Coast of
the United States). The median score from Iranian elite respon-
dents (17.1) falls slightly below the median score for all
respondents in the United States (17.5). While the lack of
comparability in these results prevents one from suggesting that
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Iranian elites manifest levels of insecurity not appreciably
different from Americans to whom the test was administered, it
should be mentioned that the author's working hypothesis that
the Iranian elite would manifest appreciably higher scores than
Americans was not borne out by test results.
INSECURITY IN IRAN
This was all the more surprising to the author because so
many of the subsyndromes specified by Maslow appear to be
descriptions, not only of the psyches of the individuals who
score highly on the S-I Inventory, but also, intuitively, of the
ways in which the Iranian political system itself operates. The
politically active segments of the population appear to be
motivated by just such considerations--individualism, striving
for security and status, acute self-consciousness, verbal dis-
content, pessimism, mistrust, feelings of threat, etc. Numerous
examples from Iranian culture and general observations of the
behavior of the political elite may be advanced to support these
notions.
Feelings of rejection: The highly articulated social
structure which exists in Iran can be conceived as serving the
function of protecting individuals from feeling rejected. While
the class structure in Iran is theoretically open--mobility is
not denied individuals because of lowly social origins--positions
within the social hierarchy are very well defined. Elaborate
and ritualistic modes of greeting and salutation, of deferen-
tial behavior, of discourse and other forms of interpersonal
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interaction exist and are widely accepted. To an outside obser-
ver, these appear to allow Iranians to confront their fellow
countrymen as occupiers of positions within a status hierarchy
rather than as individuals. Because the social code prescribes
correct behavioral patterns toward virtually all positions in
the hierarchy and because that code is so generally accepted,
an individual need never fear being rejected or accepted; he
has a high probability of always being treated on the basis of
his status position. "When Persians meet in the streets," said
Herodotus some 2,400 years ago, "one can always tell by their
mode of greeting whether or not they are of the same rank . . ."33
Of all the tales of the legendary Mullah Nasr ed-Din, one of the
best known, "My New Sleeve Should Eat the Polou," laments this
very code and the resultant failure to confront others as in-
dividuals. As the story goes:
Mullah Nasr ed-Din heard that there was a banquet being
held in the near-by town, and that everyone was invited,
He made his way there as quickly as he could. When the
Master of Ceremonies saw him in his ragged cloak, he
seated him in the most inconspicuous place, far from
the great table where the most important people were
being waited on hand and foot.
Nasr ed-Din saw that it would be an hour at least
before the waiters reached the place where he was
sitting. So he got up and went home.
He dressed himself in a magnificent sable cloak and
turban and returned to the feast. . . .
The Chamberlain himself came out of the palace and
conducted the magnificent visitor of high rank to a
place almost next to the Emfir A dish of wonderful
food was immediately placed before him. Without a pause
Nasr ed-Din began to rub handfuls of the polou into his
turban and cloak.
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"Your Eminence," said the prince, "I am curious as
to your eating habits, which are new to me."
"They are nothing special," said Ahe Mullah, "the
cloak got me here, got me thQ food. Surely my new
cloak should eat the polou."
A central feature of this ritualistic code of interper-
sonal behavior is also mirrored in Nasr ed-Din's tale--the
dictates of mehman navazi (hospitality). Iranians have devel-
oped and adhere to a highly formalized system of hospitality.
At all levels of the class structure, visitors are greeted with
tea, and except at the most humble abode, with fruits and nuts.
The guest is invited to "'order" the host for "this home is
yours; and I am your servant." Indeed, when asked to name the
outstanding characteristic of Persians as a people, 20 per cent
of the political elite replied in terms of Iranian hospitality.
But in terms of this analysis, this ritualized code can be seen
as a social method of limiting the likelihood that any indivi-
dual will feel rejected, or need fear being treated coldly.35
Feelings of "uniqueness"--An earlier student of Iranian
attitudes and modernization noted the frequency with which
Iranians of the "modern" middle class believe they are "per-
sonally superior, both morally and intellectually to those
around [them]." He goes on to observe that " . . megaloma-
niac claims to greatness are so common in Iran as to be
socially accepted as harmless.'r36 These individual notions of
uniqueness are matched by a cultural stress on the uniqueness
of Iran itself. More or less constant reference is made to a
number of these "unique" points, e.g., the continuity of
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Iranian history (plans have been in motion for several years
to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the Iranian monarchy);
the "greatness" of past monarchs (Darius, Cyrus, Shah Abbas,
etc.); the impressively long reign of the present ruler
(1941- ); the unique national and official religion of Iran,
Shi'ism--the "Ja'afariya doctrine recognizing twelve Imams"
(Article One, Supplementary Constitutional Law, October 8,
1907); and, certainly, the persisting belief in the ability of
Iran to "conquer its conquerors." These notions of pre-
eminence are prevalent in circles far wider than the "popular"
culture at large. Elite respondents, for example, agreed in
proportions of three to one that "Iran's culture is so unique
that it has always subverted would-be conquerors and 'Iranized'
them,"
Feelings of anxiety--Gastil has concluded that middle
class Shirazis seemed " . often to live in a state of psy-
chological isolation and generalized fearfulness."3 7 This
observation is supported by elite estimates of the prevalence
of injustice in Iranian society. In response to one interview
question, some 72 per cent of the elite (N = 120) felt that
there is a great deal or a very great deal of injustice abroad
in their land. An additional illustration of elite anxieties
appeared in a different area. Iranians frequently boast of
their profound devotion to literature and-this was attested to
by many of the political elite who lauded the value of literary
studies, even for professional politicians. One respondent
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explained its value in an atypical fashion which may, never-
theless, be more telling of the underlying motivations which
support such pursuits than is commonly realized. He recounted
how books have been a continuing significant influence on his
personality and beliefs. "Books," he explained, "provide a
guide for life and they are harmless--they never threaten one."
Perception of the world and others as dangerous and
hostile--This orientation appears to operate on at least two
levels in Iran. On the one hand, nature is not seen as a
beneficent provider. The natural world, in a way which is per-
haps commensurate with Iran's climate and harsh terrain, is not
recognized as intrinsically bountiful and nurturant. On the
other hand, the people within that world are themselves seen
as threatening. As Gastil puts it, "The westernized middle
class Iranian believes that men are by nature evil and power-
seeking and irrational." 38 It appears that a similar general
orientation is operative among the political elite. For in a
world which is perceived as threatening, the "rational" re-
sponse is not only to be on one's guard but probably to act
similarly in a threatening fashion.39 It occasions little sur-
prise, then, that 119 of the political elite (71.2%) felt that
"it is usually better in Iran to 'get' one's rival before he
'gets' you." Only 23 individuals (13.8% disagreed with this
notion.
Feelings of mistrust--"He believes he must distrust those
around him in society, no matter by what bonds they may be at-
tached to him, nor how friendly they may seem at the moment. .
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His father continually warns him of how others are out to
cheat the unaware." 40 This observation on contemporary middle
class behavior is supported by virtually all aspects of popu-
lar culture as well as by our respondents. A host of Persian
aphorisms exist to warn the unsuspecting of others. The
Masnavi, written in the thirteenth century by Mullah Jallal
ed-din Rumi, cautions
Chun basi iblis i adam ru'i hast
Pas be har dasti, na shayad dade dast
Since there are many devils in the guise of me 41
One should not give one's hand into every hand4 1
It was on the basis of this very mistrust that one elite respon-
dent placed responsibility for the inefficiencies which plague
the Government bureaucracy. He contemplated the red tape, ex-
cessive paper work, and petty rules and regulations which
characterize the Iranian bureaucracy. (These faults are not
solely in the minds of foreign advisors or the Iranian High
Council on Government Administration, both of which have
struggled valiantly for so long to lessen these inefficiencies.
For seven out of ten of our respondents [N = 116] reported
that they "almost always" feel "'surrounded and impeded" by such
obstacles to sound administration.) This perceptive respondent
suggested
Paper work and red tape are definitely connected with
psychological factors. The greater the trust between
the members of a bureaucracy, the less the paperwork.
The greater the attempt to escape responsibility, the
more the paperwork. There is a g at deal of paperwork
being done in our offices . . . .
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General pessimism--Iranian literature is especially
noted for its pessimism based on an acute consciousness of the
brevity of life and the imminence of death. From the poetry
of Khayyam to the most contemporary literary products of Iran,
themes which stress the evils of life overbalancing the happi-
ness it affords are rife. 4 3 Gastil, incidentally, also notes
the presence of a pervasive pessimism.
Feelings of self-condemnation--Many of the authors
already listed, plus a host of others, have noted the propen-
sity of Iranians for self-condemnation. A great deal of this
appears to be part of a general cultural pattern of elevating
the status of others in an exaggeratedly polite fashion in
immediate interpersonal language. Phrases such as "I am your
slave" or "I am the dust under your feet" are part of the
standard vocabulary of everyday language and seem to have as
little affective content as any of the polite idioms used fre-
quently in English such as "it's good to see you." Nonethe-
less, it is significant that phrases of the former type are
so prevalent in Persian, while generally being absent from the
English language, Although frequently used in a symbolic way
to facilitate interpersonal relations, these terms do seem to
reflect a propensity for more fundamental self-condemnation.
An earlier traveler to Iran noted that
Persia's young men are very prone, nowadays, to lament
their failings as a race. National self-abasement is
the burden of their talk, and much fluen diction is
wasted in destructive criticism . . . .4
The author of these remarks goes on to suggest that far more of
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this disparagement is directed at Iran's political leaders than
at the individuals advancing the complainL. Nonetheless, it is
clear that an immense quantity of deprecation and derogation is
aimed at Persians as a nation, ipso facto including the speaker.
The elite respondents themselves were startlingly free in their
tendency to offer gratuitous comments which constituted ridi-
cule and derision of "Iranians." A few examples will suffice:
Injustice in Iran is great because Iranians are
basically unjust,
Iranians accord a higher value to animals than they
do to human beings.
No society in the world can be found in which as many
people understand as much as in Iran. All say, "I
know." All are experts.
Iranians are lazy and irresponsible. On my first trip.
to the United States, I waited 1 1/2 hours at the air-
port and watched an unsupervised workman repair a con-
crete floor, put a string around the area, ask the
magazine salesman to remove the string the next day,
and leave. In Iran St would have taken two workmen and
a foreman one week to do the job half as well.
Individualistic trends--Of all the observations one
might make about Iran, it is this which seems to be made most
repeatedly, Plutarch described Artaxerxes' campaign in Egypt,
unsuccessful because of the failure of his generals to work
together.45 More recently, Sir Percy Sykes attributes Iran's
defeat in Mohammad Shah's campaigns against Afghanistan in
1837-1838 partly to the same factor:
. . . during the winter, operations dragged on month
after month with no decisive results, the Persian
generals working entirely independently of one another
and each being rather pleased if a rival general was
defeated. 4 6
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Gobineau, perhaps the most perceptive foreign writer on Iran,
saw and reported much the same phenomenon. But he was aware
that this was by no means restricted to the military.
Je ne sais si, par les details qui precedent, jrai
suffisamment prepare le lecteur a comprendre que
l'Etat persan n'existe pas u realite, et que
l'individu est tout. . . .
The "conspicuous individualism" of Iranians continues to be
reported to the present.4 8 And, indeed, one is struck by the
relative absence in Iranian life of meaningful and functioning
groups other than the family. Iranian politics is not a pro-
cess in which groups play an especially relevant role. Iranian
political parties are primarily collections of individuals
gathered about a prominent political activist or activists and
effected for office-seeking purposes. These parties most
often disintegrate if the office is attained or if it appears
beyond reach. They play no role as a group in the policy pro-
cess itself. A similar line of reasoning might be advanced for
all social activities in Iran, from the operation of the
Government bureaucracy to more homely examples of criminal
activities. Bank robberies as they are known in the United
States, for example, are substantially unheard of in Iran.
That kind of successful group activity appears beyond the ken
of the Iranian underworld. Bank robberies, if they are com-
mitted, tend to be primarily the work of a solitary bandit.
Individualism appears operative in this area of Iranian life
as in others.
Certainly, a seemingly endless parade of other quota-
tions, anecdotes, and observations might be advanced to argue
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for the relevance of these and the remaining sub-syndromes of
insecurity as advanced by Maslow to the Iranian context. Ira-
nian society and especially its politics appear to operate in a
fashion consonant with behavioral consequences expected to fol-
low from persons who score highly on the insecurity inventory.
Given these observations, how much more surprising that
elite scores on Maslow's Security-Insecurity Inventory were not
grouped more highly at Insecurity levels. Part of this failure
may be attributable to the shortcomings of the testing instru-
ment in the Iranian elite context as discussed above. But
additional evidence (derived primarily by "casual empiricism")
is available. This evidence centers on childrearing practices
in Iran.
CHILD REARING IN IRAN
General observations of child rearing in middle and upper
class urban residences in Iran suggest that children receive
upbringings most conducive to developing a sense of psychic
security. Children in these homes receive what appears to an
outside observer as a virtually endless amount of love and suc-
cor from their parents and servants. They are rarely forced
into positions whereby they need accept responsibility for their
actions or make decisions independently of their parents.
In addition, children are virtually never punished for
their misbehavior and physical punishment is conspicuously
absent. It is assumed that being "only a child," the improper
youngster cannot be expected to assume responsibility for his
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behavior. And if he is not responsible, he could hardly be
considered accountable. It is startling to note the advanced
age at which children are considered by their parents to be
still "only children." For most purposes, "childhood" extends
to the period when the "child" is married (often to a spouse
selected by his parents) and leaves his parents' house to
establish his own residence.
When asked how they would deal with a ten year old son
who disobeyed his parents, fully 80 per cent of the elite respon-
dents suggested that they would "talk to the child to show him
his incorrect behavior." One of the elite justified this by
suggesting that "You can make a slave out of a free man by
kindness . . . and it is better to enslave one man in kindness
than free a thousand slaves." (It is interesting to note the
parallel which it was suggested above pertains in the relation-
ship of the monarch to his subjects. It also is revealing of
family life in Iran that this respondent felt that the father-
son relationship should approximate that of master-slave.) A
greater number of the elite (5) felt that they would "forget
the whole thing" than felt that either spanking, confinement,
or depriving the child of food (3) was an appropriate response.
When they were asked how they would deal"with a ten year old
son who insulted his father and struck him" their responses
were immediately incredulous. "If a child struck his father,
one would have to believe that the child was joking, for this
is so serious an act, it could not be done," replied one
typical respondent. As a group, their responses were hardly
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more forceful than were those for the less serious offense.
TABLE 7.3
FAVORED METHODS OF THE IRANIAN ELITE FOR
DEALING WITH A TEN YEAR OLD SON
Son Who Disobeys Son Who Insults
Punishment and Strikes
His Father His Father
Spanking 1.8% 4.2%
Isolation/Confinement 0.0 1.2
Depriving of Food 4 9  0.0 0.0
Scolding 2.4 6.0
Talking to Show
Incorrect Behavior 79.0 66.5
Talking to Learn Reasons
for Misbehavior 3.6 4.8
Loving Child More 2.4 1.8
Forgetting the Whole Thing 3.0 2.4
Other, Don't Know 7.8 13.1
Total 100.0% 100.0%
One patient father seemed to sum up the group's thoughts when
he suggested that " . . force in dealing with a child is
similar to force in dealing with a nation. In both cases,
force is inefficacious, undesirable, and destructive." Given
these orientations to childhood misconduct on the part of
Iranian fathers, who are generally alleged to be more authori-
tarian than Iranian wives, it would seem that children from
such households would receive unconditional love. It is as-
sumed that such an upbringing would contribute to the develop-
ment of individuals with personalities manifesting high levels
of personal security.
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On the assumption that the present-day political elite
received their earliest socialization in generally similar
circumstances, results on the Maslow instrument are more com-
prehensible. The elite score at the "secure" end of the con-
tinuum because in the sense of personal "security'F which those
questions are designed to measure, i.e., underlying or primary
security-insecurity, they are relatively secure.
One specific finding of our research is relevant to this
interpretation of child-rearing and family life. In the origi-
nal factor analysis, nine items loaded highly on an orthogon-
ally rotated factor. The items and loadings are as follows:
TABLE 7o4
FAMILY DISDAIN FACTOR
Frequency with which the respondent discusses
the following with his/her spouse:
1. The upbringing of children .657
2. The education of children .646
3. The family budget .453
4. Birth control .386
5. Your own career and the affairs of your work .344
6. Apart from your immediate family, is there anyone
to whom you confide your most personal and impoq-
tant problems? .367
7. How old would you think a child had to be before
he could be trusted with information about family
finances, i.e., the income and expenses of the
family? .356
8. Do you feel that you get enough praise? .340
9. Do you think people like you as much as they do
others? .335
The items central to this factor pertain primarily to intra-
familial trust and communications. As a result, the factor
has been labelled "Family Disdain." What groups together in
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this factor are answers which indicate a low level of discus-
siQn within the family on a host of subjects, an unwillingness
to trust younger children with information on family finance,
and a failure to confide in others. It would appear that in
families where these opinions of the heads of household were
translated into behavioral regularities, conditions conducive
to fostering insecurity would prevail. For such homes would be
those in which confidence and warmth did not encompass all mem-
bers of the household--in which unconditional love and other
factors conducive to psychological security were absent.
Interestingly, when scores on the Security-Insecurity
Inventory are compared with scores on this factor, there is a
significant positive relationship. High levels of insecurity
are associated with high levels of family disdain. The converse
relationship also exists (x2 = 6.706, df = 2, p < .04,
g = .344). What would appear to be happening is another ex-
ample of the oft-noted phenomenon whereby the sins of the
parents are visited on the children. Fathers (and the few
mothers in the sample) who manifest high levels of insecurity,
hold attitudes which, if congruent with their own practices of
child rearing, would most likely contribute to the development
of high levels of primary insecurity in their children. On the
other hand, elite respondents who score on the "secure" end of
the Maslow continuum show little family disdain and, hence,
would tend to raise children who also manifested higher levels
of primary security.
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Another tantalizing relationship appears in the compari-
son of Security-Insecurity scores with the social background
factor we have labelled "Urban-Rural Factor." This five-item
factor has two items which load most highly--population of
respondent's birthplace (.802) and population of father's birth-
place (.773). A third question, "When did you and/or your
family move to Tehran?" also loaded highly on this factor (.568).
The three positive high loadings indicate the propensity of
the elite and their fathers to have been born in similar sized
cities and for those born in the provinces to have moved to
Tehran relatively early in their lives.
When run against security-insecurity scores, the rela-
tionship is as follows:
TABLE 7.5
SCORES ON THE MASLOW SECURITY-INSECURITY INVENTORY
BY SCORES ON THE URBAN-RURAL FACTOR
Level of Security Urban-Rural FactorUrban Rural
Secure 33,3% 16.2%
Medium 33.3% 45.6%
Insecure 33.4% 38.2%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (68) (81)
(x2 = 5.943, df = 2, p = .05, g = - .221)
We note that scores of those from the "Urban" end of the fac-
tor continuum--virtually all respondents born in Tehran--show
no relationship with Maslow scores. The same is not the case
with scores which we have designated as "Rural" but which
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contain elite from smaller cities as well as villages. Here a
clear relationship is established with scores bunching at the
more insecure end of the continuum.
These results are consistent with a good deal of evidence
regarding child rearing practices in smaller cities, towns, and
villages of Iran as well as in other developing societies, One
investigation of the determinacy of the adult personality by
infant experiences focused on these issues. The author noted
that the personalities of adult members of Sinhalese society
11
'seem to be marked by feelings of insecurity."50 Yet, he notes,
by all criteria of personality accepted in the West, Sinhalese
children are treated most permissively, and should, therefore,
develop secure personalities. The author goes on to hypothesize
that this apparent paradox can be explained by post-infantile
experiences, Firstly, "the withdrawal of overt signs of paren-
tal affection after about age four or five" and secondly, "the
loose structuring of Sinhalese society . . . and . . . the dis-
crepancy between the rigid verbal expectation of children's
behavior and the actual weak disciplinary control and loose
supervision of children" are responsible for adult behavior
patterns.51
The extent to which child rearing practices in rural,
village, and small-town Iran conform with methods prevalent
in Ceylon is striking. And it is striking that the adult
insecurity patterns for Iranians raised in the less urban
areas is similar to Straus' findings. While little firm data
exist on this point, evidence given above, newspaper accounts,
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anecdotes, novels, and personal observation all suggest that
children in Iran do enjoy permissive upbringing in loose so-
cial structures.
The key variable which is absent in child rearing prac-
tices for middle and upper class Tehran families is the post-
infantile crisis when the child is expected abruptly to assume
the role of adult and accept adult responsibility.52 We have
suggested that this takes place in such families only with the
(arranged) marriage of the child. But such is definitely not
the case with children raised in lower class families or in
families from smaller cities and towns.53 For those children
there appears to be an equally permissive upbringing in a loose
social structure, but a marked hiatus in childhood. Children
from these social strata and from smaller sized cities are ex-
pected early to fulfill adult responsibilities, be those de-
fined as farming tasks, shepherding, apprenticeships with bazaar
tradesmen, or any of the numerous activities--other than educa-
tion--which are imposed on the majority of young children in
Iran. "The boys become independent and self-reliant at a very
early age, and are quite capable of running a shop in the
bazaar, working at a trade, or tending a flock of sheep in the
mountains." 54 It may well be that this abrupt assignment of
adult responsibilities helps explain the finding that a greater
proportion of the elite born in less urban areas score inse-
curely.
376
CONCOMITANTS OF PRIMARY INSECURITY
But to back-track, the statement that Iranian elite
are "relatively secure" has meaning only insofar as results
derived from Iranian elite responses are comparable with re-
sponses from a variety of groups in the United States. How-
eyer, we have already suggested that any such comparison is
highly suspect. A comparison of responses internal to the
elite is likely to be more valid for that analysis avoids the
deficiencies inherent in intercultural comparison. Such an
analysis does, indeed, prove to be a good deal more interesting.
One of the more relevant of these is the relationship between
insecurity as measured by Maslow's instrument and responses to
the question, "Do you often feel frustrated because you are
unable to do as you wish or unable to accomplish what you wish?"
TABLE 7.6
FEELINGS OF FRUSTRATION BY SCORES
ON THE S-I INVENTORY
Level of Reported Frustration
Level of Security Very High High Not Very High
Secure 35.0% 37.5% 66.7%
Intermediate 27.5 12.5 12.2
Insecure 37.5 50.0 21.1
Total 100.0% 100.0% 10Q.0%
N (40) (16) (90)
(x2 = 15.552, df = 4, p .004)
The relationship between security and absence of frustration
is particularly strong, with the converse relation being less
strong. In fact, when age is controlled, the association
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between these two variables is strengthened--the higher the
insecurity at all age levels, the greater the reported frus-
trations.
This relationship is to be expected on at least two
levels. Accepting Maslow's Inventory as tapping the primary
or antecedent sources of insecurity and anxiety, then frustra-
tion would be expected in terms of dynamic psychiatry. "Freud,
in The Problems of Anxiety, says that anxiety is felt by a
person at the realization of formerly repressed, unacceptable
drives and wishes . . . .,85 Frustration would be bound to
arise from the stimulus of these impulses and the continued
unacceptability or impossibility of acting so as to satisfy
these impulses. On the secondary level, i.e., sources of
anxiety in adult life, frustration would also be a part of
general anxiety or insecurity. Anticipation of negative sanc-
tions--be that defined by an outside observer as fear or
anxiety--would in all likelihood produce frustrations. Two
commentators see this relationship between frustration and
anxiety as so intertwined that they equate the two. "Anxiety,"
they stress, "is the anticipation of punishment, i.e., of
failure to receive positive rewards or expectations of pain or
frustrationt"56
The frustration of those of the elite with insecure
scores contributes to a general propensity for negativism and
pessimism. Many of the elite reported a sense of impending
doom or dread of an untoward future. They also looked upon
their recent national history in the same fashion. The elite
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were asked to comment on the most significant changes in Iranian
society since World War II. Answers were coded in a number of
ways including a count of the number of changes towards which
the respondent felt positively oriented and the number to which
he felt negative. The number of positive changes run against
insecurity shows that 56 per cent of the more insecure respon-
dents felt that no positive changes whatsoever had occurred in
Iran. Only fortyfour of the more secure were so inclined. The
relationship is soon reversed, however, for more than two-
thirds of the secure respondents reported at least one favorable
change, whereas only one-third of the less ecure held such
sanguine views. Clearly for these respondents insecurity and
negativism do go together,
But once said, there is no necessary indication of the
direction which such negative attitudes will take. One respon-
dent who scored appreciably more insecure than the mean, felt
that the recent changes which had occurred in Iran were meaning-
less, or worse. He attributed responsibility for this not only
to His Imperial Majesty, but also directly to the United States,
whom he perceived as ultimately the most significant factor in
Iranian politics. The United States, he claimed, was losing
the immense reservoir of good will created by such men as
Morgan Shushter, whose economic mission to Iran in 1911 was
subverted by Anglo-Russian pressure on the Iranian Government,
and Dr. Samuel Jordan, long time principal of the Presbyterian-
run Alborz College,5 7 The problem, he suggested,
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*. stems from America's tendency to see money
and economic factors as the basis for all human action.
The Soviets, however, are masters. When they want to
paint a car, they scrape off the old paint and start
anew. The United States just tries to throw a new coat
of paint over the old standards of thinking . . . .
For this respondent, then, the apparent problem was that the
United States had failed to intervene enough in domestic Iranian
affairs.5 8
A host of additional examples relating S-I score to other
attitudes might be given. But it is clear that irrespective of
any comparison of insecurity levels among the Iranian political
elite and a variety of groups in the United States, those mem-
bers of the political elite who do manifest higher levels of
insecurity on the Maslow test display attitudes consonant with
Maslow's expectations. This would tend to lend credence to
Maslow's assumptions on the cross-cultural applicability of
the concept of primary insecurity, as we have labelled it, or
"'the ontogenetic priority of safety, belongingness, and love
. 6 . " as he has termed it. 5 9
What this analysis and that of Maslow suggest is that
security-insecurity as measured by the Maslow test is a general
character orientation which would affect all areas of a per-
son's striving. Maslow himself suggests that:
In every insecure person with whom the writer has
worked, he always found a continual, never dying
longing for security . . . there were found wide
variations in the subjects' individual definitions
of the security that they longed for. Some defined
it in terms merely of safety, some interms of depen-
dence upon a stronger person, some in terms of having
power and money and a few defined it in what is a
more "correct" way, i.e., as a longing to deserve and
win back the love and affection of other peQple.60
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Much of the evidence from elite responses would support this
generalization. Thus, for example, we asked the elite the
following question: "How probable is it that you will lose
your present position?" Some two-thirds of the elite who felt
it fairly probable or very probable that they would lose their
present position scored at insecurity levels on the Maslqw ques-
tionnaire. Conversely, of those who felt it fairly or very
improbable that they would lose their positions, 56 per cent
had "secure" scores. The "spill-over effect" so prevalent with
the cynicism factor below seems to be operative here, for the
elite who manifest high levels of primary insecurity also
manifest insecurity in areas far removed from primary psycho-
logical concerns--security of job.
But Maslow himself pulls back from complete identifica-
tion with this primary-secondary "spill-over" effect. He cau-
tions that:
We do not wish to embark upon any typology and speak
of secure and insecure people in a black and white
fashion as if they were completely different 0 .
Most people in our society can be seen to be both
secure and insecure. For example, . . . a person secure
in the 6 ntellectual world may be insecure in the social
world.
While Maslow quite clearly recognizes, then, that individuals
may be secure and insecure in different areas of their striving,
"his conceptual framework does not lend itself to analysis
along these lines 0 . .t62
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MANIFEST INSECURITY
As a response to these difficulties implicit in the
Maslow instrument, a number of additional items were included
in the questionnaire. These were meant to tap specific areas
of insecurity at the secondary level. When run in a factor
analysis with other general characterological variables, these
"fell out" together in an orthogonal rotation. This factor,
labelled manifest insecurity (MI) includes the following items
and headings:
TABLE 7.7
MANIFEST INSECURITY FACTOR
1. Do you often feel frustrated because you are
unable to do as you wish or unable to accom-
plish what you wish? .506
2. How probable is it that you will lose your
present position? .440
3. How secure do you think you are in your
present position? .430
49 To what extent do you feel surrounded and
impeded by red tape, petty rules and regu-
lations, and other annoyances? .392
5. Respondents favored method for dealing with
a disobedient ten year old son. -578
6. Concerning your personal future, would you say
that in general you feel enthusiastic, hopeful,
indifferent, anxious, resigned, or embittered? .377
7. The best way of life is to walk in the path of
our fathers. .325
S. What do you consider the likelihood of Iran's
overcoming in the next ten years the problems
which you have enumerated? .319
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9. I don't think that really powerful public
officials and politicians care much what
people like me think. .301
I0. In terms of what you see around you, would
you say there is a great deal of injustice
or really not very much? - .294
11. During your own upbringing, how were most of
the major family decisions made? - .291
From the loadings on these questions and the answers to
them which were received, it appears that the conceptual unity
of manifest insecurity is similar to that which would be ex-
pected on theoretical grounds in the case of secondary insecu-
rity. What coalesces together in this factor are frustration,
fear, pessimism, inefficacy, firmness with children, and an
authoritarian upbringing. A central issue in the factor
appears to be the respondent's expectation that he will lose
his present position--that he is not "secure" in that post.
Insofar as a formal position within the bureaucracy is so vital
for assuring status, communication, access, and, thus, power,
loss of position or fear of such loss would be expected to ap-
pear as an essential element in manifest or secondary, adult
sources of insecurity. Indeed, the elite were almost unanimous
in their agreement over the necessity of a formal post. One
put it this way:
There is a universal feeling among Iranians that an
official administrative position is essential for
safety and to be able to protect one's own and family's
interests. A ''title" is necessary for in running even
one's family affairs, one perpetually comes up against
the formal structure of the Government. One needs a
title to deal with that structure. . . . By law every-
one has the same protection, but it remains true that a
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title or office holder has the power to use that part of
the structure over which he has control and his suppor-
ters against other formal office holders.6 3
And as we have shown above, positions have been awarded and
withdrawn from individuals without respite for decades. No won-
der, then, that such fears would have a solid founding in the
realities of Iranian politics.
But, in fact, such fear over the probable loss of offi-
cial position is surprising. Firstly, the most recent political
history of Iran would argue that the average tenure of high-
office holders is considerably greater than ever before. We
have already noted that the average tenure for the Prime Minis-
ters who have served since the inauguration of the first Con-
stitutional Government is nineteen months. But more recently,
that average has been considerably lengthened. The ministers
who were given Cabinet-level portfolios with the elevation of
Hassan Ali Mansur to the Premiership in March of 1964, have con-
tinued in their posts, with minor exceptions, to the present.
Secondly, we have also noted that when high officials
have been removed from their posts, they are more likely than
not to receive another high commission. To take only some of
the more recent examples: when General Hassan Pakravan was re-
lieved of his command of the State Security and Intelligence
Organization, he was posted as Ambassador to Pakistan. Ex-
Prime Minister Alam was established as Chancellor of the Pahlevi
University in Shiraz and more recently, Minister of the Im-
perial Court. Ex-Prime Minister Eghbal was made Ambassador to
UNESCO and then Director of the National Iranian Oil Company.
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This list could be extended indefinitely but the conclusion
should already be clear--as long as the official continues to
operate within the rules of the political system as established
by His Imperial Majesty, some high-level formal position within
the Governmental bureaucracy is, in the main, a certainty.
Why, then, this concern with loss of formal position?
One quite reasonable basis for concern is that while another
formal position is statistically a virtual certainty, there are
exceptions. A member of the elite recently relieved of his
position is not especially interested in aggregate probabili-
ties. Rather, his concern focuses on his own immediate poli-
tical future. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the
realization by the elite that they exercise virtually no
control over their tenure in a given position or over their
appointment to any other position. No well established or
generally understood criteria for the maintenance of office
appear to exist. In fact, the same is true for achieving
office. One respondent, in a story reminiscent of the mythical
deputy whose tale was told above, recounted how he happened to
become a member of the Senate. "I was in Switzerland," he re-
called, "with no intention of being active in Iranian politics.
One day in Zurich, I picked up a Swiss newspaper and noticed
an article about Iran's new Senate. There was my name. Hi
Imperial Majesty had nominated me as one of the thirty Senators
he is empowered to select'" Loyalty to His Imperial Majesty,
of course, is an absolutely basic criterion for office holding.
But numerous examples indicate that "loyalty" is a concept
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difficult to operationalize; to translate into a guide for
behavior in office. Moreover, loyalty is only the minimal
criterion, insufficient to explain the majority of dismissals
which have lately occurred.
The elite are acutely aware of the absence of satisfac-
tory operational meanings for "loyalty." The less cynical
attribute their success to loyalty in the sense of "efficiency"
in executing the monarch's reform plans. The difficulty of
measuring such "efficiency" and the difficulties of assigning
responsibility for any Governmental action whatsoever suggest
that this claim is not taken seriously by either the cynical
or the non-cynical among the elite. Rather, there appears to
be more general importance attached to the concept of loyalty
in its more common meaning. On this latter meaning, there is
agreement among both the holders of official positions and those
of the political elite without such positions. The position of
the office holders was succinctly put this way: " . . to re-
tain my post, I remain what I must be---now kare dowlat [a ser-
vant of the government]." A member of the elite without formal
position put the matter differently when he told of a private
audience he had with the Shah.
I told His Imperial Majesty that his sacrifice [i.e.,
the person being interviewed] was insane. The Shah
asked why I talked that way. "Because a sane person
pursues his own selfish interests and I do not." The
Shah agreed and asked why I did not do so. "Well," I
replied, "the only way to achieve one's interests in
this country is to flatter you and to agree with what-
ever you say. To do so one must be without personal
scruples. I am not and so cannot and will not do so."
Since then, I have been retired.
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Whatever the actual bases for maintaining one's position,
it is clear that the general belief among the elite is that
those bases are highly elusive and their control is perpetually
beyond one's grasp. Being beyond one's grasp, insecurity is
generated in the course of the individual's realization that he
is not in control of his own, personal fate. Similar conclu-
sions have been reached in countless studies of employment in
other countries. As one student of the problem put it: "A
good deal of comparative research has found that the workers
experiencing the most recurring unemployment and underemploy-
ment are the ones most likely to be discontented with the
existing order, to conceive of themselves as its 'exploited
victims,' to be 'class conscious' and to support the political
left in their country.64 In many ways, the recurring turnover
of personnel in high level Government jobs as well as the
realization of helplessness in controlling or altering that
turnover, is a central source of secondary insecurity among
the Iranian political elite. 65
And expectations of losing formal position, so essential
for maintaining political power, contribute to the elite sense
of fear, frustration, and pessimism--which in turn are all cen-
tral features of manifest insecurity as determined by the fac-
tor loadings. In addition, manifest insecurity goes together
with relative harshness in dealing with a disobedient son and
with childhood upbringings whereby fathers were the dominant
individuals and the sole decision makers.
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It should be clear to the reader that these items which
load highly on the MI factor are the very ones which are sig-
nificantly associated with scores on the S-I factor. Not sur-
prisingly, then, individuals tend to score similarly on both
indexes.
TABLE 7.8
COMPARISON OF SCORES ON MI AND S-I FACTORS
S-I Score MI Score
Secure Medium Insecure
Secure 38.9% 15.4% 19.4%
Medium 31.5 65.4 35.8
Insecure 29.6 19.2 44.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (54) (26) (67)
(x2 = 15,488, df = 4, p = .001, gamma = .345)
This table implies that theorists of security-insecurity
are correct in suggesting a key relationship between primary
and secondary sources of insecurity. Thus, "the effect of an
emotionally disturbing event may be multiplied as a consequence
of the important effects of various antecedent vicissitudes of
early life, which come to serve actually or symbolically as
analogous prototypes." 66 One immediate difficulty, however, is
the problem of the direction of causality. Certainly, in a
psychoanalytic sense, primary sources of anxiety or insecurity
would affect secondary sources. But does the Maslow instrument
measure primary insecurity alone? In fact, does it measure that
insecurity at all? It is certainly conceivable that responses
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to the Maslow items, which ostensibly are unrelated to secondary
sources of insecurity, are significantly affected by the level
of secondary or manifest insecurity then being experienced by
the respondent. Not surprisingly, then, would be high scores
on the Maslow instrument by inmates of penitentiaries. Maslow
avoids this dilemma by claiming to measure both types simul-
taneously--but in the process, also avoiding the issue of
whether there are, in fact, two such sources of insecurity,
their relationship, and the functional specificity of insecurity.
Among the Iranian political elite, there is a clear
propensity for persons who score insecurely on Maslow's instru-
ment to score highly in terms of manifest insecurity. Because
this is a study of the political process, moreover, we feel
justified in concentrating primarily on this latter type of
insecurity--feelings of threat and danger occasioned by adult
life experiences primarily encountered in the course of parti-
cipation in the political process. Undoubtedly, those members
of the elite with early childhood experiences most conducive
to producing primary insecurity would react most strongly to
such later events. And indeed what limited data we have to
bring to bear on this point supports that contention. But we
would also argue that even in the absence of primary insecurity,
the reality of participation at high levels of the Iranian
political process are conducive to producing the latter, but
no less psychically real, secondary insecurity.
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CONCOMITANTS OF MANIFEST INSECURITY
Turning then to this manifest or secondary insecurity, we
wish to know who among the elite demonstrate these qualities.
Who are the insecure? An immediate answer, from interview data,
is, "those who participate most actively in the system." Those
who are most imbedded in the Iranian political process--as
measured by age, reputed political power, degree of participa-
tion, number of activities, and social status--these are the
most insecure
AGE
One of the social background factors produced in a rota-
tion of those variables was labelled the Age Factor. It con-
tained the following variables and factor loadings:TABLE 7.9
AGE FACTOR
1. Respondent's age at time of interview - .787
2. Number of Senate sessions in which the
respondent was a member - 4642
3. Highest education level achieved by the
respondent .495
4., Highest education level achieved by the
respondent's father - .464
5. Number of Majles sessions in which the
respondent was a member - .430
6. Number of films which the respondent has
seen in the past three months .429
7. Number of living children - .342
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Age, parliamentary service, lower education for the respondent
and his father, many children, and fewer films were all related
in this factor. When run against the MI factor, the following
results were produced.
TABLE 7.10
SCORES ON THE MANIFEST INSECURITY FACTOR
BY SCORES ON THE AGE FACTOR
Age Factor
MI Young Old
Low 57.6% 40.2%
High 42.4 59.8
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (85) (82)
(Yates x 2 = 4.386, continuity corrected, p = .036, gamma = .338)
The older elite with lower educations and greater parliamentary
experience demonstrate by far the highest levels of manifest
insecurity.
An intensive review of recent Iranian political history
will attest to the validity of these results. For the inaugu-
ration of Hassan Ali Mansur as Prime Minister in early 1964
brought to formal positions of power the members of his dowreh
and larger group known as the Progressive Center (see above).
Coupled with an intensity of royally led reform--rare in the
reign of Mohammad Reza Shah--the older elites saw their hold
over the key points of power vanishing. The earlier dissolu-
tion of both Houses of Parliament had eliminated one such
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vantage point. When the results of the elections to the new
houses of Parliament were announced in the fall of 1963, it
was obvious that a fundamental change had occurred. The older
members of the traditional elite had lost their majority in
the lower house, the Majles. 6 7 Only in the Senate were these
traditional wielders of political power still in control.
But the final blow came with the resignation of Prime
Minister Assadollah Alam in early 1964. For he and his Cabinet
were replaced by Mansur and the "technocrats." While these
individuals were primarily the sons of members of the tradi-
tional elite, they brought two new factors to bear in the
performance of their executive responsibilities: relative
youth and technical educations. Together, these resulted in a
degree of vitality and enthusiasm unusual for Iranian politics.
In the process, however, it became clear that the remaining
occupational base of the previous rejal (elite), the Senate,
would be insufficient to allow for their exerting influence in
Iranian politics as was their custom. As they felt themselves
being displaced from positions in the administration--the very
center of political power in Iran--their discontent and their
manifest insecurity rose marked 1y. For not only were the
older members of the elite being displaced from positions of
political power, but the prime virtue which they claimed was
now in disrepute. Mansur and his colleagues justified their
rapid rise to power on the basis of their technical educations.
He claimed that such education more than compensated for any
lack of experience. In fact, their lack of experience and
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slavish adherence to outmoded customs were hailed as beneficial.
But perhaps more than any other single criterion, experience had
long been prized in Iran. A frequently related proverb makes
the point:
A wise man needs two lives in this world,
So as to gain experience in the one and apply
it in the other.
Mansur, then, was not only taking administrative office but in
the process denigrating that experience which so many of the
elite had used to justify their wielding political power in the
past. Bitterness arose between the elite who had served in the
Majles and Senate and the ministers. The result was growing
and often intense insecurity on the part of those who could not
lay claim to technical educations or to membership in Mansur's
circle.
This combination of variables--age, relatively poor edu-
cation, and relatively great experience in the Parliament--all
contributed in the early 1960's to fostering manifest insecu-
rity. But age is related to insecurity in another fashion.
Insofar as age is congruent with length of participation in the
political system, increased participation would be expected to
lead to heightened levels of manifest insecurity. Operating
in the milieu of Iranian politics with its eccentricities and
vagaries--over which the individual has no control--can only
contribute to heightened levels of manifest insecurity irres-
pective of the additionally threatening factor of the denigra-
tion of one's most valued skills.
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ACTIVITY
But the connection between involvement and heightened
manifest insecurity can be seen more strikingly when we con-
sider yet another of the factors produced in the orthogonal
rotation of social background variables. Labelled the Activity
Factor, it grouped together eleven variables all of which
measure, in some fashion, the extent of the respondent's par-
ticipation in the political system. The variables and loadings
are as follows:
TABLE 7.11
ACTIVITY FACTOR
1. Total number of groups, organizations, clubs,
etc., to which the respondent belongs .823
2. Total number of positions or occupations held
for which no remuneration is received .694
?. Number of professional and occupational groups
or social classes with which the respondent
converses a few times per month or more frequently .582
4. Frequency of respondent's conversations with
various professional and occupational groups
or social classes .573
5. Membership in a dowreh (circle) of friends or
family which meets regularly .465
6. Total number of occupations or positions held
by the respondent for which he receives
remuneration 
.458
7. Number of magazines, in any language, read
each month .382
8. Recency of respondentb last trip outside Iran - ,381
9. Highest education level achieved by respondent .360
10. Reputed Power Score .327
11. Number of trips of any duration made outside
Iran by the respondent .323
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What groups together in this factor are variables pertaining
to the number of the respondent's remunerated and non-
remunerated positions, organizational memberships; dowrehs;
frequency of his communication with a variety of occupational
and social groups; and finally, his reputed power score. All
of these relate in the predicted direction--higher levels of
reputed power being associated with greater number of occupa-
tional positions and organizational memberships and communica-
tion. When run against MI, the following significant relation-
ship is found:
TABLE 7.12
MANIFEST INSECURITY SCORES BY
SCORES ON THE ACTIVITY FACTOR
MI Activity Level
Low High
Low 56.8% 40.5%
High 43.2 59.5
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (88) (79)
(Yates x2 = 3.803, continuity corrected, p .05, gamma .318)
The greater the immersion of the respondent in the
political system, the greater is his level of manifest insecu-
rity. And perhaps more importantly, the greater the reputed
power of the respondent, the higher the level of manifest
insecurity. This manifest insecurity appears to be an accom-
paniment of mobility up the ladder of elite success. Rather
than serving to provide the individual member of the elite
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with a greater sense of safety and protection, increasing
power appears to extract its toll in greater insecurity. As
the level of power increases so do the rewards--but perhaps
to a greater extent does the insecurity. That which is meant
to represent higher levels of well-being thus turns on acqui-
sition to be of less substance than one had imagined.68
In this sense, this relationship may very well have
reciprocal effects. A variety of studies of voluntary asso-
ciations in the United States have led one observers to conclude
. . it is likely that another psychological satisfac-
tion [besides "the two needs for self-expression and
satisfaction of interests through collective action"]
provided in other societies mainly by the immediate
family and secondarily by the extended family, church,
and community, is also being inadequately provided by
them in our society69 This is the provision of a sense
of security . . .
Failing to find that sense of security in the family, church,
or community, Americans are seen turning to voluntary organiza-
tions--trade unions, clubs, fraternal societies, political
groups, etc.--in order to locate that sense of security. The
Kluckhohns have suggested this in a slightly different fashion:
Why are Americans a nation of joiners? In part this
is a defense mechanism against the excessive fludity
of our social structure. Because of the tension of
continual struggle for social place, people have tried
to gain a degree of routinized and recognized fixity
by allyin Othemselves with others in voluntary asso-
ciations.
We.would argue that these factors operate in the Iranian con-
text. Members of the political elite turn to voluntary asso-
ciations to obtain a sense of security in the face of a changing
social system and, more importantly, as a base to attain or
maintain political power.
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DOWREHS
The dowreh system in Iran is a telling example of such
voluntary organizations, and we have already noted that member-
ship in a dowreh is highly associated with manifest insecurity
(p = .001). The dowreh is a small group, usually numbering no
more than fifteen, who organize about some common purpose and
meet on a regular basis. Dowrehs exist for card playing,
poetry, music, and, of course, politics. Earlier in the twen-
tieth century, the role of these last types of dowrehs was
explained in this manner: "In practice the country is run,
one can't say ruled, by small rings of politicians cooperating
with a powerful and corrupt bureaucracy, whose aim is to enrich
themselves so far as possible before a turn of the political
wheel brings their term of office to an enda72
As an example of a dowreh which typifies many of the
qualities of the "ideal type"' we may consider the following
group of gentlemen:
1. Mehdi Namazi 7. Mohammad Najmabadi
2. Mohammad Khosrow Shahi 8. Ali Ardalan
3. Gholem Hossein Khoshbin 9. Ebrahim Mahdavi
4. Abdol Hossein Behnia 10. Ali Vakili
5. Nasrollah Entezam 11. Ali Amini
6. Abdullah Entezam
These eleven constitute the core of one of the oldest continu-
ously operating dowrehs in Iran. It is reported that along
with four or five others who have joined or left the group
over time, they have been meeting weekly for lunch for over
twenty-five years.
The common interests and the satisfactions which their
members receive from their association are at the root of the
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phenomenal prevalence of these dowrehs throughout Iran. In
order to assess these factors, let us turn to some salient
characteristics of the members of the "ideal type" dowreh being
considered.
TABLE 7.13
BIRTH DATE, EDUCATION, AND OCCUPATIONS OF
THE MEMBERS OF AN "IDEAL TYPE" DOWREH
Member Birth Principal Secondary
Number Date Education Occupation Occupation
1 1901 Traditional Senate Business
2 1920 European com- President, Business
mercial Tehran Chamber
of Commerce
3 1898 D.Law, Geneva Minister of Banking
Justice
4 1907 D. Economics, Minister of Business
Paris Finance
5 1889 D.Law, Paris Ambassador Land ownership
to France
6 1907 Tehran School Director, Land ownership
of Diplomacy National Iran-
ian Oil Co.
7 1894 D.Law, Paris Ambassador
to Lebanon
8 1910 D.Law, Paris Ambassador
to Moscow
9 1901 Agricultural Minister of Farming
Col., Germany Agriculture
10 1908 License, Paris Senate Business
11 1905 D.Law, Paris Prime Minister Land ownership
With few exceptions, these dowreh members are all in the
same generation and have had similar educational experiences.
(Although not true of each participant, the dowreh has the repu-
tation of being the "French Doctorate" group.) Within the
period of three years in the early 1960's, the members of the
dowreh held the positions listed. Not surprising, therefore,
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that all eleven were included within the 307 most politically
powerful Iranians.
The occupations of the members provide one clue towards
an explanation of the prevalence of these'groups. One member
of the elite referred to them as'"joint stock companies' for
the exploitation of the political situation and, less frequently,
of the economic situation." With the impossibility of overt
political activity, groups are formed--ostensibly on non-
political grounds--whose purpose is the mutual furtherance of
each other's careers. These groups may even bind their members
to secrecy and mutual aid by oaths or various rituals.
The "French Doctorate" circle is an apt example of this
type. It "placed," or if that term is too purposive, "has" its
members in different positions throughout the political struc-
ture. With the assistance of these representatives, the power
of almost all significant sections of that structure can be
utilized for purposes of mutual welfare. If some members of
the group are "in" while others are "out" of power, no one need
suffer unduly. In addition, these dowrehs provide Iranian
politics with a significant degree of continuity and stability
which a superficial examination would not otherwise reveal.
When one of the members of the clique is elevated to a position
of political importance, there exists a long established coterie
of fellow elites who can be called upon to fill other offices.
The premiership is the most vital of these. Without straying
beyond the confines of his own dowreh a new Prime Minister may
locate individuals to hold ministerial portfolios, men who have
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known each other, communicated with each other on a relatively
intimate basis, and developed a more or less common outlook
together for a number of years. While the premiership is the
most vital example, similar opportunities and problems arise
when one member of the dowreh accedes to any position of
administrative responsibility.
A final key role of the dowrehs in the political process
is the communication function which they provide. Many Iranians
are frequently members of more than one dowreh. An individual
may belong to a political group, such as the one detailed here.
In addition he may also be active in any variety of other
dowrehs organized for social, cultural, recreational, or intel-
lectual purposes. With the overlapping and interlocking
quality of membership which does exist, a message inserted into
one dowreh will quickly fan out through the entire network.
Moreover, dowrehs, especially those organized for the last
three purposes above, frequently cut across social class lines.
As a result, the message will fan out not only within a given
social class, but between social classes. No wonder that a
message generated at the Imperial Court will reach the most
humble bazaari within a day or two. No wonder that this net-
work is so frequently the source of information for members of
the Iranian political elite. When they were asked to mention
the three sources from which they most frequently got news
about Iranian politicial and economic affairs, the responses
were as follows:
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TABLE 7.14
SOURCES OF NEWS ABOUT IRAN
1st mentioned 2nd mentioned 3rd mentioned
Other persons 35.3% 18.6% 15.0%
All other sources 62.3 62.9 52.1
None, don't know 2.4 18.5 32.9
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (167) (167) (167)
Of the variety of sources of information about Iranian poli-
tics--the mass media, Government reports, personal observa-
tions, etc.--the most frequently cited single source is "other
persons." When an elite mentioned this source of news, he was
also asked to mention the kind of person or persons who usually
served as such a source. "Friends" was the most common answer.
It is likely that these friends are those with whom the respon-
dents share membership in a dowreh.
Membership in a dowreh, then, and in other voluntary
organizations, as well as multiple job-holding, tend to serve
the same functions for members of the elite. They are used to
provide fall-back positions, to offer the elite a variety of
access points through which to approach the formal structures
of political power, to multiply the elite's communication pat-
terns, to provide contact with a diversity of elite and non-
elite individuals, and to establish reciprocal obligations with
as many individuals representing as diverse sectors of Iranian
life as possible. All such motives, in short, center around
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the acquisition of a sense of security.73
But the very security which members of the elite seek in
multiple association memberships and occupational positions con-
tributes to their felt insecurity. For with such participation,
they are subjected to the pressures generated by social change
and the tenuousness of the political process itself. And the
more they are subjected to these processes, the greater is
their insecurity. Increased participation in the political
system may, in fact, contribute to the objective political or
social security of the elite by contributing to the stability
of their elite positions. But simultaneously, their psychic
security is diminished.
In at least one sense, this conclusion seems contradic-
tory to the literature on group participation and insecurity
levels. For such participation is assumed to enhance control
over one's environment and such control is assumed to contri-
bute to psychological security. This conclusion, a common one
in the literature, is predicated on the assumption that the
individual who participates in a variety of organizations will
be able to influence the policies of those organizations in
directions congruent with the individual's self-interest. By
this sense of efficacy derived from molding his environment
and by the objective benefits which will flow to the individual
from controlling his environment, it is generally assumed that
the individual will enhance his sense of security.74
But in Iran, it is highly doubtful that these results
accure to individuals who participate so thoroughly in their
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society. For the chief source of insecurity for the Iranian
elite remains perpetually beyond their control. We refer, of
course, to His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah. Members of
the elite can use multiple job holding and overlapping organiza-
tional memberships to acquire wealth and enhance their poli-
tical power by acquiring control over administrative hierarchies,
but they can, with these techniques, never assure themselves
of sufficient bases of power to influence the Shah. And when
he reaches the conclusion that a given member of the elite is
dysfunctional, in any sense, no amount of wealth or memberships
can save the individual from dismissal, disgrace, or demotion.
The fall from grace can be cushioned. It cannot be prevented.
Suzanne Keller has made this same point on a general
level, but it applies most directly to the Iranian political
elite. She argues that:
Although individuals are increasingly achieving elite
status, this status, once won, has grown less rather
than more secure, Retirement, dismissal, defeat, or
rejection inevitably face members of a strategic elite.
In a world that demands flexible accommodation to rapidly
changing problems of national and international scope,
tenure at the top is apt to be brief and uncertain. For
the heridtary elites of old, entrances were signalled
by birth, exits mainly by death. There was no fixed
route to the top because most of the members were al-
ready at the top. If the rules of the game were ob-
served, one's status was secure. This pattern of the
past 7gurvives only in the Social Register of the present
day,,
To put the matter slightly differently, the active member of the
political elite in Iran can enhance his subjective feelings of
success0 By providing new areas of striving in which to demon-
strate competence and mastery, these subjective feelings of
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self-esteem may very well lead to an enhanced sense of personal
security.76 But by his awareness of his failure to truly con-
trol his destiny, this sense of security will be eroded and,
indeed, precluded. In the final analysis, awareness of inef-
ficacy at the most basic level will be paramount and destructive.
Evidence of this is available in the positive and sig-
nificant association between level of reputed power on the one
hand and degree of participation in the system and levels of
manifest insecurity on the other. The higher the number of paid
or unpaid positions held and the greater the number of organiza-
tional memberships claimed, the higher the individual's level
of power. Simultaneously, however, the higher is the indivi-
dual's level of manifest insecurity. As the individual enhances
his power, he increases his participation in the system which,
in turn, contributes to a further enhancement of his political
power. But as his power increases, so does his insecurity.
The members of the elite run faster and faster to stay ahead
politically. But they continually fall behind psychically
Their dilemma is bitter.
The present Prime Minister, for example, Amir Abbas
Hoveyda, is generally regarded to be the most successful holder
of that office during the entire reign of the present Shah.
Only two other premiers have enjoyed a longer tenure in the
twentieth century, and his modesty and self-effacing nature
have contributed to his -enjoying widespread good will. 7 None-
theless, Hoveyda was recently asked how long he thought he
would hold his post. "Hoveyda made no bones about the fact
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that his job was a question of being here today, gone tomorrow.
'How long I stay in office is not in my hands,' the Premier
explained, 'but I work in such a way as to make myself believe
that I will be in office for another 1,000 years. At the same
time, I am prepared to resign at a second's notice.'" 78
One final result of these multiple memberships and
occupational positions might be mentioned. In a study out-
lining the relationship between insecurity and radicalism, it
was found that "radicalism seems related to insecurity only
when it is the radicalism of the 'lone wolf.' 79 That is,
insecurity is likely to be associated with radical political
orientations for those who are "individuated" or "degrouped"
or socially isolated. As members of the Iranian political
elite are so thoroughly not socially isolated, the likelihood
of the emergence of radical politicalideologies from amongst
them is considerably diminished. The absence of such radical
ideologies is a striking feature of Iranian public life.
SOCIAL STATUS
In addition to level of reputed political power, the
level of an individual's social status is also positively
associated with manifest insecurity. As the more powerful
display higher levels of insecurity, so do members of the so-
cial elite. We compared elite scores on the MI factor with
whether or not they claimed to have influential relations,
with these results:
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TABLE 7.15
INFLUENTIAL RELATIONS CLAIMED
BY RESPONDING ELITE
Level of Yes NoManifest Insecurity
Low 24.0% 40.0%
Medium 37.6 40.0
High 38.4 20.0
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (125) (40)
(x2 = 5.85, df = 2, p = .054, gamma - .352)
The results, while not of unusually high statistical signifi-
cance, indicate that the more elite--as measured in social
terms rather than solely on political grounds--do demonstrate
higher levels of manifest insecurity. The more intimately the
elite are involved in the present system, on a class basis as
well as on a political basis, the more insecurity which is
manifested. As King Hussein titled a recent autobiography,
Uneasy Lies the Head; so with members of the elite. 80
FOREIGN TRAVEL
Another social background factor which is a frequent
companion of manifest insecurity and more strongly of its prin-
cipal component--frustration--is the respondent's personal
familiarity with the world beyond the borders of Iran. The
greater the number of trips which a member of the elite has
made outside Iran, the more likely he is to agree strongly
with the question, "Do you often feel frustrated because you
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are unable to do as you wish or unable to accomplish what you
wish?"
TABLE 7.16
NUMBER OF FOREIGN TRIPS MADE
BY THE RESPONDENT
Reported Frus- Number of Trips
tration Level 0-5 6-20 21 or more
Very High 10.8% 21.9% 43.1%
High 10.8 14.1 12.1
Not Very High 78.4 64.0 44.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (37) (64) (58)
(x2 = 14.437, df = 4, p .006, gamma - .435)
What appears to be at work is the debilitating effect of first-
hand personal experience in other political and social systems.
Daniel Lerner has discussed the ways in which a society charac-
terized by physical mobility and social mobility gradually
evolved into a society with participant life styles, inhabited
by persons with mobile personalities. "The mobile person," he
suggests, "is distinguished by a high capacity for identifica-
tion with new aspects of his environment, he comes equipped
with new mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon
himself that arise outside of his habitual experience."81
In support of this point, our data suggest that members
of the Iranian political elite who enjoy foreign travel--and
the statistics reveal that the vast majority frequently make
lengthy stays abroad--do make demands from the political
environment which are not conventionally made; neither are
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they conventionally fulfilled. As the elite with immediate
experience in other systems are rebuffed in their attempts to
translate that experience into the Iranian context, the results
are frustration and higher levels of manifest insecurity.
This relationship portends no lessening of frustration
in the future. For foreign travel is one of the benefits of
elite membership disproportionately enjoyed by the more power-
ful (r = .301, p < .001). Again the more powerful have yet
another basis for their discontent.8 2 The powerful demonstrate
higher levels of manifest insecurity not only because they are
more subject to influences from His Imperial Majesty over which
they have no control but also because they enjoy first-hand
experience--physical mobility--which exposes them to new life
styles inappropriate to Iranian conditions as defined by others
of the elite.
All the above variables which are significantly associated
with manifest insecurity can be thought of as representing the
socialization experiences of elite respondents. Analytically,
such experiences need to be separated according to the life
stages of the individuals on which they impinge.83 Experiences
peculiar to early childhood, adolescence, and adulthood need to
be treated as distinct tiers in the processes of socialization.
In addition, one must consider those attributes of the indi-
vidual which are relevant to such tiers. In this latter
category, one could conceive of wealth, height, religion, etc.,
which,while not of direct importance as a socialization
experience are nonetheless vital because they directly affect
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the experiences which the individual will undergo in these
various tiers or stages.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
We have considered above a number of socialization ex-
periences appropriate to relatively early stages of the indi-
vidual's development. Child rearing data and education fall
into that category. In addition, we have considered later
socialization experiences--occupations, foreign travel, and
the like. Finally, we have discussed certain personal attri-
butes such as social status and reputed power. Let us turn,
now, to another set of adult socialization experiences.
Another factor from the general body of social background
data was labelled "Mass Media Exposure." It contained the fol-
lowing items and loadings:
TABLE 7.17
MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE FACTOR
1. Number of newspapers read per day by
the respondent .628
2. Frequency with which the respondent
listens to the radio .518
3. Frequency with which the respondent
views television .497
4. Number of Persian or foreign language
magazines which the respondent reads
per month .427
5. Membership in a dowreh (circle) of friends
or family which meets regularly .376
6. Respondent's service in the Imperial
Iranian Armed Forces - .319
7. Sex of the respondent .313
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What is associated in this factor is consumption of all aspects
of the mass media in Iran including foreign magazines, news-
papers, and television films.84 Membership in a dowreh, as in
the Activity Factor, loads with mass media exposure as do sex
(male) and service in the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, but
these are appreciably less associated with this factor than
the mass media variables.
As might be expected, media exposure and manifest inse-
curity are positively and significantly associated,
TABLE 7.18
MANIFEST INSECURITY BY EXPOSURE
TO THE MASS MEDIA
Manifest Exposure to Mass Media
Insecurity Low Medium High
Low 49.0% 16.4% 20.4%
Medium 25.5 46.3 40,8
High 25.5 37.3 38.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (51) (67) (49)
(x2 : 17.455, df = 4, p = .002, gamma = .272)
This relationship was predictable on several grounds.
Consumption of the mass media is a prime expression of a "par-
ticipant style." 8 6 That is, the greater the individual's
consumption of the mass media, the more is he immersed in
Iranian society. As we have seen with other measures of such
immersion in Iranian life, e.g., number of jobs, number of
organizational memberships, etc., the greater is the attendant
level of insecurity. The more an individual is a part of
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contemporary Iranian society, the more is he subjected to the
strains and stresses which result in the generation of
insecurity.
These strains emanate from the individual's heightened
realization of his personal inability to manipulate the environ-
ment in ways which will foster autonomy and safety. They also
are a product of the individual's being subjected to conflicting
value systems. For as with foreign travel, so with exposure to
the mass media. Thus, the individual, especially in Iran, is
bombarded with stimuli of foreign lifeways and styles. He is
made frustratingly aware of the shortcomings of his own society,
its backwardness, and the generally low esteem in which it is
held in the world at large.87 No less an authority than His
Imperial Majesty comments on the role of the media in this
fashion:
We have found it best to control such [subversive]
organizations 0 . commonly masquerading as devoted
indigenous nationalists . . while at the same time
allowing maximum freedom for individual expression .
To allow people to speak their minds not only provides a
valuable cathartic; it also may serve to uncover abuses.
. In Iranian bookshops and in the daily Press you
can find material that is sharply critical of some of
the Government's policies. 8 8
But in order to be subversive of the established order, the
mass media need not be directly critical; the precedent of
foreign example is sufficient. The individuals who consume the
mass media are subjected to these stimuli but the effect, as
shown by their responses to other items, is not Icathartic" in
the least. On the contrary, frustrations are heightened, ten-
sions are made apparent, and insecurity is the result. While
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the messages in the media may allow political pressures to dis-
sipate, at least partially, they leave the individuals who
absorb those messages all the more insecure,
EDUCATION
A final word might be offered on the relationship of
education to insecurity. Insofar as education, especially tech-
nical education, familiarizes its recipient with a culture
contradictory to that of traditional Iran, it should be expected
to be associated with insecurity. In fact this does not prove
to be the case, as the data reveal an inverse relation between
education and insecurity. We suggest that this apparent con-
tradiction can be resolved by considering education to provide
its holder with a power base which, being in high demand by the
Shah, serves to lessen insecurity. That Mansur was able to
invest the higher levels of the bureaucracy with technically
educated colleagues and that they have remained in office after
their immediate benefactor's death have tended to augment this.
In short, the heightened insecurity to be expected from com-
peting ideologies and belief systems is absent because the very
education which serves as the source of manifest insecurity
also provides the individual with greater control over a cen-
tral base of power, control which serves to minimize insecurity.
Nonetheless, one would be optimistic to expect this satisfac-
tory resolution to continue into the future. Not only will
these technically educated elite be subjected to the challenge
of an ever-increasing number of even more highly educated and
412
younger men, but they will enjoy greater exposure to other cul-
tures. As foreign travel is positively correlated with power
(r = .301, p < .002), we can expect the "technocrats" to travel
more frequently as they become more powerful. Hence, as Iran's
elite are challenged by more first-hand acquaintance with com-
peting ideologies on the one hand and by younger and better
trained technocrats on the other, their manifest insecurity
with its attendant consequences can be expected to become more
pronounced.
In sum, then, we find members of the Iranian political
elite beset with manifest insecurity characterized as insecurity
of the secondary, adult level. Data exist which relate primary
insecurity, exemplified by answers to Maslow's Security-
Insecurity Inventory, to this manifest insecurity although
doubts engendered by the validity and reliability of the former
inventory leave the issue in the form of a hypothesis for future
testing.
But manifest insecurity is prominently associated with a
number of variables which can be reduced to two distinct con-
cepts. Firstly, heightened insecurity is associated with more
intensive participation in Iranian society, defined in its
fullest sense. Power, status, consumption of the mass media,
immersion in the bureaucracy and voluntary associations, and
multiple job holding all symbolize this immersion and all
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contribute to, and in turn are fed by, higher levels of a sense
of insecurity.
Secondly, exposure to value systems which differ from
conventional Iranian culture is an accompaniment to manifest
insecurity independent of participation in the society. Harold
Lasswell has discussed the generation of insecurity through the
world-wide dissemination of new symbols. "Propaganda, as the
name for the self-conscious spread of symbols to mobilize col-
lective action," he has argued, "tends to maximize insecurities,
and hence, crises." 8 9 Foreign travel, the most prevalent
source of immediate experience with foreign symbols and cul-
tures, is widely enjoyed by political elite and is intimately
related to levels of manifest insecurity. Attention to radio,
television, newspapers, and magazines in Iran is the most
prevalent source of mediate experience with other value systems.
And mass media consumption is also intimately related to
manifest insecurity.
M
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CHAPTER VIII
ORIENTATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ELITE:
CYNICISM, MISTRUST, AND EXPLOITATION
428
CYNICISM
The proper province of doubt extends to
infinity .
Montesquieu
The attitudinal characteristic of cynicism which has
been judged so harmful to the processes of social change is not
unknown to students of developing societies. 1 In particular,
it has frequently been ascribed to the peoples of the Middle
East. Albert Hourani, for example, notes:
This crisis of the Arab mind today is clear. All
around is a sea of nihilism: the cynicism of men
cut off from their own past, deprived too long of
responsibility for their own fate, tied too long
to a decarying Empire, exposed oo soon to the
corruption of wealth and power.
The issues implied above are those which we wish to
clarify and confront here. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines a cynic as one "disposed to deny human sincerity and
goodness." Webster's suggests that a cynic is "one who be-
lieves that human conduct is motivated wholly by self-interest."
But in terms of the philosophy of the Greek cynics, the concept
can be considered far more comprehensive. Those Cynics were
"irreverent toward culture, disloyal to the State, resentful
to authority, anti-intellectual, and scornful of conventional
morality.
In an impressionistic sense, Iranian politics and society
appear to be leavened by an unmitigated cynicism of this last,
more broadly defined type. The verses of Khayyam, who wrote so
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effectively of Iranian culture, for example, might have been
written instead by Diogenes:
The manner that I look upon
This life's affairs, and analyze,
The whole round world, as view my eyes,
Is vanity, and better gone.
They blessings on the base alone
Are showered; men of nobler part
Thou punishest; which proye s thou art
A donkey, or a doting crone."
Elite respondents were no less biting in their own perceptions
of Iranian society. One told the story of how a foreigner in
Tehran had complained about something. An Iranian friend re-
sponded: "You're right, you've hit on one of the only two
things wrong with Iranian society. The first is what's been
bothering you; the second is everything else in the country."
A second put his cynicism differently: "To become outstanding
in any field of endeavor in Iran," he warned, "requires an
appetite for corruption and a taste for personal decay."
The cynicism of the elite was reflected in the cynicism
factor which grouped the following items and assigned them, in
the varimax rotation, the loadings as given:
TABLE 8.1
CYNICISM FACTOR
1. On the whole, do you think that the Iranian
political system is working very well, not too
well, or badly? 
- .723
2. Today, political power in Iran is really con-
trolled by certain foreign governments. .711
3. In terms of what you see around you, would you
say there is a great deal of injustice or not
so much injustice? 
.658
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4. Politics in Iran is the business of such a small
group of people that I usually can't find out what
is really going on until the important decisions
have already been made. .619
5. In Iran, a person can have himself chosen for
almost any government office if he is enough of
a bootlicker and flatterer. .605
6. I don't think that really powerful public offi-
cials and politicians care much what people like
me think. .603
7. The best man is almost always picked for promo-
tion to important positions in Iran's government. - .600
8. Lawbreakers are almost always caught and punished
in Iran. .589
9. Degree of trust accorded to the mass media in
Iran by the respondent. - .548
10. In Iran, dishonesty seems to be more prevalent
in the government service than in most other
careers. .543
11. What we need more than anything else is a strong
leader to tell us what to do. - .495
12. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to
gain a profit or advantage rather than risk
losing it. .487
13. People with wild and strange opinions in Iran
should not be allowed a public platform from
which to preach. - .478
14. Mobility Scale (The total number of "yes"
answers to: In Iran do you think that any per-
son with the capability and talent, regardless
of wealth or family status, is able to become:
owner of a small enterprise; owner of a large
enterprise, an employee of the government in a
high post; a high officer in the army; a promi-
nent politician; an office worker? .468
15. It's no use getting upset and concerned about
broad political issues and public affairs;
people like me really can't do anything about
them anyway. .458
16. Number of negative or unfavorable changes in
the Iranian way of life mentioned by the respon-
dent. - .447
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17. How easy do you think it is for a high govern-
ment official to lose his position, status,
and wealth? .432
18. Number of positive or favorable changes in the
Iranian way of life mentioned by the respondent. .429
19. What do you consider the likelihood of Iran's
overcoming in the next ten years the first
problem which you have enumerated? - .417
20. To what extent do you feel surrounded and im-
peded by red tape, petty rules and regulations,
and other annoyances? .396
21. The average Iranian is overwhelmingly motivated
by self-interest, that is, the pursuit of his
own, personal interests. .389
22. How much is there that you as an individual can
do to solve the first of the personal problems
which you mentioned that you are facing? - .353
23. Do you feel that in Iran there exists much,
enough, little, or no national unity? - .326
24. How would decisions usually be made in your own
family at the present time? .325
25. Most people in Iran make friends because friends
are likely to be helpful and useful to them. .311
These items represent a number of indexes which had been
formed on a priori grounds before running the factor analysis.
The indexes and items which make them up are;
Indexes Variable Numbers
Personal Cynicism 12, 21, 25
Political and Social Cynicism 5, 7, 8, 10
Personal Efficacy 2, 4, 6, 15, 19, 22
Mobility 14, 17
Authoritarianism 11, 13, 24
General System Orientation 1, 3, 9, 16, 18, 20, 23
The relation of these indexes to the factor illuminates the
dynamics of cynicism in Iran, Firstly, the loadings indicate
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that personal, social, and political cynicism are all posi-
tively related--higher levels of one associated with higher
levels of the other. Or as reported in a study done in two
American cities, "those who are contemptuous of people in
general, the personally cynical, tend to be politically cynical
as well . . ."5 The converse is also true. Those who view
neither their society nor their fellowcountrymen with derision
have more sanguinary and positive attitudes toward the politi-
cal system. What is here implied is that cynicism is a general
character orientation which "spills over"' into all aspects of
elite perceptions.
Other studies have indicated that personal and political
cynicism may, in fact, be related in a different fashion. One
hypothesis suggests that an individual might be positively re-
lated to those persons or organizations with which he is in
most frequent contact. Feelings of hostility or negativism
which might prove disruptive of those proximate relations could
be displaced on to more distant, and safer, objects. It is
frequently alleged that such displacement operates most easily
onto symbols which are outside the national political system.
It is also possible that these feelings may be displaced to
symbols of national politics. The result could be the preser-
vation of immediate interpersonal harmony at the cost of dis-
rupting internal politics or foreign relations. Our data
indicate that this mechanism is not common among the political
elite. Rather, cynicism is equally prevalent in the most
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immediate interpersonal relations of the respondents as well as
in their attitudes towards national politics and international
relations.
A second commonly advanced notion about cynicism is that a
cynical orientation, or at least a healthy skepticism towards
the political system, may be a quite rational and ultimately
beneficial response to the political process. 6 It is doubtful
that objective, foreign observers with no personal stake in
Iranian politics would need delve too deeply before uncovering
incidents inducing cynicism. But this rather appropriate
cynicism also appears absent from the Iranian system. A con-
structive and sophisticated skepticism about the possibilities
for reform and the social benefits to be derived from political
change is absent. Rather, a more diffuse and pessimistic
negativism relating to fellow Iranians, to all Iranian society,
and to Iranian politics undercuts the social value of all
human endeavor. Thus, for example, the elite were asked to
specify the most important changes which have occurred in
Iranian society since the end of World War II (factor items
16 and 18). The more cynical invariably recounted an over-
whelmingly greater number of negative changes while the less
cynical related a more balanced appraisal.7
In addition to the indexes pertaining directly to cynicism,
other questions in this factor relate to perceptions of power.
Four question (2, 4, 6, 15) were designed to tap the respon-
dents' sense of personal, political efficacy. As originally
formulated, the questions were used in the United States to
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assess the subjective political effectiveness of the American
citizen.8 They were adapted to reflect the workings of the
Iranian political system, and the role of the elite in it. A
fifth question (22) applied to the sense of efficacy of indivi-
dual members of the elite in confronting strictly personal prob-
lems. And a final item (19) asked for their estimates of the
likelihood that Iran could overcome its national problems, i.e.,
their perceptions of the efficacy of the entire political system.
As with the diffuse sense of cynicism, so with the sense of
efficacy. Individuals who report a sense of potency in politi-
cal matters also report a sense of mastery when confronting
their own personal problems and when evaluating the possibilities
of their nation's successfully mastering its problems.9 Once
again this "spill over" effect seems to be operating. One
might expect the elite to displace their feelings of personal
inadequacy or incapacity onto the system at large or to iden-
tify with the generally recognized impotency of the system
while claiming high efficacy for themselves. Conversely, those
of the elite who feel helpless before the social change which
they are powerless to affect and a political system in which
one actor is dominant, might be expected to denigrate their own
capacities while attributing nearly magical strengths to the
political system with which they are so intimately connected.
But such is not the case,. Rather, the similar patterns
which the elite manifest in all six questions lends credence
to our assumption that the sense of efficacy is "object free,"
i.e., that it approximates a general character orientation.
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Whether the member of the elite considers his power vis a vis
his government, the elite, the Shah, foreign governments, his
personal problems, or the power of the system, he responds in
a similar fashion. It appears that in terms of efficacy, as
with cynicism, a member of the elite either does have a basic
sense of his own mastery and competence (or cynicism) or he
does not. If the former is true he is, at least figuratively,
ready to take on the world. If the latter holds, he feels
weak and ineffective in nearly all areas of life.
But how does this rather unfocused perspective on power
relate to the overriding general orientation of cynicism? As
the factor loadings demonstrate, they are inversely related.
Higher levels of efficacy are associated with lower levels of
cynicism, while low efficacy and high cynicism are positively
related. Those of the elite who possess this sense of personal
potency are less sarcastic and cynical of the political system
and other individuals.
This inverse relationship between cynicism and felt effi-
cacy has been well established in studies by Agger et al.,
Edgar Litt, and others.10 Melvin Seeman, for example, in a
study of alienation in the work process suggests that work with
little decision-making potentiality leaves the worker with a
sense of the world as unmanageable and himself as relatively
powerless on "a wide range of social and personal outcomes."
Such powerlessness is a key component of alienation in occupa-
tions which leads to the worker's viewing the social order as
"less supportive and trustworthy.tl
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Seeman, then, and most of these authors have considered
political cynicism the dependent variable in this relationship,
i.e., the failure to develop a sense of efficacy resulting in
derision of the political system or of politicians. But there
appears no valid conceptual reason why both these concepts
should be immediate or superficial accommodations to political
reality any more than that they both represent facets of the
same underlying characterological dimension. In fact, this is
what our factor analysis suggests. These two variables are so
intimately related, according to the responses of the political
elite, that they fall out on one factor: they cannot be con-
sidered statistically independent.
Another set of variables which appears in this factor
pertains to aspects of mobility. Item 14 is an index of
responses to six questions in which the elite assay the pos-
sibilities for the upward occupational mobility of non-elite.
Question 17 represents the converse situation. Here the elite
are asked to consider the possibility that high government
officials can be downwardly mobile. (For this question, down-
ward mobility was defined as the loss, not only of political
power, but of wealth and social status--a rare circumstance
in the context of Iranian politics.) The two aspects of
mobility are significantly related0 The elite who were most
optimistic over the life chances of the non-elite were those
who felt most strongly that a high government official would
not surrender his place or possessions. And similarly, with
those who felt it most unlikely that the less wealthy or
437
prestigious would advance in the society. The latter of the
elite suggested that downward mobility was not especially
unusual for high officials.
In other words, the elite tended to divide into two groups.
One group saw a benevolent social system in which sufficient
resources could be marshalled to satisfy the desires of both
the present and the would-be elite. A second group perceived
social mobility and thus, we assume, politics, as a zero-sum
game. While upward mobility was unlikely for the non-elits,
those who did rise were counter-elite or at least could have
their claims to elite status satisfied by denying the rewards
of that status to those of the existing elite.
But how are these two views of Iranian reality related to
the variables of cynicism and efficacy? Respondents who claim
a sense of efficacy and lower levels of cynicism have the most
benign view of social mobility. Those who are more trusting of
persons and politics and who feel more politically potent are
optimistic about possibilities for upward mobility for the non-
elite and for the continued 'eliteness" of the present elite.
On the other hand, the cynical and impotent of the elite see
upward mobility as less likely and the fall of high officials
as more likely. Where cynicism and powerlessness are rife,
pessimism is not absent.
Another set of variables which "fell out" in this first
factor, relates to authoritarianism (11, 13, 24). Those of
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the elite who are more cynical* are the least well-disposed to
authoritarian leadership. They disagree most strongly with the
notion that "a strong leader" who would tell "Iranians what to
do" is "what we need more than anything else." This is a re-
markable positions for members of the political elite. For,
after all, Iran already does have such a leader. Disagreement
with the statement then implies dissatisfaction with the nature
and course of Iranian politics and the very personification of
the system itself--His Imperial Majesty. In short, while the
question in the abstract has been frequently used to tap
authoritarian attitudes., it means that and more in Iran. A
predilection for authoritarian leadership constitutes a vote
for the political system as it is currently established.
A second item subsumed by this index relates to the will-
ingness of the Iranian political elite to tolerate divergent
political opinions. It was originally hypothesized that the
less cynical-more efficacious in the elite would be willing to
countenance such polemics. Being satisfied with Iranian poli-
tics and the righteousness of the system and trusting of
others' motives, these individuals might have felt less chal-
lenged by contrary opinions. In fact, the opposite is the
case. As the less cynical of the elite support decision-making
by a strong leader, so would they restrict public debate to
ideas which are politically and morally acceptable to them.
*Note that henceforth when referring to "cynicism"~ we
have in mind the entire cynicism factor and also imply low
efficacy, pessimism in regard to mobility, etc.
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Again, this is a two-pronged question for it refers both to a
general character orientation as well as a more narrowly and
specifically political concern. Time and again, the Shah has
made it clear that he will tolerate "opposition" parties and
leaders insofar as they clearly operate within the policy direc-
tive of his Six or Eight Point Reform Laws. Thus, nearly the
only legitimate issue for intra-elite or elite versus non-elite
political infighting would be a claim by the "outs" that the
"ins" are not sufficiently intent or efficient in implementing
the Shah's programs.
A willingness to tolerate the expression of opinions which
diverge from this code of public conduct is, in effect, a
rebuff to the current political order. The cynical and ineffi-
cacious elite are the ones ready to offer such a rebuff. The
non-cynical are ready to maintain the existing guidelines,
exclude threatening opinions, and support the manner in which
politics is presently contested.
It was feared that the responses to these items intended
to tap general authoritarianism might produce spurious results
because of their inevitable connection with contemporary
Iranian politics. An additional item was added, therefore,
which bears no relevance to those politics but which seeks
information on the nature of decision making within the
respondents' families. It was hypothesized that the less
authoritarian respondents would report more democratic family
decisions making. Indeed, this was the case. Those who
rejected the value of "a strong leader" and favored the
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expression of more divergent opinions also claimed that their
wives and children more often participated in the running of
their families. They personally made fewer of the decisions
unadvised and tended to share that authority more readily.
In a society other than Iran, one might be able to argue
that, in fact, such respondents are living in households
dominated by their women and children. No wonder that cynicism
and a sense of powerlessness are not far behind. While our
data do not refute this hypothesis, it appears highly untenable
impressionistically, in the contexts of both Iranian culture
and our data. The latter indicated that only five of the elite
(3 per cent) reported that their spouses made family decisions
unencumbered by their husbands and one of the elite claimed
that his children made the decisions alone.
The authoritarian item devoid of specifically political
content, then, was answered in the same fashion by the same
respondents as the more manifestly political items. We feel
more confident in suggesting that among the Iranian political
elite, cynicism, powerlessness, and non-authoritarianism are
all part of one conceptual "package."
Finally, a number of individual items measuring elite
orientations to the political system are included in the fac-
tor. Two of these--evaluations of the changes in Iranian
society since World War II--have been mentioned. But there
were a number of other items and the elite pattern of responses
to them is consistent. The higher the level of cynicism and
its attitudinal accountrements, the deeper the antagonisms to
441
the system. Not only are negative changes reported more fre-
quently but these elites perceive the political system as bogged
down in administrative inefficiencies and their country as
totally lacking national unity while they view themselves as
trapped in a mire of red tape.
Elite with this set of orientations also tend to perceive
their environments as beset by injustice (3). In fact, the
overall perception of injustice in Iran was surprisingly high.
Responses to the question, "In terms of what you see around
you, would you say there is a great deal of injustice or not
so much injustice?" were as follows:
TABLE 8.2
PERCEIVED INJUSTICE IN IRAN
A very great deal of injustice 46.7%
A great deal of injustice 25.2
Not very much injustice 18.6
Very little injustice 1.2
Don't know, or Refuse to answer 8.3
Total 100.0%
N (167)
The responses of the Iranian elite may be compared to the
attitudes of French and Italian industrial workers as reported
by Hadley Cantril. We note, not surprisingly, one major
difference in these statistics--the Iranian elite are more
likely to hold an opinion or, at least, to reveal that opinion.
The fewer "don't knows" among the Iranian respondents are
accounted for by a slight increase in the number reporting
"not much injustice" but also by a large increase in the
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TABLE 8.3
PREVALENCE OF INJUSTICE IN FRANCE AND ITALY
AS REPORTED BY INDUSTRIAL WORKERS,
BY PERCENTAGE 1 2
France Italy
Much injustice 63% 66%
Not so much injustice 17 17
No opinion 20 17
Total 100% 100%
reports of the presence of injustice. Indeed, the overall
level of perceived injustice is higher among the Iranian elite
than among the French and Italian industrial proletariat. 1 3
While the level of perceived injustice is high among the
Iranian elite in general, it is at a peak among the more cyni-
cal. Thus we removed the injustice item from the factor and
ran it against an index of other items in the cynicism factor
with the following results:
TABLE 8.4
PERCEIVED INJUSTICE BY CYNICISM
Perceived Injustice
Cynicism
High Medium Low
High 13,6% 9.5% 0.0%
Medium 52.6 57.2 24.2
Low 3.8 33.3 75.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (78) (42) (33)
(x2 = 72.597, df = 4, p 0.000)
NOR
443
The perception of injustice goes hand in hand with a sense of
powerlessness, pessimism over mobility, and general negativism.
Another single item in the factor reveals a similar rela-
tionship. The elite were asked to assess the extent to which
they believed in the content of Iran's mass media (9). Similar
to many of the other items in the questionnaire, this is a
multi-faceted tool. On the simplest level we can learn elite
attitudes to their own mass media. But on another level, atti-
tudes towards the trustworthiness of the mass media, as with
the willingness to tolerate the public expression of opinions
divergent from current maxims, reflect attitudes towards the
political system. For the media are rigidly supervised by the
Government to exclude any array of information deemed harmful.
The mass media, then, tend to reflect the political orienta-
tions of the system and a failure of confidence in the media
is a criticism not so much of the fourth estate as of the sys-
tem as a whole. And on yet another level, the question of
confidence in the newspapers, radio, and television of Iran
reflects an underlying propensity to trust the environment--
to accept, on a manifest level, the content and direction of
one's milieu. To what extent do the elite display this will-
ingness: as might be expected, to no great extent. Whereas
only slightly less than one-third of the elite were favorably
inclined towards the mass media, nearly one-half of the respon-
dents who do manifest such scores, i.e., who are "cynical,"
report that the media are "usually not" or "almost never"
trustworthy or correct. Only 6 per cent of those scoring high
pTABLE 8.5
DEGREE OF TRUST ACCORDED THE MASS MEDIA IN
IRAN BY THE POLITICAL ELITE
The mass media in Iran are
almost always trustworthy and correct 8.4%
usually trustworthy and correct 22.8
about equal 9.0
not very trustworthy and correct 26.3
almost never trustworthy and correct 17.4
(not asked or refused to answer) 16.1
Total 100.0%
N (167)
reported the converse--that the media were "usually" or
"almost always"' trustworthy. On the other hand, 54 per cent
of those who scored low on the cynicism factor expressed
trust in the mass media while only 6 per cent of the non-
cynical felt that the media were "usually not" or "almost
never" trustworthy or correct (p = 0.000).
This general disbelief in the mass media on the part of
the more cynical of the elite serves to fuel Tehran's amazingly
well-developed rumor network. That channel is widely assumed
to convey more reliable and valid information than do the for-
mal channels of communication. But rumor serves a variety of
functions other than the transmission of news and information.
One of these is the politically safe expression of hostility
or dissatisfaction towards the Government. By tolerating
such expression, the regime provides a relatively harmless
outlet for sentiments which would prove more disruptive were
they to be disseminated in the mass media. These informal
networks also provide an opportunity for the displacement into
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Very well 15.6%
Fairly well 31.7
Not too well 26.3
Badly 15.0
Don't know, Refused to
answer, or Not asked 11.4
Total 100.0%
N (167)
More of the elite were positively oriented towards the workings
of the political system than were disposed to be critical. But
of greater interest is the relationship between this item,
taken alone, and other variables in the cynicism factor. As
with the variables above, there is a statistically significant
relationship which could be expected to occur virtually niever
by chance. The greater the score on the cynicism factor, the
less well that respondent felt the political system to be
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gossip of what otherwise might assume the form of derisive and
substantive political issues. 14
A final overview of the orientation of the elite towards
their political system is provided by their responses to the
item which loaded most highly on this factor (1). The elite
were asked to present their overall appraisal of "how well" the
Iranian political system is "working." Their responses were as
follows:
TABLE 8.6
EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Performance Level Percentage
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operating. Conversely, the non-cynical of the elite, along with
their perceptions of less red tape and injustice, fewer negative
changes since World War II, and a more reliable mass media, also
see their political system as functioning reasonably well.
RELATION OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES TO CYNICISM
An interest in this cluster of attitudinal items which "go
together" in the minds of the Iranian political elite should
not be restricted to an identification of those items alone.
For the identification and interrelationship of items which
commonly load highly on a given factor are only the initial
phases of our task. We want to demonstrate, in the context of
the Iranian political system, that these items intervene be-
tween the social background variables that describe the exis-
tential experiences encountered by these elite and their policy
orientations which give shape and life to the political process
of their nation. Let us turn here to the former concern--the
social background experiences which contributive to the develop-
ment of that cynicism--and then examine in the next chapter the
policy considerations associated with this orientation.
Two social background factors relate significantly to the
Cynicism Factor: the factors which we have labelled Status
and Foreign Exposure. The Status Factor loaded most highly on
two variables generally recognized as an essential component
of social status in Iran, land ownership.
What the factor reveals is the tendency for intergenera-
tional landownership in the families of the elite to associate
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TABLE 8.7
STATUS FACTOR
1. Do you or your spouse own land? If so, more
than one village? More than five? .691
2. Do or did your mother or father own land? If
so, did your mother or father own more than
one village? More than five villages? .665
3. Number of groups or classes mentioned with
which the respondent has held discussions or
conversations a few times per month or more
frequently. 
.381
4. Conversation Score (The frequency of the
respondent's conversations with the enumerated
classes or groups in Iranian society). .381
5. Are there influential persons within your or
- your spouse's family who now hold or have held
important positions in the service of the Gov-
ernment of Iran or in private enterprise? - .301
with having influential relatives and frequent conversations
with a variety of groups in the society. This latter variable
would be expected to occur among those with higher status in
the elite. If they restricted their communication to family
members alone, they would still manifest high discussion
scores as they would be conversing with family members filling
important posts. High status in Iran, as in so many other
societies, is predicated on land ownership, influential rela-
tions, and recurrent communications with many social groups.
But how is this factor related to cynicism? The greater
the status, the less is the cynicism (r = .176, p = .05). The
higher status respondents bring the least cynicism to bear on
their perspectives of other men and their motives.
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A number of items were included in the questionnaire
whose purpose was to measure the respondents' exposure to and
familiarity with non-Iranian culture and stimuli.
TABLE 8.8
FOREIGN EXPOSURE FACTOR
1. Length of time which the respondent has spent
in foreign countries
2. Number of languages other than Persian for
which the respondent claims knowledge
3. Number of trips of any duration made outside
Iran by the respondent
4. Respondent's reputed power score
5. Number'of times respondent has served as a
Cabinet level minister
6. Number of living children
7. Number of magazines, in any language, read by
the respondent
8. Have you ever served in the Imperial Iranian
Armed Forces?
9. Number of Senate sessions in which the respon-
dent was a member
10. Recency of respondent's last trip outside Iran
.761
.587
.583
.402
.392
- .368
.332
- .321
.300
- .287
This factor groups together all the questions in the
interview schedule pertaining to foreign travel. Lengthy
residence abroad, many foreign trips, and recent foreign
travel are all statistically related. A number of occupa-
tional positions also load highly, positions which are asso-
ciated with foreign travel. Cabinet ministers, military
officers, and senators all enjoy foreign travel to a far
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greater degree than their fellows. Such travel is frequently
in the line of duty. Occupants of these posts are sent abraod
to conferences or negotiations, for specialized technical
training, or to observe the operations of foreign industries,
administrative bureaucracies, or parliaments with a view to
transferring all or part of those institutions to Iran.
Finally, foreign travel is positively associated with
higher levels of reputed power. To some extent, foreigners and
foreign experience still convey a mystique among Iranians, who
automatically assume that "foreign" and "superior" are synony-
mous. The elite who are able to demonstrate first-hand
familiarity with foreign languages, foreigners, and foreign life
styles are not only more "modern" but reputedly more able to
cope with Iran's own development, administrative, and political
problems. (The more cynical would argue that this positive
association between power and foreign exposure is a reflection
of the role which foreigners play in the domestic political
process. That is, Iranians with more foreign connections gain
power because of the intervention of those foreigners into
domestic Iranian politics. While we have no direct evidence
which would either support or refute this contention, it appears
to us an overly simplistic interpretation of the sophisticated
process which is Iranian politics.)
But foreign travel and power are also clearly related in
a converse fashion. Those members of the political elite who
are already powerful benefit from the political system by being
rewarded with opportunities for more officially sponsored
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foreign travel. This explanation appears far more plausible,
for abundant supportive evidence already exists. The connec-
tion between certain official positions and travel has already
been mentioned, and those positions in Iran, as was suggested
above, are the preserve of the more powerful.
Unfortunately, the foreign travel which is so widely en-
joyed by the elite appears inimical for the course of political
development in Iran. For such travel is one of the principal
contributory factors towards the development and maintenance of
cynicism.
TABLE 8.9
CYNICISM BY SCORES ON THE FOREIGN
EXPOSURE FACTOR
Foreign Exposure
Cynicism Low High
Low 57.2% 42.2%
High 42.8 57.8
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(Yates x2 a 3.697, continuity corrected, p = .05, gamma - .292)
As the elite are exposed to more stimuli from foreign cultures
and countries, their manifest insecurity is enhanced, So is
their cynicism. This is demonstrated by a multiple regression
analysis where scores on the Cynicism Factor were considered an
independent variable and were run against the social background
factors. Status and Foreign Exposure were the only signifi-
cantly correlated factors. (Multiple r .272, p = .01,
f 2,57, p .05).15
i
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A final relationship between social background factors and
cynicism needs to be mentioned. The regression analysis in-
versely relates scores on the Activity Factor and cynicism.
That is, the higher the activity level, the less the cynicism;
a relationship which violates our hypothesis that greater im-
mersion in the system is more productive of manifest insecurity,
cynicism, and mistrust. However, neither the partial correla-
tion produced in the regression equation (r = .123), nor the
chi squares or gammas generated in cross tabulations reach
levels of statistical significance.
There is an impelling explanation for this weak but in-
verse relation, nevertheless. Those of the Iranian political
elite characterized by the social background variables most
frequently associated with cynicism, i.e., relatively low status,
low activity level, and high direct exposure to foreign in-
fluences, tend to be the younger, better educated, "up and
coming" members of the elite. 16 And the younger the respon-
dent, the lower the level of activity. Holding age constant,
higher levels of education go with greater activity. But the
vast majority of the more active are the older of the elite,
while the vast majority of the better educated are the younger
respondents. The relation between activity and cynicism is to
be explained by the great cynicism of the less active. It is
the so-called "new men" of Iran who manifest the highest levels
of cynicism.17 As a researcher analyzing political elite in
South East Asia has put it, these men represent the "intelli-
gentsia elites." They are "ruling classes proper: they rule
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because they are intelligentsia and not because they are edu-
cated members of other ruling groups in the society."18
These ruling intelligentsia or "new men" are members of
the Iranian political elite not because they can lay claim to
the privileges of social status--their families are relatively
uninfluential; nor to their intense activities in political
parties or social groups--they are the less active of the
elite; but rather because they are the bearers of the "culture
of Modernization" emanating in the West. From their better
educations and more frequent personal contact with farangistan,
these elites are thought of as the "technocrats" who will put
Iran's Government on an administrative basis which is "scien-
tific," "modern," and "Western." Thus, lacking the traditional
bases of power which entitle an individual to a claim on elite
status, these cynical members of the elite are brought into the
system for the skills and special services they offer. They
have achieved political power by being coopted into the elite.
In return for their services, their personal rewards have been
great, but the political system has had to pay a heavy price for
the resulting cynicism.
And there is no reason to assume that with increasing age
these "new men" will lose that cynicism, now so pervasive among
them. With the advent of Mansur to the Premiership in 1965,
their rise from rather unknown young aspirants to Cabinet
posts and other high places has been brilliant. But in the
process, many of the ideals which motivated them as students
and as aspirants have been left behind. Those earlier ideals
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and the contemporary realities are too disparate for easy accom-
modation. The cynicism which has made that accommodation pos-
sible will not be soon forsaken.
MISTRUST
If he is given the egg, he wants the hen . . .
Iranian proverb
Adam Smith framed much of the subsequent debate about the
nature and value of trust when he wrote:
When an animal wants to obtain something either of man or
another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but
to gain the favor of those whose service it requires. A
puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavors by a
thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master
who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man
sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren and when he
has no other means of engaging them to act to his inclina-
tions, endeavors by every servile and fawning attention to
obtain their good will. He has no time, however, to do
this upon every occasion. In civilized society, he stands
at all times in the need of cooperation and assistance of
great multitude, while his whole life is carce sufficient
to gain the friendship of a few persons.
This early venture into ethology aside, Smith attacked the
Hobbesian dilemma by outlining countless means whereby co-
operation between individuals in common social units could be
achieved in the absence of the dreaded Leviathan. All these
means centered about the notion of trust; trust as a sense of
assured anticipation with regard to the behavior of others.
Smith did not argue that Hobbes was an especially poor judge
of human character, i.e., he too believed that individuals
could, in fact, be counted upon to pursue their own selfish in-
terests. Smith was able to demonstrate, however, a basic
fallacy in Hobbes' reasoning. For under certain conditions,
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the pursuit of individual interest could contribute to the com-
mon good. The conditions under which the common good would
accrue to a society of individuals pursuing their own interests
centered about the limits of behavior considered legitimate by
those actors.
Translated into notions of 'renlightened self interest,"
these limits have been accepted as the basis for achieving a
social optimum from individuals attempting to maximize their
own interests. Thus Tocqueville identified a crucial differ-
ence between the citizens of the United States whom he so art-
fully observed and his own France.
I do not think, on the whole, that there is more selfish-
ness among us than in America; the only difference is that
there it is enlightened, here it is not. Each American
knows when to sacrifice some of his private interests to
save the res we want to save everything, and often we
lose it all.
In the process, Tocqueville introduced a second meaning of
the concept of trust, that of an assured reliance on another's
integrity, virtue, justice, etc. These two meanings of the
term--assured reliance on another's behavior and assured reli-
ance of certain types of behavior in another--remain inter-
twined in the concept of trust as it is commonly used and serve
to introduce ambiguities in the concept's application.2 1
For Erikson, the notion of trust is relatively restricted
to the first of these two meanings. Erikson argues that an
infant will develop trust when he has "learned to rely on the
sameness and continuity of the outer providers.'t2 2 Pye, who
extends Erikson's analysis in its relevance to the processes of
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political development, also stresses those aspects of trust
which center on fixity and stability of, interpersonal relations
in the absence of concern for the quality of those relations.
He recognizes that:
First, there is the problem of certainty or predictability:
people in transitional societies can take almost nothing
for granted, they are plagued on all sides by uncertainty
and every kind of unpredictable behavior. In their errati-
cally changing world, e Sry relationship rests upon uncer-
tain foundations . . .
It is in this sense of the concept of trust that Iranian
society demonstrates the difficulties of interpersonal relations.
The inability of Iranians to count on, to be assured of the
meaning of the behavior of others is taught early. So are
Iranians taught early in life to mask their own thoughts.
Taqiyah, dissimulation, is a prevalent notion in Iranian society
dating back to the early centuries of Islam. Iranian Shi'ites
took refuge from the threats of their Sunni Arab or Turkish
overlords by misstating their own religious beliefs. For these
purposes, dissimulation was an accepted, and even honored,
technique. Essentially "the weapon of the weak against the
strong," the practice was so widely accepted and so useful for
self-protection in matters sacred, that its use in areas of
secular interpersonal relations became widespread.24
The aphorism, "Conceal thy gold, thy destination, and thy
creed," is one of a large number of similar caveats which are
the stock in trade of acculturated Persians. Indeed, this
lesson for living is explicitly taught young Persians and forms
the basis of one of the most popular games which youngsters
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play throughout the society. The game, called Goosh va
Damagh (Ear and Nose), is played by a group sitting in a
circle. The "chief" of the game begins by lightly pulling
the ear of the player on his left, or twitching his nose,
tickling his sides, etc. That player than passes on to the
person on his left a similar set of actions designed to
unnerve the recipient. Whoever is unable to control his
emotions and laughs, giggles, or makes a noise is a "loser"
and must leave circle. The game continues on until only one
player is left--the winner being the child most successful
at controlling his emotions and masking his reactions.2 5
This early training in dissimulation is carried on
throughout the -general socialization process in Iran and con-
tributes to the marked instability in interpersonal relations
which is at the root of the distrust so prevalent throughout
the society. In a rather unembellished formulation the author
of "Politics of Distrust in Iran," notes that Iranians have
found it exceptionally difficult to trust one another or to
work together over time in any significant numbers.2 6
But the notion of interpersonal relations characterized
by mistrust is important not merely because it appears to be
widespread in Iran. Rather, the nature of interpersonal rela-
tions ,especially with regard to mistrust, is central to the
efforts of developing societies to build meaningful social
cooperation and integration as a concomitant of moderniza-
tion. Pye alluded to this point above, but he has stated it
even more explicitly, "The art of modern government and
I
I
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politics requires that people work together in ways that will
maximize the forcefulness of the collective effort, while
preserving the necessary flexibility to give scope for change
and innovation.1"27
But observations in a variety of the 115 independent na-
tions reveal that the success of the collective effort--the
social optimum--is not being effectively advanced. Specifi-
cally, ambiguities in interpersonal relations stemming from
notions of trust appear as one central explanatory factor.
From peasant societies to advanced national political sys-
tems, trust in interpersonal relations is crucial and all too
often lacking. Summarizing much of the literature on national
political systems, Verba notes that " . . . unless lessons of
political trust have been learned before demands for partici-
pation arise, such demands are likely to produce tension and
fragmentation."2 8 Binder has commented on just this beha-
vioral ambiguity in his study of Iran:
We have tried to show the lack of integration in the
political system [of Iran], a lack of integration re-
sulting in conflicting expectations and uncertainties
about strategies, on the part of political actors.
Having chosen a strategy based on either traditional
or conventional value expectations, the actor may be
faced with a response based on the opposite value system.
The resultant uncertainties breed alienation
along with a strong sense that no one can be trusted.29
To an even greater extent than is the case at the national
level, problems of mistrust seem to plague interpersonal rela-
tions in developing societies at the village and community
level. After reviewing that body of literature, George Foster
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concludes that "An objective appraisal of a peasant village,
however fond the ethnologist may be of his people, will in
all likelihood reveal basic strains and tensions in inter-
personal relations that make it difficult to understand how
the community continues to function."t30 From Foster's sur-
vey it appears that at the root of these tensions lies mis-
trust--the absence of an assured certainty in the behavioral
responses of others.
Despite the ambiguities inherent in the concept as we
commonly use it, mistrust in interpersonal relations is a
key factor in limiting cooperation essential for organization
and development,31 And that mistrust is a characteristic
mode of interpersonal relations in Iran is a subject about
which virtual certainty exists among students of Iranian
politics. Not surprising, then, that a number of variables
in the elite questionnaire designed to tap this mistrust were
grouped together by the factor analysis of general character
orientations,
TABLE 8J1O
MISTRUST FACTOR
1. The world is a hazardous place in which men
are basically evil and dangerous. ,486
2, Of the following two alternatives, which do
you consider worse for a child, that his
teachers be too strict or that they be too
permissive? .473
3. I believe that most of my associates would
stab me in the back if it meant that they
could get ahead faster that way. ,468
4, A person is better off if he does not trust
anyonet .462
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5. Could you tell me if you have ever belonged to
any group in which all members of the group were
truly good friends and from which you received
full satisfaction? - .444
6, Apart from your immediate family, is there
anyone to whom you confide your most personal
and important problems? - .394
7. We must do all we can to safeguard our chil-
dren from the threats and dangers of life. - .393
8. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to
gain a profit or advantage rather than risk
losing it. .369
9. I mistrust people who are more friendly than
I would naturally expect them to be. .358
10. Maybe some minority groups in Iran do get
treated in a prejudiced fashion, but that is
no business of mine. .328
11. While some women have made valuable contribu-
tions to Iran, women should remain in their
proper place--the home. .300
What falls out on this single factor are a number of items
pertaining to the respondents' views of interpersonal rela-
tions in the family, with people in general, with friends,
with occupational associates, and with minority groups.
People in General (1, 4, 8, 9) -- The four items in
this category were included in the questionnaire as an in-
dication of the respondents' approach to interpersonal rela-
tions in the absence of any specific referents. The four
items differ, however, in pertaining to situations of varying
abstractness. Items 1 and 4 concern trust at its most ab-
stract--the world and all men. When confronted with questions
tapping highly abstract situations and no specific referents,
the elite responded in a manner indicating high levels of
trust:
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"The world is a hazardous place in which men are
basically evil and dangerous."
Agree: 10.2% Disagree: 82;6% No Answer: 7.2%
Total: 100.0% (N=167) 3 2
"A person is better off if he does not trust
anyone."
Agree: 9.6% Disagree: 85.0% No Answer: 5.4%
Total: 100.0% (N-167)
Items 8 and 9, while still devoid of referents, pertain to
interpersonal relaticns considerably less abstract, and in
that sense, considerably more relevant to the common experi-
ences of the elite in coping with others. Answers to these
items were markedly different:
"Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain
a profit or advantage rather than risk losing it."
Agree: 59.9% Disagree: 31.1% No Answer: 9.0%
Total: 100.0% (N=167)
"I mistrust people who are more friendly than I
would naturally expect them to be."
Agree: 57.6% Disagree: 36.0% No Answer: 6,4%
Total: 100.0% (N=167)
These answers reveal that while in the abstract the elite con-
side trust to be a laudable stance, in practice it seems to
be achieved only with great difficulty. As trust becomes a
matter removed from the ideal and a matter for concrete
decisions in interpersonal relations, its incidence is dim-
inished.
Minority Groups (10, 11) -- As the objects of inter-
personal relations begin to be specified more distinctly,
the level of trust accorded those objects diminishes.
Minority groups in Iranian society are a case in point. The
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status of minorities in Iran has long been a source of pride
to the regime. While minorities in one developing nation
after another have been singled out for harsh treatment--fre-
quently as scapegoats for internal dissatisfaction after the
role of colonial power and foreigners has been markedly les-
sened--Iran has presented a contradictory picture. With only
slight exceptions, minorities have continued to enjoy the
official protection of the regime.
Studies on the distribution of authoritarianism have
demonstrated that for these purposes, minorities can be de-
fined as any readily identifiable group outside the immediate
cultural environment of the subjects under study.3 3 Thus for
members of the Iranian elite, minorities in the broadest
sense may be identified as peasants, women, and more narrowly
defined, Armenians, Jews, Christians, and Baha'is. As with
other referents, as the objects of trust are more narrowly
defined, are defined in an increasingly exclusive fashion,
so does the level of mistrust accorded them increase.
One respondent seemed to speak for the majority of the
political elite when he noted that, "Minorities should always
be treated with justice, as long as they agree with the goals
of the majority. After all, one cannot have a servant or
boarder in one's house who disagrees with all you do or wish
to do.'" As long, then, as the minority groups are willing to
abide by the rules established by the dominant group, they
are accepted. When the minorities advance claims which differ
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from those of the dominant group, the minorities overstep
their legitimate role.
The parallels between the stance of the political elite
toward minority groups, howeverly broadly conceived, and the
stance of His Imperial. Majesty toward the politically active
or mobilized segments of the population are obvious. In both
cases, those outside the community live by the grace of the
community's leaders. The status of the individual with re-
gard to the Muslim community, the dar ul Islam (the "gate of
Islam") in the early Moslem centuries, defined the rights of
the person in the state. In altered form, the notion con-
tinues to function in present-day Iran. The principal altera-
tion in the concept centers around the definition of membership.
Now the chief criterion is not acceptance of the Moslem faith
or submission to Allah, but submission to the dominant poli-
tical forces.
By this test, virtually all segments of the population
can continue to enjoy the rights of "boarders" in the present
political commurity. Only one major group of the population
need be excluded on a priori grounds: the Baha'is.34 As a
widespread and expanding religion, viewed by Islamic tradi-
tionalists as a heretical schism of Islam, the Baha'is are
automatically disenfranchised on religious grounds0 But the
present regime does not at all define membership in the
dominant community on religious grounds, but solely with the
test of political loyalty. Here the Baha'is fare well, For
cognizant of the hostilities to them on the part of the
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Shi'ite ulema, the Baha'is seek the protection of the regime
by demonstrating complete political fidelity. Were the pro-
tection of the regime to be removed, the Baha'is might once
again be subjected to the violence of the majority religion.35
Indeed the support which the regime derives on these grounds
from the Baha'is, and from other religious and ethnic minori-
ties, is one of its principal bases of support. While its
support is enhanced from those minorities, however, it lays
itself open to the not inconsiderable charge that it is not
truly a Moslem Government or, even worse, that it thereby
serves the interests of foreign governments. Dissidents among
the elite frequently relate the status of minorities, and
especially the Baha'is, to foreign influence and use this
combination of sins as a means of lambasting the regime. One
member of the elite went so far as to explain the recent
expansion of the Iranian Cabinet in these terms:
The Jews are an economic people, who share the same holy
book with us. The live and work side by side with other
Iranians. The Bahais, however, are not part of our
traditions. They are spies for the English and want us
to forsake our own nationalism to serve Haifa [the head-
quarters of the Bahai faitH. Mansur included nine
Bahais in his cabinet but to do so, he had to increase
the size of the cabinet to nineteen.36
While the regime never responds explicitly to these charges,
it is quite conscious of them and misses few opportunities to
declare its fidelity to Islam. Nonetheless, it continues to
be mistrusted by many of the elite on these grounds.
Occupational Associates (3) -- As the referents of the
items designed to tap trust-mistrust are narrowed, the level
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of mistrust expressed remains on the positive side:
"I believe that most of my associates would stab me
in the back if it meant that they could get ahead
faster that way."
Agree: 53.5% Disagree: 40.1% No Answer: 6.6%
Total: 100.0% (N=167)
Elite respondents do tend to perceive their work envi-
ronment as basically hostile, one in which constant vigilance
should be exerted. In the work environment, a high correla-
tion is perceived between mistrust of one's colleagues and
the use of language as a tool in interpersonal relations.
Those of the elite who mistrusted their counterparts were
also likely to feel that the latter would resort to dissimu-
lation when it suited their own ends. Frequent references
were made to this belief.
Ideas and words in Iranian society are primary weapons
in a person's efforts to reach power. Not one person
in a thousand believes what he says, but says whan he
says as a means for achieving success. Centuries of
assimilating conquerors have left us with an incapacity
for true belief. We say "baleh, baleh!" [yes, yes] when
we mean lnah, nah" [no, no].
One result is a condition common in developing societies.
The truth value of statements is not inherent in the words
used or in the relationship of the words employed to the
reality described. Rather, the "truth" of any statement is
based on the status of the speaker and in order to validate
statements, some relevant "in-group authority" must be 10-
cated)38eIranian elite seem perpetually engaged in such a
search, But with attitudes suggesting mistrust of other
Iranians who might be defined as members of their in-group,
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such an authority is virtually impossible to locate. As a
result, the "truth value" of a statement can never be con-
clusively established.
Friends (5, 6) -- As the referents under consideration
move appreciably closer to what would be conventionally con-
sidered a rather narrowly defined in-group, the levels of mis-
trust remain rlaively high. Only 43 per cent (N = 72) of
the respondents admitted to having a close personal confidant
other than a member of their immediate families. Similarly,
only 39 per cent (N = 65) reported that they ever belonged to
a group whose members were truly good friends. Even in their
closest personal relations outside the family, then, members
of the elite rarely establish ties based on mutual trust.
Hafez offered a couplet counseling against mistrust at this
level: "With friends--manliness. With enemies--expediency."
But although the "tmanliness" which he supported contains a
large dose of interpersonal trust, his counsels, apparently,
fall unheeded.
Family (2, 7) -- Two items which refer more to sociali-
zation beliefs than to interpersonal relations within the
family appear in the factor. The question on the value of
permissiveness in child-raising has the second-highest
loading on the factor. It is related to the other questions
such that mistrust is associated with the reputed desirability
of permissiveness. Those respondents who manifest the highest
levels of mistrust report that it is worse for a child to
have teachers who are too strict. In an apparently
Man
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contradictory fashion, however, these same individuals mani-
festing high levels of mistrust also argue that parents
should safeguard their children from the dangers of life.
Actually, the majority of the elite agree with this latter
position.
"We must do all we can to safeguard our children
from the threats and dangers of life."
Agree: 80.8% Disagree: 16.2% No Answer: 3.0%
Total: 100.0% (N=167)
Nonetheless, a far higher proportion of the mistrustful in
the elite agree with this notion than the more trustful.
How is this contradiction between permissiveness outside
the home and strictness within the family to be explained?
We would suggest that what is at work here is a disinclina-
tion on the part of the mistrusting elite to allow outsiders
to play a role in the disciplining and thus in the rearing of
their children. Those of the elite who most distrust their
fellow Iranians are the most wary of allowing those outsiders
a role in dealing with their own children. But, those chi'-
dren must in turn be taught the hazards presented by others
and must be protected from them. Thus, the children of the
most mistrustful would be most shielded from the dangers of
life, and in the process, from the realities of life. As a
result, they would be less able to cope with those very
dangers, and with those outsiders who perpetratp those
dangers. Mistrust would most likely be passed directly from
generation to generation; those of the elite who themselves
mistrust others would, in turn, contribute to the development
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of mistrust in their own children by denying them the oppor-
tunity to cope successfully with life while they are children.
Moreover, the fact that they are the most eager to protect
their children would imply that they also fundamentally mis-
trust their own children, Their offspring need to be pro-
tected, for they themselves are incapable of coping with life
outside the family.
That this latter point seems to be the case is borne
out by the significant association between trust and family
disdain,39
TABLE 8.11
RESPONSES TO THE FAMILY DISDAIN FACTOR
BY RESPONSES TO THE TRUST FACTOR
Trust
Family Disdain
Low Medium High
Low 29.0% 47.8% 54,2%
Medium 29.0 21.7 25.4
High 41.9 30.4 20.3
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (62) (46) (59)
(x 2 = 10.100, df = 4, p < .05)
Clearly, the greater the mistrust of the respondent, as
measured by his responses to a series of questions pertaining
to general interpersonal relations, the greater is his dis-
dain and mistrust of his immediate family.
It is widely assumed that the family unit in Iran serves
as the principal haven from threatening interpersonal rela-
tions, It has been observed that the family often functions
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in a manner parallel to that of the dowreh. Operating under
conditions of widespread retism, family members are ex-
pected to advance the interests of their kinsmen before or
even at the expense of others. Families, as is true for
dowrehs, frequently attempt to place their members in a vari-
ety of posts throughout the official and private bureaucracies.
From thesemultiple vantage points, it is assumed that the
joint interests of the family can thus be more easily secured.
These observations have led many students of Iranian
society to conclude that, therefore, the family in Iran some-
how represents a pattern of personal relations which defy
conventional morality. Here, then, is that "in group" based
on trust.40 In fact, our data refute these allegations.
While the family unit may manifest more trust in the relations
of its members than do other social units, it is not able to
avoid the underlying ethos. For as with cynicism, so with
mistrust; individuals who manifest these general character
orientations tend to bring them to bear on all of their inter-
personal relations. Whatever the nature of these relations,
whether they be object free, relate to Iranians in general,
minority groups, occupational associates, friendsor family
members, Iranians carry over their orientations. And in a
majority of cases, the general orientation is one of mistrust,
RELATION OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES TO MISTRUST
Being a pervasive character orientation of the political
elite, the conditions which contribute to such a perspective
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are more difficult to identify than is the case with other
general orientations. Certainly one concomitant of mistrust,
as with insecurity (and in an inverse fashion with cynicism),
is the level of participation in the political system. The
more the elite participate in the day-to-day operations of
the system, the more they manifest mistrusting attitudes.
One measure of this is the association between scores on the
Activity Factor and levels of mistrust.
TABLE 8.12
LEVEL OF MISTRUST BY SCORES ON
THE ACTIVITY FACTOR
Activity
Mistrust
Low High
High 43.2% 58.2%
Low 56.8 41.8
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (88) (79)
The more active the member of the elite as measured by his
participation in voluntary organizations, dowrehs, charities,
multiple job holding, and the like, the more apt he is to
manifest mistrust.
In his historical view of mistrust in Iran, Westwood
described how the almost frenzied activities of the Iranian
elite are both a symptom of mistrust and, in turn, a cause.
Expecting betrayal, men seek to balance political
alliance with contradictory alliance, thus each ful-
filling the other's prophecy of betrayal. To have
lines of alliance in so many directions that no
betrayal, no development will leave one isolated and
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exposed is the ideal and the quest after this ideal,
of course, leaves all isolated and exposedQ41
A further clue to this relationship is revealed by an
examination of the number of years which the respondents have
filled their present principal positions by the level of mis-
trust which they manifest.
TABLE 8.13
NUMBER OF YEARS IN PRESENT PRINCIPAL
POSITION BY LEVEL OF MISTRUST4 2
Number of years in post
Mistrust
Less than 1 - 2 3 - 10 16 or more
High 38.6% 51,4% 26.8%
Medium 27,1 22.9 21.4
Low 34.3 25.7 51.8
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (70) (35) (56)
(x 2 = 8.394, df 4, .10< p > .05)
Members of the elite who have served in their present posts
for up to ten years demonstrate higher levels of mistrust
than do those more permanently placed. But among those of
the elite who have served for less than ten years, the longer
the tenure, the higher the mistrust, What appears to be at
work here is that the elite with the longest tenure in their
present posts have been isolated, by dint of that tenure,
from the buffetings of the political system. Among this
group will be found private businessmen with no formal ties
to Government bureaucracies, bureaucrats and politicians re-
tired from Government service, and the relatively few
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Government employees who have, nonetheless, been successful in
holding onto their posts.
But for those who have served for less than ten years, the
overwhelming majority of whom are in Government service, the
relation is altered. Here, longer tenure is accompanied by
higher mistrust. As these Iranians settle into a given bureau-
cratic structure and are socialized into its style of inter-
personal relations, they manifest higher levels of mistrust,
mistrust which is an appropriate response to the milieu in
which they operate. In short, "'participation in the system"
translated as age or number of years of active political life
is too crude a measure. What appears more relevant is a com-
posite of the number of years of political participation plus
frequent alterations in po -ition; this combination consti-
tuting a more nearly modal pattern of experience for the
Iranian elite. Lengthy participation with fixed tenure is
neither typical nor positively related to the incidence of
the character orientations.
That greater familiarity with and immersion in the Gov-
ernment bureaucracy (as defined to include frequent changes
in position) contributes to feelings of mistrust is also at-
tested to by the relationship between military service and
scores on the mistrust factor. A positive (gamma = .367) and
significant association (p < .02) exists between the two
variables. Respondents who have fulfilled their military ser-
vice are more likely to manifest higher levels of mistrust
than non-veterans. Controlling this relationship by a number
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of other variables--age, social status, power, etc.--reveals
no basic change in the relationship between military service
and mistrust. We suggest that military service represents
but another channel of experience into the political system,
experience which contributes to the orientation of mistrust.
One relationship which seems contradictory needs to be
mentioned
. 
It appears that as the elite make more trips out-
side Iran, their level of mistrust decreases. We have already
demonstrated the positive relationship which exists between
foreign travel and insecurity. It was suggested that such a
connection might be explained by the subjection of the elite
travelers to immediate experiences with foreign value systems.
The conflict which often arises between the culture of Iran
and the foreign culture as experienced by a member of the
elite contributes to manifest insecurity. Should it not also
contribute to mistrust?
TABLE 8.14
NUMBER OF FOREIGN TRIPS
BY LEVEL OF MISTRUST
Number of Foreign TripsMistrust
0 - 5 6 - 20 2 1 - more
High 50.0% 40.6% 25.5%
Medium 21.1 21.9 28.8
Low 28.9 37.5 45.7
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (38) (64) (59)
(x2 = 6.662, df 4, p < .20)
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In fact, the greater the number of foreign trips, the less the
mistrust.4 3 Indeed, this relation would be expected on
grounds other than the clash of value systems. For as an in-
dividual experiences others in a widening network of relation-
ships, as the individual achieves a "decentering from the unit
of self to a progressively larger social unit," he would be
expected to manifest greater trust toward other individuals. 44
And we have noted that Iranians who demonstrate trust do so
throughout the entire social system.
But, nonetheless, this notion of foreign travel' ex-
panding the size of the community which is accorded trust in
interpersonal relationships does not resolve this dilemma.
For participation in the political system, through military
service or intensive activity or lengthy service in a bureau-
cratic position, would also serve to widen the social units in
which the individual interacts. Clearly what seems relevant
is not so much altering the ratio between inclusivity-
exclusivity in terms of the definition of in-group versus
out-group, but the quality of personal relationships experi-
enced within such networks, Because it would be condescending
in the absence of data to imply that the positive association
between trust and foreign travel among the elite must be due
to a different (and presumably superior) type of interpersonal
relations, the resolution of this issue remains unclear.
An alternative explanation,which is supported by the
data, is that the greatest foreign travel is experienced by
businessmen and Government officials who have served over
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eleven years in their present posts. In this case, their iso-
lation from the values characteristic of the Iranian bureau-
cracy, rather than their exposure to new value systems, would
explain the association.
As a group, then, the Iranian elite are beset by mis-
trust. They mistrust the motives of other Iranians, their
families, their children, and, most likely, themselves, at
least partially because they are unable to control their
environment and their places within it. Regis Debray, in
his primer for revolutionaries, offers three "golden rules"
for guerilla fighters--rules which the Iranian political elite
seem to have long ago taken for granted. Debray insists on
the need for "constant vigilance, constant mistrust, constant
mobility."45
EXPLOITATION
Chicanery, artifice, and mendacity are our
heritage . 0 0
--Elite respondent
In popular usage, the name of Niccolo Machiavelli is as-
sociated with the ruthless pursuit of political power through
principles characterized by "cunning, duplicity, and bad
faith0"4 6 In his classic, The Prince, Machiavelli sought to
inform Lorenzo Medici of the proper governance of an absolute
state or monarchy; "'proper" defined here as that which contri-
butes to the maintenance of the rule of the monarch.4 7 For
that purpose, politics was conceived as an end in itself and
the ruler was counseled to pursue that end in a totally
amoral or non-moral fashion. To aid the ruler, Machiavelli
elaborated what might be considered a socio-psychological
model of interpersonal relations, especially those between the
ruler and the ruled. He provided the monarch with a set of
predictive statements about those relationships and about
means of influencing those relations in ways consonant with
the ruler's purposes. Thus,
. 0 . it may be said of men in general that they are
ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid
danger and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit
them they are entirely yours; they offer you their
blood, their goods, their life and their children.48
And yet much of what Machiavelli has suggested as rele-
vant for the maintenance of power in sixteenth-century Florence
appears familiar in the context of contemporary Iran.4 9 Mem-
bers of the Iranian political elite, without referring to the
ill-reputed Machiavelli, talked as if they were familiar with
his thoughts, A well-known member of the elite complained:
There is a great deal of upward mobility in Iran, but
very few have made progress by talent alone. Rather,
flattery, lying and hoghe bazi [fraud] must be one's
tools.
Another suggested that:
Iranians are like chameleons: they switch their colors
every day and along with their colors, their policies.
We never feel we know another person's position or
what he thinks, or how we can count on him. If a poli-
tician announces a policy, we do one of three things0
Either we don't believe it, we wait for him to change
it or we ignore it,
What is being charged here and in much of the literature on
Iran is the notion that Iranian politics frequently approximate
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what was a normative model for Machiavelli. In order to test
this notion, a variety of items were included in the ques-
tionnaire, items about the proper conduct of interpersonal
relations.50 With surprising frequency, these items all
grouped together in an ort.hogonally rotated factor.
TABLE 8.15
EXPLOITATION FACTOR
1. Most people in Iran make friends because friends
are likely to be helpful and useful to them. - .648
2. The average Iranian is overwhelmingly motivated
by self-interest, that is, the pursuit of his
own, personal interests. - .542
3. Religious and political minority groups, when
they are given too much money and freedom, just
misuse the privileges and create disturbances. .515
4. I mistrust peo-ple who are more friendly than I
would naturally expect them to be. .506
5. It is usually better in Iran to 'rget" one's
rival before he gets you. - .506
6. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to
gain a profit or advantage rather than risk
losing it.
7. One reason why we can't have complete democracy
in Iran is that such a large percentage of the
population is innatel7 incapable and deficient, - .354
8. A person should adapL his behavior and thoughts
to the group that happens to be with him at that
time, - .343
9. The present is an immeasurably small fragment
of time which has taken its place in the past
almost beforce we are aware of its existence. - .327
10. The present exists only as a product of
creation of our senses, The future is still
a matter for conjecture. Thus only the past
has tangible reality. - .297
The items grouped in the factor suggest a view of human
nature as opportunistic, manipulative, aggressive, immoral,
deficient, and outer-directed, Men act in "Machiavellian"
ways to achieve their selfish ends, even at the expense of
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the welfare of others. There are no natural limits on the
lengths to which individuals will go to achieve those ends,
the possibilities for human behavior being virtually
less.
The two items loading most highly on the factor are the
subject of widespread certainty on the part of the elite.
Some 70 per cent of the elite agree that the concept of
friendship in Iran is translatable into mutual benefit. (Only
25 per cent disagree, while 5 per cent gave no answer.) One
of the elite suggested that, in fact, friends were really of
two kinds. Some were friends because of the contributions
which they could make to one's career. Others were friends
because they were genuinely admired. But all men had both
types of friends and the secret of success in life was to be
adept at parceling out one's acquaintances in these categories
so that the former group could be "handled"' in ways beneficial
to the self.
The second item was the subject of even more certainty.
Seventy-nine per cent of the elite believed that their fellow
countrymen were "overwhelmingly motivated by self-interest,"
(Only 17 per cent disagreed, while less than 5 per cent offered
no answer,)52 While some of the respondents were wary of
probes in this area, many felt free to discuss their responses,.
In a surprising number of instances, these elite had a common
policy for coping with opportunistic others. In order to pre-
vent being duped or used, especially by one's coworkers, some
respondents in positions of administrative responsibility
20220
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claimed always to hire colleagues or workers who appeared
less talented than themselves. "That way," one explained, "I
need never fear that my coworkers could impede my progress,"
The other items in the factor which tap similar orienta-
tions--items 3, 4, 6--all load in a similar direction. Were
no specifically behavioral evidence available, we would be
willing to argue, on the basis of these attitudes alone, that
the political elite do, in fact, behave in a manner consonant
with these attitudes. For it is likely that a self-fulfillin.g
prophecy would tend to operate.53 If members of the elite
truly believed that others do act as they report they believe
others act, then they would undoubtedly alter their own beha-
vior to respond to the perceived acts of these other indivi-
duals. Their anticipatory responses would lead to real
responses in others, etc.
Additional items which load highly imply that this is,
in fact, what has occurred. Item 5 refers to the estimate
of appropriate behavior as a response to the other attitu-
dinal items. Over 70 per cent of the elite agree that it is
better to "get" one's rival before he gets you. (Only 14 per
cent of the most powerful Iranians disagreed with the idea')
We have assumed throughout that the behavior of the elite is
at least consonant with their attitudes. If this is the
case, then these members of the elite would strive to "get"
their rivals rather than wait to respond to the attack which
they are certain will occur. If this is the case, then their
own aggressive behavior, whether or not it be perceived as
0 - -
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anticipatory to a certain set of aggressive behavior from
another or only to a potential set of aggressive behavior,
would undoubtedly occasion that behavior in another. (The
situation is highly analagous to strategic thinking vis a vis
the Soviet Union. If we believe that the Soviets will even-
tually launch a nuclear attack against us, then we should
launch a first strike to pre-empt the advantage of initial
attack. But if they believed that we believed that they
would launch an attack and that we would respond with a first
strike, then they . .. , etc., etc. 5 4 )
Another item which poses these same dilemmas is that
which suggests that an individual should adapt to the group
of which he is then a member. This question raises the spec-
ter of the David Riesman-Daniel Lerner-Abraham Maslow debate5
on the nature and value of disparate personal reference
figures and "other-direction." The relevance of those issues
in terms of the striking similarity between the question of
adapting to the group and the factor as a whole and the pre-
vious quotation on the "chameleon-like" qualities of Iranians
is obvious. The point also bears striking parallels with
Machiavelli, who counseled:
. . 0 it is necessary to be able to disguise this char-
acter [of faithlessness] well and to be a great feigner
and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to
obey present necessities, that one who deceives will
always find those who allow themselves to be deceived.56
We seem to be coming full circle, back to the maxim on
tagiyah (dissimulation) cited in the sectxion above. But there
is more at work among the Iranian elite than Machiavelli's
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notion of "feigning" and "dissembling." For the distinctive
characteristic of chameleons is that they do actually change
color. They do not merely take on a neutral shade or effec-
tively look like the color of their environment; they become
the color of their environment.
What the factor item was proposing is precisely this:
that an individual not dissimulate by mouthing the beliefs of
the group he
his behavior
appear as if
full-fledged
that this is
a sense, the
one pretends
of the elite
playing. In
happened to be with, but that he actually adapt
and thoughts to the group. He should not merely
he belonged to the group. He should become a
member. The common, high factor loading suggests
what goes together in the minds of the elite. In
consummate fraud is perpetrated: becoming what
to be. Indeed, it appears that certain members
perceive their situation as analogous to role
their interactions with others of the elite, a
set of roles generally considered appropriate for each of the
politically powerful actors seems to exist. It order to
function in the political process, the elite would have to
assume the norms of a the roles. Otherwise, harsh sanctions
could be expected and an actor might be disenfranchised from
further participation.5 7
Of importance to us is the large body of research which
concludes that role-playing can be effective in altering the
most fundamental and deeply held attitudes and values. 58
Merely participating in a game--even though the "game" be as
important as Iranian elite politics--will tend to foster
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attitude change in a direction concordant with the activities
of the game and its rules. This process appears to be oc-
curring among some of the political elite. For the variables
which are principally associated with the factors already
discussed and with the Exploitation Factor (which we shall
note below) are those relating to the specific type of in-
volvement with Iranian politics experienced by the elite.
The greater is the involvement of members of the elite in
Iranian politics, as defined above, the more likely are they
to score highly on the first three factors. The greater the
tenure of the members in one position, the more likely are
they to score highly on the Exploitation Factor. Gerth and
Mills come upon a similar conclusion from different premises.
Beginning with Mead's concept of the "generalized other," they
argue:
The content of a person's generalized other generally
depends upon the normative attitudes of "the society"
only as these attitudes have been selected and refracted
by those who have been and who are authoritatively sig-
nificant to the person. Accordingly, persons who have
moved along different career lines will accordingly
feel quite different "pangs of conscience" in regard to
given actions. And, on the other hand, persons who have
occupied similar instit gional positions will have simi-
lar generalized others.
One qualification based on the research on attitude
change needs to be added to this conclusion. It is generally
the case that the greater the coercion attached to the role
playing, the less the subsequent attitude change. Persons who
feel coerced into fulfilling the norms of a given role will
be less likely to change their attitudes in a direction
02m
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prescribed by those norms. Interestingly, in these cases, the
definition of coercion extends even to accepting a payment for
playing the role. The larger the payment, the greater is the
perceived coercion and the less the attitude change. 60 In many
respects, the cooptative style of His Imperial Majesty estab-
lishes conditions approximating the coercion of the inducement
payments of laboratory experiments. The ability of the elite
to convince themselves that their outward conformity to their
roles was the sole result of the coercion of the Shah would
contribute to the maintenance of their attitudinal integrity,
While a number of the rcspndents alluded to this type
of reaction, it seems unlikely that it could be completely
effective in preventing any attitude change. What seems to
result, instead, is an amalgam of opinions, attitudes, and be-
liefs reflecting various degrees of commitment and hostility
to the political system and the actiors therein. In the process,
the elite do not develop a commonly held body of beliefs which
could serve as the foundation for political development. The
contradictions and ambiguities in the value structures of the
elite mean that while the process called "identification"
takes place, it is an identification which feeds on insecurity,
mistrust, and cynicism on the one hand, and exploitation on
the other.6 1
A final set of items which load highly on this exploita-
tion factor refer to the sense of time perspective. One of
the more widely commented characteristics of Persian society
has been this very issue--that Iranians have little regard
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for time. As one of the respondents put it, "In Iran, time is
not money." A well-known aphorism expresses this same time
sense:
Baleh, Baleh, Insha'allah;
Chashm, Chashm, Pasfardah.
Yes, Yes, God be willing;
0.k., o.k., The day after tomorrow.6 2
The two items loading on the factor are similar. The present
is either incalculably brief or has no real existence at all.
W1a they are assumed to imply is a certain sense of taqdir
or kismet (fatalism). For if the present is brief (at worst)
or does not exist (at best), then whatever goes on in the
present can be more easily tolerated. A certain callousness
would result, a capacity for enduring suffering. An individual
with such time perspectives would not be expected to rail
against the indignities or unpleasantnesses of the present,
however defined.
But some means of reacting to those indignities must be
found. Rather than attempting to confront those directly,
those of the elite with attitudes deprecating the present
respond, we would argue, by coping, not by challenging. And
one copes by wheedling and adapting; in short, by manipulating
others., Indeed, there is a significantly positive relation-
ship between the two items tapping time perspective and those
comprising the principal body of the Exploitation Factor.
Those who hold attitudes supporting interpersonal exploitation
place slight stock in the importance of the present, remember-
ing a bitter past--a past which was, perhaps, less beset by
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the upsetting interpersonal relations which do characterize
the present.
RELATION OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES TO
THE EXPLOITATIVE ORIENTATION
Once again, we wish to relate this factor to its ante-
cedents, the variety of social background data, personal
experiences, and the like, with which it is significantly
associated. Many of the same social background factors which
we have identified and related to the orientations of insecu-
rity, cynicism, and i. strust also relate significantly to the
Exploitative Factor. But they relate significantly in an
inverse fashion. To illustrate this point, it will suffice
to present but one of the possible relations, that between
exploitation and the number of years in which the elite
respondents have served in their present, principal, positions.
TABLE 8.16
22" V~ON THE EXPLOITATION FACTOR BY
NUMBER OF YEARS IN POST
-. p .Number of Years in Present Position
1 or less 1 - 2 3 - 10 11 or more
Low 25.9% 37.0% 29.7% 28.6%
Medium 48A 43.5 54.1 21.4
High 25.9 19.6 16.2 50.0
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (27) (46) (37) (56)
(x2 = 19.831, df = 6, p O .003, gamma = .179)
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The table illustrates that those of the elite who have been
locked into a given position for more than ten years are most
prone to score highly on the Exploitation Factor. For respon-
dents who have served in their posts ten years or less, the
percentage at the medium level of interpersonLi exploitation
increases, although in none of the categories is there ever
a majority found at the lowest levels. This is not surprising,
inasmuch as a relatively high level of positive orientation
toward manipulation is a sine qua non for elite membership.
But of relevance for us is the fact that the elite who have
achieved relative stability of tenure in their positions
manifest higher percentages of manipulative responses. Rather
than gaining a sense of permannc:.Ce from their tenure and having
to play less the role of the manipulative politician, the game
of politics in Iran with all its interpersonal exploitation,
is played to an increasing degree.
What is being suggested is that the members of the elite
who have been least beset by the turmoil of the political
system, as measured by frequent job changes, are most likely
to manifest attitudes conducive to interpersonal manipulation,
That is, they seem most likely to act the role of politician.
But, in fact, they do not appear to do so. An overview of
all four factors demonstrates this point.
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THE GENERAL CHARACTER ORIENTATION FACTORS:
AN OVERVIEW
The four factors which we have already considered at
length--undoubtedly at too considerable a length for the
reader--have been analyzed in terms of their component
variables and their relationship to the social background fac-
tors. In the next chapter, their relationship to factors
made up of political and social attitudes will be examined.
Here, we turn to the relationship of ie four character fac-
tors to data on elite communications patterns as well as to
each other.
Elite respondents were asked the frequency of their'bon-
versations or discussions" with eleven groups in Iranian
society:
1. Officers of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces
2. "Big" businessmen
3. Peasants or agricultural workers
4, Workers or laborers
5. Syndicate or labor leaders
6. University students
7. Members of the National Police '
8. Foreigners
9. Members of the Royal Family
10. Religious leaders
11, Members of the present Cabinet
The elite were presented with eight answer choices of-
fering frequencies from "never" to "a few times per day."
Correlation coefficients based on the extent of elite commu-
nications with each of the groups were then computed for each
of the eleven groups for all 167 respondents. We wished to
find out whether the eleven groups could he viewed as a single
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communication network from the viewpoint of the elite or
whether sub-networks comprising particular groups existed.
Indeed, on the basis of common correlation coefficients,
three identifiable sub-networks of the eleven groups emerged
and one group appeared as the nexus of the three sub-networks.
The figure below illustrates these identifiable groups:
FIGURE 8.17
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The networks here are identified by lines based on the magni-
tude of the correlations among the groups. Taking the upper-
most group as an example, the figLre illustrates that those
members of the elite who communicate frequently with union
leaders are also very likely to communicate frequently with
workers and are also likely to communicate with members of
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the business elite and with peasnts. They are also very
likely to communicate with members of the National Police
and somewhat less likely to communicate with officers of the
Armed Forces.
The second major grouping indicates that those in the
elite who communicate frequently with members of the Royal
Family are very likely to communicate frequently with members
of the Cabinet and officers of the Armed Forces. They are
also apt to converse frequently with foreigners and somewhat
less likely to communicate frequently with the National
Police. The third grouping indicates that the elite who con-
verse with religious leaders are also very likely to converse
with the National Police and somewhat less likely, with stu-
dents. Note that all the communications links among these
groups which represent a correlation coefficient of .295
(p< .001) , reater are indicated.
Several interesting conclusions c lout Iranian politics
are revealed by these sub-networks alone. It is clear that
the National Police binds together the major groups of
Iranian society. Only one other group communicates directly
with a group in a different sub-network--the military. These
agencies of repression are the sectors of the official burea-
cracy which unify the major parts of the social structure. In
that sense, these groups are responsible for transmitting
downard the policies of the regime.
In the process, however, they are particularly unsuited
for mobilizing the population behind those regime policies.
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In many other societies, these functions tend to be performed
by political parties, their inherent advantage being that
they are ideally suited to serve as two-way channels of com-
munication, not only transmitting the policies of the regime
to the masses but also aggregating the interests of the
masses and articulating those interests to the government.
Even the most unlikely political parties have demonstrated a
capacity for these latter functions. The Republic People's
Party of Ataturk began to cemonstrate this capacity early.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union seems to be developing
that capacity at present. But in no case have the Police or
Armed Forces been able to function as two-way channels.
The links which the National Police possess also reveal
the present security concern of the regime. Syndicate and
union leaders are an especially important concern, for they
are the officers of the officially sanctioned unions created
as a challenge to Communist domination of organized labor or
even a non-Communist but independent body of organized labor.4
The ulema have proven to be especially troublesome to the
regime and remain one of the few, if not the only, organized
or, least, semi-organized, group which the regime has been
unable to coopt or thoroughly permeate, Because of this inde-
pendence and their resulting reputation for rectitude, they
assume the role of the only independent group outside the
official bureaucracies. And the ulema have used that position
to challenge the regime on a number of occasions: land reform
and the reputed rigging of the 1963 Parliamentary elections
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representing only two of their more serious challenges. If
the regime's charges of religious connections to the June
1963 riots are valid, then the ulema are indeed a serious
threat. No wonder, then, that they remain a focus for police
activities. That the police have direct communication 7 nks
with university students is also understandable in the context
of recent Iranian politics. Students at the University of
Tehran have demonstrated on numerous occasions their fidelity
to the ideals of Mohammad Mossedegh and his National Front and
a proportionately great resentment toward the regime. Many of
the active leaders of the Front have faculty and research ap-
pointments at the University and with the students have parti-
cipated in a number of serious and often violent demonstrationr!s.
Finally, the ties between the Royal Family and the
National Police are of interest on two grounds, Firstly, they
lend credence to the notion that the Pahlevi Princes and Prin-
cesses are not the unified and closely-knit family group which
they claim to be. Their loyalty to their reigning sib is per-
petually suspect and subject to scrutiny. Secondly, however,
only the Pahlevis and the military of all the elite o. Gov-
ernmental groups who would be expected to have frequent com-
munications links with. the police, do so. The ties of the
military to the police are accountable on the basis of their
common undertaking in security affairs. But the monarch pre-
vents other elite groups from establishing communication links
to the police for fear of the threat which would then result
to his rule.
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The communication links also reveal the framentation
which exists in the society. A key elite sub-network is made
up of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, the Cabinet, and
foreigners, all linked together by the Royal Family (network
M, C, R9 F). A second sub-network is composed of the
economically productive group in the society--peasants,
business leaders, workers, and union chiefs (network P, B,
W, U). Finally, the ulema and students exist on the periphery
of the political and economic sectors with links to each other
and through the police to the remainder of the society (net-
work R, S).65
When we turn from an examination of the relations inter-
nal to these sectors to an examination of their relation with
the four factors, additional insights are produced, We ran
the factors in zero order cross tabulations against the
extent to which the elite communicated with each of the
three major communication sub-networks.
TABLE 8.18
DIRECTION OF RELATIONSHIP (+ or -) AND PROBABILITY OF
OBTAINING THE CHI SQUARE PRODUCED IN A CROSS-
TABULATION OF THE FOUR GENERAL CHARACTER
ORIENTATION FACTORS AND THE EXTENT OF
ELITE COMMUNICATION WuiTH EACH OF THE
COMMUNICATION SUB-NETWORKS
Character FactorSub-Network Insecurity Cynicism Mistrust Exploitation
M, C, R, F + + + -
.05 .04 .04 .02
P, B, W, U + + + -
n.s. .12 .08 .25
R, S + + + -
.005 .15 .04 nos.
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Irrespective of the significance level obtained in the
cross tabulation, in every case the association was positive
for the first three factors. That is, the higher the scores
on these factors--the more insecurity, the more cynicism, the
more mistrust--the more frequent the communication with all
the sub-networks. Of these sub-networks, however, the most
positive association was consistently found between the fac-
tors and the military, Cabinet, foreigners, and the Royal
Family.66 This is consonant with our findings above: the
more intimate the participation of the elite in the political
system--here measured by frequency of communication with the
most powerful groups in the communications sub-networks--the
more likely are the members of the elite to manifest those
general character orientations by which we have depicted them.
But what of interpersonal exploitation? Of the four
factors, only this one bears a negative association; greater
orientation toward manipulation associated with lower com-
munication, This is consonant with our original hypothesis
of the incidence of these general orientations. For only
those of the elite who are most firmly ensconced in their
positions are isolated from the sholugh-polugh (moil and
toil) of the political system. And their greater isolation
is signified by their more infrequent communication with key
groups in the society, To state this conclusion in another
way: we have found that the greater the extent of elite
participation in the Iranian political system, the more
likely are those elite to be characterized by cynicism, inse-
curity, and mistrust,
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But we would hypothesize that the ability to manipulate
others and the attitudes conducive to such manipulation imply
and, indeed, necessitate relatively low levels of insecurity,
cynicism, and mistrust. Individuals distinguished by such
characteristics would be uninterested or incapable of inter-
personal manipulation. The cynical person would not consider
it worthwhile to manipulate others; he would be too contemp-
tuous of other persons and too disparaging of the value of
such behavior to engage in the manipulative relation. The
insecure person would be too unsure of himself and his
capabilities as well as too immersed in his own dissatisfac-
tions and frustrations to step outside his own framework long
enough to form a relationship in which manipulation might
occur. The mistrustful would be incapable of calculating the
responses of others as well as his own attitudes or responses.
Unable to depend on his own or the responses of others, he
cannot exploit them in ways which will achieve his ends.
Those of the elite who are incapable of trust, security, and
sincerity and commitment, are equally incapable of working
with others in mutually beneficial relations or even in rela-
tionships which promise to be beneficial to at least one of
the pair. 67
In order to measure these relationships more adequately,
the factor loadings produced in the principal components
factor matrix were subjected to an oblique rotation, as well
as to the varimax rotation. The resultant non-orthogonal
loadings were then correlated, with the following results:
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TABLE 8.19
CORRELATIONS OF FACTORS PRODUCED IN OBLIQUE ROTATION
ManifestCynicism Insecurity Mistrust Exploitation
Cynicism x .291 .078 - .108
Manifest
Insecurity .291 x .103 - .080
Mistrust .078 .103 x - .277
Exploitation - .108 - .080 - .277 x
While all of these correlations do not reach levels of
statistical significance, they are all in the expected direc-
tion. They demonstrate that higher levels of cynicism, mis-
trust, and insecurity are all positively associated with
each other while negatively associated with exploitation.
That is, the members of the elite who score highly on the
Cynicism Factor are likely to have high scores on the Mani-
fest Insecurity and Mistrust Factors as well. Similarly, they
are likely to have low scores on the Exploitation Factor.
The insecure, the cynical, the mistrustful fail to develop
the psychic equipment necessary to play the game of politics
as its is conventionally defined.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Lucian Pye, for example, has warned that:
Without a sense of basic trust and faith, political
promises and even the most glowing plans for future
development are likely to arouse suspicions on the
part of the public. When basic trust is replaced by
cynicism, a people will suspect that behind the screen
of political promises their leaders are really "out to
get everything for themselves."
Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, op. cit.,
p. 55.
2. Albert Hourani, "Arabic Culture," Perspective of the
Arab World, New York: Intercultural Publications, 1956, p. 11.
3. David Clark Hodges, "Cynicism in the Labor Movement,"
American Journal of Economics and Sociology,XXI, 1962, p. 33.
Hodges, in line with the subject matter of his study, notes
that historians call cynicism "'a philosophy of the prole-
tariat."t In fact, Donald R. Dudley, author of A History of
Cynicism (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1937), calls this notion
misleading, for unlike modern proletariats, the Cynics had no
interest in establishing any new social order (p. xi).
4. Translated by Fitzgerald and reproduced in A. J.
Arberry, Aspects of Islamic Civilization as Depicted in the
Original TextsNew York: A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 1964,
pp. 299 ff.
5. Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley
A. Pearl, "Political Cynisicm: Measurement and Meaning,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, No. 476, 1961, p. 490. Also
see Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology,"
American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, December, 1956, pp.
690-695.
6. Thus Pye suggests that an "uncritical and childlike
trust in the rulers and in all forms of higher authority" is
an "obstacle to development." Lucian W. Pye, "Political Cul-
ture and Political Development," in L. W. Pye and Sidney
Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 22.
7. The differences in the responses by the elite may
be exemplified with the following quotations on the changes
in Iran since World War II:
A less cynical response:
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Iran has begun to travel the path of the United States:
to use the knowledge of the twentieth century to the
exclusion of the archaic ideas which have kept us poor,
backward, and miserable . . .
A more cynical response:
The Americanization of Iranians: using Kleenex,
drinking Coca Cola, having parties, hanging multicolored
drapes in the living room, wearing cowboy pants, dancing
the hully-gully on the Varamin Plain .
8. The original items were:
1., Voting is the only way that people like me can
have a say about how the government runs things.
2. Sometimes politics and government seem so com-
plicated that a person like me can't really understand
what is going on.
3. People like me don't have any say about what
the government does.
4. I don't think public officials care much about
what people like me think.
See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, The
Voter Decides, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company,
1954.
9. For a discussion of the personal efficacy of non-
elite and elite, which stresses social factors, see Gabriel A.
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 180-257. For a discus-
sion which puts more emphasis on the psychoanalytic, see
Robert E. Lane, Political Life, Why People Get Involved in
Politics, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959, pp. 149-155.
10. Agger, et alii, op. cit.; and Edgar Litt, "Political
Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, XXV
May 1963, pp. 312-323.
11. Melvin Seeman, "On the Personal Consequences of Ali-
enation in Work," American Sociological Review, Vol. 32, No.
2, Aptil 1967, p. 274.
12. Hadley Cantril, The Politics of Despair, New York:
The Collier Press, 1962, p. 50.
13. The high level of reported injustice among both
cynical and non-cynical groups of the Iranian elite lends
credence to the notion that perhaps the expectations of an
industrial proletariat can be more easily satisfied by im-
provements in their material conditions than can the expec-
tations or aspirations of an elite group which may be based,
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to a greater extent, on non-material values. See, for ex-
ample, Robert Greenway, "Eupsychia--The Good Society," Journal
of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1962,pp. 1-11.
Greenway is reporting on a radio interview with Abraham
Maslow.
14. This general disbelief in the mass media serves to
fuel Tehran's amazingly well developed rumor network. But
rumor serves a variety of functions other than the trans-
mission of news and information. One of these is the safe
expression of hostility or dissatisfaction by displacing the
focus onto another object and channeling such expression
through informal communications networks. See, for example,
Rebecca Birch Stirling, "Some Psychological Mechanisms Opera-
tive in Gossip, '" Social Forces, Vol. 34, No. 2, December 1955,
esp. pp. 264-265. See also Max Gluckman, "Gossip and Scandal,"
Current Anthropology, Vol. 4, No. 3, June 1963, pp. 307-316;
and Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, "The Analysis of Rumor,"
in G. W. Allport, Personality and Social Encounter, Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964, pp. 311-326.
15. The actual multiple regression is as follows:
Dependent Variable Multiple r F df
Cynicism .272 2.57 161
Independent Variable Partial r F Simple r
Status .179 5,33 .175
Foreign exposure - .150 3.70 - .146
Activity .123 2.46 .119
16. Interestingly, the lower social status of these
more cynical of the elite is reflected in the educational
attainments of their fathers. Low status members of the elite
are the sons of traditionally educated fathers. In other
words, their fathers were far less likely to have had a
modern secular education than a traditional maktab one
(p = ,05). This finding affirms the frequently noted observa-
tion that modern education in nineteenth century Iran was re-
served for the children of the elite, Cf. Sadiq, History of
Education in Iran . . ., op. cit., esp. pp. 332-334.
17. For a description and analysis of these "'new men"
see Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the
Middle East and North Africa, Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1963, esp. pp. 51-78; Morroe Berger, The Arab
World Today, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
1964, esp. pp. 249-258 on the Middle Class; and William R.
Polk, "An Analysis of Social Change,"' mimeo, n.d.
18. Harry J. Benda, "Political Elites in Colonial South-
east Asia: An Historical Analysis," op. cit., p. 234.
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19. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern
Library, 1937, Book I, Chapter 2, pp. 13-14.
20. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New
York: Vintage Books, 1945, Vol. II, Book I, Ch. 9, p. 131.
Tocqueville also adds:
The principle of self-interest rightly understood
produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it
suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself
it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous, but it dis-
ciplines a number of persons in habits of regularity,
temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command; and
if it does not lead men straight to virtue by the will,
it gradually draws them in that direction by their
habits.
Ibid.
21. These concepts of virtue, justice, etc. are decidedly
not absolutes but are recognized as fluctuating in intensity
depending on the context in which they are applied. Lasswell
observes, for example, that "The bargaining Yankee is still
admired because he knows how to use his head to outsmart the
other fellow and this easy toleration of mutual fraud is a
major trait of capitalist society.'r Harold D. Lasswell,
Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1936, p. 92.
22. Erikson, p. 248. We emphasize the notion of
"relatively restricted" for Erikson seems to argue that trust
also contains elements of the second definition, e.g.,
"Mothers create a sense of trust in their children by that
kind of administration which in its quality combines sensi-
tive care of the baby's individual needs and a firm sense of
personal trustworthiness . . . " (ibid., p. 249). Here he
seems to introduce notions entailing the nature of the rela-
tionship and not merely that it has dependability.
23. Pye, Politics Personality, and Nation Building,
op. cit., pp. 54-55.
24. Wilson, op. cit., p.5. This readiness for dissimu-
lation apparently tlies in the face of the culture of ancient
Iran. Herodotus, for example, claimed that "The period of a
boy's education is between the ages of five and twenty, and
they are taught three things only: to ride, to use the bow,
and to speak the truth." Herodotus, op. cit., p. 70. More
striking evidence of the value of truth-telling is provided
by the Achaemenid inscriptions at Behistun, in west-central
Iran. There Darius the Great had car vedthe record of his
conquest of the pretender, Smerdis. Darius adds:
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hereafter, beware of lies; the man who is a liar,
destroy him utterly; thou thinkest (thereby) shall my
land remain whole.
See The Scriptures and Inscriptions of Darius the Great on
the Rock of Behistun in Persia [no author given], London:
British Museum, 1907, p. 66.
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States Commission for UNICEF, Hi Neighbor, New York: Hastings
House Publications, No. 4, 196 1, p. 52.6
26. Andrew F. Westwood, "Politics of Distrust in Iran,"
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1958, esp. pp. 7-12.
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Society," Human Organization, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter, 1960-
1961, p. 176. For other studies which treat of peasant mis-
trust, see Banfield, op. cit.; G. Morris Carstairs, The Twice
Born: A Study of a Community of High-Caste Hindus, Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press, 1958; S. C. Dube, Indian Villa e,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955; F. G. Friedman, The
World of 'La Miserial," Community Development Review, Vol. X,
1958; Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village; Tepoztlan Re-
Studied, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951; Octavio
Romano, "Values, Status, and Donship in a Mexican-American
Village," unpublished ms., 1959; Ozzie G. Simmons, "Drinking
Patterns and Interpersonal Performance in a Peruvian Mestizo
Community," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, Vol. XX,
1959.
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31. For a study of the success of communism in over-
coming this mistrust and contributing to the effective con-
cerning of people's behavior, see Philip Selznick, The
Organizational Weapon, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1937
32. These answers may be compared to responses to the
identical question in a cross-national survey of college
students:
TABLE 8.20
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS EXPRESSING VARIOUS VIEWS ON
PROPOSITION THAT THE WORLD IS A HAZARDOUS PLACE
IN WHICH MEN ARE BASICALLY EVIL AND DANGEROUS
Country N Agree Disagree
Men Women Men Women Men Women
United States 590 187 17% 10% 83% 90%
Egypt 31 32 55 69 45 31
France 106 25 32 16 68 84
Italy 40 37 17 27 83 73
Germany 20 11 10 9 90 91
Japa 72 117 22 31 78 69
Israel 29 11 34 27 66 73
See James M. Gillespie and Gordon W. Allport, Youth's Outlook
on the Future, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Papers in
Psychology, 1955, Table 10, p. 58.
33. Theodore W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J.
Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality:
Studies in Prejudice, New York: Harper and Row, 1950.
34. In many respects, the Bahais of Iran are subject to
the criticisms frequently levelled against the Jews of the
West. Thus one respondent said:
In two thousand years of our history, the Jews have been
the most trusted group. Armenians, however, are of
dubious loyalty for in two world wars they have served
foreigners. The Bahais are undoubtedly the worst. They
do not recognize our Central Government, they cluster
together, and they work against all people who are not
Bahais.
See Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, Social Change and
Prejudice, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964, esp. Part II,
"Patterns of Ethnic Intolerance," pp. 111-135; and "Stereo-
typing the Minority," pp. 136-151.
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35. The most recent occasion on which Moslem hostilities
toward the Bahais was manifest occurred during the June, 1963,
riots. Then a variety of symbolic and not so symbolic dis-
plays of anti-Bahai sentiment were reported. Previous to
these events, Bahais were subjected to a series of primarily
minor indignities but including the near destruction of their
religious center in Tehran and its confiscation by the Govern-
ment shortly after the overthrow of Mossadegh.
36. The presence of Bahais in "high places" in the Govern-
ment is frequently alleged but virtually impossible to demon-
strate inasmuch as Bahais apparently resort to tLaiyah
(dissimulation) about their religion as often as did the
Shi'ites of old. Only one of my elite respondents admitted to
the faith and he held no official Government position. In
fact, Mansur's first cabinet had twenty-one members, five more
than did his predecessor, Assadollah Alam. A number of the
additional members were not full ministers, however, but
Deputy Prime Ministers elevanted to Cabinet rank.
The wording of this question proved to be troublesome
for the concept of a "stab in the back"' in Persian bears none
of the connotations conveyed by the English phrase. Nonethe-
less, the meaning of the phrase is unambiguous in Persian and
it was retained in the final instrument.
38. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Mass Media and Politics
in the Modernization Process," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communi-
cations and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1963, p. 242. See also, Felix Keesing, Marie
Kessing, and Thomas Blair, "Social Structure and Information
Exposure in Rural Brazil," Rural Sociology, Vol. XXV, March,
1960, pp. 65-75; and Felix Keesing and Marie Keesing, Elite
Communication in Samoa, Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1956, passim,
39. The family disdain factor is described above in the
chapter on insecurity. Note that that factor and the trust
factor share one variable which loads significantly highly on
both: "Apart from your immediate family, is there anyone to
whom you confide your most personal and important problems."
While this overlap would clearly affect the significance of
association, it is suggested that it would be insufficient to
bring about the magnitude of the association found.
40. Binder, cit., p. 159, was astute enough to deny
the conventional wisdom on Iranian family relations by noting
that "Generally speaking, these obligations [of nepotism]
stand, despite a good deal of family friction, usually the
result of sibling rivalry." (italics added)
41. Westwoodop. cit., p. 124.
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42. The reader is warned that this table should be
interpreted with the maximum of caution. It proved ex-
ceedingly difficult to translate "present principal position"
unambiguously into Persian. While its most obvious meaning
was identical with the concept in English, it could also be
taken to imply not "positiont but "occupation." Thus a member
of the Iranian Supreme Court, for example, who had served on
the bench for over twenty years in a series of lower courts
before being elevated to the highest court of Iran only months
before the interview, responded, "over eleven years," When
the primary meaning of the question was emphasized, however,
he changed his answer to "less than one year.," While the
interviewer attempted to remain sensitive to this ambiguity,
there exists no assurance that all such difficulties were
eliminated,
43, The other variables and factors which are signifi-
cantly associated with insecurity are all related in a similar
direction with mistrust although the relationship does not
achieve the same level of significance,
44, Gordon W Allport, "Circles of Interest and the
Revolusion of Conflict," in Allport and Postman, eds., Og.
cit., p. 175. A similar point is made by J. C, Flugel,
'75me Neglected Aspects of World Integration," in T. H. Pear,
ed., Psychological Factors of Peace and War, London: Hutchin-
son and Company, 1950; and Foster, op. cit0
45. As quoted in Ahmad Eghbal, "A Primer for Revolu-
tionary Guerillas: Revolution in the Revolution?" from Regis
Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, New York: Grove Press,
1967, in The Nation, January 29, 1968.
46. Richard Christie and Robert K. Merton, "Procedures
for the Sociological Study of the Values Climate of Medical
School," Journal of Medical Education, Vol. 33, October,
1958, Part 2, Also in H. H. Gee and R0 J. Glaser, The Ecology
of the Medical Student, Report of the Fifth Teaching Institute,
Association of American Medical Colleges, Atlantic City, New
Jersey, October 15-19, 1957, p. 134,
47. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci (trans.),
London: Oxford University Press, 1903, p. 2.
48, Ibid,., p., 46. The author goes on to warn the Prince,
however, that tthe friendship which is gained by purchase and
not through grandeur and nobility of spirit is merited but
not secured," (ibido)
49. Indeed the social and political state of sixteenth
century Europe bears striking similiarities to contemporary
Iran. See, for example, George H. Sabine, A History of
Political Theory, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937,
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pp. 331-336; and esp. Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aris-
tocracy, 1558-1641, London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
50,, Unfortunately, at the time of formulating the testing
instrument, the author was unaware of Christie's work in this
area, See the above as well as Richard Christie, "A Quanti-
fication of Machiavelli," unpublished ms. Milbrath has used
Christie's scale in his study of Washington lobbyists and re-
ports on the results in Lester W. Milbrath, "Measuring the
Personalities of Lobbyists,"' Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Department of Political Science, mimeo, 1961 (?).
51. Christie and Merton, op. cit0, p. 134, describe
their wariness in referring to their scale as a 'Machiavel-
lianism" scale,. We share many of the same reservations but
in addition have applied the title "Exploitation" in order to
avoid confusion with their work even though similar processes
are being measured,
52, Foreigners have been noting this phenomenon for cen-
turies, One struck a particularly contemporary ring at the
beginning of the twentieth century:
The Persian newspapers have been telling their readers
for years that what they lack is public spirit--the
spirit of cooperation. Well-meaning foreigners have
asked them why they do not organize trade guilds and
merchant guilds as Europeans did in their Middle Ages.
They reply that they are too fond of intrigue, that
they suspect each other too much, that their standard
of business morality is too uncertain, that their ideas
are too volatile. The Persian likes advice, but has
always a fairly sound reason for not accepting it.
Hale, op. cit,, po 31o
53. See Robert K. Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,"
op. cit., pp. 421-436,
54. Such arguments led explicitly to the recognition of
insuring a massive second strike capability which could sur-
vive intact an initial attack. In the process, the value of
launching a first strike may be reduced. See Herman Kahn,
"The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards,." in Donald G. Brennan,
ed..;, Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, New
York: George Braziller, 1961, pp. 89-121; and Herman Kahn,
On Thermonuclear War, Pinceton: Princeton University Press,
1961, esp. pp., 190-218. This situation of anticipatory beha-
vior is one which has been dealt with at lenghth in the
literature on stable solutions in game theory. See, for ex-
ample, R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions,
New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964,esp. pp. 199-236.
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55. The principles of this debate, never framed as
such, may be found in David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd--A
Study of the Changing American Character, Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., 1956; Daniel Lerner, "Comfort and Fun:
Morality in a Nice Society,'r American Scholar, Vol. 27, No.
2, Spring 1958, pp. 153-165; Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a
Psychology of Being, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company,
Inc., 1962.
56. Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 70.
57. For an analysis of the relationship between Whites
and Blacks in the United States in terms of role theory, see
Thomas F. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American, Prince-
ton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964, esp., pp. 3-26,
and the same author's article, "Complexity and Change in
American Racial Patterns: A Social Psychological View,"' in
Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Clark, eds., The Negro American,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1965, pp. 325-359.
58. For some of this research, see: F. J. Culbertson,
"Modification of an Emotionally Held Attitude Through Role
Playing," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol.
54, 1957, pp. 230-233; I. L. Janis and B. T. King,"The In-
fluence of Role Playing on Opinion Change," Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, 1954, pp. 211-218;
H. C. Kelman, "Attitude Change as a Function of Response
Restriction," Human Relations, Vol. 6, 1953, pp. 185-214;
T. B. King and I. L. Janis, "Comparison of Improvised Versus
Non-Improvised Role Playing in Producing Opinion Changes,"
Human Relations, Vol. 9, 1956, pp. 177-186; Milton J. Rosen-
berg, et a_11, Attitude Organization and Change: An Analysis
of Consistency among Attitude Components, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1960; W. A. Scott; "Attitude Change Through
Reward of Verbal Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, Vol. 55, 1957, pp. 72-75; W. A. Scott, "Attitude
Change by Response Reinforcement: Replication and Extension,"
Sociometry, Vol. 22, 1959, pp. 328-335.
59. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and So-
cial Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions, New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1953, p. 96.
60. See, for example, Scott, op, cit., and Rosenberg,
op. cit.
61. Parsons refers to "identification" as
. . . the process by which a person comes to be inducted
into membership in a collectivity through learning to
play a role complementary to those of other members in
accord with the pattern of values governing the collec-
tivity. The new members come to be like the others with
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respect to their common membership status and to the
psychological implications of this--above all, the
common values thereby internalized.
Talcott Parsons, "Social Structure and the Development of
Personality," Chapter 4 in Parsons, Social Structure and
Personality, London: The Free Press-Collier-Macmillan Ltd.,
1965, p. 91.
62. Originally related to the author by Professor
Richard W. Frye, whose storehouse is practically limitless.
For other references to time in Iranian society, see Upton,
op, cit., p. 34; Wilson, op. cit.,p. 10; Sparroy, op. cit.,
p. 19; Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 79.
63. The National Police in Iran are responsible for
a number of law enforcement duties which are dispersed among
several agencies in the United States. Their duties include
border patrol, passports, and customs; traffic and automobile
supervision; the enforcement of the criminal law code; nar-
cotics, food, and drug law administration; counterfeiting
control; and certain aspects of state security and intelli-
gence.
64. See the following on labor in Iran: George B.
Baldwin, "Labor Problems in a Developing Economy," Current
History, Vol. XXXVII, No. 216, 1959, pp. 91-95; George B.
Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1967; for a review of this latter
work see the author's forthcoming review in the American
P'tical Science Review, June, 1968; International'Labor
Organization, "Evolution of Labour Legislation and Admini-
stration in Iran," International Labor Review, Vol. LXIX,
March 1959, pp. 273-295; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Office of Labor Affairs, Summary of
the Labor Situation in Iran, Washington. U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1955.
65. Besides the internal composition of each sector,
the frequency with which the elite reported conversing with
each of the four groups is revealing. We calculated the
mean number of responses for each of the sectors by com-
bining responses for the appropriate groups.
506
TABLE 8.21
MEAN FREQUENCY OF REPORTED COMMUNICATION
LEVEL WITH EACH OF THE THREE
SUB-NETWORKS
Frequency MCRF PBWU RS
Never 12.3 14.3 23.5
Once or twice 2.8 4.o 6.0
A few times/life 9.8 18.8s 18,5
A few times/year 34.3 35.0 42,0
A few times/month 38.3 31.8 27.5
A few times/week 41.0 32.5 23.0
Every day 17.5 17.5 12.5
A few times/day 5.0 7.2 8.0
Not surprisingly, but fortunately for the credibility of our
data, the members of the political elite converse most fre-
quently with members of the four groups which compose the
more elite communication sub-network. The ulema and students
are communicated with the least.
66. As measured by the size of the statistic "gamma"
derived from the cross-tabulation.
67. Lucian W. Pye, in a discussion with the author,
made a remark more perceptive than appeared at first sight.
We were attempting to understand the failure of the long-
heralded revolution to occur. After listening to the
author's explanations, hemeclaimed, "Why, they're just too
incompetent to fall apart."
CHAPTER IX
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELITE ORIENTATIONS
The internal composition of the general character orien-
tations and the analysis of their antecedents have been
examined. But of more immediate import is their relevance.
That is, do these orientations of manifest insecurity, cyni-
cism, mistrust, and exploitation affect the more narrowly
defined political attitudes of the elite? If these orienta-
tions which we have described do not affect elite policy per-
spectives, then we can assume that they are interesting, but
largely irrelevant to the nature of Iranian politics, insofar
as those politics are directed or influenced by the elite.
In fact, these general orientations are highly relevant.
In order to examine their applicability, let us turn
to the factors produced in yet another factor analysis, fac-
tors which have been labelled Xenophobia, Orientation to the
Shah, Social Disdain, Family Disdain, Populist-Non-Elite,
and Reduce Government Role.1 These factors are assumed to
represent, by the nature of their component variables, less
an indication of the general character orientation of the
elite thanindications of more manifest political attitudes,
opinions, and beliefs. As the former set of factors may be
considered to delineate elite orientations towards human na-
ture and interpersonal relations at a rather abstract level,
these latter factors tap the more mundane, but for our pur-
poses, more relevant, political issues. Let us turn to
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these factors and their relation to the general character
orientations.
XENOPHOBIA
The issue of the role of foreign governments in the
domestic political process of Iran is central to the atti-
tudes of the elite and non-elite to the present regime. In
the late nineteenth century, Lord Curzon observed:
Perhaps a special sympathy is due a sovereign [Nasr ed
din Shah, who ruled from 1.848 to 1896], the exigencies
of whose rank and position render it almost impossible
for him to receive the assistance which tried and inde-
pendent counsellors can afford even to the wearer of a
crown . . The foreign Ministers are probably al-
most the only source from which he learns facts as they
are, o2 receives unvarnished, even if interested,
advice
That the only source of reliable counselling on which the
monarch could depend was the foreign Ambassadors appears anala-
gous to the situation as it exists to this day. The American
and British diplomatic representatives still seem to consti-
tue the most trusted advisors of the Shah. But the ability
of these foreigners to gain the ear of the monarch does not
result in the greater regard of the population for either.
On the contrary, the king is sometimes viewed as a tool of
foreign governments, while the latter are viewed as continu-
ously meddling in the internal affairs of an independent nation.
But this is by no means a recent development, having
begun not with Nasr ed din Shah, but centuries earlier. The
first of what was to prove an interminable series of foreign
interventions apparently began with the Sassanians. Chosroes II
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is reported to have gained his throne in 590 or 591 A.D.
with the aid of "Byzantine troops sent by the Emperor Maurice
against the usurper Bahram Chubin."3 Once begun, the call for
assistance to foreign powers--especially at the time of kingly
succession--became common.
But their help was by no means restricted to the problems
of succession. Shah Abbas called on the British for aid in
driving the Portuguese from the trading center of Hormoz.4
Later, Shah Tahmasp, who proclaimed himself king after the
Afhgan invasion of 1722, signed a treaty with Russia whereby
he agreed to cede to Russia the Caspian provinces of Gilan,
Mazandaran, and Gorgan as well as the towns of Baku and Dar-
band in return for the expulsion of the Afghans and the res-
toration of his authority0 5
In more recent times, the pace of foreign intervention
has accelerated, When Fath Ali Shah died in 1834, for example,
a three-wiay struggle for the throne developed. According to
Curzon, only because of "the inexhaustible energy and influ-
ence of Sir John Campbell, then British Minister and to the
assistance of British officers [especially Sir Henry Lindsay
Bethune] in command of the Persian troops," was Mohammad Shah,
"the rightful heir," able to accede to the throne. 6 On the
latter's death, in 1848, a series of rebellions broke out in
major cities throughout the country, but the swift action of
the British and Russian Ministers helped Nasr ed din achieve
supreme power.7
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All the subsequent monarchs of the Qajar dynasty bene-
fitted to at least a similar extent by the willingness of the
British to tip the scales of power in their favor at the time
of a troubled accession. Even Reza Khan is not immune from
charges of British favoritism in effecting the 1921 coup and
subsequently mounting the throne in 1925. Harold Nicolson has
put the case most elegantly:
After the collapse of Lord Curzon's Anglo-Persian treaty
of 1919, it was evident that Persia was heading for com-
plete disintegration; the only hope was that she could be
renovated under strong leadership from within; Sir Percy
[Sykes, then British Minister at Tehran] rightly foresaw
that Reza Khan was capable of such regeneration. And thus
it came about that the Kajar Dynasty was deposed by the
Majles .
And the present monarch, of course, came to power only with
the grace of Britain and the Soviet Union then occupying Iran
and responsible for Reza Shah's deposition.
But much of the intervention of foreign powers was occa-
sioned not by the requests of Persian sovereigns for assis-
tance in their internal political struggles, but rather by
the international political concerns of those powers them-
selves. As early as the seventeenth century, numerous dip-
lomatic missions were despatched by various European countries
to enlist Persian assistance against the Ottomans. It was
hoped that Persian aggression in the East combined with Euro-
pean pressure from the West would so weaken the Ottomans as
to eliminate their threat to Christendom.9 Later, a much more
compelling set of reasons arose for British interest in Iran:
the defense of India. Both the India and Foreign Offices
Nil~
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viewed Iran as a bulwark against a land invasion of the Em-
pire. The English believed that it was " . . in the power
of the sovereigns of that country to repress or assist the
host of barbarians ready at all times to precipitate them-
selves on India as on a certain prey."'10 Having determined
early that Persia guarded the only major overland invasion
route to India, the next 150 years witnessed perpetual efforts
on the part of the British to control Iran so as to eliminate
it as such a route.
The intervention of the foreign powers took on all the
elements of an intense wooing campaign, complete with all
those gifts which are conventionally loaded on monarchs. One
of the earliest of the English Ministers, Sir John Brydges,
told how he curried the favor of Fath Ali Shah in the early
eighteenth century:
L'exhibition d'un beau diamant 'gage d'amitid du Roi
d'Angleterre ainsi que d'une bonne quantits d'objets
precieux et de monnaie sonnante destin'es au Soverain
et a son entourage influent appuyaient favorablement
les allegations de l'astucieux Ambassadeur.1 1
By this period, the campaign for influence in Iran was limited
to Britain and Russia. From their compulsion and largesse,
Iran was buffeted throughout the century, in the process sac-
rificing its most valuable assets to the foreign powers in
the form of concessions. The rights to operate, control, or
own telegraphs, banks, the issue of internal currency, rail-
roads, mines, petroleum, customs, armed forces, tobaccoand
fisheries were parcelled out to the Russians or British or
their subjects. 12
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The Constitutional Revolution can be viewed as the prin-
ciple internal reaction to the ceding away of Iran's sov-
ereignty. But that revolution against the Qajars, who had so
abysmally managed the fortunes of their realm, was carried out
with all the ambiguities common to Persian politics. For it
was conduced with the material assistance of the British Gov-
ernment and their representatives in Tehran. This first of
the Middle Eastern nationalist revolutions was made possible
by the intervention of the British in allowing dissident mer-
chants to encamp on the grounds of the summer embassy and by
otherwise pressuring the Qajars. Thus was demonstrated a
peculiar condition of Iranian nationalism, strains of which
are still evident. Persia's ills are laid squarely at the
feet of interventionist foreign governments. But simultane-
ously, foreign governments are somehow perceived as the
principal and most efficacious means of altering that con-
dition and preserving Iran's independence. 13
But with the intrusion of foreign governments in its
nationalist revolution, not surprisingly, foreign interven-
tion did not cease. The British, thereafter, advanced a
monthly subsidy to the Qajars of 15,000 tomans per month.15
The new Soviet Government renounced all Tsarist concessions
in Iran but proceeded to invade Iran and support secessionist
movements. 16 While such overt intervention declined during
the rule of Reza Shah, the lightning destruction of the
Iranian Armed Forces in 1941 was testament to the relative
strength of Iran gis a vis her more powerful neighbors. War
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time occupation, the Kurdish and Azarbaijan separatist move-
ments, the overthrow of Mossadegh, and American foreign aid
are all well known instances of contemporary foreign inter-
vention and require no retelling here.
The legacy of such intervention, however, deserves
careful analysis. Perhaps the single most salient political
issue in contemporary Iran is the evaluation of these in-
stances of foreign encroachment on Iranian sovereignty and
their relevance for domestic politics. For while Iran, unlike
her immediate neighbors, was able throughout recent history
to maintain its independence, that independence has been but
nominal. And while its neighbors have experienced unifying
struggles for national identity and independence, Iran has
not. The Mossadegh experirment is generally regarded as the
Iranian analogue to other nations' independence struggles.
But that was an unambiguous failure as the monarch was able
to regain control and enhance his power. Thus Iran can boast
of lengthy independence, but an independence in which foreign
manipulation subverted the integrity of many domestic institu-
tions while depriving the nation of a unifying struggle for
national independence.
But the interviews on which this work is based were all
conducted before the conclusion of the most important agree-
ments with the Communist nations: the steel mill-gas pipeline
and arms accords with the U.S.SR.Q and the barter trade agree-
ments with the European bloc nations. Nonetheless, we doubt
that these recent instances of Iranian independence from the
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United States have altered the basic attitudinal ambiguities
of the elite toward foreign powers. And these ambiguities are
profound. One member of the elite summed up the last several
centuries of Iranian history as follows:
Whenever two external powers competed for influence in
Iran, we were comfortable. When these were three or
more foreign powers, or only one, we invariably have
lost our comfort and peace. Those two powers, whether
democratic or dictatorial, allowed us to deal with one
and then the other. But the day when the third power
arrived, most recently the United States, the government
felt that the third power could save it from the other
two, and the independence and integrity of Iran were
destroyed. The leader of our country forgot us, in
his job of becoming a partisan of this third power.
Not surprising, then, that with the lessening of Great Britain's
role in the Middle East, and the return to bipolarity, the Shah
would make a move to restore Iran's position as a classic
example of the buffer state. Not surprising, too, that the
United States should be viewed with such mixed feelings. An-
other respondent expressed these ambiguities:
The United States spent billions of dollars in Iran and
saved Iran from the chains of the U.S.S.R., but the
people hate them. My opinion is the same as almost the
entire nation. The United States imposed Prime Minis-
ters on the king and th-e people; Prime Ministers with
programs prepared in Washington with little knowledge
of Iranian conditions. When the program proved un-
feasible, the solution was to put aside the Prime Minis-
ter, Thus much of the cursing of the United States
stems from Prime Ministers who are independent, arrogant,
and inexperienced and who derive their power from the
support of the United States. 17
These ambiguities extend most profoundly to policies as
well as to personnel. Those of the monarch's policies which
constitute social reforms are viewed as American inspired and
directed, even by the elite who support them. Three such
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policies in particular are viewed as hothouse American trans-
plants. The first and most castigated by periodic references
in the press is the Government's moves toward equalizing the
distribution of wealth in Iran. In the questionnaire, members
of the elite were given a list of ten issues and asked to
rank them in order of importance. In terms of mean scores,
"more nearly equalize the distribution of wealth" was the
eighth issue. The only two issues considered less important
were the suggestion that the Government build houses for the
poor (considered irrelevant in a land where building mate-
rials--sun dried or glazed bricks--are inexpensive) and that
Iran reduce its foreign trade to strive for economic self-
sufficiency (considered economically suicidal). There was
little doubt that this was a U.S. imposed issue. "Why,"
one member of the elite asked, "does America force this
equalization of wealth upon us when it has great inequalities
in its own country? This is communism."
A second major policy area which has enhanced the dis-
affection of the elite toward the United States is the effort
to reduce corruption. From the Shah's first trip to the U.S.
in 1949 and his subsequent efforts to lessen corruption upon
his return, the United States has been viewed as the prime
mover behind his campaign. Only 4.8 per cent of the elite
agreed with the idea that "Corruption in the government appa-
ratus really isn't such a bad thing--it helps 'oil the
wheels' of government and gets things done. (Ninety per cent
disagreed, 78.4 per cent strongly disagreed.) Yet despite
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this nearly unanimous view that corruption is not beneficial,
most of the elite reacted violently to the suggestion that its
elimination was essential. I was perpetually reminded that,
"An honest fool is not as good as a slightly corrupt man who
can be controlled." But when challenged on the evils which
corruption represents, many charged that:
Most of the corruption in government stems from for-
eigners. Our corruption does not come from people
passing a tip to some third-rate government servant
in order to get a license. No, the corruption stems
from the foreign carpet baggers who are here.
The pressures to eliminate corruption, then, are judged to be
American hypocrisy. For what the Americans propose to
eliminate, according to many of the elite, is everyone else's
corruption. Then the field will be open for American efforts.
The third of these policies attributed to American inter-
vention is the land reform, While this issue is relatively
popular, its inception is generally regarded as the handiwork
of the U.S.A.I.D. mission and the American Embassy. One of the
critics of the program charged that:
Land reform is an example of the way everything is done
in this country: with no prior investigation, no
knowledge, no money, and no plans. One result is a drop
in production. Another is the creation of conditions
whereby the government must now deal with millions of
landlords, the peasants, while before it dealt with a
few thousand, Now when the crops are poor those millions
of peasants will turn to the owner of them all, the
Shahanshah, rather than to their former landlords. But
this was forced on us by the United States.
For all three of these policies, the relevant issue is
not whether the elite are in favor or opposed. Nor is it the
actual role of the United States in influencing Iran or the
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Shah toward implementing such policies. Of greater signifi-
cance is the tendency of the elite to lay responsibility for
the major policies of their own Government on the United
States. The resultant psychic conflicts over national integ-
rity and independence in the face of alleged foreign respon-
sibility are perpetually troublesome. This is the case even
when the charge of "foreign pressure" is levelled solely as a
means of rationalizing a policy for which the individual
policy maker wishes to avoid responsibility. That such a
charge can be made and be accepted as at least minimally
credible bespeaks the immense ambivalence of the elite toward
their own country. Insofar as the feelings of these elite
include as a significant component the efficacy, integrity,
and independence of the nation, then such attitudes must be
ambiguous, as well as ambivalent.
For the elite, His Imperial Majesty is the direct symbol
of that ambivalence. His filling this role is based not solely
on his responsibility for the policies of the Government. It
comes, instead, from his own complicated relation to foreigners
and foreign governments. We have mentioned his consultations
with foreign, and especially the British and American, Ambas-
sadors. But in addition, the monarch's connection to foreign
and particularly the American, governments is enhanced by the
presence of large numbers of U.S. diplomats, military per-
sonnel, technical advisors, and the like; the massive U.S.
financial and military assistance with all the concomitant
tales of its being siphoned in corruption; the almost slavish
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accession to U.S. foreign policy, the alleged role of the U.S.
in overthrowing Mossadegh to return the Shah his throne, etc.
No wonder, then, that xenophobia in Iran has far-ranging con-
notations for domestic politics, connotations whIich imply
dissatisfaction with the contemporary balance of political
power within Iran.
In order to measure these attitudes in an indirect, but
reliable, fashion, a ten-item index of xenophobia was designed.
The index elicits elite attitudes to a variety of foreign in-
fluences which presently impinge on Iranian society and poli-
tics. In the factor analysis, all ten items loaded highly
with one factor., Along with one other question, they con-
stitute the Xenophobia Factor.
TABLE 9.1
XENOPHOBIA FACTOR
Which of the following external influences on Iranian cul-
ture do you consider on the whole "very beneficial" or "some-
what beneficial" and which influences do you consider on the
whole "very harmful" or "somewhat harmful" for Iran?
l Radio stations from other countries broad-
casting to Iran .546
2. Books and magazines from abroad .530
3, Foreigners being allowed to live in Iran .526
4. Foreign films and television programs .515
5. Advertising from foreign countries trying
to sell their products in Iran .495
6. The growing popularity of :ravel abroad .476
7. Iranian youth studying in foreign countries .469
8. Foreign economic assistance .454
9. Foreign military assistance .452
10. Maybe some minority groups do get treated in
a prejudiced fashion, but that's no business
of mine. - .343
11. Foreign investments in Iran .273
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The ten items on the original xenophobia index, called
"foreign usefulness," were scored from 1 to 9 with lower
scores indicating more approving attitudes. Combining scores
for the ten individual items reveals that the respondents
grouped at the lower, non-xenophobic end of the scale.
TABLE 9.2
ELITE SCORES ON FOREIGN USEFULNESS INDEX
Scores Per Cent Scores Per Cent
10-19 9.0% 60-69 0.6%
20-29 13.2 70-79 0.0
30-39 34.7 80-89 0.0
40-49 28.1 D.K. or N.A. 5.4
50-59 9.0 Total 100.0%
N (167)
Among the ten items, there were appreciable differences
in the extent of elite approval, as is shown on Table 9.3.
Books and magazines from abroad are highly valued by the
elite. Only 23 (13.8%) of the elite did not regularly read
such a publication. Half of the elite reported that their
primary source of news about international affairs was
foreign media. The consumption of foreign news sources is so
prevalent that 22 (13.2%) of the elite reported that the
foreign media serve as their principal source of news about
Iranian events. Another 36 individuals (21.6%) reported
foreign publications as the second most important source
for such news,
...........
- w~- j~iW.~w~ 
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TABLE 9.3
ELITE RESPONSES TO ITEMS IN THE "FOREIGN USEFULNESS INDEX"
BY PERCENTAGE
Iter Very Somewhat Somewhat Very N.A.,
Beneficial Beneficial Neither Harmful Harmful D.K. Total
Books and (167)
magazines 55.7% 3127% 4.8% 1.2% 010% 6.6% 100.0%
Investments 437 35.9 2.4 9.0 1,2 7,8 100.0
Study abroad 413 34A 3.6 12.6 30 7.8 100.0
Economic aid 37.7 35.9 8.4 8,4 2.4 7.2 100.0
Travel 36.5 35.3 7.2 12.6 2.4 6.0 100.0
Foreign
residents 34.1 41.9 12.0 2.4 1.8 7.8 100.0
Military aid 28.1 36.5 4.2 7.2 6.6 17.4 100.0
Films and TV 16.8 28.7 1296 26,9 4,2 10.8 100.0
Broadcasts 15.0 30,5 21.6 21.0 3.0 9.0 100.0
Advertising 9.0 29.9 22.8 25.1 6.6 6.6 100.0
-_____ I I.-- I a-
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Study and travel outside I-n are also considered bene-
ficial but have come under significant attack in recent years.
Both represent immense drains on foreign currency rese-.ves and
both are considered the principal means whereby Iranians lose
the best of their own culture. While travel has consciously
been used for just this purpose--socialization into new life
styles--many of the elite have come to feel that the only
aspects of the exotic culture adopted are the most superficial
and trivial. As one of the elite expressed it:
We go to Europe or America and send our youth to sLudy
there. Our people are mimics, out too often of the
frivoloties of your culture. They return having
learned the latest Westcr. fashions but not self-
discipline, hard work, savings.
As a result, there is mounting sentiment in Iran opposed to
both sendino students abroad, except in special circumstances,
and general tourism. Partly in reflection of this, the Gov-
ernment imposed in 1965 a 10,000 rial ($133.00) tax on all
Iranians leaving their country.
The most widely ill-considered foreign influences are
films and television programs which have come under severe
attack for allegedly teaching American-style sex and violence
to the youth of Iran. A rather vast campaign was undertaken
in Iran, including hostile speeches in the Majles, calling for
banning of these Western products. Advertising, the second of
these little valued influences, has never been subject to any
public criticism. Elite comments indicate, however, that
advertising by foreign companies is considered an attempt by
foreigners to "raid" the Iranian economy and damage the growth
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of internal industry. The third of these, foreign broad-
casting, has been the subject of much public concern and
even of several official exchanges between the Government of
Iran and Communist governments. For at least two clandestine
radio stations are supported and operated in the U.S.SOR. and
bloc countries; stations whose sole content is anti-regime
and anti-American propaganda, broadcast primarily in Persian
but also in other Iranian languages.
Finally there are a number of items reflecting inter-
Governmental relations, As a whole they tend to be viewed as
less beneficial than most other items. The least beneficial
of these is military aid. Here is an item of such intense
importance to the regime that the number of "refused answer"
responses was relatively very high.18 Foreign residents are
seen primarily as exmployees of foreign Governments and are
also relatively devalued. Only economic aid of all inter-
Governmental relations is found in the first five of these
foreign influences,
On balance, then, it is clear that the elite cannot be
considered generally xenophobic, although their aversion to
foreign influences of the Government is conspicuous. When we
turn to sub-sectors of the elite, however, more interesting
patterns emerge,. Of the social background factors, only one
bears any significant association with these attitudes. The
Age Factor is inversely associated with xenophobia. The older
the member of the elite, as measured by factor scores, the
less the xenophobia (x 2 = 14.810, df - 4, p = .005, gamma
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.131). Recall what variables made up the Age Factor. Pri-
marily, the factor combined increasing age with more service
in the Senate and the Majles and lower levels of education for
both the respondent and his father. The relation of the two
factors indicates that the younger and better educated of the
elite are the most xenophobic. This relation holds even when
we take into account another variable which is significantly
associated with age--the amount of foreign travel experienced,
There is no relationship between the amount of foreign travel
and xenophobia, irrespective of age. The better-educated,
younger members of the elite most strongly bridle at the asso-
ciation of the Shah with foreign governments and at the nearly
pervasive intervention of foreigners in Iranian affairs.
When we turn to the association between the general char-
acter orientations and xenophobia, more telling results are
produced. All four of these orientations are significantly
related. The most startling is that association with manifest
insecurity.
TABLE 9.4
XENOPHOBIA BY MANIFEST INSECURITY
Xenophobia Manifest Insecurity
Low Medium High
Low 56.1% 27.3% 26.8%
Medium 36.6 40.0 26.8
High 7.3 32.7 46.4
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(x2 = 20.568, df = 4, p < .001, gamma = .418)
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The entire agglomeration of variables which make up the Mani-
fest Insecurity Factor would suggest that the elite do displace
their own insecurities within Iranian society onto distant,
and safer, objects.0 9 But this displacement in Iranian soci-
ety operates in a different fashion than would be expected.
For by expressing dissatisfaction with the extent and nature
of foreign involvements in Iran, the elite are also able to
express their dissatisfactions with His Imperial Majesty. Here
is a relatively safe means for criticizing domestic politics.
For in the minds of most of the elite, the Shah and foreign
governments, especially the United States, but increasingly
the Soviet Union, are intimately associated. Thus an attack
on the policies of those governments in terms of their activi-
ties in Iran can be accepted as an expression of dissatisfac-
tion with the king and his policies. Thus rather than the
phenomenon of displacement, as it is conventionally under-
stood, the high xenophobia of the insecure repesents a
manifestation of a general hostility to all those factors
viewed as responsible for the condition of politics in con-
temporary Iran.
ORIENTATION TO THE SHAH
This becomes clear when we compare scores on the Manifest
Insecurity Factor with scores on another factor encompassing
political attitudes, a factor entitled Orientation to the Shah.
We have already mentioned the question which asked the
elite to state the "most striking changes in the Iranian way
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TABLE 9.5
ORIENTATION TO THE SHAH
1. Number of references to His Imperial Majesty
made in answering the question of changes in
the Iranian way of life .503
2. Assuming you were to lose your present occupa-
tional position, in that case do you think that
you would also lose your present position in
Iranian society? - .445
3. Concerning your personal future: would you say
that in general you feel enthusiastic, hopeful,
anxious, or embittered? - .383
4. Do you ordinarily like to be with people rather
than alone? - .316
of life since the end of World War II." In addition to coding
the substantive responses to that question, we recorded the
number of times in which each respondent mentioned the Shah,
in any context regarding the changes. The number of refer-
ences loaded most highly on the factor. What groups together
are numerous references to the Shah, the fear that one's so-
cial position is tied to one's occupational position, an
optimistic appraisal of one's future, and a desire to be with
people rather than alone. On a post facto basis, what this
factor appears to express is the realization that one's fate
is tied to the Shah. That is, the elite who are positively
urt led to the Shah, retain thereby their optimism, espe-
cially because they are aware and undoubtedly fearful of
losing their social status along with their occupational
position (and failure to support the Shah would probably
result in such a loss).
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When run against the Manifest Insecurity Factor, the
following results are obtained:
TABLE 9.6
ORIENTATION TO THE SHAH BY MANIFEST INSECURITY
s .t Orientation to the ShahManifest Insecurity LwHg
Low High
Low 39.6% 60.5%
High 60.4 39.5
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (91) (76)
(Yates x2 = 6.469, continuity corrected, p = .01, gamma= -.402)
As expected on the basis of the alleged connection between
foreign influences in Iran and the position of the Shah, as
insecurity is related to xenophobia, so it is related to
orientation to the Shah. The greater the antecedent insecu-
rity, the greater the xenophobia and the less the orientation
to the Shah.20 The more insecure the elite, the less is their
attachment to the Shah and the greater is their hostility to
foreign influences, especially to the United States.
A social background characteristic of the elite that
also plays a telling role in their attitudes toward the Shah
is foreign travel, As the elite's foreign travel increases
and as, concomitantly, their dissatisfactions with the Iranian
political system mount, so do their disaffections with their
monarch. This relationship disappears, however, when foreign
travel is held constant and the attitudes conducive to low
orientations to the Shah are varied, That is, foreign travel
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TABLE 9.7
NUMBER OF YEARS THE ELITE HAVE RESIDED OUTSIDE
IRAN BY ORIENTATION TO THE SHAH, BY PERCENTAGE
Orientation Number of Years Abroad
to Shah 0 - 4 4 - 10 10
High 45,3% 27.3% 24.2%
Medium 34.0 25.0 30.6
Low 20.7 47.7 45.2
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (53) (44) (62)
(x2 = 11.166, df 4, p .025, gamma = .294)
per se is not productive of this neglect or worse of the king;
what is so productive are the generalized orientations of in-
security, cynicism, and mistrust. But the table is included
here because foreign travel is itself so conduc ive to the
development of those attitudes. And despite regime attempts
to limit general tourism, foreign travel is widespread and
increasing for the political elite. The result can only be
the nurturance of more orientations antitietical both to poli-
tical development and to the security of His Imperial Majesty.
These relationships outlined here are unusual in that they
cover the spectrum of all the elite, We have noted previously
that the older the individual, the greater was the accompanying
manifest insecurity and here we have shown the connection be-
tween insecurity and xenophobia. On the other hand, we have
also argued here for the propensity of the younger, better
educated of the elite to be xenophobic. What appears to be
529
at work are multiple roots of xenophobia; roots which affect
virtually the entire body of the elite.
Cynicism and mistrust also relate significantly and
positively to xenophobia. The higher the level of cynicism,
the greater the anti-foreign feelings (x2 = 17.633, df = 4,
p = .002, gamma = - .320). A similar association exists for
mistrust (x2 = 30.889, df = 16, p = .01, gamma = - .251).
Again, these are relationships explicable in terms of general
dissatisfaction with the political system. But the of
the elite who manifest high levels of exploitation also mani-
ce?: low levels of xenophobia, as would be predicted from our
understanding of those who can and do manipulate their fellows
in the elite (x2 = 27.684, df = 16, p = .035, gamma = -.185).
Those of the elite who have enjoyed the longest tenure in
their posts and have developed a propensity for manipulating
others, manifest the least dissatisfaction with foreign in-
fluences and ipse dixit with the Shah himself.2 1
SOCIAL DISDAIN
A charge frequently levelled at politically active
Iranians is their propensity for belittling the contributions
of their fellows. The natural political counterpart to
general orientations of cynicism and individualism would be
a belief in the disutility of others and their service to
society, It was felt that a reliable test of this phenomenon
would have to go beyond an evaluation of other individuals,
however, for in any highly competitive political system
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feelings of personal animosity would likely be present. Thus
a more broad-gauge evaluatory scale would be required. To
tap these attitudes, then, the elite were asked a series of
questions about entire social, political, and occupational
groups. These fell out in the orthogonal rotationin a factor
labelled Social Disdain.
TABLE 9.8
SOCIAL DISDAIN FACTOR
Please consider each of the following groups in Iranian so-
ciety and indicate whether you think each group is performing
a positive, negative, or neutral service for the country:
1. University professors - .642
2. The peasants - .629
3. Judges - .626
4. The police - .611
5. The armed forces - .531
6. Businessmen - .477
7. Members of the Majles and Senate - .419
8. Government officials - .388
9. Those who inform the country through
the press, radio, and television - .380
10. Number of negative or uinfavorable changes
in the Iranian way of life since the end
of World War II mentioned by the respondent. - .438
11. Estimate of the value to Iran of foreign
economic assistance - .419
12. Estimate of the value to Iran of foreign
military assistance - .344
13. Frequency of discussion of career and work
affairs with spouse - .341
In the original questionnaire, an evaluation of the con-
tribution of ten groups was sought: Attitudes toward one--
the ulema--did not load ih.y on the factor. Tiis group was
the only one of the ten subject to general disapprobation.
Some two-thirds of the elite felt that the ulema were performing
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a negative service for Iran--a rather conclusive demonstra-
tion of the fundamental bifurcation between the religious and
political elite and a rationalization for the political cam-
paign being waged against them. Inasmuch as the regime has
been unsuccessful in mobilizing the religious elite for regime
policies, the regime's response has been overwhelmingly nega-
tive, both against the ulema themselves and against religion
per se. (Although this latter point is not one which would
be conceded by the regime.)
But how do the remaining groups fare? As a whole, re-
markably well. The overall attitudes of the elite are positive,
while only two groups--the Majles and Senate and the Government
officials--fail to win majority support for the positive nature
of their contribution. But this is directly supportive of our
original hypothesis. For while the elite are willing to con-
cede to groups outside the political process, the same is not
true for those within that process. And of all ten groups,
only the two here are legitimately part of the political
process. While university professors, the military, the em-
ployees of the mass media, judges, and police are entirely or
in large measure employees of the Government, the Shah strives
to exclude them totally from politics. In the Iranian con-
text, of course, "exclusion from politics"' means isolating
chose groups from the influence of anyone but the Shah, not
isolating them from political influence in toto. Their insula-
tion leaves the administrative bureaucracy and the Parliament
as the legitimate arena for politics. And these two groups
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are the least positively received of any of the groups within
the factor.
The remaining items in the factor are loaded in such a
fashion as to demonstrate positive attitudes not only to
other groups in the society but also to more general aspects
of the system. Those of the elite who feel positively toward
other groups also report few negative changes since World War II,
welcome foreign economic and military aid, and tend to discuss
their careers with their spouses.
When we turn to the relationship of antecedent variables
to social disdain we note that cynicism is most strongly asso-
ciated with that set of attitudes. The greater the cynicism,
the greater is the social disdain.
TABLE 9.9
CYNICISM BY SOCIAL DISDAIN AMONG
THE POLITICAL ELITE
Social Disdain 
Cynicism
Low Medium High
Low 46.3% 32.0% 18.9%
Medium 44.4 32.0 34.0
High 34.4 36.0 47.2
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (54) (50) (53)
(x2 = 20.761, df = 4, p = .000, gamma = .436)
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FAMILY DISDAIN
In addition to the Social Disdain Factor, another factor
was generated which defined disdain for another significant
set of referents for the respondents, their families. While
this factor has been partially dealt with above, we repeat it
here for its immediate relevance to the issues we are now
raising.
TABLE 9.10
FAMILY DISDAIN
Frequency with which the respondent has discussed the following
topics with his spouse:
1. The upbringing of his children .657
2. The education of his children .646
3. The family budget .453
4. Birth control . ?86
5. His career and occupational matters .344
6. Apart from your immediate family, is there
anyone to whom you confide your most per-
sonal and important problems? .367
7. How old would you think a child had to be
before he could be trusted with informa-
tion on family finances? .356
This factor includes all the items originally conceptualized
as a measure of family integration on the basis of intra-
familial communication. The factor also loads highly on
variables which pertain to intra-familial trust and inter-
personal trust. Little communication within the family, a
disinclination to trust cbildren with matters of family im-
portance, at least until they are well into their twenties,
and an absence of personal confidants outside the family are
suggested as a common behavioral pattern among the elite.
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As with xenophobia and social disdain, so with family dis-
dain. This latter factor also is positively and significantly
related to cynicism (x 2 = 14.C04, df = 4, p = .007). The
elite manifest a rather universal contempt extending from
their most intimate personal relations to others in the poli-
tical process to foreigners. This recalls the charges brought
against first century, A.D., Greek cynics. "They despise
everyone," a contemporary critic decried, "and call the man
of good family effeminate, the low-born, poor spirited, the
handsome man a debauchee, the ugly person simple minded, the
rich covetous, and the poor greedy."23  But while these atti-
tudes of the Iranian political elite are reminiscent of the
Greek cynics, they are in sharp contrast to the findings of
much other research. It has frequently been argued, for
example, that individuals displace their hostilities and ag-
gression from proximate relationships on to distant, and
presumably safer, objects. From his analysis of non-
industrialized societies, Robert LeVine has concluded that
"there appears to be a correlation of internal solidarity,
trust, and sociability with external hostility."24 Our
findings, on the contrary, suggest a correlation between
internal "solidarity, trust, and sociaoility" with external
"solidarity, trust, and sociability.,,25
In the context of Iranian politics, it is this pervasive
contemptuous and derisive view of other men--all other men--
and interpersonal relations in general which serves as the
attitudinal bulwark for the behavioral independence, or
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individualism, for which Iran is so justly renowned.26 How-
ever, this individualism falls far short of the self-reliance
and autonomy which the concept suggests to be the ideal in
the West. Rather, it assumes the form of self-seeking behavior,
reinforced by cynicism, mistrust, and insecurity, while re-
strained only by considerations of relative power.
But this individualism is not restricted to Iran. It
appears to be a condition of much of the developing world.
President Nasser, for example, recognized these same atti-
tudes after the 1952 coup in Egypt:
If I were asked then what I required most, my instant
answer would be, "To hear but one Egyptian uttering one
word of justice about another, to see but one Egyptian
not devoting his time to criticize willfully the ideas
of another."
. . . Personal and persistent selfishness was the
rule of the day. The word "I" was on every tongue. It
was the magic solution of ever difficulty and the ef-
fective cure for every malady. 7
But as Nasser so quickly realized, these propensities are
inimical to the very root of political development: the con-
cerning of behavior through the strengthening of organizations.
The development of effective organizations depends fun-
damentally upon ihe capacity of individuals to associate
with each other, This capacity calls into question a
wide range of basic human values and the ability of
individuals to make commitments--commitments as to the
goals and purposes of group action, the means and spirit
of associational relationships, the appropriate limits 28
of such associations and the integrity of the self . . .
Yet when we asked the members of the elite what they would do
if the Government of Iran were contemplating an action which
they considered harmful or unjust, only one respondent suggested
that any type of organized, group activity--either through a
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political party or the Parliament--would be appropriate. (And
that respondent was one of the half dozen women in the panel
of respondents') 2 9
Even more telling were the responses indicating what the
elite would do in such a case. Their responses were signifi-
cantly associated with levels of cynicism, mistrust, and in-
security and conversely with exploitation. To examine only
one of these:
TABLE 9.11
REPORTED BEHAVIOR CONTEMPLATED BY THE ELITE IN
RESPONSE TO UNJUST OR HARMFUL GOVERNMENT
PROPOSALS, BY CYNICISM
Proposed Cynicism
Behavior High Medium High Medium Low Low
Nothing 65.2% 44.4% 42.1% 3.3%
Some Action 34.8 55.6 57.9 96.7
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N (23) (18) (19) (30)
(x2 = 23.499, df = 4, p - 0.000)
Nearly two-thirds of the most cynical would do nothing if the
Government were contemplating a harmful action. Only 3.3%
(1) of the least cynical would so respond.
This policy of behavioral inaction by the political elite
in the face of prospective injustice constitutes a clear in-
stance of the operationalization of cynicism, insecurity, and
mistrust. In all likelihood, the proposed measure would be
enacted; its probable personal consequences assessed by each
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of the elite, and if judged personally harmful, some attempt
to evade or divert the measure would be made. But no confron-
tation would be risked, no group or even individual action
considered. For that type of response would require psychic
equipment beyond the grasp of these members of the elite. The
minimal levels of trust, security, and sincerity which make
possible manipulation, the basic tools in trade of politicians
in every society, are generally absent in Iran. As a result,
the political response would be post facto and personal, with
the effect that the outputs of the Iranian political system
are rarely predictable and usually remote from prior expecta-
tions.
REDUCE GOVERNMENT ROLE
A set of ten policies which were being pursued or dis-
cussed by the Government at the time of the survey were
presented to the elite for their evaluation. Of the ten, one
loaded highly and the thrust of that policy has been used to
identify this factor.
TABLE 9.12
RGR FACTOR
1. Dissolving government-owned monopolies is an
important policy worthy of implementation. - .479
2. Government officials are performing a rather
harmful service for the country. .454
3. It's no use getting upset and concerned about
broad political issues and public affairs;
people like me really can't do anything about
them anyway. - .437
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4. That person in all the world who is most
respected by the respondent, living or
dead .423
5. I don't think that really powerful public
officials and politicians care much what
people like me think. - .371
6. Second most respected person, living or
dead .321
That single policy of the ten issues which loads on this
factor urges that the Government disband its monopolies in
the economy. This has been an important issue in Iran for
several years, having its roots in the period of Reza Shah's
rule. For the indigenous bourgeoisie were first presented
with the conditions for strengthening their role in Iran's
economic life by Reza Shah. He centralized the country's
administration, established security, built railroads and
highways, expanded the secular education system, and estab-
lished a university.30 The wartime occupation of Iran by the
allies added impetus to their growth by providing new oppor-
tunities for profit. These were not lost on Iranian business-
men.3 1 With the beginning of U.S. economic aid after the
war and the resumption of oil production after the overthrow
of Mossadegh, the private sector experienced phenomenal
growth, growth which devastated foreign exchange reserves and
led to the economic slowdown of the early 1960's.32
But by this period, a new factor becomes significant in
the contribution of the private sector toward economic devel-
opment. The ownership of agricultural land had lost some of
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its previous luster. Partly as a result of the opportunities
for gain in light industry and importing, but more from the
gathering Government momentum to effect land reform, capital
began to flow from land in the countryside to urban land or
to other parts of the economy.33 The result was not only that
the economy received a much needed fillip, but that the ex-
landlords, recently recruited to the side of the bourgeoisie,
made demands on the Government seeking a loosenig of Govern-
ment control over the economy. This control not only con-
sisted of the usual customs and tariff rates, foreign exchange
regulations, taxes and licenses, but involved outright
Government ownership of the major industrial units throughout
virtually all sectors of the economy. Textiles, sugar re-
fining, etc., are the major productive parts of the economy,
and the lion's share of their capacity was claimed by the
Government.34
The demands for foreign exchange, government subsidies,
and the like continued. But now demands of a different type
were being voiced:
. . . in this economy, all roads lead to the State. The
State produces textiles, shoes, canned fruit, chairs,
desks, wire, and even poultry. The State is a business-
man, dealing in sugar, paper, automobiles, oil, type-
writers, and even cosmetics. The State is a farmer and
a fisher; the State is a dairyman selling milk and eggs,
the Government breeds cattle, it operates bakers and
grociers.
When we talk of the Government, we do not refer to
the cabinet, but to the Administration. They oppose the
transfer of the State monopolies to the people. It ob-
structs this as logH as it can and then it spoils the
whole thing . .
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And, surprisingly, these demands received the sympathetic at-
tention of the Cabinet. In his first major economic address to
the Majiles, the then Prime Minister Mansur declared that "one
of our guiding principles is to transfer the affairs of the
people to the people themselves . . . which has amounted to
the Government relinquishing its commercial and profit making
operations.",36
In practice, the Government grouped together a large num-
ber of industrial enterprises in a Government Owned Factories
Corporation. Shares in this corporation were then sold to the
public or exchanged for land reform vouchers.37 But this came
too late with too little and the debate over Government mono-
polies continued, its intensity revealed by the position of
the item in the factor.
The second item grouped on the factor mirrored respon-
dents' attitudes toward Government officials. Members of the
elite who urged the dissolution of Government monopolies con-
sidered these same officials to be harmful for the welfare of
the country. When the elite were asked to specify persons
whom they most respected, these respondents invariably chose
persons long since dead. Their reference figures were no con-
temporary political figures--like Reza Shah Kabir or even the
present Shah; not Taghizadeh nor Mossadegh. Nor did they men-
tion contemporary literary figures or foreigners. Kasravi and
Sadegh Hedayat, Kennedy and de Gaulle were infrequently men-
tioned by them. These elite reverted to the more distant past
for their reference figures. Shah Abbas, Darius, or Cyrus;
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Mohammad the Prophet or Ali, his son-in-law, even Jesus or
Moses; non-Iranians such as Lincoln; and, of course, the
great Iranian poets, Hafez, Sa'adi, and Ferdowsi: these were
the reference figures for those with high scores on the fac-
tor. Invariably their dissatisfaction with contemporary poli-
tics was reflected in their inability to specify contemporary
figures as worthy of respect or admiration.
Finally, two items that loaded highly on this factor
refer to the elite's sense of mastery vis a vis the political
process. Those who wished to dissolve the monopolies, who
thought Government officials were, on balance, harmful, and
who turned to past for reference figures--these respondents
also felt the least sense of relevance to and control over
the political process.
When we turn to the antecedents of this package of
variables expressing disenchantment with the present political
system, we find the strongest association with scores on the
Mistrust Factor.
TABLE 9.13
SCORES ON THE MISTRUST FACTOR BY SCORES ON
THE REDUCE GOVERNMENT ROLE FACTOR
Mistrust
RGR Low High
Low 67.5% 36.7%
High 32.5 63.3
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(Yates x2 = 14,608, continuity corrected, p = 0.000,
gamma .565)
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The elite who are mistrustful of others are the most eager
to reduce the role of the Government in Iranian life, appa-
rently "'to turn the affairs of the people over to the people."
The same association exists with the other variables of inse-
curity and cynicism. As the elite manifest higher levels of
these orientations, they report a progressively increasing
tendency to wish the Government ill, to lessen its impact on
Iranian life, and to disperse political power more broadly
from its present allocation.
POPULIST--NON-ELITE
But how broadly they choose to allocate that power is an
issue not answered by the RGR Factor. For more insight, we
need to turn to yet another of the political factors.
TABLE 9.14
POPULIST, NON-ELITE FACTOR
1. The Government should undertake policies whose
result would be to equalize more nearly the
distribution of wealth in Iran among indivi-
duals. - .598
2. Increasing the share which Iran derives from
oil production is an important policy for the
Government to implement. .473
3. That type of loyalty which is most important
to teach a child in Iran - .428
4. Iran's culture is so unique that it has
always subverted would-be conquerors and
"Iranized" them. .376
5. Land reform should be accelerated. - .324
6. The civil service of Iran should be reformed. - .319
7. Foreign military assistance is, on balance,
a harmful influence on Iranian society. .318
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Grouped here are a number of additional policies which the
elite were asked to rank in terms of their importance for
Iran. The effect generated by the issue of income equali-
zation has already been mentioned. Many of the elite railed
at the notion, associating it with American naivete larded
with Marxism. But its loading on this factor was to the con-
trary, implying support for the policy.
While those with high scores advocated Government
measures to reduce income disparities, they did not consider
an increase in Iran's share of the oil revenues to represent
a salient issue. But why should elite oriented toward all the
social and political changes in Iranian society implied by
equalization of wealth not support a policy of increasing the
wealth flowing to Iran? The explanation is ro-ted in recent
political history. For a basic belief on the part of many of
the elite and non-elite is that the oil revenues are the foun-
dation on which the present system of politics maintains its
stability. The oil revenues have not proved conducive to the
types of social change which are advocated. Rather, they serve
oppositely. For the massive oil revenues make possible the
system of cooptation which we have described as the basic com-
ponent of His Majesty's style of rule. And those revenues
have been massive and continually increasing. From the resump-
tion of oil production in 1954 to the present, Iran's total
annual earnings in foreign exchange from petroleum have mounted
nearly 2200 per cent. Since 1960, her total earnings from
petroleum have been growing at an average rate of 15 per cent
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TABLE 9.15
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RECEIPTS FROM OIL
1954-1967, $ MILLIONS
Purchases from: Annual
Year Oil Ui Utner Oil Total Percentage
Revenues Consortium Companies Increase
1954-1955 $ 22 $ 12 $ $ 34
1955-1956 92 47 139 318.80',
1956-1957 140 40 180 43.88
1957-1958 208 48 256 42.22
1958-1959 245 74 25* 344 34.37
1959-1960 261 77 338 - 1.74
1960-1961 285 74 359 6.21
1961-1962 291 100 391 8.91
1962-1963 342 91 5 438 12.02
1963-1964 388 81 2 471 7.53
1964-1965 40Q 77 197* 754 60.08
1965-1966 514 76 23 613 - 18.70
1966-1967 644 85 26 755 23.16
(*These sums represent advance payments from non-consortium
members in return for prospecting and production leases.)
per annum. Revenues were flowing into the country at the rate
of 775 million dollars per year as of 1966. Since then,
revenues have mounted sharply. With the stoppage of production
in Arab crude oil following the June 1967 war with Israel and
the mounting pressures which Iran has been applying to the
Consortium for increased production, Iran's oil revenues should
be at an annual rate of one billion dollars per year by the end
of this decade (at the latest), 39
These immense revenues underlie the cooptation system.
For His Imperial Majesty's chief means of cooptation are finan-
cial means. But of significance to the Shah is not only the
annual level of these revenues. Although they must be high,
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their absolute level is but part of the equation. In addition,
these revenues must continually expand, just as do the expecta-
tions of the elite and their "needs." In order to continually
satisfy these, His Majesty must see to it that oil revenues
perpetually increase. Fortunately for his style of rule, he
has been successful.
But this very success explains the disinclination of cer-
tain of the elite respondents to press for increased oil
revenues, as do so many of their peers. For they appreciate
the relation between the increase of such revenues and the
maintenance of the present distribution of power within Iran.
One presented an extreme position when he argued:
What is the curse of Iran? The curse of Iran is its
oil. Look at the greatness of the United Kingdom.
That greatness originates in the fact that Great
Britain has nothing.
While most of the respondents would disagree with this view
and with the "oil-less Iran" policy attributed (incorrectly)
to Mossadegh, neither do they place a high priority on forcing
those revenues upward, given their present use.
Another variable whose political meaning is similar to
that of oil is the issue of military assistance from foreign
nations. Such assistance is frequently perceived as not
serving the purpose of helping Iran protect itself from
foreign aggression, but rather of maintaining the power of
the regime. This most crucial issue of contemporary politics
in Iran was not one about which it was simply to allude in
interviews. But oblique and telling criticisms of military
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assistance were frequently levelled. Comments such as, "Our
armed forces are performing a positive service for Irant
they defend us against Afghanistan," were not rare. This
item, then, loaded in a fashion similar to the issue of oil.
Elite with high scores on this factor held unfavorable atti-
tudes toward the value of foreign military assistance.
Another set of variables loading on this factor was the
kinds of loyalty which the elite felt most important to teach
a child. The types of loyalty from which they were asked to
choose and the responses were as follows:
TABLE 9.16
TYPE OF LOYALTY TO TEACH A CHILD FOR
THE IRANIAN ELITE
Type of First Second
Loyalty' Choice Choice
Loyalty to Islam 12.6% 5.4%
Loyalty to the Nation 28.1 32.9
Loyalty to His Imperial Majesty 18.0 22.8
Loyalty to the Professicor.
Organization where he works 3.0 4.8
Loyalty to the F m. ly 6.6 7.8
Loyalty to the S-. 15.6 2.3
Other, No Answer 16.1 24.0
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (167) (167)
The choices were framed in this fashion so that responses
could be placed on a continuum of abstractness from universal,
inclusive symbols (all Moslems, all Iranians) to parochial,
exclusive symbols (the child's family, the child himself).
Loadings of these answers on the factor indicate that those
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who are least disposed to accept the existing distribution
of power (and of income) most favor the inculcation of univer-
salistic symbols in their children. In other words, the defi-
nition of the community to which oyalty is due is broad
rather than narrow, is universal rather than parochial, and
is inclusive rather than exclusive--a very non-elitist approach
to the polity and to interpersonal relations.
Two other policies whose implementation is accorded high
priority according to their factor loadlings are the accelera-
tion of land reform and the reform of Iran's civil service.
The former is clearly a policy with populist implications
(even in the sense of Populism as it existed in the United
States), The latter policy has similar implications. For
civil service reform would undoubtedly produce two results:
First, the efficiency of the administration would be cnhanced.
Consequently, the many policies of the Government whose imple-
mentation would conduce to far-reaching changes in the social
structure would stand a better chance of being implemented in
fact. Secondly, the bureaucracy would serve less as a source
of employment and an instrument for cooptation and more as the
administrative organ for which it was originally designed.
The Populist-Non-Elite factor grouped a number of vari-
ables whose impact was that the Government of Iran should pur-
sue policies which would reduce disparities of wealth, speed
land reform, and reform the civil service. Increased oil
revenues and foreign military assistance are, on balance, not
valuable, Finally, the political community should be as
548
broadly defined as possible and, concomitantly, that definition
is facilitated by a disinclination to view Iran's culture as
unique. The orientation of these variables in the factor
suggest that those of the elite who advocate a reduction in the
sway of the Government would score highly on the Populist-Non-
Elite Factor. But such is not the case,
The mistrustful, cynical, and insecure of the respondents
deprecated the performance of the Government and, accordingly,
scored highly on the Reduce Government Role Factor. But these
same respondents had low scores on the Populist-Non-Elite
Factor, In a regression analysis, the three general character
orientations correlated with scores on the Populist Factor in
this fashion (multiple r = .313, df = 162, p = .001). In other
words, while these respondents wished to reduce the role of
the Government, they were not in favor of transferring that
power to any other sector of the populace. As there was a
general spill-over of disdain for other persons, so is there
a general disaffection for Government as it does exist and
Government as it might exist. One result is that these elite
approach the essence of the Greek cynics in the modern-day
inception of their political belief: anarchism0  The principal
difference is that these elite continue to operate in political
life, their cynicism and mistrust feeding their insecurities
and all serving to lessen their effectiveness as political
actors while rationalizing their being coopted.
These elite evince in certain surprising ways attitudes
characteristic of major segments of the Iranian political
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opposition. We discussed above the unwillingness of the oppo-
sition to participate in Iranian politics in order to avoid
the kind of cooptation which has befallen the elite. Their
stance recalls that of Bakunin, who argued that the capitalists
hold their capital by the grace of the state (unlike Marx, who
made an opposite argument)., Bakunin concluded that inasmuch as
. . the state is the main evil, nothing must be done
which can keep the state . . . alive. Hence complete
abstention from all politics. To commit a political act
. . . would be a betrayal of principle.40
But in a very definite sense, this is also the stance of the
present elite. They would appear to "salve"' the guilt of their
"betrayal of principle" by maintaining the orientations which
they do and by maximizing the material rewards which the system
is so willing to offer them.
When we turn to those of the elite who do not evince cyni-
cism and mistrust and the accompanying insecurity--those who
score highly on the Exploitation Factor--we find different poli-
tical attitudes. Those who can, and apparently do, manipulate
their fellows in the elite show little inclination to lessen
the power of the Government.
TABLE 9.17
SCORES ON THE EXPLOITATION FACTOR BY SCORES ON
THE REDUCE GOVERNMENT ROLE FACTOR
Exploitation
RGR Low High
Low 40.5% 60.2%
High 59.5 39.8
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N (79) (88)
(Yates x2 = 6.478, continuity corrected, p .02, gamma - -. 380)
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These same respondents see little cause to "return the affairs
of the people to the people" and in that sense are the most
"elitist" of the political elite. For their disinclination to
disperse political power and increase reciprocity in the sys-
tem is based on their own competence in dealing with the sys-
tem, their lengthy tenure in their positions within and
without the political system, and the sense of psychic security
which they manifest,, Not "a plague on all your houses,"
which is the message of the insecure and cynical; but rather,
"a plague on only your house" seems to be the message of the
exploitative.
In short, what appears to be operating among the political
elite is a nearly universal disinclination to broaden the base
of political participation. In this sense, the behavioral
consequences of all four general character orientations are
similar. Those of the elite who are relatively removed from
day-to-day operations of the political process or those who
have successfully mastered the art of manipulating others for
their own benefit are disinclined to disperse power. They see
no need to do so,. On the other hand, those of the elite oeset
by insecurity, cynicism, and mistrust react by disparaging
foreign influences, the Shah, their fellow elite, other
Iranians, and their families. They are disinclined to share
political power with anyone and would seem to be characterized
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by a general disaffection or alienation from the political
process in general.4 1
With such intense feelings of hostility to politics by
such a large segment of the most politically powerful actors,
we may well ask why the political system has been immune from
collapse. With these general orientations of insecurity,
cynicism, and mistrust and the political attitudes of xeno-
phobia, social disdain, family disdain, and reduce Government's
role, why has Iran not emulated so many of its Middle Eastern
neighbors? Why has Iran been immune from the coups d'etat
and revolutions which seem to characterize so many developing
nations? Why has the Shahanshah been able to boast so cor-
rectly that Iran is a "sea of tranquility and stability" in
the midst of the world's political chaos?4 2
Fundamentally, the answer lies in the success of the
monarch in creating a consensus among the political elite.
Contrary to his efforts, however, the consensus revolves
neither about his person nor about his policies. The consen-
sus is rooted in a pervasive sense of the immutability of the
system in the face of an equally pervasive sense of personal
inefficacy on the part of the vast majority of the elite.
Beset by personal insecurities, mistrustful of themselves and
their fellows, and cynical about the motives of all persons
and the outcomes of all programs, the elite respond by coping
with the system, not by attempting to alter it in fundamental
ways. And the process of coping consists, basically, of
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learning to operate within its norms while maximizing the
benefits which can be derived from it.4 3
Such is the consensus that has been formulated. But
while conducive to stability, the consensus is maintained
only at great costs to the processes of political development
in Iran. It is to these costs--the costs of politics in
Iran--that we need, finally, to turn.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The factors were drawn from a standard Principal Com-
ponents Factor Analysis on a selected array of 141 variables
and then subjected to an orthogonal rotation approximating a
simple structure varimax rotation. Sixteen factors were pro-
duced, which explained approximately 46 per cent of the total
variance. The six factors which we have specified as reflect-
ing more narrowly political concerns explained 14.9 per cent
of the total variance, as follows:
Per Cent Variance Per Cent Total
Explained Variance Explained
1. Social Disdain 3.3% 7.2%
2. Xenophobia 3.0 6.4
3. Populist 2.3 5.0
4. Family Disdain 2.3 5.0
5. Reduce Government Role 2.2 4.8
6. Orientation to Shah 1.8 3.8
14.9% 32.2%
2. Curzon, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 401-402. He continues:
With the best intentions in the world for the undertaking
of great plans and for the amelioration of his country,
he has little or no control over the execution of an en-
terprise which has once passed out of his hands and has
become the sport of corrupt and self-seeking officials.
Half the money voted with his consent never reaches its
destination, but sticks to every intervening pocket with
which a professional ingenuity can bring it into a tran-
sient contact. . .
Ibid..
3, Frye, The Heritage of Persia, op. cit., p. 239.
4. Curzon, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 390.
5. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, op. cit., Vol.
IV, p. 130.
6, Curzon, op.-cit., Vol. I, p. 406. The other two
claimants were Zillu's Sultan and Farman Farma, both of whose
descendants have been active in Iranian politics to the
present time.
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7. Ibid.
8, Harold Nicolson, Friday Mornings, 1941-1944, London:
1944, p, 7. Another observer notes:
The British cooperated with Reza Khan and Zia ed Din,
rendering every assistance to the former, and enabling
him to collect some sort of an army from the ragtag and
bobtail forces in Kasvin. Everything that they lacked
in the way of arms and ammunition was found for them by
the British.
Forbes-Leith, cit, p, 79. British State Papers reveal,
moreover, that the British Government was overwhelmingly
favorable to Reza Khan and welcomed the coup. E.g., see
Butler and Bury, op. cit., Document #688, Tehran, March 3,
1921, pp. 735-737. It might also be noted that not until
April 1921, three months after Seyyed Zia ed Din and Reza
Khan's coup, did the British remove their troops from Iran.
More conclusive information awaits the publication of a manu-
scipr on the coup by Seyyed Zia, who has given instructions
that it not be published until his death. (Personal commu-
nication to the author)
9,, Busbecq, Ferdinand's ambassador at the Court of
Sulayman, is quoted as saying: "'Tis only the Persian stands
between us and ruin. The Turk would fain be upon us, but he
keeps him back. . . i" Foster and Daniell, Life and Letters
of . , Busbecq, London: 1881, Vol. I, pp. 221-222, quoted
in Browne, A Literary History . .. ,op. cit., P. 11.
10. From a despatch by General Stuart in 1880 quoted in
R. L4 Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892,
London* University of London, Athlone Press, 1959, p. 24.
See also a dispatch from the Government of India to the Sec-
retary of State for India, in Council, dated September 21,
1899, as repro. ced in Shushter, op, cite, p. 231.
11, Siassi, op. cit., p. 638.
12,. For information on concessions in nineteenth century
Iran, see Eugene Aubin, La Perse d'aujourd'hui, Paris: 1908,
p. 221; Keddie, op. cit.; Siassi, opo cit.; Frechtling, op.
cit0 , pp. 518-533; and Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain .
op. citC, pp. 148-385.
13. For a similar position, see Cottam, op. cit., p. 212.
14. The classic study of foreign intervention in the
immediate post-revolutionary years is still Shushter, op. cit.
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15. Butler and Bury, op. cit., Telegram #417, June 25,
1920, pp. 538-539. After discussing the continuation of the
subsidy, the report continues on that Ahmad Shah
. . is now thoroughly well disposed towards us and
determined to work with us in his own rather odd way.
Best method of keeping him in this frame of mind is to
give him or obtain for him as much money as we can for
that is what he loves most in the world.
16. See Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, esp. pp. 1-35;
and George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948:
A Study in Big Power Rivalry, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1949.
17. The Prime Ministers most consistently named as U.S.
imposed were Ali Amini and Hassan Ali Mansur. Interestingly,
a sizeable number of the elite put Dr. Mossadegh in this
category--a position which is similar to that taken by the
U.S.S.R. One of the elite assured me that eight months before
Mansur became Prime Minister, the director of U.S.A.I.D. in-
formed the respondent that "Mansur was groomed for the Pre-
miership, was now ready for it, and should have the post."
The respondent added, "I immediately wrote the then Prime
Minister Alam to tell him that Mansur would be his successor."
While the conclusion that the statement of the A.I.D. Direc-
tor meant that Mansur was imposed by the U.S. has dubious
logical validity at best, such is the evidence on which most
political conclusions in Iran are drawn.
18. The attitude of many of the elite toward military
aid is reminiscent of a quotation attributed to Nasr ed din
Shah. When he was counselled to modernize and re-equip his
armed forces, his reply was, "What does Persia want with
rifles? Let England and Russia fight it out." Quoted in
Stuart, op. cit., pp. 209-210. Indeed, it is arguable that
the very military weakness of Persia was a major factor in
her retaining independence,
19. See Herbert C. Kelman, ed,, International Behavi:.
A Social Psychological Analysis, New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1965, passim, for views on the operation of dis-
placement in international politics. For a more theoretical
treatment of displacement as it applies to conflict situa-
tions in general, see.Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social
Conflict, New York: The Free Press, Inc., 1956, esp. pp.
70-48. Coser also gives a number of references to particular
studies of displacement.
20, Once again it will be noted that there is no neces-
sity for these statements to have causal significance. It
seems plausible that insecurity would result in greater
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dissatisfaction with domestic and foreign policy. It also
seems plausible, however, that in a relatively authoritarian
political system, policy dissatisfactions would conduce to fos-
tering a sense of insecurity. We believe, however, that the
causal flow is likely from the opposite direction. On this
point see Nettler and Huffman, op. cit., p. 57.
21. In a multiple regression analysis, xenophobia,
treated as an independent variable, was run against the four
general character orientations and the social background
variables (separately and in groups). The four orientations
were most significantly correlated with xenophobia with mani-
pulation negatively correlated when the social background
variables of age and foreign exposure were held constant. In
other words, at a given age level, the more the foreign expo-
sure, the greater the insecurity, for example, and the greater
the insecurity, the greater the xenophobia and the less the
orientation to the Shah,
22. The association and correlation between cynicism and
orientation to the Shah is in the expected direction; the re-
lation is inverse but does not reach significance levels.
23. Dudley, op. cit., pp. 136-137, quoting Dio Cassius,
65.13.
24. Robert A. LeVine, "Socialization, Social Structure
and Intersocietal Images," in Kelman, ed., op. cit., p. 68.
25. The abundance of research findings and observations
of developing societies which tend to support LeVin's conclu-
sion must give pause to any effort to question them. An in-
tensive re-examination of these relations was conduced with
no change in results, however. A survey of the survey in-
strument was then made to seek to uncover other objects of
displacement, but none were found. It appears that cynical,
mistrustful, and insecure elite members in Iran do, in fact,
display contemptuousness "across the board."
26. See, for example, Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 252-253.
27,. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolu-
tion, Buffalo: Economica Books, 1959, p. 34.
28. Pye, Politics, Personality . ., op. cit., p. 39.
29. To respond to this point with the charge that the
Government considers group action in opposition to its poli-
cies as anathema is to beg the question of the paucity of
meaningful group action of any kind in Iran.
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30. Eng. Mohammad Zavosh, "Why Is Iran Industrially
Backward?" Economic Reports, Tehran: Echo of Iran Press,
No. 11, December 1961, esp. pp. 1-5.
31.. For insight into the economic opportunities during
this period, see Millspaugh, op. cit.
32. This is the gist of Baldwin's analysis, op. cit.
33. This assertion, which is, in fact, being advanced
in the form of a hypothesis, has also been made by Peter Avery
in a communication with the author.
34. Ministry of the Interior, Bureau of Public Statis-
tics, Amare Namaye Mossavar Ba'azi az Fa'aliatha va Pish-
rafthaye Keshvar dar Salhaye Akhir ("Illustrated Statistics
of Internal Activities and Progress in Recent Years"), Tehran,
1961.
35. Dr. B. Shari'at, "State or Free Enterprise," Tehran
Economist, March 5, 1965. This editorial occasioned a good
deal of debate, for it seems actually to have been ghost-
written by one of the most powerful of the private indus-
trialists, Eng. Taleghani, one-time Minister of Agriculture,
then Director of the B. F. Goodrich Factory in Iran,
36. Hassan Ali Mansur, "Iran's Program for Economic
Prosperity," Facts About Iran, Tehran: Ministry of Informa-
tion, No. 191, April 30, 1964, p. 15. Mansur, who had a
penchant for offending people, also said in that speech:
"The Government, under the law, can take any action it desires
against private companies . . " (Ibid., p. 16) There was
little understanding of the specific~Taw to which he was re-
ferring . . .
37. While this move was clearly not satisfactory to the
private sector, it was unusual in comparison to most of the
developing nations. Several reasons can be advanced to ex-
plain the Government's action. It is generally conceded that
the G.O.F. Corporation was composed overwhelmingly of the
least profitable public enterprises. Secondly, distribution
of ownership in G.O.F. to landlords would eliminate future
demands for payment of their land reform vouchers. Thirdly,
it was widely rumored that while the corporation was formed,
it has been dragging its feet and offered but few shares to
the public, its principal function being a propagandistic one.
38. Sources: The Central Bank of Iran, Bulletin, Vol. 5,
No. 30, March-April 1967, pp. 1088-1089; and Vol. 6, No. 32,
July-August 1967, pp. 276-277.
39. "In an attempt to force the international oil con-
sortium in Iran to make a dramatic 17 per cent increase in
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production, the Government of Iran is threatening to deprive
the Western companies making up the group to forsake all or
part of their exploration area." Dana Adams Schmidt," Iran
Is Pressing the West on Oil," New York Times, November 7,1966, p. 43. Subsequently, the consortium agreed to relin-
quish virtually all its concession areas not then under pro-
duction and to increase production by 14 per cent annually.
But this soon proved inadequate for the Shah and he began
mounting new pressures on the consort:ium in 1966, pressures
which have continued to the present. Even so, by late 1965,
Iran's oil revenues amounted to "about half the government's
running expenses and development spending." Thomas F. Brady,
"International Oil Group in Iran Lifts Output Fivefold in
Decade," New York Times, December 20, 1965, pp. 59-60.
40. Friedrich Engels in a letter to Theodore Cuno,
London, January 24, 1872, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Lewis S. Feuer,
ed., Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1959, p. 443.
41. In order to test the validity of these conclusions
and to reach for intervening variables which might offer al-
ternative explanations for these relationships, a series of
some two hundred regression analyses were computed. In each
case, one of the six political factors was specified as the
independent variable and a combination of general character
orientations and social background factors was specified as
the dependent variables. Two principal conclusions can be
derived from these computations. Firstly, for virtually
every combination of variables, the general character orien-
tations are better predictors of the political attitudes than
are the socrial background variables. Secondly, even when
controlling for any or all social background factors, the
relationships between those general orientations and political
attitudes continueto hold.
Within these general conclusions, several specific findings
and qualifications need to be advanced:
1. Cynicism and insecurity were the strongest predictors
of the social disdain factor.
2. Insecurity and mistrust were the most efficient pre-
dictors of xenophobia.
3. Insecurity was the best predictor of orientation to
the Shah.
4. Insecurity and mistrust were the best predictors of
scores on the Reduce Government Role Factor.
5. Mistrust, insecurity, and age were the best predic-
tors of Family Disdain.
6. Activity level was the best predictor of scores on
the Populist, Non-Elite Factor.
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7. Holding constant the factors of age, foreign exposure,
occupation (private or government), and status in concert
with insecurity and mistrust enhanced the predictive
capability of the latter two variables for xenophobia.
8. Holding foreign exposure constant enhanced the predic-
tive capability of insecurity for orientation to the Shah
and reduce government role scores.
42. These claims permeate the monarch's public utterances
and may be found even more profusely in his new book, Enghelabe
Sefid (The White Revolution), which has not yet been trans-
lated into English.
42. This point is similar to a conclusion of another
study which bears striking similarities with my own. After
his examination of the U.S. State Department, the author
determined that:
The network of interconnected coercive processes [within
the Department of State] creates a tight system with the
ability to make individuals behave according to the sys-
tem's demands. All participants now will experience the
system as all-powerful and unchangeable. Although they
may dislike the system, they will tend to feel a sense
of helplessness and resignation about changing it.
Chris Argyris, Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness
Within the Department of State, Washington: Department of
State, Center for International Systems Research, Occasional
Papers, No. 2, 1967 (?), p. 33.
CHAPTER X
THE COST OF POLITICS IN IRAN
All problems of man stem from men, all solutions,
from understanding men.
--Member of the Iranian elite
Thomas Mann has argued that in our century, destiny works
itself out in political terms. In order to assess the "working
out" of "destiny" in Iran, we have turned to the political
process of that country. For politics in Iran does present
opportuni es for the acquisition of those rewards which are
available in Iran, rewards in the Weberian sense of class,
status, and political power. Whereas these rewards are con-
ventionally available from ae areas of human endeavor
in other societies, in Iran they emanate almost exclusively
from the political process which thus becomes so much more
central than other areas.
And persuaded of the caveat of the elite respondent
above, it seemed appropriate to examine Iran's political
process through a study of its political actors. But why, you
may ask, study the political elite? Tocqueville has provided
us with one answer:
When the world was full of men of great importance and
extreme insigni. 'ance, of wealth and extreme
poverty, of great learning and extreme ignorance, I
turned aside from the latter to fix my observations on
the former alone, who gratified my sympathies. But I
admit that this gratification arose from my own weak-
ness: it is because I am unable to see at once all that
is around me that I am allowed thus to select and separate
the objects of my predilection from among so many others0 1
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Iran, beset by the social change now characteristic of most
nations, presents contrasts of this nature. Unable to grasp
all aspects of this change in all parts of Iranian society,
an analysis of only one area of society, the most politically
powerful, was undertaken.
But how to locate these men? Initially, an attempt was
made to identify the politically powerful by seeking out
decision makers, those Iranians who had participated in the
making of crucial political decisions in recent times. In-
formation was sought about the land reform, oil negotiations,
military pacts and aid, and the like. But such inquiry in
the secretive Iranian system which strives to disperse and
mask responsibility proved fruitless. A new approach was
initiated, an approach which sought to identify the powerful
by locating those with reputations for exercising such power.
Firstly, the holders of formal position within the Gov-
ernment were identified. Then the occupants of key social
roles--doctors, tribal leaders, members of the Royal Family,
opposition leaders--were identified and a list of 3,000
"general elite" constructed.2 A panel of ten persons
knowledgeable about Iranian politics then attributed various
levels of political power to the 3,000 and a rank ordering of
these general elite constructed. The 10 per cent of those who
boasted the greatest reputations for political power were
specified as the political elite.
But why 10 per cent, why three hundred men? There is no
especially telling answer for this question. All 3,000 could
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have been referred to as the political elite. Equally ar-
bitrarily we could have limited the political elite to four
persons: His Imperial Majesty, the Shahanshah, Mohammad Reza
Pahlevi; his twin sister, Her Royal Highness, the Princess
Ashraf; the boyhood companion of the Shah and virtually his
only trusted Iranian confidant, an ex-Prime Minister and now
Minister of the Imperial Court, Assadollah Alam; and the then
Chief of the State Security and Intelligence Organization,
General Hassan Pakravan. Of all 3,000 members of the general
elite, only these four were reputed to be "politically very
powerful" by all ten of the rankers. 3
But basically three hundred were specified, not so much
because a convenient cutting point fell there,but because we
wished a universe large enough to allow for statements about
the elite which could be considered statistically valid. Just
as Tocqueville noted that the "moral authority of the majority
[in America] is partly based upon the notion that there is more
intelligence and wisdom in a number of men united than in a
single i ndvidual," so we sought to be able to make relevant
statements about the Iranian political process on the basis
of a majority of the political elite.4
Coincidentally, this same figure of three hundred has
been recognized before. Prior to the rule of Reza Shah, a
perceptive foreign observer noted that "Persia is ruled by
Tehran and Tehran is ruled by perhaps three hundred men,
including the ins and outs," 5
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Once this universe of the elite was identified, the goal
became to study that universe in the most productive fashion,
defined as an analysis fruitful for explaining the present
course of politics and for predicting the likely immediate
future of politics in Iran. Plutarch long ago gave one clue
as to how this might best be done:
. . .the most glorious exploits do not always furnish
us with the clearest discoveries of virtue or vice in
men; sometimes a matter of less moment, an expression
or a jest, informs us better of their characters and
inclinations than the most famous sieges, the greatest
armaments, or the bloodiest battles whatsoever. There-
fore, as portrait painters are most exact in the lines
and features of the face, in which the character is
seen, than in the other parts of the body, so I must be
allowed to give more attention to the marks and indica-
tions of t souls of men, and while I endeavor by these
to portray their lives, may be free to leave more weighty
matters and great battles to be treated of by others.
Just as great and momentous events may be less useful indica-
tions of the souls of men, so may they be less useful than
those "souls" for the kind of analysis contemplated for the
elite in Iran. In a political system where institutions are
not paramount but where individuals in their interactions
constitute the essence of the political process, the "souls"
of men, or their personalities, to use a more contemporary
formulation, are of primary importance. So it was that in
Iran insights to the personalities of the most powerful poli-
tical actors and the interactions of these actors with each
other were sought. As Parsons has cogently argued:
On the one hand, Freud and his followers, by concen-
trating on the single personality, have failed to
consider adequately the implications of the indivi-
dual's i!r a-ictions with other personalities to form
a system. On the other hand, Durkheim and the other
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sociologists have failed in their concentration on the
social system as a system to consider systematically
the implications of the fact that it is the inter-
actions of personalities which constitutes the social
system. . . . Therefore, adequate analysis of motiva-
tional process in such system must reckon with the
problem of personality.
As description and explanation were the ultimate ends, an
analysis which would consider both aspects of the actors'
personalities as well as their interactions was contemplated.
In short, we sought the "code" of the Iranian political elite.8
To do so, it was clear that ideally some form of projec-
tive tests, administered to the elite themselves, would be
essential. Because of their ease of administration, it was
decided to employ a series of projective questions which would
allow the elite respondents maximal opportunities for exter-
nalizing subjective feelings. A search of already developed
psychological testing instruments was conducted and a number
of items, whose utility had been established, were included
in the questionnaire. Additionally, standard items pertaining
to social background data, communications patterns, political
and social attitudes were included. After extensive pre-
testing, translation, more pre-tests, and revisions throughout
these stages, a final instrument whose data were to fill
eleven IBM cards was ready for administration.
The analysis above was primarily based on the responses
of 167 members of the Iranian political elite to that ques-
tionnaire. While access to active duty military officers was
denied the author, those of the elite who were interviewed
constitute, impressionistically, a fair cross-section of the
566
civilian political elite. Interviews were obtained with
present and past office holders (including a larger number of
retired military officers as well as those serving in the
Senate and the Cabinet), supporters and opponents of the mon-
arch, political "comers" and those whose political star has
clearly descended, members of the Royal Family, and commoners.
We found that the contemporary elite claim the highest
degrees of formal Western education, counting many Ph.D.'s,
Doctorates, and M.D.'s in their number. They are inordinately
well-traveled, having spent many years in residence outside
their own country. Attuned to the West, they are well informed
of developments in Europe and the United States, and are fre-
quent and avid readers of Western publications.
In recent years, especially with the assumption to the
Premiership of the late Hassan Ali Mansur, the Shah has
broadenedthe base from which his elite are drawn. He has
raised men to Cabinet level posts with few or no social con-
nections to the traditional elite. As a result, he has suc-
cessfully begun to alter the base of power from its traditional
sources of wealth and social status to expertise and technical
competence.9 In the process, this democratizing of recruit-
ment to positions of political power has served the Shah well,
For with a growing pool of technically educated Iranians from
which to select his elite, he has enhanced his control over
the political process. No longer need he feel constrained to
select officials from the families of the traditional social
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elite. And no longer do the social elite have any claims for
official position on the king.
But this process of democratization involved a key
challenge to the traditional style of rule which the king had
constructed. While the technically educated Iranians would
be personally more dependent on the monarch for their power,
and thus contribute to his control over politics in Iran, they
have been the most vociferously critical of his rule in the
past. That the Shah has been successful in overcoming their
criticism has been one of his finest achievements and a great
contribution to the continuity and stability of his rule.
In essence, he has coopted his former critics by making
available to them rewards over whose distribution he main-
tains control.10 The bases of class, status, and power are
all within his province. He has despatched those bases in a
most effective fashion, with the result that he has silenced
the opposition, withdrawn power from those over whom he had
less control, and brought to power younger men who owe their
present elevated positions entirely to the Shah while placing
their technical competence at the service of his rule.
But the very manner in which he has accomplished all
this has had dysfunctional consequences for political devel-
opment in Iran. It is generally acknowledge that kings
"measure their friends and foes by the sole standard of ex-
pediency."l But the cooptative style of His Majesty carries
this ancient practice to new levels. Two principal results
accure. Firstly, the members of the elite have little
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independence of action vis a vis the Shah. "In general, the
fewer the rewards a society offers members of a particular
group in the society, the more autonomous will the group
prove to be with reference to the norms of that society0,,12
The elite appear incapable of stepping outside their political
roles to view the entire system with perspective.
Secondly, many of the elite who are being coopted into
the system were, at least in their student days, ardent
critics of the regime. By acceding to the regime's efforts
to recruit them to positions of power, the elite contribute to
the markedly high levels of political cynicism which already
exist in Iranian society. The opposition who formerly counted
the newly coopted elite as one of them, now must question the
sincerity and motives of all their members. These defections
from "outs" to "ins," so common in Iran, have debilitating
effects on the efforts of members of the opposition to alter
the style of His Majesty's rule.
But more importantly, acceding to cooptation contributes
to the cynicism of the elite themselves. And it is cynicism,
one of the principal general character orientations of the
political elite, which takes a heavy toll in Iranian politics.
This propensity to discredit the sincerity and integrity of
all human motivations and actions virtually forestalls the
possibility of concerting the behavior of the political elite
in socially beneficial ways.
Once within the political elite and participating in the
political process, the values of the system and the experiences
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undergone do nothing to lessen the cynicism bred by the co-
optative means of recruitment. Rather, this cynical orien-
tation is reinforced and others are introduced. Insecurity
and mistrust are the common plight of the elite. Meeting
frustrations in their efforts to exercise their technical
competence, subject to frequent and unpredictable changes
of position over which they have virtually no control, beset
by a huge and amorphous bureaucracy which even they cannot
make respond, they react in a predictable fashion.
Those of the elite who are cynical, mistrusting, and
insecure withdraw from aggressiveness and in-fighting. 13 They
get along by going along with their superiors and with others
who might conceivably one day be their superiors. But since
this latter group includes virtually the entire political
elite, active cooptation with everyone becomes impossible.
Many in the elite come to see themselves playing a role in
which interpersonal relations within the elite are never
ruffled, harmony being the main goal.
But the very artificiality of this resolution contributes
to their frustration, their insecurity, and their cynicism.
Indeed, a decidedly circular process is at work here, so that
the values and attitudes of these elite alter their expecta-
tions from the poliical process and from others which in turn
causes them to adjust their behavior in appropriate ways. In
response, others behave toward them in ways which reinforce
their original values and expectations, confirming the wisdom
of their initial behavior.
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The elite themselves enjoy taking refuge in this type of
analysis. An avoidance of confrontation can be rationalized
by reference to the profound complexity of cause and effect.
Another of Mullah Nasr ed Din's exploits is advanced by them
as supporting evidence.
"What is Fate?" Nasr ed Din was asked by a scholar.
"An endless succession of intertwined events each
influencing the other."
"That is hardly a satisfactory answer. I believe
in cause and effect," replied the scholar.
"Very well," said the Mullah. He pointed to a pro-
cession passing in the street. "That man is being taken
to be hanged. Is that because someone gave him a silver
piece and enabled him to buy the knife with which he
committed the murder; or because someone saw him do it;
or because someone stopped him?" 14
Concomitant with their withdrawal from personal confron-
tation and their refuge in a sense of the complexity of the
world, there is a flight from responsibility. Ann Labmton
has argued that in the past, Iranians had a sense of group
responsibility stemming from the corporate nature of Iranian
life. 15 Guilds, religious orders, aniumans or dowrehs, see-
tors of the city, etc., all served as foci for that respon-
sibility. But with the destruction of those institutions as
viable forces in Iranian society, the sense of group respon-
sibility and loyalty was also destroyed.
Within the political elite, this lack of responsibility
takes on an additional form. The system is highly conducive
to the avoidance of assuming responsibility for any bureau-
cratic act. Conflicts are pushed ever higher in the
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bureaucracy for resolution. Still more committees and groups
are created for decision-making, but even they tend to assume
ritualistic functions whose ceremonial contributions are far
greater than their purposive contributions.
One result is a continued reinforcement of the tendencies
of the elite to avoid challenging others and the system. Vir-
tually no member of the elite can ever firmly attribute respon-
sibility for any policy to any other member. To respond, then,
would be virtually impossible. Far better to play it safe by
coping with the system and agreeing with everyone about every-
thing. If need be, the execution of the policy can be secretly
subverted, but any attempt at a personal showdown would be dis-
ruptive, probably based on a miscalculation of the other rele-
vant members of the elite, and, ultimately, likely to arouse
the attention of His Imperial Majesty.16
This fear of coming to the attention of the monarch, es-
pecially in the guise of a disrupter of the political quietude,
introduces the second major consequence of the flight from
responsibility--the congruity between the interests of the
elite and of His Imperial Majesty. The former wish to mini-
mize their role in decision-making for fear of the consequences,
the latter wishes to make the maximal number of decisions so
as to maximize his control over the political process.
In an unusual sense, this process has reciprocal effects.
Occasionally the secrecy inherent in the political system and
the desire of the Shah to husband control by personal decision-
making allows a member of the elite to act while attributing
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responsibility for that act to the king. This can be done
directly or by claiming that the act is in accord with the
Shah's wishes. Like the charisma of Weber, which rests on
belief in a gift of grace, these elite seek to cloak them-
selves in the mantle of kingly power. But this is at best a
risky policy. For kingly retribution would be swift in coming
were it brought to his attention. The Shah seeks to strip his
elite of responsibility for major acts while enhancing his own.
A member of the elite individually making importani. decisions
or especially decisions under the guise of the king's wishes
approaches a hubris rarely tolerated.
Note also the extent to which it is in the interests of
the Shahanshah to maintain this flight from responsibility.
Fred Riggs has noted that
the more differentiated a system becomes, the more dif-
ficult and delicate becomes the task of coordinating the
highly specialized roles. One of the major functions of
the government for a differentiated system becomes pre-
cisely the task of assuring the reciprocal adjustment of
highly interdependent structures. This task can be ac-
complished only in part by the voluntary cooptation of
the interacting units, because it seems unavoidable that
at certain points, their interests would diverge. Hence,
there must be someone--some laxStitutions or roles--
standing outside the interdependent units to define the
Irules of the game" and assure their observance. 1 7
The role which performs these functions in Iran, of course, is
that filled by the monarch. As the political system in Iran
becomes more differentiated and as the insecurity, cynicism,
and mistrust of the elite enhance their tendencies to withdraw
and avoid responsibility, so do the decision-making and co-
ordinating function s of the Shah become greater. There is
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almost an inverse relation b)etween the operations of the
political process and the quality of the bureaucracy with
the utility of the monarch.18
One result of this relation is the introduction of pro-
found ambiguities into the processes of political development.
For political modernization "involves the differentiation of
new political functions . . . and autonomous, specialized, but
subordinate organs arise to discharge those 'tasks.'" 19 The
growth of these specialized functional subunits is very much
in the interests of a monarch committed to social change as
well as to political longevity. The proliferation of such
units is perceived as contributing to the efficiency of the
administration and to enhancing opportunities for kingly con-
trol.20 They also provide opportunities for greater numbers
of personnel and, thus, more options for the exercise of royal
cooptation. But the autonomy of these subunits, so vital to
the very development process which he also seeks, is perceived
as incompatible with the political control which the monarch
cherishes.
The growth of functionally specific subunits within the
bureaucracy is also very much to the interest of the political
elite. They are very much aware of the commensurate increase
in the number of prestigious new appointments which are opened.
Moreover, these new sectors provide even greater opportunities
to delay the making of decisions, to avoid responsibility and
personal confrontation, and to force all of these--decision,
confrontation, and responsibility--to the highest levels of
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the bureaucracy.21
In short, these members of the elite, beset by insecurity,
cynicism, and mistrust, seem to react to their plight in ways
similar to those of subordinates in other societies. Active
::esitance appears foolhardy and useless. But passive resis-
tance can safely be used to restore one's self-esteem.22 And
in the Iranian context, that passive resistance takes several
forms. Ceaseless vigilance is maintained in interpersonal
relationships along with timidity and apprehension. Caution
and conscrvatism mark their approach to innovation and poli-
tical policy. Cooperation with others is unwise, for joint
behavior represents both a direct threat and a loss of per-
sonal control., Independence in thinking is as unwise as inde-
pendence in behavior. Any marked display of intelligence may
single one out as too threatening. Gossip and rumor allow the
legitimate expression of hostilities and aggression, by pro-
viding "inside information" they enhance the sense of eficscy,
and participation in these informal networks of communication
provides a sense of communality, otherwise so lacking. Finally,
maximal efforts will be devoted to the acquisition of material
wealth, as a mainstay for the day when the elite member will
fall from power and as a symbol of his own worth and indepen-
dence from others of the elite and the vagaries of the poli-
tical process.
We have also identified a subset of the contemporary
elite who cannot be characterized by these general orienta-
tions. Manifesting relatively low levels of insecurity,
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mistrust, and cynicism, they bring a certain psychic strength
to their interpersonal relations. Consequently, they are
able to act in ways conventionally defined as "political."
Expecting their fellows in the elite to be manipulative, they
respond in kind. Rather than avoidance and passive resistance,
they too manipulate and almost relish the opportunity to exer-
cise their political skills in interpersonal confrontation.
But these "politicians exist rather at the periphery of the
formal structures of the political proces. If they have ap-
pointments within the governmental bureaucracy, they tend to
be "locked in' frequently having served for over ten years in
their present positions. More likely, they are retired from
Government service and can survey Iranian politics from a safe
and distant perspective. Or, they are not employed by the
bureaucracy at all, being part of the private sector, but,
nonetheless, exercising considerable political power. As a
result, these more secure of the elite are atypical of the
elite as a whole. For the latter would be characterized by
active formal involvement in the government bureaucracy with
all the alterations of power and position which that implies.
While those who manipulate would, undoubtedly, be more success-
ful as the modernizing cadre required to effect the ambitious
reform programs of the Shah, they are not so strategically
placed in the administration to make that role a feasible one
for them.
The problems of governance in Iran are profound. Inef-
ficiency is their hallmark; the general character orientations
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of the centrally placed political elite, their bulwark. An
inability to predict, with surety, the behavior of others and
a disbelief in the sincerity and integrity of others (and, in
a real sense, of oneself); and absence of cooperation and
mutual interdependence; a flight from responsibility and
decision-making; and the pursuit of personalized, systematically
non-substantive goals, characterize the elite and their politi-
cal system. The bureaucracy, principally charged with the task
of implementing measures designed to move Iran closer to moder-
nity and the more developed West, does not and cannot function
in ways which will contribute in an appreciable degree to
these goals.
Also, the human resources which must be part of the devel-
opment process are not being mobilized. Just as there exists
a fear of losing control and a mistrust of others, so there are
fears of a broad-'oased involvement of the population at large
in the processes of modernization. There is a disinclination
to foster any widespread participation. So is there a dis-
inclination to strengthen the organs of g)overnment most
suitable for mass mobilization. The goals of political parties
and their operations are highly suspect. Not only might they
involve large sectors of the population which are now quies-
cent and thus capable of being ignored in the allocation of
the large but nevertheless limited resources over which the
regime has control, but those very parties perpetually
threaten to channel demandsupward, demands which would result
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in reciprocal influence and a loss of control by the pinnacle
of elite power.
As a result, only superficial acknowledgement is accorded
to the importance of political parties in the developmental
processes. And stringent efforts are made to limit their
bases of support and efficacy. Rather more attention is
lavished on those reliable organs of the government which can
be used for mobilization. The National Police, the Imperial
Iranian Armed Forces, and the State Security and Intelligence
Organizations have become the principal vehicles for elite
communication with and conscription of the non-elite. But
while these arms of the bureaucracy have demonstrated a capa-
city for the control of the populace, they have been con-
siderably less successful in organizing that populace behind
the modernization programs of the regime.
But the Iranian poliLical elite is unable to serve as an
effective modernizing cadre for yet another reason. For the
elite are incapable of demonstrating the self-discipline re-
quired to carry out the ambitious proposals of the monarch.
Organized largely to satisfy their own material aspirations,
the elite cannot and do not desire to enforce the type of
austerity required of them. As Fred Riggs has so percep-
tively noted in Thailand:
A bureaucratic polity . . . cannot impose a tight sys-
tem of centralized control, as can a single party
dictatorship. Such a control system requires that
the state officials themselves be subjected to iron
discipline so that they can be relied upon to carry
out the unplesant and arduous tasks imposed upon them
by the ruling party. A bureaucratic polity, run in
ft - 6--_ -- 01WIWbA
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the interests of the state officials, is so s if-
indulgent that such discipline is impossible.
While these elite appear too devoid of discipline to serve
as effective leaders of modernization and while the very con-
cept of a "political community" in Iran is buffeted by the
insecurity, mistrust, and cynicism of its members, the regime
has demonstrated an astounding capacity for survival and
stability.24 While monarchs and Presidents throughout the
Middle East and the developing world have been deposed or
dismissed and political chaos has been rife, Iran does appear
as an island of stability. From Egypt to Iraq, Algeria to
Indonesia, neither royal blood nor political charisma have
proved sufficient for the preservation of the ruler and his
political stability.
The Shah has pursued th-ose goals and for the present and
foreseeable future has accomplished them. Four pillars of his
style of rule have been major contributories to his success.
Firstly, the Shah has been able to broaden the bases of poli-
tical recruitment from the traditional elite alone to non-
aristocratic aspirants to power, More widespread access to
secondary, and especially higher, education has resulted in
the acquisition, by non-aristocratic elements of the popula-
tion, of technical educations which the Shah has pressed into
the service of his regime. Mosca also saw the value of this
recruitment process.
The best regimes, that is, those lasting a long time
and able to avoid the violent convulsions which have
plunged mankind into barbarism, are the mixed regimes.
We call them mixed because in them neither the
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autocratic nor the liberal principle rules supreme,
and the aristocratic tendency is tempered by a gradual,
but continuous renewal of the ruling class, enablg it
thus to absorb the better elements frto its ranks.
Secondly, the Shah has been successful at recruiting the
new aspirants to political power without in the process alien-
ating any significant sector of the traditional, aristocratic
elite. He has managed this by husbanding the immense oil
revenues over which he has control while using them to markedly
expand the bureaucracy. This has created sufficient new posi-
tions so that satisfying the aspirations of would-be elite
was not and, indeed, did not have to be done at the expense of
the existing elite. In addition, immense resources have been
expended in satisfying other elite aspirations. Luxury im-
ports, automobiles, modern water and electricity systems for
Tehran and major cities are all part of this latter concern.
Thirdly, the Shah has contributed to a breakdown of the
sense of community of his elite. Along with the clash of
traditional Iranian value systems and those from the West, the
structure and operating procedures of the bureaucracy foster
this breakdown, or anomie, as that term is used by de Grazia.
That any decisive set of the politically relevant population
could combine to effect his overthrow has been a negligible
possibility since the fall of Mossadegh.
Finally, where all other means of political control have
failed, the Shah has not hesitated to reply with strength.
Exile, house arrest, imprisonment, and other means for iso-
lating dissident members of the elite from politics have all
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been part of His Majesty's political tools. All have been
used, but only in a highly selective fashion and as a last
resort.2 6
But while the monarch has achieved the stability he so
eagerly sought and in the process insured the preservation of
his own throne, he and Iran have been forced to pay the costs.
Tocqueville long issued the admonition:
I readily admit that public tranquility is a great good,
but at the same time, I cannot forget that all nations
have been enslaved by being kept in good order. Cer-
tainly it is not to be inferred that nations ought to
despise public tranquility, but that state ought not to
content them. A nation that asks nothing of its govern-
ment but the maintenance of order is a slave at heart,
the slave of its own well-being, awaiting only the hand
that will bind it. 7
We can see the fruition in Iran: a low priority assigned to
the essential components of political and economic develop-
ment; grossly inequitable distribution of resources; the
development of attitudes and orientations conducive to
stability, but not to "stable change"; to order, but not to
"orderly growth"; to mobility, but not to democracy; to
tranquillity, but not to legality.
And yet herein is not the ultimate irony. That term must
be reserved for the present and future course of Iran's poli-
tical life. For all the above were meant to be but the prelude
to a different work. With the establishment of the precondi-
tions by Reza Shah, Iran could be dragged into the twentieth
century. Then under Mohammad Reza Shah those preconditions
could be elaborated and refined for the transition to a
national, Western, powerful, unified democratic state,
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But it is on this transition that Iran has foundered.
The very policies and elite orientations which brought Iran to
its present condition--a relatively admirable one in the con-
text of much of thc developing world--hinder its moving on to
a new stage in its development. Political reform from the
bottom up has become virtually impossible. But such reform
from the top down, now referred to as the White Revolution,
has become increasingly unattainable. For the political rela-
tions of the elite, the Shah, the already mobilized segments
of the population, the tribes and the peasantry have become
more intractable as they have become more enduring. Like a
commercial enterprise beset by threatening competition, the
Government of Iran has responded by creating a cartel to insure
its survival and profitability.28
But unlike monopolies, hedged by the tariff walls of
beneficent governments, political systems cannot insure them-
selves against competition from abroad. Most especially is
Iran incapable of doing so. The press of foreign values and
life-styles, of alien ideologies and conflicting norms, cannot
be excluded from Iran as might the wares of foreign manufac-
tories. And as long as that competition whose market is the
mind bears on the ideologies, myths, and values of the present
regime, its stability remains tenuous; and its power, prob-
lematic,,
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conscious perspectives and unconscious demands, iden-
tifications, and expectations. The measure of intensity
is the degree to which the total personality is involved.
Lasswell, "The Comparative Study of Elites," in Lasswell and
Lerner, op. cit., p.12. See also Nathan Leites, The Opera-
tional Code of the Politburo, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.
9. These are essentially the findings of the study by
Rotblat, op. cit. For a case with interesting parallels, cf.
Lloyd A. Fallers, ed., The King's Men: Leadership and Status
in Buganda on the Eve of Independence, London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1964, passim.
10. An interesting and relevant anecdote exemplifies
the cooptative style of the king. During an audience with a
foreign visitor, the Shah was asked whether he appreciated
that the young men of the Army's Literacy Corps o-w 'e "sub-
verting" their pupils. "Don't worry," replied the Shah. "We
know just who those young men are and will be offering them
high level jobs as appropriate." Related to the author by
Dr. Israel T. Naamani, who was the foreign visitor,
ll, Dudley, op, cit., p. 76, quoting Polybius, ii, p. 48.
12. Lee Rainwater, "Crucible of Identity," in Talcott
Parsons and Kenneth Clark, eds., The Negro American, Boston:
Beacon Press, 1966,fn. 5, p. 200. In terms of an analogous
form of cooptation, Walter Lippmann explained his decision
to move from Washington, after decades of living there, to
New York:
Cronyism is the curse of journalism. It is impossible
for an objective newspaperman to be a friend of a
President. Cronyism is a sure sign that something is
wrong and that the public is not getting the whole jur-
nalistic truth. He [President johnson] shouldn't be
calling us up and asking us for advice,. That sort of
relationship is very corrupting.
Walter Lippmann in an interview with the Washington Post,
December 30, 1966.
13. A similar point is made by Argyris, op, cit., pp.
8-9.
14. Shah, op. cit., p. 1120
15. Ann K. S. Lambton, "Islamic Society in Persia," OP.
cit., p. 3L
16. Cf. Argyris, op. cit., p. 33,
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17. Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a
Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966,
p. 376.
18. Cf. de Tocqueville:
Despotism, which by its very nature is suspicious, sees
in the separation among men the surest guarantee of its
continuance, and it usually makes every effort to keep
them separate. No vice of the human heart is so accep-
table to it as selfishness: a despot easily forgives his
subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love
one another. He does not ask them to assist him in
governing the state; it is enough that they do not aspire
to govern it themselves. He stigmatizes as turbulent and
unruly spirits those who would combine their exertions to
promote the prosperity of the community; and, perverting
the natural meaning of words, he applauds as good citi-
zens those who have no sympathy for any but themselves.
de Tocqueville, op. cit., Vol. II, P. 109.
19. Samuel P. Huntington, "rPolitical Development and
Political Decay," World Politics, April 1965, p. 378.
20. Mannheim, for example, supports this notion. "The
more elites there are in a society," he argues, "the more each
individual elite tends to lose its function and influence as
a leader, for they cancel each other out." Karl Mannheim,
Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, London: Kegan
Paul, 1946, p. 86.
21. Cf. Argyris, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
22. See John Dollara's Caste and Class in a Southern
Town, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, for ways in
which Negroes in the Southern United States engaged in such
passive resistance. Feigned ignorance and childishness,
laziness, impulsivity, irresponsibility are all seen as such
techniques.
23. Riggs, Thailand . . , op. cit., p. 379.
24. For comments on the disintegration of the political
community from the skepticism of its members, see de Grazia,
op. cit., p. 189; and Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, New
York: McGraw-Hill, Chapter II.
25. Gaetano Mosca, "Storia della dotrine politiche,"
trans. by James Meisel and included as the Supplement to the
latter's The Myth of the Ruling Class, op. cit., p. 390.
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26. Merle Kling has made the point that:
Continuismo, prolonged office holding by a strong
caudillo, in its essence represents the reverse side
of the shield of political instability. Continuismo
signifies not the absence of political instability, but
the effective suppression of potential and incipient
rebellions by competing caudillos. Continuismo in
fact may be regarded as perpetuation in officeby means
of a series of successful anticipatory revolts.
Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instabi-
lity in Latin America," Kautsky, ed., op. cit. While this in-
terpretation alone is insufficient to explain the continuismo
in Iran, it needs to be counted as one of the major explana-
tory variables.
27. Tocqueville, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 150.
28. Christopher Jencks, "Is the Public School Obsolete?"
The Public Interest, No. 2, Winter 1966, pp. 18-27, makes this
point and a number of others about urban, public school sys-
tems which are strikingly parallel to our analysis.
APPENDIX I
IDENTIFYING THE POLITICAL ELITE
One problem which has long interested political scien-
tists is the variance between the distribution of power
according to the formal institutions and structures of govern-
ment and its actual distribution in the political system. The
majority of empirical studies of foreign elites have failed to
confront this problem but have been content, with some efforts
at rationalization, to assume that the holders of formal posi-
tions--be they legislators, cabinet members, political party
members, or what-have-you, were in some way coterminous with
the "political elite."1 The present study attempts to avoid
this pitfall while hazarding the often problematic method of
elite selection through a two-stage reputational analysis.
Preliminary investigations suggested that Iran is illus-
trative of those societies with a vast differential between the
actual and formal distributions of power. To assume that this
were not true for purposes of identifying the political elite
might result in a gross falsification of Iranian politics.
Unfortunately, the nature of politics in Iran makes it impos-
sible to pursue an issue analysis. Reliable information on
the processes and participants in the making of key decisions
is especially difficult to obtain: decisions attributed to
politicians, civil servants, or other officials would deni-
grate the role and thus the aura of His Imperial Majesty the
Shahanshah. (But to accord sole importance to His Majesty
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would sully the purported democratic cast of the Iranian
polity.)
Thus an investigation which attempts an empirical exami-
nation of the actual distribution of political power must do
so through some other method. This study is based on one
such method, a "two-stage" reputational analysis. A "general
elite" was identified and the names of the members of this
general elite offered to a panel of ten rankers, who attri-
buted varying degrees of political power to each. Specifically,
the following steps were undertaken.
On the assumption that the Government is the central
political institution in Iranian society, present and past
holders of official positions were included in the general
elite. Members and office holders of organizations such as
political parties, interest groups, etc., which have both
formal and informal relationships with the Government were
not included. Finally, the names of holders of various social,
economic, of occupational positions in Iran, irrespective of
any manifest link with the national political system, were
added.2 The categories whose members were arbitrarily con-
sidered members of the general elite are as follows:
1. All members of the Pahlevi dynasty including
spouses and ex-spouses, children, and in-laws.
2. All ex-Prime Ministers.
3. All Ministers in all Cabinets since the accession
to the throne of His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza
Shah in 1941.
4. All Deputy-Ministers, Assistant-Ministers,
Director-Generals, and Department chiefs in all
589
Ministries during the tenure of the last three Prime
Ministers (1961-1965).
5. All Military officers holding positions of admini-
strative or command responsibilities in the Imperial
Iranian Armed Forces, Gendarmerie, or National Police
during the tenure of the last three Prime Ministers.
6. All Directors, Administrative Officers, Board
Members, and Department Directors in all government
"Agencies" and "Departments'r (i.e., non-Ministerial
agencies at the national level: The Plan Organization,
the Central Bank, the National Iranian Oil Company,
the Department-General of Civil Aviation, the Office
of the Prime Minister, etc.) for the period 1961-1965.
7. All provincial Governors-General, Governors, Mayors
of large cities, and Department Directors of major pro-
vincial administrative offices (1961-1965).
8. All officials of the Imperial Court, including sec-
retaries, aides, civil and military adjutants to the
various members of the Royal Family.
9. All members of the 20th and 21st sessions of the
Majles (the lower house of Parliament) and the 3rd and
4th sessions of the Senate,
10. All committee chairmen and officers of the 18th and
19th sessions of the Majles and 2nd session of the Senate.
11. Politically influential or important members of all
21 sessions of the Majles and 4 sessions of the Majles.
12. All present and past members of the Supreme Court
of Iran.
13. All heads of Diplomatic missions (Ambassadors,
Consuls-General, Cultural Attaches) during the tenure
of the last three Prime Ministers,
14. Officers and members of the Central Committees or
Boards of all political parties (e.g., The Iran Noveen
Party, the National Front, the Mardom Party, the Mel-
liyua Party, the Pan-Iran Party, the Socialist Front
of Iran, the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran, the
Freedom Movement of Iran, the Iran Party, etc.)
15. Political influentials not holding official govern-
mental or political party affiliations,
16. Chiefs and heads (Khans, Il-Khans, Il-Beigis, etc.)
of principal tribes.
t! __ 61,
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17. Leading merchants and businessmen as well as
officers and board members of commercial organiza-
tions (e.g., the Chamber of Industry and Mines, the
Chamber of Commerce of Iran, the Syndicate of Iranian
Industries, etc.).
18. Directors of all labor guilds, syndicates, and
unions.
19. Directors, managers, and members of the boards
of all private banks and major fiduciary institutions.
20. Principal religious leaders--Ayatollahs, Mullahs,
Mujtahedin.
21. Journalists who receive frequent by-lines in all
Iranian publications, publishers, editors, and managing
directors of the press.
22. Leading intellectuals and members of the Iranian
Academy of Letters, the Cultural Council of Iran, etc.
23. Chancellors, deans, noted professors, members of
University Senates, and the Central Council of Iranian
Universities.
24. Lawyers.
25. Physicians.
26. Engineers.
27. Officers and directors of women's organizations,
members of the High Council of Iranian Women's Organi-
zations, etc.
28. Officers and members of boards of directors of
Iranian-foreign "cultural" and "friendship" societies,
eg., Iran-American Society, Irano-Soviet Friendship
Society, Goethe Institute, Iran-Pakistan Cultural
Society, etc.
29. Officers, directors, members of the board, of
leading fraternal and social organizations, e.g., the
Rotary Club, Lions Club, Iran Javan, Tehran Club, The
Key Club, Gorgan Club, the Freemasons, etc.
30. Leaders of athletic organizations (Zurkhaneh),
and the fruit and vegetable bazaars, and important
choqu-keshan (knifewielders)--leaders of semi-criminal
or criminal factions or gangs usually based in parti-
cular neighborhoods of major cities.
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Obtaining the names of members of the thirty categories
often proved a difficult task. For certain of the categories
(specifically categories 1 through 10, 12-13, 17-19, 22-23,
27-29), lists of appropriate individuals were available from
Iranian encyclopedias, almanacs, year books, or more fre-
quently catalogues or records kept by the agency concerned.
Thus, for example, the director of the Senate graciously made
available to me his official lists giving committee assign-
ments, officers, et c, for members of the Senate.
For the remainder of the categories, lists of names were
either unavailable or inclusion of all the names relevant to
that category was assumed to be inappropriate. As an example
of the former--to my knowledge there is no one list stating
the names of all religious leaders or even the principal ones.
On the other hand, as an example of the latter, lists of
names of all lawyers in Iran were available. But it appeared
unlikely that all members of that profession could be con-
sidered members of a "general elite."
For each of categories 11, 14-16, 20-21, 24-26, and 30,
two methods were used to locate members of this "general elite"
from within the given categories. On the one hand, names of
officers of professional organizations were obtained when
possible (lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.). On the other
hand, interviews were held with at least three individuals
who would be considered not only members of that category but
representative of diverse tendencies within that group, e.g.,
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French- and American-educated lawyers were interviewed, as were
pro- and anti-government religious leaders. Each person inter-
viewed was asked two questions:
1. "What are the names of those Iranian lawyers (or
religious leaders or doctors or engineers, etc.) who are
generally considered to be outstanding in the performance of
their professional tasks?"
2. "What are the names of those Iranian lawyers (or
others) who are generally considered to be oustanding because
of their alleged political power?"
The names acquired through these various methods were
then added to lists acquired for other categories and checked
for overlap. While no statistical analysis will be presented
of individuals appearing in more than one of the 30 categories
above, one example of such agglutination might be given:
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal appeared in the following categories:
L One of Dr. Eghbal's daughters was at the time of
the study married to His Highness Mahmud Reza Pahlevi,
step-brother of His Imperial Majesty.
2. Ex-Prime Minister, 1957-1960.
3. Held the posts of Minister of Health, Education,
Roads, and Communications, Interior, P.T.TO, and the
Imperial Court, 1943-1950 and 1956.
u, Chairman of the Board and General Managing Direc-
tor of the National Iranian Oil Company, 1963-
7. Governor General of Azarbaijan.
8. Civil Adjutant to His Imperial Majesty.
9. Elected to the 20th Majles,
10. Chairman, Health Committee, 2nd Session of the
Senate.
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11. Considered a politically influential member of
the Majles and the Senate.
13. Ambassador to UNESCO, 1961.
14. Member, Central Committee, Melliyun Party.
17. Member, Board of Directors, Chamber of Industry
and Mines of Iran.
19. Member of the Board, Iranian Development Bank.
23. Ex-Chancellor of the University of Tehran,
1955-1957.
25. Considered a politically influential physician,
M.D. degree, Paris, 1933.
29. Officer, Rotary Club of Iran.
While Dr. Eghbal is an exceptionally active and successful
member of the Iranian political elite, there were a vast
number of other duplications and overlap. When these cases
were eliminated, some 3,100 different individuals remained
who were considered the "general elite" of present-day Iran.
The names of the 3,100 individuals who appeared in one
or more of the above categories, and thus are considered mem-
bers of the general elite, were then typed on file cards in
preparation for power attribution by the panel of readers,
The selection of individuals for this panel was based on the
criteria that:
1. The members of the panel must be as knowledgeable
about the intricacies of Iranian politics as possible;
2. The members of the panel be widely reputed to be
men of integrity and truthfulness;
3. The members of the panel be willing to cooperate
and especially, able to devote sufficient time to the
ranking process (which required up to forty hou'rs);
and
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4. The members represent diverse interests and poli-
tical orientations. (Whatever their pretentions at
objectivity, two panels of rankers, one group all
partisans of the monarch and the other left-leaning
intellectuals would probably produce less than perfect
consensus on the compostion of the political elite.)
With these criteria as a guide, the following panel of ten
was selected:
1. A newspaper publisher with a diverse and lengthy
career in and out of Iranian politics. Knowafor his
objectivity, he is nevertheless of strong personal
opinions, but intimately acquainted with all aspects
of Iranian politics.
2. A magazine editor and scholar. He is the author
of numerous published and unpublished works on Iranian
political and social institutions.
3. A member of the Central Committee of the National
Front. He possesses a number of higher degrees from
Iran and abroad. His refusal to accept proffered
Cabinet-level positions has reinforced his widely
acclaimed reputation for integrity
4. A Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University
of Tehran. An older man with lengthy service in a vari-
ety of capacities within and without the Government, he
is especially well versed in Iranian politics because
of his wide-ranging family and social ties.
5. An ex-Prime Minister. He Las over thirty-five
years of experience in a majority of the most important
posts in the Iranian government. His personal integr-
rity and independence are widely acclaimed.
6. A Professor of Political Science at the National
University of Iran. While not personally involved in
Iranian politics, he has had extensive professional
training in the United States and has conducted per-
ceptive research in Iran.
7. A journalist and long-time student of Iranian politics.
His e2rlier fiery political career and equally cogent
political analyses have earned him the enmity of the
Government censors, who now forbid the publication of his
works.
8. An Undersecretary of a Government Ministry. From an
important family whose predecessors were key figures in
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the Constitutional Movement, this political activist
is widely known and knowing.
9. A banker. Educated as a lawyer and now a prac-
ticing banker, he has a deep understanding of Iran's
economy and the role of the private sector. His
family is known for its professionals, poets, and
politicians.
10. A foreign diplomat. The only non-Iranian ranker,
this individual has years of diplomatic service through-
out Iran and is recognized by Iranians as particularly
sensitive, aware, and candid about their politics.
The panel members were individually visited and the
nature of the project was explained, including the concepts
of "political power" and "political elite." They were then
presented with the file cards bearing the names of the
"general elite" and asked to assign a rating of political
power to each individual. This they did by assigning the
cards to one of four groups: a. "This man is politically
very powerful in Iran today." ( 2) b. "This man is politi-
cally powerful in Iran today." ( 1) c. "This man is not
politically very powerful in Iran today," (-4) d. "I don't
know whether this man is or is not politically powerful in
Iran today," or "I don't know who this man is." (0)
Weights were assigned to the four power groupings (as
indicating in the parentheses above, and the thirty-one
thousand rankings (10 members of the panel attributing power
or the lack of power to thirty-one hundred individuals) were
arranged in a "power scale" with scores of from 20 (all
ten rankers considered the individual"very politically
powerful") to -10 (all ten rankers considered the indivi-
dual "not politically very powerful"). The distribution
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of individuals receiving scores of 0 to 20 is as follows:
TABLE 1.1
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE "GENERAL ELITE" OF IRAN
RECEIVED POLITICAL POWER ATTRIBUTION SCORES
OF ZERO TO TWENTY
WHO
Power Rating Number of Individuals Cumulative
Score Receiving In Each Internal TotalScore Score Category
20 4 4 4
19 3 3 7
18 7 2/5 14
17 2 2 16
16 5 2/3 21
15 5 5 26
14 10 1/2/1/6 36
13 18 3/5/10 54
12 14 1/2/5/6 68
11 18 2/1/1/3/11 86
10 32 1/6/8/13/9 118
9 18 1/3/5/3/6 136
8 35 3/5/5/5/12/5 171
7 52 1/5/15/4/17/7 223
6 57 1/1/14/11/7/20/3 280
5 76 1/1/1/1/13/9/1/25/16/8 356
4 72 428
3 82 510
2 108 618
1 107 725
0 159 884
It was then decided to establish a cut-off point
delineating the political elite from the general elite on the
basis of reputed political power. This was arbitrarily estab-
lished at 10 per cent of the general elite. Thus, the first
three hundred and ten individuals in the power hierarchy were
considered to be the "most politically powerful"' individuals
in Iranian society at the time of the power attributions. The
cut-off point accomplished one o'- our objectives in identifying
for
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the elite--differentiating the elite from the non-elite on
the basis of the distribution of the value of political power. 3
A second objective was to establish an internal differen-
tiation among those identified as the most politically power-
ful individuals in Iranian society. This was accomplished in
two ways. Firstly, the elite were internally differentiated
by the actual score received from assigned weightings (as
indicating in column two of the chart above). But secondly,
they were more distinctly differentiated by means of rank
orderings within similar scoring categories. (Column 3 of
the chart above lists the distribution of the elite within
identical score categories.) This differentiation within
score categories was accomplished by listing elite with iden-
tical scores on the basis of the numbers of "very politically
powerful" and "politically powerful" attributions received.
For example, seven individuals received scores of 18. But
the score of 18 could be achieved on the basis of 9 "poli-
ticaly very powerful" ratings and 1 "don't know (9 x 2 x
1 x 0 = 18) or 8 "politically very powerful" and 2 "politi-
cally powerful" ratings (8 x 2 x 2 x 1 = 18). In actuality,
two individuals received scores of 18 in the former method
and five in the latter. The two individuals have been
ranked first, for they received the highest number of
"politically very powerful" ratings.
As the scores decrease, the number of permutations of
ratings which will result in that score increases, as the
chart illustrates, Nonetheless, elite within each score
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category were ranked in a similar fashion, by listing indi-
viduals on the basis of the number of "'very powerful" attri-
butions received, then the number of "powerful'" attributions
received.
These 307 individuals4 distinguished from their fellow
Iranians then ranked internally--and distinguished from each
other--were considered the elite universe and subject to
intensive study.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See, for example, the following:
George E. Schueller, "The Politburo,"' in Lasswell and
Lerner, op. cit., pp. 97-178. A study of the members of the
Politburo.
Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, op. cit. A study
of members of the Turkish: Parliament.
Lester G. Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation: Politi-
cal Development in Israel, New York: Atherton Press, 19647.A
study of members of the Israeli Knesset.
P. C. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa,
London: Oxford University Press, 1966. In his introduction,
Lloyd discloses that participants at the International African
Institute's seminar "determined" that "the overwhelming
majority of the elite of independent African states are in
Government bureaucratic employment." (p. 7)
2. These categories tend to conform and overlap with the
eight base values specified by Lasswell in his elite studies.
See H. D. Lasswell, Power and Personality, New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1948, pp. 16-19; or H. D. Lasswell, "rIntro-
duction: The Study of Political Elites," in Lasswell and
Lerner, op. cit., p. 8.
3. The extent of my intellectual debt to Harold D.
Lasswell can hardly be over-emphasized here.
4. It was through this means for ranking within score
categories that individuals were selected for the elite near
the cut-off point. It will be noted that the cut-off point
of 10 per cent of the general elite falls within the group of
general elite with scores of 5 (N = 76). But a total of 280
individuals had already been selected for inclusion (indivi-
dually with scores of 20 to 4). The problem was to select
30 of the elite from the group of 76 to constitute a total
elite of 310 without doing violence to the ranking on the
basis of attributed power. This was made possible by the
ethods outlined for ranking of elite within similar score
categories. The chart indicates that identification of the
27 most powerful individuals with scores of 5 was accomplished
through such internal rankings (1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 13 + 9 + 1 in-
dividuals. These 27 individuals produced an elite total of
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207 (280 + 27). Rather than select an additional three names
at random from the next group of 25, the cut-off point was
established for convenience after the seventh sub-category
of the score category of five.
APPENDIX II
THE PHENOMENON OF NON-RESPONSE
AMONG THE POLITICAL ELITE
The following is an analysis of the phenomenon of non-
response in a study of the Iranian political elite, of whom
167 were actually interviewed in the period December, 1964
to May, 1965. One hundred and forty members of the universe,
therefore, were non-respondents and are the subject of this
inquiry. Specifically, we wish to determine the biases, if
any, introduced into the results of the elite interviews by
the exclusion of the 140 non-respondents.
NON-RESPONSES BY POWER RANKING
The universe of 307 from which the respondents were
drawn were given Power Rank Orderings (PRO) of 1 to 307 with
power and rank in an inverse relationship, i.e., the lower
the PRO, the higher the reputed political power. Comparing
the mean PRO of the 167 respondents and the 140 non-
participants with the mean PRO of the universe, we find a
spread of some twenty PRO between the respondents and the
non-participants.
TABLE II.1
MEAN PRO OF RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS
Respondents Universe Non-Participants
163.6 152.3 143.7
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Considering all respondents and all non-participants,
therefore, we find that the latter group are reputedly poli-
tically more powerful.
We may consider the 307 members of the elite to be
stratified into thirteen "power clusters," A comparison of
the PRO by such clusters figes the results in the following
table.
Table 11.2
A COMPARISON OF PRO OF RESPONDENTS AND
NON-PARTICIPANTS BY CLUSTER
PRO by No. of Average PRO/ No. of Non- Average PRO/
Cluster Respondents Respondents Participants Non-Part.
1 - 25 7 16.8 18 11.5
25 - 50 12 36.2 13 39.7
51 - 75 10 60.3 15 64.8
76 - 100 16 88.2 9 87.7
101 - 125 15 113.2 10 112.7
126 - 150 15 138.1 10 137.8
151 - 175 14 164.4 11 161.3
176 - 200 15 188.2 10 187.7
201 - 225 17 212.3 8 214.5
226 - 250 11 237.9 14 238.1
251 - 275 16 261.8 9 265.1
276 - 300 12 285.3 13 290.5
301 - 307 7 304.0 0 0
Universe
Total and
Average 167 163.6 140 143.7
We note that in only six of the thirteen clusters is the PRO
lower for residents than for non-participants. (It should be
noted again that the lower the PRO, the higher the reputed
political power.)
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Treating the response data among the 307 members of the
universe in this gross fashion, belies the availability of
respondents. In fact, not all members of the universe were
potential respondents. Because of problems of access, some
seventy-five members of the elite had to be excluded from the
universe.
EXCLUDED MEMBERS OF THE ELITE
Military: From the inception of this study, the proba-
bility of being able to interview, on a formal basis, highly
placed officers in the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces was con-
sidered very low. Indeed, when the Shahanshah of Iran gave
his official permission for the conduct of this study, the
military was conspicuously absent from the list of groups
sanctioned for interviewing. Despite repeated attempts to
gain access to this group through other channels, no member
of the elite whose primary occupations were in the military
were ever available for formal questioning and, thus, must be
considered members of the "excluded elite." The average PRO
of the twenty-nine military officers in the universe is
145.4, slightly more powerful than the average member of
that universe.
Out of Iran: Some thirty-one members of the universe were
discounted as potential respondents because of their residence
outside Iran during the period of the interviews. Of these,
twenty-four were serving the Government of Iran in foreign
posts, three were in exile, and four were undergoing medical
wo qs ,
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treatment. The PRO averages of these three categories are
180.7, 141.3, and 281.0, respectively.
Jail or Arrest: Six members of the political elite were
either in jail or under house arrest during the period of in-
terviewing. They all were serving sentences, usually of
unspecified duration, for "political crimes against the State."
Their average PRO is 153.1. Another six members of the elite
had been released from incarceration within a period of twelve
months preceding the interview period. Still politically
inactive during the time of the survey in their search for
security through anonymity, they were also excluded from con-
sideration (average PRO: 189.0). Some seven members of the
"political opposition" who had not as recently served jail
sentences did participate in the survey (PRO: 156.1). (Since
my departure from Iran, two of the seven have been arrested
for treason and are now being held incommunicado--for reasons
unrelated to participation in this project.)
Illness or Death: Two members of the political elite
with an average PRO of 137.5 were ill and undergoing medical
treatment during the entire interview period. One member of
the elite, the late Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur (PRO: 6),
was assassinated on the day before my scheduled interview
appointment.
Thus, from the universe of three hundred persons, seventy-
five members of the Iranian political elite, with an average
PRO of 158.5, were excluded from consideration as potential
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respondents because of their political or physical unavaila-
bility.
Wno, then, were the remaining sixty-five of the elite who
were neither interviewed nor excluded--the actual non-
respondents?
NON-RESPONDENTS
Cabinet Ministers: The following Cabinet Ministers were
non-respondents: PRO
Prime Minister 32
Minister of Foreign Affairs 47
Minister of Labor 49
Minister of State 66
Minister of State 90
Minister of State 91
Minister of State 149
Minister of Education 177
Average PRO of non-respondents
in Cabinet 87.6
Number of non-respondents in
Cabinet 8
The present Prime Minister of Iran, with a PRO of 32,
was not the Prime Minister at the time the attributional power
ratings were made. Then then-Prime Minister, PRO 6, was sub-
sequently assassinated in early 1965, and was replaced by the
then-Minister of Finance (PRO: 32) and present Prime Minister.
All PRO given in this paper represent attributions of power
made in the year 1964. The position attributed to the given
member of the elite, however, is the position held by that
individual at the present time.
The following Cabinet Ministers were interviewed:
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PRO
Minister of Economy 23
Minister of Finance 31
Minister of Culture 35
Minister of Agriculture 36
Minister of Interior 87
Minister of Justice 88
Minister of Development 92
Minister of State 125
Minister of Water and Power 258
Average PRO of responding Ministers 86.1
Number of responding Ministers 9
There is only a slight difference in the PRO averages of the
two Cabinet groups. The reasons why interviews were not ob-
tained with the excluded Ministers suggest that no special based
were introduced.
1. The present Prime Minister, upon his accession to the
Prime Ministership made vacant by the assassination of his
closest personal friend, was too emotionally disturbed to grant
interviews to anyone. Subsequently, he did grant some inter-
views to foreigners, but only to official persons.
2. The Ministers of State who did not respond all worked
directly for the Office of the Prime Minister in the latter's
suite of offices. The conditions applicable to the Prime
Minister above apply here also, with the additional factor that
these Ministers were the most burdened with the day-to-day
business of the Government during the transition period fol-
lowing the assassination.
3. The Minister of ForeignAffairs granted me time for an
interview on four different occasions, none of which were
carried out. The four scheduled meetings and the reasons for
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their cancellation are as follows:
a. the day after the shooting of the late Prime Minister;
b. The day of the funera] of the late Prime Minister;
c. the day on which President Bourguiba of Tunisia, then
visiting Iran, announced the cancellation of his scheduled
visit to Iraq and extended his remaining stay in Iran by a
week; and
d. The day after the recent attempt on the life of the
Shahanshah.
4. The Minister of Labor acceded while Minister to the
post of Secretary-General of the ruling Iran Novin Party upon
the death of the Prime Minister. The demands on his time as a
result of this new post in combination with the fact that he
had no articulate policy for running the Party made him loathe
to grant interviews, especially to foreigners.
Senators: Ten of the bureaucrats or Government personnel
who were neither "excluded elite" nor respondents were members
of the Senate. Their PRO average is 115.5. Aside from these
non-respondents in the Senate, thirty-nine Senators with a PRO
average of 137.5 were interviewed. The non-respondent Senators,
therefore, tended to be politically more powerful than the
respondents. My impression is that the ten non-respondents
were older, more conservative persons who felt more hostile
to the group in Ministerial positions, more hostile to the
United States, who, they have assumed, forced the Shah t~o
accept these men as Ministers, and basically more dissatisfied
and frustrated than other Senators. Fundamentally, their
-I
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dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that they, the more
mature, experienced voices of wisdom, had been excluded from
positions of administrative power by the younger "techno-
crats" and the latter's protectors, the United States. I was
seen as a representative of this type of person and thus in-
curred their hostility,
Miscellaneous Posts: The eight non-respondent bureau-
crats holding various jobs in the Government civil service had
a PRO average of 100.9. As their reputational PRO indicates,
they tended to be more powerful than the average member of the
universe. This is borne out by an examination of the positions
represented:
1. Director, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
2. Director, Central Bank of Iran
3. Director, Plan Organization
4. Director, National Bank of Iran
5. Deputy Minister of Finance
6. Governor General, Gorgan Province
7. Member, Board of Directors, NIOC
8. Member, Board of Directors, NIOC
I would suggest that the four individuals filling directorships
did not grant me an interview because I had already inter-
viewed their deputy directors. I am quite certain from con-
versations with their appointments secretaries that the
directors believed I obtained all the information possible on
that organization's policies from the deputy directors and that
an interview with the director himself would have been redun-
dant. It was impossible to convince the non-respondents that
I was not interested in organizational policy, but rather
personal attitudes.
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Private and Retired: A second major group of non-
respondents were persons in private business and those who
had recently retired from Government service and had begun to
engage in private business or had remained idle. These four-
teen individuals had a PRO average of 186.6. Of the fourteen,
seven could be described as "pure" businessmen with no pre-
vious Governmental connections (PRO: 229). Eight other
"pure" businessmen (PRO: 179.2) were among the respondents.
I would suggest that the willingness of the latter to be in-
terviewed and the unwillingness of the former can be explained
by the wide disparity in average reputed power. It is likely
that the non-participation of the less powerful businessmen is
a reflection of the same processes as are found among American
businessmen who do not participate in politics, i.e., an
unwillingness to jeopardize their profit-making potentials.
The other seven non-respondents in this category (PRO:
151.3) were elderly men who were once active in politics but
are no longer. Their collective approach might be summarized
by the comments which one of them made (approximate age: 70)
when I walked into his living room to explain the project:
Do you know what the trouble with the world is today?
The trouble with the world today is that it is being
run by the young. They are running this country and
the world to ruin. And I don't want to hear about or
take part in your study because it is stupid. It has
to be stupid--you're young."
Royal Family: Eleven of the non-respondents were members
of the Royal Family (PRO 104.4). As a whole, members of this
group were reluctant to involve themselves in a situation
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whereby they might be asked for information the giving of
which would be demeaning or embarrassing or potentially
embarrassing. The three members of the Royal Family (PRO:
63.7) who consented to a formal interview and completed the
questionnaire have reputations as among the more outspoken
members of the Pahlevi Family.
Religious Leaders: Seven religious leaders (PRO: 93.0)
indirectly declined to involve themselves in the interview.
Six of these leaders are residing outside Tehran in other
religious centers. To meet with them, one contacts their
representative in the Capital. These representatives are
without fail extremely cautious and conservative. While
receiving the usual infinite number of promises from these
representatives, I also received ultimately no results. The
religious leaders would not, except under unusual circum-
stances, meet with an American in any case. One of the
three religious leaders who did consent to be interviewed is
not only considerably less reputedly powerful (PRO: 198)
but was a serious student of psychology and the social
sciences'.
Ministry of Court: The six officials of the Ministry of
Court (PRO: 126) who refused to be interviewed may be con-
sidered in a situation analogous to members of the Royal
Family. The highly sensitive nature of their positions, e.g.,
Minister of Court, Private Secretary to His Imperial Majesty,
Private Secretary to the Empress of Iran, etc., preclude par-
ticipation in even potentially awkward, embarrassing, or even
4
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unusual projects. (In fact, no employee of the Court was
interviewed.)
Ministry of Justice: Four employees of the Ministry of
Justice were included in the universe of 300 elite members.
The Minister of Justice (PRO: 88) was interviewed, primarily,
he confided, because his son is a university student in the
United States. The other three members of the Ministry (PRO:
94.7) declined to participate on the grounds that such par-
ticipation would be incompatible with their judicial positions:
Chief Justice of the Iranian Supreme Court, Public Prosecutor
General of Iran, and Director of the Iran Bar Association.
Let us turn to an overview of the problem of non-response
in this survey. The next table presents PRO figures broken
down to represent the excluded elite and the non-respondents.
Table II3 demonstrates that the PRO average of the non-
respondents is considerably less than the PRO average of the
respondents (163.6). Despite the disparity, however, I would
argue that there is no significant bias introduced into the
interview data because of the unbalanced coverage of the poten-
tial respondents. Nonetheless, there were some biases so
introduced.
1. Members of the Iranian Armed Forces, a vital element
in Iranian politics, have been totally excluded from the sur-
vey. While this group would have been an extremely interesting
one to investigate, this analysis of the Iranian political
elite must limit itself to a study of the "civilian elite."
TABLE 11.3
A COMPARISON OF PRO OF RESPONDENTS, EXCLUDED ELITE, AND NON-RESPONDENTS
BY CLUSTER
PRO by Respondents Excluded Elite Non-Respondents
Cluster Number Average PRO Number Average PRO Number Average PRO
1 - 25 7 16,7 10 12.4 8 10.5
26 - 50 12 36.2 2 39.0 11 38.3
51 - 75 10 60.3 8 65.5 7 64.0
76 - 100 16 88.2 4 91.5 5 86.5
101 - 125 15 113.2 7 114.7 108.0
126 - 150 15 138.1 6 133.7 4 144.4
151 - 175 14 164.4 3 160.0 8 161.8
176 - 200 15 188.2 7 187.7 3 187.7
201 - 225 17 212.3 5 215.4 3 213.0
226 - 250 11 237.9 5 246.8 9 233.2
251 - 275 16 261.8 5 264.2 4 266.3
276 - 300 12 285.3 13 290.5 0 0
301 - 307 7 304.3 0 0 0 0
Total and
Average 167 163.6 75 151.8 65 137.6
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2. Most members of the active political opposition ex-
cluded themselves from participation in the interviews. None-
theless, I would hypothesize that their attitudes are
adequately reflected in responses by others of the elite. Some
seven active opposition leaders were interviewed. Moreover,
personal observation in Iran convinces me that opposition
opinion has been sufficiently reflected in the responses of
non-opposition elite.
3. The respondents who were outside Iran during the in-
terview period do not, on an examination of their social
backgrounds, appear significantly different from other members
of the political elite who were in Iran and who did participate.
4. I have tried to demonstrate above that non-response
among members of the Cabinet is not particularly like to have
introduced biases in respondent data.
5. There is little doubt in my mind that the ten Sena-
tors who refused to participate did so because they were
dissatisfied and frustrated with the distribution of political
power in Iran. A sense of actual or alleged deprivation in
the exercise of that political power resulted in their non-
cooperation. These feelings seem to be widespread throughout
the Senate. It may be hoped that the thirty Senators who
were interviewed would constitute a sufficiently large group
to reflect the dissatisfactions prevalent among the ten non-
respondents. If this does not prove to be the case, one can
assume that the data have been biased in the direction of
greater satisfaction and less frustration.
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6. Of the eight non-respondents holding relatively
influential positions in the Governmental hierarchy, only
four need concern us here. The less important of the four
positions are not particularly distinctive as many other
holders of the same positions have been interviewed. The
first four on the list, while more powerful than the average
respondent, do not appear at all unusual in their reputed
attitudes, public positions, or social backgrounds. I do not
assume that their present high positions are a reflection of
a particularly distinctive or unusual set of beliefs or atti-
tudes. In fact, quite the opposite argument might be
legitimately advanced, i.e., they are what they are specifi-
cally because they are not distinctive.
7. The absence of the generally less powerful business-
men from the respondents probably does not introduce any
particular distortion into the data. Other businessmen were
respondents. The self-exclusion of the elderly, the more
frustrated, dissatisfied, and generally hostile, would bias
the data, if at all, in a direction similar to the non-
respondent Senators.
8. It is very likely that interviews with all members of
the Royal Family would have resulted in fairly similar re-
sponses, determined not only by common family backgrounds and
life experiences but also by the dictates of membership in
the ruling family. The three interviewed members of the fami-
ly, however, were not standardized. One respondent presented
the answers to be expected from a brother of His Imperial
!4 -W w 9"Mil- -- I
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Majesty. The other two respondents are known as the family
"misfits"--better educated, more democratic, less venal.
They were strongly outspoken critics of present policy in
Iran. It is likely that these two types of interview intro-
duced all shades of Pahlevi opinion.
9. The religious leaders are one "civilian" group for
which problems of access are as difficult as for the military.
In the Iran of Today, these leaders tend to be the most out-
spokenly critical of the Government, hostile to the United
States, and opposed to the rule of the Shah. Unfortunately,
their views could not be included explicitly in the response
data.
10. The ten members of the Ministries of Court and Jus-
tice who excluded themselves from participation did so because
of the sensitive nature of their positions. Aside from their
obvious discretion, there is no reason to assume that they
are particularly different from the respondents.
In conclusion, then, the following seem to be the prin-
cipal factors contributing to the phenomenon of non-response:
* Exclusion of a total occupational group from failure
to obtain approval for their being interviewed.
* Impossible conditions of physical access, e.g.,
residence outside Iran, hospitalization, incarcera-
tion.
* Fear of political reprisals.
* Hostility to the interview technique.
* Unwillingness to spend the time required for the
interview.
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* A feeling of non-participation in Iranian politics
per se and thus the belief that participation in a
study of Iranian "politics" or about "political"
elite attitudes would be inappropriate.
On balance it seems that any biases introduced by the exclu-
sion of the non-respondents would tend to alter the data
toward a more positive orientation to the regime. Such
being the case, the character orientations and political
attitudes which were uncovered are all the more striking.
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